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ABSTRACT/RESUM/RESUMEN 
 
The aim of this investigation is to understand how international project teams enable 
mature multinational enterprises (MNEs) to cope with knowledge diversity and 
political activity, two well-known disruptive organizational phenomena, in order to 
leverage their innovative potential and competitive capabilities. To answer this 
question a longitudinal multi-case study has been designed to collect in-depth 
qualitative data from three large-scale international projects conducted by a focal 
MNE and an array of its subsidiaries. In a dialectic way, data collected has been used 
both to enhance the dynamic knowledge change framework provided by 
contemporary sociology and to explain the complex mechanisms that make 
international project teams an increasingly used organizational tool. As a result, 
knowledge change (and thus innovation) has been found to hinge on a dynamic 
balance between power and politics which is favored by conditions that are inherent 
to these organizational settings. Finally, a model describing the mechanisms that 
enable international project teams to drive knowledge diversity and political activity 
towards innovation and knowledge change within MNEs has been developed.  
 
L'objectiu d'aquesta investigació és entendre com els equips de projectes 
internacionals permeten a les empreses multinacionals madures fer front a la 
diversitat de coneixements i l'activitat política, dues reconegudes fonts de problemes 
organitzacionals, amb la finalitat de potenciar les seves capacitats d'innovació i 
potencial competitiu . Per respondre a aquesta pregunta un estudi longitudinal 
embolicant casos múltiples s'ha desenvolupat per recollir dades qualitatives en 
profunditat des de tres grans projectes internacionals a càrrec d'una empresa 
multinacional focal i una gran varietat de les seves filials. D'una manera dialèctica, 
les dades recollides han estat utilitzats tant per millorar el marc del canvi dinàmic del 
coneixement proposat per la sociologia contemporània i explicar els complexos 
mecanismes que fan que els equips de projectes internacionals en una eina cada 
vegada més utilitzada per aquestes organitzacions. Com a resultat, es mostra que el 
canvi d'un determinat coneixement depèn d'un equilibri dinàmic entre poder i 
política afavorit per les condicions que són inherents a aquests formats 
organitzacionals. Finalment, es desenvolupa un model que detalla els mecanismes 
que permeten als equips de projectes internacionals impulsar la diversitat de 
coneixements i l'activitat política cap a la innovació i el canvi del coneixement dins 
de les empreses multinacionals madures. 
 
El objetivo de esta investigación es entender cómo los equipos de proyectos 
internacionales permiten a las empresas multinacionales maduras hacer frente a la 
diversidad de conocimientos y la actividad política, dos reconocidas fuentes de 
problemas organizacionales, con el fin de potenciar sus capacidades de innovación y 
potencial competitivo. Para responder a esta pregunta un estudio longitudinal 
envolviendo casos múltiplos se ha desarrollado para recoger datos cualitativos en 
profundidad desde tres grandes proyectos internacionales a cargo de una empresa 
multinacional focal y una gran variedad de sus filiales. De una manera dialéctica, los 
datos recogidos han sido utilizados tanto para mejorar el marco del cambio dinámico 
del conocimiento propuesto por la sociología contemporánea y explicar los 
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complejos mecanismos que hacen que los equipos de proyectos internacionales en 
una herramienta cada vez más utilizada por estas organizaciones. Como resultado, se 
muestra que el cambio de un determinado conocimiento depende de un equilibrio 
dinámico entre poder y política favorecido por las condiciones que son inherentes a 
estos formatos organizacionales. Por fin, se desarrolla un modelo que detalla los 
mecanismos que permiten a los equipos de proyectos internacionales impulsar la 
diversidad de conocimientos y la actividad política hacia la innovación y el cambio 
del conocimiento dentro de las empresas multinacionales maduras. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Emergent factors have dramatically changed the political, economic and social scenes 
(Czinkota & Ronkainen, 1997; Caves, 1998).  Political-economic integration, 
widespread economic deregulation, technological advances and the growing 
importance of the so-called emerging markets provided the basis for a qualitative 
shift in the economic dynamics in play (Dunning 1998). On the way of these changes, 
markets that used to be portrayed as quintessentially efficient become ensnared with 
a level of dynamism and complexity far beyond any attempt of simplification (Ostry, 
1998). Increasingly the neoclassical notion of perfect markets (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1975), with their dispersed players, substitutable goods, complete information, 
mobile/tradable resources, seems a distant reality (Cool & Schendel, 1988; Rumelt, 
1991; Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989). Firms who have long addressed competition in 
monopolistic terms, dedicating time and effort to restrict the number of competitors 
and to build large business structures, now see their leadership vanish in face of 
newer and apparently less-endowed competitors (Teece et al., 1994). 
 
In response to the challenge of explaining the mechanisms underlying such a 
competitive shift, scholars rendered increasing interest in the insights of the so-called 
“Austrian” economics (Schumpeter, 1934; Mises, 1949; Kirzner, 1973). According to 
this theoretical body, in imperfect markets, above normal returns result from rapidly 
dissipating opportunities originating from the entrepreneurial discovery of new 
products, unnoticed markets or novel processes. By gathering, processing and using 
increasing amounts of information firms can induce changes in the current state of 
knowledge that enhance their capacity of market assertion. By putting knowledge, 
change and profits in close causal relationship, authors in this line argue that 
economic forces progressively drive market participants away from a monopolistic 
competition paradigm and closer to a knowledge-based one, where innovation plays a 
central role in market organization and wealth generation (Jacobson, 1992). 
 
Paradoxically, traditional organizational structures that helped firms thrive in 
monopolistic environments put their future at risk in knowledge-based ones 
(Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001; Boisot & Child, 1998; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992; Hedlund, 1986). The bureaucratic legacy of conformity to 
rules, long command chains and adherence to codified knowledge present in most 
contemporary organizational structures impose strong constrains to innovation 
(McGrath, 2001). But if bureaucratic systems are the best organizational response 
within monopolistic markets, then how should firms, in organizational terms, shall 
address a knowledge-based competition? Although anecdotic evidence converge 
towards some key features that organizations shall pay attention, empirical evidence 
remains scattered and an encompassing organizational theory addressing this 
emerging competitive paradigm remains elusive (Grant, 1996a; Spender, 1996; 
Eisenhardt & Santos, 2001; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004. Martín de Castro et al., 2011).   
 
Underlying much of the debate on the effects of knowledge in organizational 
structure and behavior is the notion that social processes are of huge importance 
(Child, 1997), and therefore, social sciences should be revisited in order to elicit the 
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conditions in which social organization favors innovation. Cumulative works not only 
in the field of Sociology (Berger & Luckman, 1966, 1995; Baudrillard, 1984; 
Habermas, 1984; Sewell, 1992; Padgett & Ansell, 1993; Ellingston, 1995) but also in 
the field of business (Pichaut, 1998; Clemens & Cook, 1999; Coopey & Burgoyne, 
2000; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Deeg, 2005; Morgan, 2001, 2005) point that innovation 
can be understood as a change in the current state of institutionalized knowledge 
commonly associated to situations where knowledge diversity and political action are 
found simultaneously. Organizational literature, however, has traditionally 
portrayed knowledge diversity and politics as liabilities rather than assets (Parkhe, 1991; 
Watson et al., 1993; Kanter & Brinkerhoff, 1981; Mintzberg, 1985; Rosen et al., 2009), 
and as a result, organizational theories have frequently addressed how these two 
social phenomena should be constrained or mitigated rather than understood and 
explored.  
 
The study of multinational enterprises (MNEs), however, could never rule diversity 
and politics out of their analysis (Béret et al., 2003), and thus, offers a unique 
opportunity to examine the influence of these two social phenomena over 
organizational systems. Having diversity as a defining condition and heterarchic 
networks as an outcome of their natural evolutionary process (Malnight, 1996, 2001; 
Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Taggart, 1998), MNEs offer a vivid example on how 
diversity and politics can co-exist within organizations. Even though, empirical 
evidence demonstrates that innovation capacity varies considerably among MNEs 
(Zander & Sölvell, 2000; Luo, 2002; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001; Edwards, 1998, Béret et 
al., 2003), showing that although diversity and politics are two necessary elements for 
innovation they are not sufficient ones.  
 
Recent research (DiStefano & Maznevski, 2000; Salk & Brannen, 2000; Earley & 
Mozakowski, 2000; Lam, 2003; Haas, 2006; Javernick-Will & Levitt, 2010) report the 
increasing use of international project teams as a way by which MNEs develop 
unique complex tasks where innovation is either the objective or an intrinsic part of 
the work (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1995; Hoegl & Gemuenden, 2001). These observations suggest that there might be 
conditions involved in this mode of organizing that punctually contribute for 
innovation to occur amid knowledge diversity and intense political action.  Authors, 
however, fall short to explain the circumstances and mechanisms involved in this 
process, and thus, fail to provide insights that can contribute to improve 
organizational theory towards knowledge-based competitive environments. In this 
sense, the main objective of this investigation is to understand how international 
project teams enable MNEs to cope with knowledge diversity and political activity 
in order to unleash their innovative potential. 
 
To answer this investigative question it was necessary to describe which social 
mechanisms were enacted during these collaboration processes, the key variables 
involved and their relationships.  For this, a longitudinal multi-case study has been 
designed to collected in-depth qualitative data through participant observation from 
three large-scale international projects involving a focal MNE and an array of its 
subsidiaries along a continued period of four years. Following a dialectic tradition, 
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data collected has been used to strengthen the dynamic knowledge change 
framework stemming from current sociological debates, which in turn served as a 
backdrop to approach the object of investigation and to answer the investigation 
question. As a result, a dynamic approach on knowledge change could be more 
clearly delineated and model on how international project teams can operate as 
innovation hubs within MNEs has been developed. 
 
A better understanding on the mechanisms behind knowledge diversity and politics 
can benefit both international and strategic fields of management. For international 
management it can help unlock the vast potential MNEs have in changing and 
disseminating knowledge while integrating and bridging different cultures and 
institutional traditions. For strategic management in general, it can be useful in 
identifying mechanisms that can help domestic firms to take advantage of their inner 
knowledge diversity (divisional, disciplinary, functional, regional, educational and 
generational) to leverage their innovative capacity, and thus stand for the challenges 
of a knowledge-based competition. 
 
This work is organized as follows: 
 
SECTION I presents the theoretical background which supports this investigative 
work. Chapter I examines the economic and sociological basis that this investigation 
used to approach the object of investigation. Chapter II presents theoretical 
developments regarding MNE macro-dynamics (origins, development) with an 
emphasis on current debates which highlight the close connection between diversity 
and politics. Chapter III, regarding MNE micro-dynamics (management with an 
emphasis on they address the challenges posed by politics and diversity. Chapter IV, 
exposes the theoretical guidelines that supported investigation design, data 
collection and analytic work.   
 
SECTION II covers data presentation and analysis. Chapter V provides information 
regarding the context of the investigation, researcher standpoint and field entry. 
Chapter VI, VII and VIII present data collection along the three cases investigated. 
Chapter IX, presents the analytical work. Chapter X comprises conclusions and final 
considerations. 
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ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, KNOWLEDGE  
AND SOCIAL PROCESSES 
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1.1- MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
 
Much of the traditional strategic management thinking is based on the neoclassical 
economics concept of efficient/perfect markets (Jacobson, 1992). According to 
neoclassical authors (Coase, 1937, for example), perfect markets are those characterized 
by small and numerous players, trading perfectly substitutable goods, in possession 
of complete information, using mobile/tradable resources, within a foreseeable future 
(Fergunson, 1972). Provided such conditions, competitive forces naturally drive 
markets into a state of efficient equilibrium where prices reach a minimum and rents 
are just enough to maintain capital investment (normal equilibrium rents).  
 
Within neoclassical economic framework, firms of an industry are nothing more than 
identical combinations of resources that serve the function of paying factors of 
production the value of their marginal product (Robins, 1992). The notion of perfect 
competition provides the foundation for the premise that to earn above normal 
returns firms must be able to restrict competitive forces and actively seek to create 
imperfectly competitive markets. In a general sense, this can be achieved by means of 
monopoly power, cartelization, dumping, entry barriers, lobby, and control over 
scarce resources or any other mean with potential to upset competitive forces from 
driving markets into a state of efficient equilibrium.   
 
Porter (1980), a key author in this line, has long advocated that the main strategic 
objective of a business unit is to position itself in an industry where it can best defend 
against competitive forces or at least influence them in their favor. In his competitive 
forces approach, he identifies five industry level forces (entry barriers, threat of 
substitution, bargaining force of buyers, bargaining force of suppliers and rivalry 
among industry incumbents) as key determinants of a firm potential profitability. In 
the competitive forces approach, strategies are often aimed at altering the firm’s position 
vis-à-vis competitors and suppliers. Furthermore, in considering that some industries 
and sub-sectors are more attractive because they have structural impediments to 
competitive forces, his approach claims that industry structure plays a central in 
determining and limiting the strategic action of a firm.  
 
Closely related to the latter in its focus on product market imperfections, entry 
deterrence, and strategic interaction is the strategic conflict approach (Shapiro, 1989). 
This approach uses the tools of game theory to analyze the nature of competitive 
interaction between rival firms. The main thrust in this tradition is to reveal how a 
firm can influence the behavior and actions of a rival firm and thus the market 
environment. It implicitly views competitive outcomes as a function of the 
effectiveness with which firms keep their rivals off balance through strategic 
investments, pricing strategies, signaling, and the control of information. Underlying 
this approach is the belief that by manipulating the market environment, a firm may 
be able to increase its profits.  
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Although game-theoretic models view the strategic problem as one of interaction 
between rivals with certain expectations about how each other will behave, both 
approaches appear to share the view that rents flow from privileged product market 
positions (Teece et al., 1997). In this sense, both approaches assume that industry 
structure plays a central role in determining and limiting strategic action. Rents are 
created largely at the industry and sub-sector level rather than at firm level. For both 
approaches, the strategic movements follow the intrinsic objective of eliminating, 
weakening or controlling competitors to obtain a monopoly position. In so far, these 
approaches represent different perspectives of a monopolistic competition paradigm 
within strategic management.  
 
It the last two decades, however, the monopolistic competition paradigm came into 
growing criticism because it failed to explain many inconsistencies empirically 
observed  (see Cool & Schendel, 1988; Rumelt, 1991; Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989). As a 
first attempt to break with the monopolistic tradition, another class of approaches 
emerged with an emphasis on the advantages stemming from fundamental firm-
level advantages.  
 
One strand of this literature (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984), often 
referred to as the ‘resource-based perspective", emphasizes firm-specific features and 
assets as the fundamental determinants of firm performance. The resource-based 
approach sees rents not as a result of strategic investments that may deter entry or 
raise prices above long-run costs, but as a result of a unique set of idiosyncratic and 
difficult to imitate resources that a certain firm might possess. The resource-based 
approach is based on two key assumptions: firms are heterogeneous with respect to 
their resources, and these resources are “sticky”, that is, they are not readily tradable 
or readily movable. Even when the asset can be purchased the price paid for it in a 
competitive factor market will fully capitalize its potential rents (Barney, 1986). If 
within a monopolistic paradigm the strategic logic follows from the selection of an 
attractive industry to the acquisition of the necessary assets in the factor market, 
within a resource-based approach this logic follows backwards, that is, starts with 
the identification of firms’ unique resources, proceed to the search of a industry 
where those resources are most valuable.  
 
Despite the fact that the resource-based perspective invites consideration of 
managerial strategies for developing new firm-specific resources, its focus on the 
exploitation of existing firm-specific assets is evident. In last analysis it may be said 
to represents a variant of the monopolistic view in the sense that it considers the 
control over scarce resources as a key source of competitive advantage. As a whole, 
this perspective recognizes but does not attempt to explain the nature of the 
mechanisms that enable above normal rents and competitive advantage to be 
sustained. Moreover, empirical evidence shows that firms can accumulate a large 
stock of valuable assets (brand, capital, specialist knowledge and so on) and even 
though be outcompeted by apparently less endowed firms.  
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1.2- KNOWLEDGE-BASED COMPETITION 
 
The persistence of theoretical blind spots and the accruing of contradictory evidence 
rendered increasing interest in the insights of the so-called “Austrian school of 
economics”, embodied in the works of Bain, Mises, Kirzner, Hayek and also 
Schumpeter. Authors in this line see above normal returns not as the result of 
restricted competition but rather as the consequence of discovery and innovation. 
Such perspective points to a complete shift in strategic thinking formulation.  Instead 
of trying to limit competitive forces, firms should concentrate efforts in overcoming 
them through ‘entrepreneurial discovery’ of new products, unnoticed markets or novel 
manufacturing methods.  
 
Schumpeter (1934), for example, not only sees innovation and discovery as the only 
way to outperform other firms and achieve higher profits but also highlights the role 
of the entrepreneur as the key agent of this process. For Mises (1949), entrepreneur is 
the one who discovers errors or inefficiencies in the market and tries to eliminate 
them. By exploiting these market imperfections, the entrepreneur receives not only 
the normal equilibrium rents but also the residue of the arbitrage.  
 
Noteworthy, however, is that these entrepreneurial profits are short-lived. As soon as 
innovations reach the market and imperfections become visible to competitors, they 
can be easily imitated, what dissipates arbitrage returns and send profits back into 
the level of normal equilibrium rents. This process termed as “creative destruction” by 
Schumpeter, sets the markets in a state of constant disequilibria where firms have to 
exploit rapidly dissipating and changing opportunities.  
 
Also in this line, Kirzner (1973) suggests that at any given time, an enormous amount 
of ‘ignorance’ stands in the way of the complete coordination of the actions and 
decisions of the many market participants. Even though some opportunities are 
uncovered by pure chance, certain firms have more information than others, and this 
knowledge gives them an advantage in ascertaining market inefficiencies. Through 
entrepreneurial action, firms gather, evaluate and utilize additional amounts of 
information that enable them to extend their capacity of market assertion.  
 
For Jacobson (1992), these changes in the state of knowledge themselves produce 
disequilibrium situations and, therefore, profit opportunities. Because knowledge is 
continually changing, the market is also continually changing. When the competitive 
process eliminates one opportunity, changes in the stream of knowledge produce 
other opportunities. As such, an unending stream of knowledge keeps the market in 
perpetual motion and new profit opportunities result from ever-changing sources.  
 
Overall, this economic view on market dynamics brings knowledge, change and 
profits into close causal relationship substantiating an alternative competitive 
paradigm known as knowledge-based competition. Underlying this view is the belief 
that by producing continuous innovation, that is, by constantly challenging the 
current state of knowledge of market participants, firms can reap above normal 
returns and stand out from the competition.  
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1.3- THE ORGANIZATION IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED COMPETITION 
 
Bureaucracy is by far the most traditional way of organizing and its origins can be 
traced back to the ancient times. It has in Weber (1978) its greatest advocate and still 
represents the dominant form of economic organization. The various functions of a 
firm (e.g.: finance, marketing, production) focus on the efficient production of their 
own outputs, coordinated by a general manager who exercises a command-and-
control influence over the functions. Bureaucracies, in the weberian sense, are 
organized around the following characteristics: governance by written rules, hierarchical 
control and well-delimitated boundaries.  
 
Within a knowledge-based competition, however, the results of bureaucratic 
organization are awkward. Obedience and conformity to rules, expected and 
rewarded in bureaucratic systems, means complete submission to a sanctioned stock 
of knowledge and thus stands in stark contrast with the very idea of innovation 
(McGrath, 2001). Even where rule breaking is selectively allowed, the time wasted in 
obtaining authorization across long command chains and in re-writing the rule 
system allows room for imitation or for further environmental changes, which either 
dissipates rent generation potential or renders changes ineffective. Finally, well-
delimited organizational boundaries insulate entire domains of organizational 
knowledge within firms precluding cross-fertilization among functions and divisions 
and stimulating partisanship among organizational actors. 
 
Advocates of alternative forms of organization (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001; Boisot & 
Child, 1998; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Hedlund, 1986) argue 
that, in order to face the challenges of a knowledge-based competition, decisions 
should be pushed to where relevant knowledge and information reside or is more 
readily available. Instead of providing top-down direction, managers are expected to 
identify business opportunities, provide guidance, settle conflicts, and work for 
better communication. Small units should be encouraged because they are more 
responsive to market requirements and better able to adapt to external changes 
rapidly. Organizational units must concentrate on core activities for which they have 
developed a distinct competence. Workers in general are expected to become 
responsible for larger, but less well-defined roles (Child & MacGrath,2001).  
 
Authors, however, are not unanimous in these claims. Afuah (2001), for example, 
contends that making firms smaller or horizontal does not represent a definitive 
alternative. He found that there are contexts and time delimited situations where a 
vertically integrated hierarchy outperforms horizontal structures (e.g.: during 
industrial standard setting disputes). Other authors try to re-elaborate traditional 
organizational theories in the lights of a knowledge intensive competition, what 
usually takes the suggestive form of enabling bureaucracies (Adler et al., 1999). In the 
opposite direction is the emerging concept of boundaryless organizations (term 
popularized by Jack Welch, former General Eletric CEO) where quasi-independent 
units contribute with complementary functions to a value chain, aided by electronic 
data exchange and communication.  
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For quite some time an intense debate hovered around the growing relevance of 
knowledge within firms and for the way firms are approached and managed. The 
idea of knowledge as critical input in production (rather than resources or capital) 
and primary source of value turned upside-down the traditional dichotomy  markets 
(contract-based organization) versus hierarchies (authority-based organizations) 
which have long dominated the way firms were approached. Demsetz (1991), for 
example, pointed that firms represent a response to a fundamental asymmetry in the 
economics of knowledge due to the immobility of tacit knowledge and the 
expropriability of explicit knowledge. Hence, firms would exist because they create 
optimal conditions for the accumulation and deployment of knowledge.  
 
In this line, March (1991), as well as Nelson & Winter (2002), see organizational 
knowledge as stored in procedures, norms, rules and routines, accumulated over 
time by its members through historical recollection (p.73). Firms, in this sense, are 
repositories of knowledge accumulated through experience. The problem with this 
view is that usually firms and their members know more that what is written in their 
procedures and know more than what is visible through their observations. 
Moreover, this view disregard the fact that knowledge can be harnessed through the 
interaction of organizational members. 
 
Grant (1996a), in opposition, sees knowledge as a property of individuals and firms 
as knowledge integrating entities. As a result he argues that coordination (rather than 
cooperation) is the key organizational challenge that organizations face and point to 
the key role of "common knowledge" (basic knowledge evenly distributed within 
organizational members, p. 115) in allowing for that. In his view, the higher the need 
for specialized knowledge in decision making the more hierarchies are expected to 
fail. Moreover, this view allow for different form of organization within firms 
depending on the type of knowledge predominantly manipulated by a department. 
 
Spender (1996) goes a step further and sees the firm as a system of both knowledge 
production and application and place the manager at the center of internal 
knowledge processes. Similarly, Nickerson & Zenger (2004) use a problem-solving 
perspective to indentify three essential forms of organization (i.e.: markets, authority-
based hierachy, consensus-based hierachy) which address different combinations of 
problems and required levels of interaction for a solution. These authors also 
recognize that firms can change their boundaries and internal functioning according 
to the problems they face.  Nevertheless, Eisenhardt and Santos (2001), argue that a 
knowledge-based theory of the firm remains elusive, but point that by advancing the 
static notion of "knowledge as a resource" (tacit x explicit) towards a dynamic notion 
of "knowing as a process" further firm´s theoretical advancement can be achieved.  
 
According to Child (1997), a common notion underlying much of the debate around 
emerging organizational forms is that social processes are of huge importance. Once 
assumed that knowledge change and social processes are at the core of the 
contemporary economic-organizational problematic it is key important to revisit 
social theories to understand the circumstances where social organization facilitates 
knowledge change, and thus, innovation.  
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1.4- KNOWLEDGE CHANGE AND SOCIAL PROCESSES 
 
1.4.1- Traditional Approaches to Knowledge in Organizational Studies 
 
Knowledge is broader, deeper, and richer than data or information. For Bhagat et al., 
(2002) data reflect discrete, objective facts about events in the world, information is 
organized around clusters of interrelated data and knowledge is created, restructured, 
or changed from both related and unrelated pieces of information. Davenport & 
Prusack (1998) define knowledge as a fluid mix of framed experience, important 
values, contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for 
evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information.  
In organizational studies, the most widely used theoretical framework on knowledge 
is the one proposed by Nonaka (1994) and Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995). Drawing on 
Polanyi (1962), these authors see knowledge along a continuum that ranges from 
tacit to explicit. Explicit refers to articulated knowledge embodied in artifacts (e.g.: 
manuals, softwares, tools), whereas tacit refers to non-articulated knowledge 
embodied in personal cognition or social routines. In their view, organizational 
knowledge is created along four sequential processes - socialization, combination, 
internalization and externalization – which gradually transforms knowledge from tacit 
into explicit and from individual into collective. This model, known as the “spiral of 
organizational knowledge creation” (SECI model), is represented by the following 
diagram: 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Spiral of Organizational Knowledge Creation (SECI model) - (Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995).   
 
Several authors depart from this framework to propose their own organizational 
knowledge approaches. For Crossant et al. (1999), organizational knowledge creation 
also follows from individual to collective and to organizational, with a difference on 
the processes, which are: intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing. 
For Smith et al. (2005) the focus of knowledge creation process falls upon the 
exchange and combination aspects of SECI model. Zollo & Winter (2002), as much as 
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Levitt & March (1988), depart from the variation-selection-retention paradigm 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Campbell, 1969) to arrive at a circular mechanism that 
extends the SECI model by adding external stimuli and positive feedback as dynamic 
forces within the process of knowledge creation, and by distinguishing exploration 
and exploitation phases. 
 
 
Fig. 2 – Activities in the Knowledge Evolution Cycle  (Zollo & Winter, 2002, p. 343) 
 
Although SECI model (and their variants) offers a theory about how organizational 
knowledge can be created as a cyclical process it say little from where does 
knowledge creation starts and where it ends. Neither there is a reflection on the 
effects of pre-existing knowledge over emergent ones (Levitt & March, 1988; Smith et 
al., 2005) nor on how some piece of knowledge might emerge anew from scratch. The 
social processes and forces involved in the bi-directional conversion of tacit and 
explicit knowledge are also not clearly described. Moreover, the relative strength and 
persistence of a determined body of knowledge reflected in its power to induce and 
constrain action is not well addressed by the tacit – explicit continuum. Finally, the 
notion of time compression inherent to a knowledge-based competitive paradigm fits 
awkwardly into the cyclical timeframe assumed in the SECI model as less time 
would invariably lead to less knowledge. 
 
The sociology of knowledge has long examined how kinds of social organization make 
whole orderings of knowledge possible, offering deep examinations on the very 
forms, processes and practices of knowing. As such, this approach will be used as a 
theoretical background on what knowledge is and how it is created and evolve 
overtime. 
 
1.4.2- The Social Construction of Knowledge 
 
The sociology of knowledge first appeared in Mannheim’s works on how the social 
location of individuals shaped their knowledge about the world. According to 
Mannheim (1936), the principal tenet of the sociology of knowledge is that there are 
modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social 
origins are obscured. In his opinion, individuals find themselves in inherited 
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‘already-defined’ situations with patterns of thought which are appropriated to this 
situation. Although representing a turnaround on the approaches to knowledge this 
initial tradition has come under growing criticism as the relationship of knowledge 
and social position has been viewed as reductionist (Geertz, 1973).  
 
In the late 60s, the expansion of cultural studies has greatly enriched data for 
sociologists of knowledge to work with. This shift to cultural elements that are more 
conscious equipped the discipline with new models of how social organization 
influences the creation and dissemination of knowledge and brings the sociology of 
knowledge back into evidence (Swidler & Arditi, 1994). Among the many direct and 
indirect contributions it has received, the works of Peter L. Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann (especially The Social Construction of Reality, 1966 and the more recent 
Modernität, Pluralismus und Sinnkrise, 1995) deserve special attention as they provide 
important insights on how knowledge is socially constructed and disseminated. 
According to these authors, knowledge is created as a result of four processes: 
typification, objectivation, socialization, and institutionalization, which take place 
sequentially along a linear timeframe.  
 
As long as two individuals interact, in whatever manner, typifications will be 
produced quite quickly. The typificatory schemes of interacting actors enter into an 
ongoing negotiation as long as the direct interaction lasts. In the course of this 
negotiation individual typifications evolve into a mutually specific pattern of 
conduct, and so, a collection of reciprocally typified actions is expected to emerge. In 
general terms, all actions repeated once or more tend to be habitualized to some 
degree, just as actions taken by one actor naturally develop some typification on the 
part of an observer. However, for typification to occur there must be a continuing 
social situation in which the habitualized actions of two more individuals interlock. 
Which actions are likely to be reciprocally typified will depend on which actions are 
relevant within their common situation.  
 
For Berger & Luckmann (op. cit), the most important gain individuals accrue from 
typification is that their actions will be mutually predictable and can be continually 
built on a common ground. In their opinion, typification relieves individuals of a 
considerable amount of tension. Time and effort are saved not only in external tasks 
they might be engaged in separately or jointly, but also in terms of their respective 
psychological economies, as many joint actions will be possible on a low-level of 
attention. Overall, as the process of typification proceeds, individuals will be 
constructing a background which will serve to stabilize both their separate actions 
and their interactions. 
 
The typifications undertaken during the interactions of the initial set of actors, 
formations that until this point still had the quality of ad hoc conceptions, gradually 
gain historicity. With the acquisitions of historicity, these formations perfect a quality 
that was incipient when interaction began and this quality is objectivity. The process 
by which the externalized products of human activity attain the character of 
objectivity is called objectivation. Language and symbols are two particularly 
important cases of objectivation as they clearly delimitate typifications and enable them 
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to transcend time and space. For the time that this incipient knowledge is kept at the 
interaction level of the initial set of individuals and they are able to reconstitute the 
whole creation process and reassess the objectivations made, objectivity remains 
tenuous and knowledge easily changeable.  
 
The process of transmission of objectivated typifications, either for newcomers or 
across generations, known as socialization, changes the character of knowledge 
among individuals. In the process of transmission, knowledge “hardens” and thus 
gains “density”, not only to those who receive it but also for those who transmit it. 
Institutionalization takes place as actors come to accept shared definitions of reality. 
Knowledge at this point assumes an institutional character and henceforth cannot be 
changed so readily. Institutional knowledge is experienced as existing over and beyond 
the individuals, which confronts them as an external coercive fact. The validity of 
institutional knowledge is taken-for-granted and people are unlikely to lift doubts 
about it under the threat of severing the knowledge ties that bind them to population 
at large.  
 
Deviance from the institutionally programmed courses of action, however, becomes 
more likely as institutional knowledge becomes distanced from its origins. Newcomers 
also posit a problem of compliance because, different from knowledge creators who 
can revive objectivations by recollection, they receive it as a given fact. In order to 
contain deviations, it is necessary to develop underlying explanations that bring 
together disparate realms of institutional knowledge. The constitution of symbolic 
universes makes up for a special case of legitimization where different pieces of 
institutional knowledge are manipulated to become complementary, further 
reinforcing their rigidity and density. This task is performed by concrete subjects 
who tanks to a privileged position operate as reality definers. Legitimation, thus, is this 
process by which these reality definers or legitimators “explain” and “justify” 
institutional knowledge.  
 
1.4.3- Reification and Anomie: Divergent paths along knowledge development 
 
The specialization of knowledge and the consequent emergence of competing 
legitimation bodies also bring occasions for social dissension. As diverse and more 
complex forms of knowledge emerge many alternative versions of a determined 
reality may arise without making for an overarching system. As long as some of 
these alternatives can be conceptually and socially segregated as appropriate to 
“strangers”, it is possible to have fairly friendly relations with them. The trouble 
begins when events make this “strangeness” breakthrough and the knowledge it 
embodies appears as real option. Although dissenting definitions of reality may 
coexist over a period of time or through the spatial segregation of dissenters, 
attempts of elimination or integration are always expected to follow as a result of their 
rivalry. 
 
In principle, the question can be decided with relative ease by seeing which theory is 
most conducive to success in practice. However, due to the complexification of 
knowledge the proof of practice many times reveals itself impractical, or ensnared 
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with a great deal of chance and argumentation, which by their very nature does not 
carry the inherent conviction of pragmatic success. What might be convincing in one 
tradition may not be in another. In this vacuum of certainty, power is frequently 
employed as a way to enforce one argument against its competitors. In short, 
definitions of reality may be enforced by the coercive use of power. 
 
Power in society includes the prerogative to legitimate institutional knowledge and to 
determine decisive socialization processes, that is, to produce reality and to make 
one self to internalize it. To eliminate dissention and ensure knowledge identical 
reproduction subjects need to be over-socialized what requires additional socialization 
methods like physical segregation, ritualization, and mythification. The coercive use 
of power inevitably strengthens institutional knowledge tendency to persist even when 
it has completely lost their original functionality or practicality. One does certain 
things not because they work, but because they are “right”, that is, right in terms of 
the ultimate definitions of powerful reality definers. When a logic of appropriateness 
and legitimacy completely supersedes practical reasons, reality, and thus the 
knowledge it embodies, becomes reified.  
 
Drawing on Lukács, Berger & Luckmann (1966) see reification as the apprehension of 
human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or possibly in supra-
human terms (e.g., cosmic laws, facts of nature, or manifestations divine of will). 
Reification implies that social actors have forgotten their own authorship of 
knowledge and thus consider themselves unable to change it. The reified world is, by 
definition, a dehumanized world. It is experienced by individuals as a strange 
facticity over which they have no control. Radical faith and dictatorships are two 
extreme examples of how knowledge can be completely abstracted from its initial 
practical roots to control realities and turn into far-reaching systems of control over 
entire populations.  
 
Apart from the situations where over-socialization is imposed, it can be expected to 
exist a social-structural base for competition between rival definitions of reality. 
Thanks to the frequent detachment of knowledge from the precise scrutiny of 
practice, it is largely expected that non-practical interests will decide the outcomes of 
this rivalry. Different social groups will have different affinities with the dissenting 
theories and will consequently become carriers of the definitions that please them 
most. Whatever result prevails in theoretical terms will intrinsically depend on the 
outcome of the conflicts involving these rival groups. Side by side with this struggle 
between interest groups for imposing their definitions of reality, the contemporary 
phenomenon of modernization contributed to further complicate this scenario by 
dramatically weakening the strength of institutional knowledge.  
 
Modernization emerged as a result of the consolidation of democratic-capitalist 
societies and implies in a radical transformation of most objective conditions of 
human existence. In material terms, this development translates into a huge 
expansion on the range of possibilities to what individuals are confronted within 
these societies. Modernization means the change from an existence largely based on 
fate to one consisting on a series of possible choices. The technological-economical 
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foundations of this change are material, however, its social dimensions are 
intensified, above all, by pluralism. Pluralism not only permits one to make choices 
but it forces one to do so. One can no longer choose not to choose. 
 
Two central institutions of modern society promote this transition from the 
possibility of choice to the compulsion for choosing: the market economy and 
democracy. Both institutions are founded on the aggregation of individual choice, and 
themselves encourage continuous choice and selection (Berger & Luckmann, 1995). 
As previously discussed, institutions emerge to alleviate individuals of the necessity 
to reinventing the world and reorienting themselves on a daily basis. Institutions 
retain their power as long as the validity of their knowledge is not effectively placed 
in doubt. However, they are endangered as soon as people begin to place themselves 
at a distance and viewing the world as options rather than givens. For Baudrillard 
(1984), fixed meaning is being replaced by a ‘network of floating signifiers’ that 
allows for one-off communication rather than the ability to store and transmit 
knowledge. 
 
In this sense, modern pluralism undermines the “density” of institutional  knowledge as 
the world, life, society and personal identity are called ever more into question. They 
may be subject to multiple interpretations and each interpretation defines its own 
perspectives of possible action. No interpretation, no body of knowledge, no range of 
possible actions can be accepted any longer as the only true and unquestionably right 
one. Where pluralism has achieved its full development, meanings are not equally 
shared by all members of a population. In these places, tolerance is reckoned as the 
virtue par excellence, because only through tolerance can individuals interact guided 
by partially distinct bodies of knowledge.   
 
Overall, modernization can be experienced as a great liberation, as an opening of new 
horizons and possibilities of life, leading out of the institutionalized modes of 
existence and patterns of action. However, it may be also experienced oppressively, 
as it pushes the individual to repeatedly make sense of an ever-changing unfamiliar 
reality. At a certain extent, there are some people who withstand this pressure while 
others may even seem to appreciate it.  Increasingly, however, people feel insecure 
and lost in a confusing world full of possibilities, some of which are linked to 
alternative ways of life.  
 
Within an uncertain body of knowledge to be shared, individuals are under-
socialized, that is, receive nothing but the toolkit of knowledge necessary to make 
just enough interactions as necessary. Along time, these processes increasingly 
retreat individuals from the psychically extenuating task of relating to the others 
what further contribute to weaken the existing body of knowledge, as well as social 
roles and identities. At limit, shared knowledge may become so rarefied that it can 
barely sustain any meaningful social interaction, leading to a state of social paralysis 
and disaggregation identified by Durkheim (1897) as anomie.  
 
As depicted above, reification and anomie represent two limit cases in the 
development of knowledge within a social group. At one extreme, social processes 
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produce a sort of knowledge so dense that changes can only be achieved through 
exogenous shocks which not rarely leads to the breakup of social order. At the other 
extreme, social processes produce a sort of knowledge so tenuous that there is no 
common referential structuring social interaction anymore. A conjecture that may 
arise at this time is that as both these extreme paths of knowledge development 
ultimately leads into social disintegration then the existence of relatively stable social 
settings along time implies that there must be additional social processes responsible 
for a certain level of dynamism and equilibrium in the development of knowledge. 
 
1.4.4- Isomorphism, Path Dependence, Increasing Returns and Complementarity: 
Explaining Institutional Continuity 
 
As previously seen, legitimacy is a key mechanism of institutional knowledge self-
preservation. Legitimacy is achieved by the skillful action of actors that claim 
validity of one body of knowledge based in the validity of similar ones. As such, 
institutional isomorphism drives social groups towards forms of knowledge that are 
socially legitimate, that is, isomorphic or consistent with the institutional 
environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Powell & DiMaggio, 1983). According to these 
authors, isomorphism can take three forms: coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive 
isomorphism happens when a group receives pressures to conform to the beliefs of a 
more powerful group or from society as a whole. Mimetic isomorphism happens when 
uncertainty forces a group to follow the knowledge of another group perceived as 
successful. Normative isomorphism is rooted in closed circles of socialization and 
communication which along time eliminate divergent views.  
 
The concept of path-dependency is also widely invoked in the social sciences to explain 
institutional continuity and, to a much lesser extent, institutional knowledge resistance 
to change. Morgan (2005b) highlights that the range of experimentation and 
differentiation in any society is institutionally determined, and while individuals can 
do things differently, that can have a wider impact if it brings advantages to other 
actors to follow that practice rather than the existing rules of the game. In other 
words, is important to know whether there is complementarity and consequently 
increasing returns. 
 
Some authors (Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000) argue that a path-dependent process is 
one characterized by a self-reinforcing sequence of events. Each event or choice 
points in the sequence sets the direction of subsequent events. Events early in the 
sequence matter more in determining overall path trajectory because their effects are 
exaggerated downstream. As events move down the path, changes become more 
bounded, that is, previously viable options are increasingly costlier to adopt. A path 
starts with a critical juncture, after which following moves would be reinforced 
through a positive feedback mechanism.  
 
Deeg (2005) conceptualizes institutional path as a logic, a distinct pattern of 
institutionally rooted constrains and incentives that limits institutional knowledge 
change. Changes that do not defy such logic are considered ‘on-path’ and can be 
approached as institutional improvements, in a sense that something has to change 
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so that the overall order can be reinforced. He suggests that four mechanisms act in a 
self-reinforcing way to tie actors into a determined path: initial costs, learning effects, 
coordination effects, adaptive expectations and coherence/complementarity. 
 
Initial costs keep changes on-path because after making investments in a given path 
actors have an incentive to sustain that path in order to recover their investments. 
Learning effects strengthen the path as actors learn how to explore on their favor the 
existing arrangement enhancing its value and utility. Coordination effects make that 
the greater the number of actors along a determined path, the greater the returns for 
all of them. Along adaptive expectations, actors adopt a particular path because they 
expect others to do so. Finally, through coherence/complementarity, additional 
arrangements are encouraged by previous ones to adopt similar or complementary 
roles on the promise of social legitimation or mutually reinforcing (synergistic) gains.  
 
Complementarity is commonly used to explicate the links that are considered to bind 
such ensembles. Two things are complementary when one makes up for the 
deficiencies of the other. Complementary set of knowledge differ from each other but 
they are not just different, they are linked in the specific way defined, that makes 
each one more plausible due to the existence of the other. The logic of complementarity 
also works on the side that certain efficiencies are achieved when balancing or 
contrasting characteristics are found alongside each other (Crouch, 2005).  
 
According to Deeg (2005), as complementarities loosen between particular 
institutions, actors may look for ways of acting that sustain the parts of the system 
that survive. Accordingly, other institutions may be brought into action to take the 
place of the old ones, the roles of the remaining ones may also change in order to 
reaccommodate the existing balance. For Morgan (2005), institutional complementarity 
needs to be understood in terms of how institutions and the knowledge they carry 
can create powerful and effective balances in social systems. Any particular form of 
institutional knowledge can be characterized by divergent principles that exist in 
creative tension and reflect a broader sociopolitical compromise between key actors. 
 
Strong versions of path-dependency advocate that only exogenous shocks can radically 
alter the incentives/constrains that tight actors to a path and demand radical and 
socially painful changes.  Short of this, changes are incremental and ‘on-path’. As 
such, the theory of path-dependence suggests that the longer an institution has been in 
place, the more resilient to change it will be and the more likely that change will be 
incremental and limited. As a consequence, given enough time and enough self-
reinforcing mechanisms, a path will develop a ‘deep equilibrium’, and thus, become 
highly resistant to change and likely to endure for a long period.  
 
It is important to highlight, though, that institutional path-dependence does not directly 
translate into stability, as it clearly begins within a dynamic framework marked by 
incremental changes and adjustments. What calls attention, however, is the 
unidirectional and decreasing character of these changes that at limit (t  ∝) become 
imperceptible. This means that even in the absence of a direct form of coercive 
power, natural mechanisms of institutional development like isomorphism, increasing 
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returns and complementarity, if let alone, can direct institutional knowledge into a state 
of static-equilibrium, and therefore towards reification.  
 
If efforts made to keep institutional knowledge unchanged under a static equilibrium 
state inexorably contribute to its reification, it thus can be expected that institutional 
knowledge equilibrium, if exists, shall be a dynamic one. A state of dynamic equilibrium 
therefore shall imply constant change around a certain gravitating point, a move 
restricted by the limits imposed by the attraction zones of anomic chaos and 
reification. As such, one might expect to exist mechanisms along knowledge 
development that constantly upset and restructure knowledge within the limits of 
meaningful interaction and knowledge reasonability.  
 
1.4.5- Non-Identical Reproduction, Institutional Layering, Endogenous Shocks and 
Strategic Action: Explaining Institutional Change 
 
Clemens & Cook (1999), devise venues of change for institutions. First, where rules 
and models of action are not homogeneously enforced, there is opportunity for 
agency (Sewell, 1992). By weakening the institutional determination of social action, 
agency fosters mutation and innovation. Second, even within a determined 
institutional domain, models or scripts of behavior appropriate in one situation may 
prove strongly dysfunctional elsewhere. To the extent that institutional arrangements 
embody internal contradictions, reliable reproduction is less likely. Third, overlapping 
institutional fields expose actors to alternative frames, allowing them discretionary 
action.  Therefore, action becomes less predictable where multiple institutions 
compete or no institution is firmly established. 
 
The capacity of human beings to learn means that, where there is knowledge of the 
past, even if inaccurate, there is no pure repetition of an action. According to Sorge 
(2005), no matter the effort made in reproducing institutional knowledge, and the 
institutions that happen to embody them, the socialization process is never perfect 
and the result is somewhat different from what has previously existed. Although 
these differences may eventually come to be marginalized and segregated, the non-
identical reproduction character of socialization contributes to minimally diversify the 
stock of institutionally knowledge available within a social group. 
 
Djelic & Quack (2005) argue that the idea of path dependence implies a focus on the 
past constraining the present and the future. As such they put forth the concept of 
path generation, in which a redirection of the path comes not from a single critical 
juncture but is rather constructed through a historical sequence of multiple junctures 
that cannot be fully anticipated. As a result of the accumulation of changing 
pressures, the path is a crooked one and reflects long periods of struggle between 
countervailing forces interrupted by sudden change. This crooked-path shows the 
historical interplay between pressures for change and continuity, as long as the 
accumulation of external and internal change claims challenge institutional knowledge 
development mechanisms. 
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Thelen (2000) advances this argument proposing that mechanisms of change can 
operate at the same time as mechanisms of reproduction of given path. Over time, 
however, the mechanisms of change may outweigh those of reproduction, leading to 
a major change in path trajectory. Institutional layering, thus, must be understood as 
the process by which actors recombine legitimate elements of existing institutional 
knowledge in alternative arrangements that lead to more suitable outcomes. She also 
recognizes the role of politically marginalized actors who may use such mechanisms to 
turn a path more favorable to their interests. 
 
Another probably source of change concerns the fact that interests of actors on the 
path may change such that they seek radically alter the path they are on. Such shift of 
interests may result not only from exogenous shocks but also from unanticipated 
effects or developments of the path that may lead actors to reassess their interests in 
face of the current path outcomes. In that sense, endogenous shock would include 
actions, events, or processes that result directly from the key mechanisms of path 
reproduction and that at certain point make increasing returns level off or turn into 
decreasing returns.   
 
In the same way that institutional complementarities may empower certain institutions 
to the point that their influences are transmitted across unrelated institutional 
domains, unexpected tensions generated by conflicting principles of rationality 
within certain institutional domains may yield a fertile ground for strategic action 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). In this case, actors may use entrepreneurial skills, power, 
or access to other social networks or institutional ideas in an effort to alter the path. 
Therefore, endogenous shocks may result both from unexpected institutional 
developments and from unexpected outcomes from this development. 
 
Due to institutional layering the effects of these forces may pass unnoticed and 
accumulate over long periods of time, until unpredicted events come to unsettle long 
existing bodies of institutional knowledge (Morgan, 2005b). Although to a badly 
informed observer change has occurred under a critical juncture due to a onetime 
event, in fact it has silently developed along time as a result of the struggle of several 
actors for their interests in face of the changing effects of many small scale events and 
from unpredictable development and outcomes of the institutional path they are in.  
 
1.4.6- Knowledge Heterogeneity, Politics and Innovation 
 
For Clemens & Cook (1999), institutional change rests on an appreciation of the 
heterogeneity of institutional arrangements and the resulting patterns of conflict or 
prospects for agency. In their opinion, knowledge change is more likely when 
models of action are understood to be discretionary, institutional knowledge 
heterogeneity is high and social networks are fragmented and extend across significant 
social distances. In their opinion, knowledge diversity constitutes the loci of 
structural indeterminacy that may be exploited by political entrepreneurs. All this 
argument drives to the conclusion that changing high-order institutional rules, and 
thus, moving social orders or even subsystems into ‘off-path’ change is a process 
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strongly mediated by political activity. Knowledge change requires the coordination 
and exercise of political action by pro-reform groups.  
 
Underlying this argument there is a distinctive kind of political action called 
institutional entrepreneurship. The essence of institutional entrepreneurship is to 
skillfully contrast, align or transpose organizational institutional forms with those 
from the outset. Political entrepreneurship presumes a degree of knowledge 
fragmentation or the availability of alternative models for mobilization and 
intervention. Institutional entrepreneurs seek to transpose models of collective action 
from one social setting to another in order to enhance the available set of alternatives 
and therefore shape the political space. According to this view, the presence of 
alternatives creates the space for political action and innovation.  
 
Political challengers may mobilize change by deploying familiar models of social 
organization in unfamiliar ways. They can also go around highly controlled 
institutional systems by using its complexity and segmentation to craft alternative 
paths to problem solving. Political entrepreneurship, however, is complicated when 
there are multiple audiences for whom new political events and arrangements must 
be interpreted and legitimated (Stryker, 1999). As Padgett & Ansell (1993) noted, 
political action is grounded in multivocality, that is, single actions being interpreted 
coherently from multiple perspectives simultaneously. Insofar, the disruption of 
institutional systems creates space in which political actors struggle to reestablish 
interpretive frames for multiple audiences (Ellingston, 1995). 
 
The content of institutions can also change over time as a result of diffusion and 
experimentation. Diffusion processes may also spur innovation as actors seek to 
accommodate newly adopted institutional rules to existing practices, resources and 
competing schematas (Stryker, 1999). The greater the heterogeneity of institutional 
arrangements, the more likely that the effort to transpose models and embed them in 
different social settings will disrupt reliable reproduction and lead to innovation.  
While experimentation may be an important source of institutional change, not all 
actors are equally likely to experiment. Marginalized groups, for example, are more 
likely to experiment because denied the benefits of current configurations they have 
fewer costs associated with deviating behavior.  
 
For Clemens & Cook (1999), success in articulating, passing and implementing 
knowledge change often depends on embedding a proposed program in an array of 
supportive constituencies. In this sense, effective politicians may enhance the 
attractiveness of a particular body of knowledge by building deep analogies to 
already institutionalized models or widely held norms. Therefore, the institutional 
effects attributable to normative legitimacy and socialization are reinforced by the 
mobilization of a set of stakeholders and alignment of incentives. 
 
Pichaut (1998) suggests that concentration and asymmetry of power elicit different 
kinds of political activity. He argues that concentrated and asymmetric power 
systems have a tendency towards perpetuation and thus elicit resistance and exit, 
whereas dispersed and symmetric systems elicit negotiation and compromising in 
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order to satisfy multiple stakeholders. Overall, he proposes that power concentration 
stimulates regressive political processes while power dispersion elicits more 
progressive political processes. Their proposition has two fold implications. First, it 
supports the argument that ‘unbounded’ social systems are more prone to political 
processes than more ‘bounded’ and formalized ones. Second, that the way power is 
distributed along social settings allow for dissidence and contestation on the part of 
disadvantaged actors1. 
 
Drawing on Habermas (1984), Coopey & Burgoyne (2000) argue that an open 
political space is key to create ideal speech conditions which in turn foster learning and 
knowledge exchange. In their view, free and open political activity encourage people 
to share ideas while free speech enhances mutual understanding what help actors to 
move from entrenched positions and accept that no view is authoritative or represent 
absolute truth. In their view, political activity is both seen as a means to create 
psychic space in which people are able to speak out and engage with others in 
knowledge change and also to promote a space for innovation to be disseminated. 
 
1.4.7- Intermediate Institutions and Quasi-Institutional Equilibrium: Towards a 
Dynamic Order 
 
According to Morgan (2005b), as individuals learn both across and within 
generations, change rather than stasis characterizes human societies and their 
organizations. Actors in contemporary society often regard the institutional context 
as provisional and as capable of amendment. Institutional knowledge is therefore 
caught in an almost permanent process of redefinition and search for equilibrium, a 
dynamic situation more likely to result in a ‘quasi-institutional order’ where actors are 
free to explore and negotiate meanings and interpretations that can be very different 
from the ones that were initially intended.  
 
Berger & Luckmann (1995) argue that overarching institutions and their taken-for-
granted, almost indisputable knowledge have been dislodged from the center of 
modern societies. In their place has emerged a distinct class of “intermediary” 
institutions, which account for a state of quasi-institutional equilibrium that makes 
                                                
1
 As noted by Lawrence et al. (2005), organizational research and theory has traditionally seen power and politics as intrinsically 
linked constructs. Pfeffer (1981; 1992) define power as "the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of 
events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things that they would not do otherwise", and politics and influence as 
"the processes, the actions, the behaviors through which this potential power is utilized and realized" (p.30). In the same line, 
Buchnan & Badham (1999) define power as "the capacity of individuals to exert their will over others" and politics as "the 
practical domain of power in action" (p. 611). Authors like Lawrence et al. (2005, p.182), however, clearly differentiate power 
as "force" (systemic) and as "influence" (episodic), a view also shared by Pichault (1998) which sees power either 
"concentrated/asymmetric" or "dispersed/symmetric". This conceptual divide is an important one because it allows for a different 
concept of politics (more akin to political sciences) which equates politics with persuasion (direct/open/interactive) rather than 
influence (indirect/covered/unidirectional). In this line, March (1962, p. 671) advocates for a process-oriented political theory 
which sees politics from a conflict-resolution perspective.  According to his view, social systems are composed by various 
interest groups where brokers - the politicians - try to organize viable coalitions around interest maximizing outcomes by means 
of bargaining, compromise, and negotiation. Politics, thus, is a process by which system welfare takes precedence upon 
individual ones and therefore must be enacted collectively. Similarly, view is shared by Cardoso (2012, p. 146), which sees 
politics as an art in which persuasion has a key role in "creating the conditions for the achievement of an objective which are not 
given at first-hand". In line with Habermas (1975), he argues that even though such conditions can be created by the coercive use 
of power, in the absence of the consensual character or persuasion, the cost and consequences of unilateral decisions tends to 
wear off the legitimation that is the very source of power. Following these authors and in line with Pichault (1995; 1998) the 
present work assumes that power and politics (understood as persuasion) though intrinsically linked, are mutually excluding. 
The more power is used the less space there is for politics (consensus) and system welfare. 
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society to experience a sort of dynamic order. In consequence of the mediating role of 
such institutions, the knowledge they embody is not experienced as authoritatively 
given but as a repertoire of possibilities, which is sufficiently flexible to be open to 
further change. Consequently, intermediary institutions make up for a social space 
where individuals have the chance to participate in knowledge reexamination and in 
the authorship of their realities. 
 
Similarly, for Coopey & Burgoyne (2000) it is possible to strike a dynamic balance 
between unity and disunity so that continuous learning is facilitated without 
destabilizing the organization. In this state, which they call “dynamic balance”, social 
life is regulated by a minimum amount of tradition and the friction between 
competing ideas sparks a stream of innovation. In their framework, learning, 
unlearning, rationalization and re-framing are key moments in knowledge change 
and innovation. 
 
1.4.8- The Social Construction of Knowledge: A Dynamic Perspective. 
 
The theoretical body previously presented suggests that institutional knowledge and 
social organization are intrinsically linked and overtime develops a sort of dynamic 
order (red arrow in the picture below). On the one side, we have environmental 
changes and the strategic action of social actors bringing into question the validity 
and legitimacy of institutional knowledge. At the other hand, we have political action 
continually renewing the stock of knowledge to fit environmental needs and 
accommodate the interests of a broader set of social actors. All this dynamism is 
surrounded by zones of attraction (grey arrows) composed by socially undesirable 
states of both stasis (reification) and disruption (anomie) elicited by power 
imbalances.  
 
 
Fig. 3 – The social construction of knowledge: a dynamic perspective.   
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2.1- MNEs, INTERNATIONAL DIVERSITY AND POLITICS 
 
2.1.1- International Diversity as MNE determinant 
 
For Dunning (1998), intellectual capital, technological trade, and stakeholder 
collaboration are key forces driving the world towards increasing economic 
integration. This phenomenon, roughly known as globalization, can be viewed as the 
gradual establishment of linkages at the level of national and regional economies, 
such that decisions, activities, and competitive strategies taken in one part of the 
world have clear implications in other parts.  
 
By coordinating and controlling operations across borders, MNEs stimulate the 
establishment of such links and thus are central agents in this process (Whitley, 
2001). In opposition, individual countries continue to exhibit distinctive cultural, 
institutional and legal modes of operation which directly affect the nature and the 
behavior of these firms (Ferner & Quintanilla, 1998). As a result of this duality, MNEs 
are expected to confront decision-making problems that exceed in complexity those 
of single-nation businesses.  
 
As noted by Béret et al. (2003), diversity is a key aspect to understand the kind of 
tension experienced by MNEs. On the one side, authors claim that diversity in 
cultural backgrounds, organizational characteristics and management practices can 
severely hamper the ability of organizational units to work jointly and effectively 
(Parkhe, 1991; Watson et al., 1993). On the other, diversity is acknowledged to 
provide firms with abilities to cope with complex and changing scenarios 
(Boyacigiller & Adler, 1991; Maznevski, 1994), enhance their capacity to learn 
(March, 1991) and lower operational risk.  
 
The way international diversity affects MNEs dynamics and evolution has been 
addressed by many different approaches. Next, a critic review of the last three 
decades of academic debates is exposed in order to review assumptions and 
weaknesses of traditional approaches (economic, cultural and institutional) as well as 
to single out elements that point to the reassessment of political processes within 
MNE studies.  
 
2.1.2- Economic Approach to International Diversity: Arbitrage and Firm-Specific 
Advantages 
 
Guillén (2002) indicates that the study of firms´ international expansion has been 
traditionally approached from an economic perspective. One of the first authors to 
show interest for the thematic, Hymer (1960) proposed to treat foreign direct 
investment (FDI) not as the simple move of capital beyond borders but as the result of 
a firm’s decision to go abroad due to market/industry-related advantages in the 
home country. As such, economic analysis of MNEs have traditionally focused at 
differences at the country, industry, and firm level, including among others, labor 
costs, currency exchange rates, trade protectionism, industry concentration and 
growth, as well as firm size and technological assets. According to the basic 
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‘transaction-cost model of the MNE’, FDI is launched to exploit the differential quality 
of firm’s proprietary assets (Buckley & Casson, 1998a).  
 
Adepts of this approach see diversity not only as an opportunity for economic 
arbitrage but also as enhancing operational flexibility through global sourcing, 
facilitating access to international markets and way to diversify or reduce bulk risks 
(Dunning, 1993). Foreignness can be considered an asset as well, for example when it 
is associated with desirable product characteristics, or when local companies lack 
legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Mezias, 2001). 
 
Scholars, however, recognize that diversity also confront MNEs with challenges. 
Zaheer (1995) coined the term liability of foreignness to specify the kind of costs that 
MNEs face that domestic companies face to a much lesser extent, such as: 
transportation costs, coordination costs, lack of knowledge about the market, 
nationalism and contested legitimacy. Furthermore, qualitative studies recognize 
that knowledge accumulated in the home country context are of limited usefulness 
abroad (Lam, 2003; Morgan et al., 2003). Brannen (2004), for example, draw a 
compelling case on how cultural recontextualization can change the meaning of a 
determined strategic asset (i.e.: practice, a brand or a product) to the extent that it 
completely loses its character of competitive advantage as believed at home market. 
 
Overall, the economic approach of MNEs sees international diversity as an absolute 
measure to be stripped and explored. According to this view, differences must be 
assessed within an eye on differential economic properties which shall be arbitrated 
to generate rents. The absolute and straightforward character of this approach makes 
the balance between opportunities and challenges to be poorly addressed at the 
organizational level. As such, the simplified picture of diversity provided by the 
economic approach explains why its use has prevailed only in macroeconomics and 
at industry-level analysis. 
 
2.1.3- Cultural Approach to International Diversity: Conflict, Acculturation and 
Hybridization. 
 
In the early years of international management studies, Swedish researchers 
(Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson & Valhne, 1977) developed the 
concept of psychic distance to describe the “factors preventing or disturbing firms learning 
about and understanding a foreign environment” (O’Grady & Lane, 1996, p.313). Later, 
authors recognized the strong cultural content of this concept then cultural distance 
became a key proxy for international diversity (Barkema et al., 1996; Gomez-Mejia & 
Palich, 1997).  
 
Dissimilarities in national cultures are considered one of the most important causes 
of conflict and misalignments within MNEs. Studies exemplifying how differences 
frustrated cooperative efforts and business negotiations between people of different 
national cultures abound (Adler, 1986; Graham, 1985). A key tenet among culturalists 
is that entering psychically/culturally close countries is easier for companies than 
distant ones (Johanson & Vahlne, 1992; Kogut & Singh, 1988).  
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Authors in this line assume that individuals enact in their work their particular 
cultural background and that processing frameworks acquired in one culture are 
persistent and influence behavior even though contextual circumstances change 
(Erez & Earley, 1993). Another assumption in this approach is that people within a 
given country share common values, and these values can be used to distinguish one 
country’s culture from another. Finally, they assume that similarity is easier for firms 
to manage than dissimilarity, thereby making it more likely that they will succeed. 
 
A considerable body of literature in this tradition follows Hofstede’s (1980) 
framework, which conceive organizations in each country as situated within a given 
cultural framework, from which they are a manifestation and a consequence. His 
four cultural dimensions are frequently used to describe a ‘typical’ national behavior. 
Their potential to make inferences and formulate hypothesis about organizational 
phenomena in cross-cultural analysis, as well as their potential to generalize findings 
across cultures explains a great deal of its wide use among scholars. 
 
Many authors, however, argue that culture is a problematic determinant of 
variations in organizational functioning and structuring (Clark et al., 1999; Smith, 
1992; Chapman, 1996). They point that, at the conceptual level, the most fundamental 
problem is the lack of any agreement as to how define culture. The distinction 
between ‘culture’ and ‘nation’ is a further problem. Even though ‘nation’ is a much 
broader construct encompassing social, political and economical institutions, within 
cultural studies, this concept has been indiscriminately used as proxy for ‘culture’ 
(Ferner & Quintanilla, 1998). 
 
In this matter, Smith et al. (1996) cast doubts on the reliability of using cultural 
indexes as a reference frame to explain cross-country organizational differences. His 
findings show that despite of the different cultural backgrounds, a great deal of 
similarities marked the way managers tackle firm problems. For Shenkar (2001), the 
inconsistent results reported from cultural distance’s impact on FDI mode and 
performance show that it may be to narrow a construct to capture the decisions of 
firm-level actors. Au (1997) demonstrates how cultural measures can be misleading 
when taken as discrete variables and not as population distributions. For Schein 
(1985), measuring cultural distance at the national level overlook differences that 
may exist within countries, industry, groups or individuals. 
 
The culturalist approach has been also criticized in other fronts. Salk & Brannen 
(2000) provide evidence that poor performance does not emerge out of cultural 
differences but rather on how organizational contexts and individual members’ 
orientations channel these differences. O’Grady & Lane (1996) shows that entering a 
psychically close country may paradoxically result in poor performance or even 
failure. Brannen (2004) shows that entering psychically close countries does not 
necessarily reduce the level of uncertainty, and in fact, might represent a persistent 
shortcoming once attempts to single out differences are often misguiding.  
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Another point of attention is that much of the cultural debate on MNEs has been 
focused on dyadic contexts (home x host), with an emphasis on the adaptation of 
exiting competencies and capacities to new environments. A key assumption in this 
approach is that different cultures can be appropriated by interacting partners. 
Acculturation and hybridization are frequently quoted as means by which diversity in 
international settings can be resolved. Lam (1995), however, argues that such 
approach neglects the multidimensional nature of inter/intra-firm diversity and that 
cross-cultural blending may not be always feasible or indeed desirable. While the 
concepts of adaptation and hybridization aid in the specification of different practices 
in local sites, it can be argued that they do so at the expense of ignoring the dynamics 
of change associated with multinationals in these broader contexts.  
 
Overall, cultural studies see diversity as a nuisance to be overcome or contained 
within MNEs. Although diversity is seen as a variable measure and subject to 
change, the focus on conflict and tension make their analysis limited and piecemeal. 
The term ‘cultural diversity’ when applied to organizational studies is either defined 
in psychological or behavioral terms and used as an ‘omnibus variable’ that account 
for various dimensions and levels of diversity without specifying how they are 
interconnected, and in what ways each dimension reduces or enrich collaborative 
organizational efforts. 
 
2.1.4. Institutional Approach to MNEs: Between Convergence and Divergence. 
 
Within an institutional approach, studies share an interest in structures rather than 
content and take into account firms’ ability to produce both of them. In the study of 
MNEs two streams of research prevail. The traditional phenomenological 
institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1994), is rooted in the 
idea that institutions are sets of cultural rules and norms. The more contemporary 
historical institutionalism (Whitley, 1992) argues that institutions are sets of structural 
arrangements stabilized at the level of the nations which serve as a context for 
different logics of action and multiple rationalities (Djelic & Bensedrine, 2001). 
Although departing from a common framework, these two streams arrive at quite 
different views of MNEs.   
 
For phenomenological institutionalists, institutions are responsible for providing a 
coherent set of rules upon which structured interaction among actors is made 
possible (Aoki, 2001). Institutionalization operates at various levels, from the 
interpersonal to the supranational, such that the wider social and cultural world is 
infused with long-term processes of rationalization. Social actors feel compelled to 
adopt positions that are consistent with rationalized beliefs held at large in society 
(Scott & Meyer, 1994). In this sense, institutional frameworks powerfully shape the 
reaction space of actors both by defining the scope and nature of new problems, as 
they operate as filters for environmental stimuli on how actors perceive changes, and 
by limiting the set of available alternatives. By structuring both preferences and 
power, the institutional framework constitute a matrix of incentives and constrains 
that militates toward some kind of behavior and away from other.  
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Authors in this line, argue that global pressures are leading to the increasing 
convergence of both governance structures and business practices (Alvarez 1998; 
Chandler, 1990; Ohmae 1995, Scott & Meyer, 1994). Benchmarking, mergers and 
acquisitions, international management consultant firms, specialized press, and 
business schools are among the main sources of external isomorphic pull (Moen & 
Lilja, 2001). Tainio et al. (2001) add that institutional investors play a central role in 
disseminating the so-called shareholder value orientation (i.e.: liquidity, short-term 
returns, and risk diversification) which drives corporate restructuring worldwide. 
Internally, as MNEs expand their reach, they feel compelled to closely integrate their 
activities and make the best use of its resources and competences, differences are 
formalized and made available for use in other parts of the company. The 
enforcement of ‘best practices’ represents a move away from diversity and is 
manifested in the standardization of management tools and modes of organization.  
 
If phenomenological institutionalists take institutional fields at large, historical 
institutionalists (or neo-institutionalists) have traditionally described MNEs as social 
constructions shaped by their home contexts. They assume that the home context 
shape the strategies and structures of these firms as well as the way they 
internationalize and behave in foreign contexts. Overall, authors in this line advocate 
that the behavior of a MNE is significantly influenced by its home-country 
institutional framework. 
 
The concept of national business system (NBS) (Whitley, 1992) is a central construct for 
this stream. For NBS theorists, institutional arrangements reflect key phases and 
formative events in the evolution of the nation-state, such as the manner and timing 
of industrialization, the process of class formation, the development of political 
representation, as well as the role of the State itself. These State-level institutional 
fields influence market structures, financial system, collective bargaining, skill 
formation, corporate governance, intra-firm labor division, and control systems, 
which are key elements to understand firms’ business behavior. Therefore, NBSs can 
be seen as ‘clusters’ of interlocking institutional and business-related cultural 
elements that shape the behavior of firms rooted in them. 
 
Although evidence shows that MNEs indeed display characteristics from their home-
country NBSs (Egelhoff, 1984; Erramilli, 1996), many authors demonstrate that MNEs 
may be prevented from moving them abroad due to countervailing host-country NBS 
influences (Bélanger et al., 2003). Hayden & Edwards (2001) show that the diffusion 
of employment practices within MNEs is severely hampered by local labor laws, and 
trade union organizations. Béret et al. (2003) argue that the influence of local 
practices persist in HRM despite attempts to establish global guidelines. Rosenzweig 
& Singh (1991) suggest that HQ influence over different aspects of subsidiary 
management depends on the strength of countervailing local isomorphic pressures 
arising on the subsidiary side. According to Sharpe (2005) the fact that MNEs 
selectively transfer practices due to local constrains, reinforce diversity rather than 
reduce it.  
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At the convergent front, Westney’s (1993) argues that the institutional framework 
fails to explain how firms deal with competing isomorphic pulls arising from the 
many different environments they participate. Morgan (2005) claims that competitive 
pressures stimulate firms into more differentiation and not to less. Béret et al. (2003) 
suggests that even when companies adopt foreign guidelines, they do that in 
manners that retain a considerable number of elements characteristics of the local 
NBS, a process identified as hybridization.  
 
At the divergent front, many authors argue that examining MNEs in terms of 
national business systems leads to an incomplete picture of the phenomenon. 
Bélanger et al. (2003) claims that multilevel interactions and increasingly 
interconnected stakeholders across the globe challenge the notion of closed system 
that permeate most of NBS theory. For Morgan (2005), national institutional contexts 
are not as monolithic and internally homogeneous as supposed because their 
systemic linkages are neither tight nor entirely complementary. Ferner & Quintanilla 
(1998) suggest that institutional analysis appears at times to be rather vague in 
specifying the precise mechanisms whereby conflicting isomorphic pulls become 
translated into particular outcomes within MNEs.  
 
As debates over the role of diversity in MNE organization seemed to have stuck 
between convergence and divergence of institutional paths, some authors call for an 
emphasis on strategic action. Within an ‘actor-centered’ view (Herrigel & Wittke, 2005; 
Hancké & Goyer, 2005), MNEs are viewed as populated by strategic actors, who, 
although constrained by national business systems, simultaneously possess some 
capacity of independent action. Institutional frameworks, they argue, have the capacity 
to offer alternative adjustment paths that cannot simply be read-off following the 
conventional views. The creative use and the re-articulation of existing elements of 
the institutional frameworks by strategic actors allow them to adopt unpredictable 
paths. Therefore, institutions are seen as influencing the range of effects but not 
determining the outcomes (Sorge, 2001). 
 
According to Ferner & Quintanilla (1998), research on such complex conjunction of 
forces calls for a greater attention to the power relations of organizational and 
institutional actors, as long as actors within subsidiaries may find in local 
institutional constrains a power resource in negotiating their relationship with the 
parent company. In that sense, it is useful to view MNEs as firms with complex 
internal processes of contradiction and conflict which are the outcome of political 
negotiation between actors in and around the company. 
 
2.1.5. Politics as MNE Resultant 
 
Botti (1995) argues that subsidiaries may be considered as places where 
organizational knowledge can be translated and negotiated. Sharpe (2001) suggests 
that multinationals are sites of negotiation and conflict in which the underlying 
mechanisms of different business systems and actors come into confrontation and 
contest. For Morgan et al. (2003), once firms go abroad, they create new social spaces 
(transnational social space) where well-accepted practices and routines are confronted 
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in the light of alternative ones. What was taken for granted at home-country need 
once again to be made explicit, communicated, negotiated and implemented in the 
new context. In this process, actors try to make sense of these changes not by 
drawing on old models or repertoires but by developing new understandings. Once 
the experience of internationalization has been absorbed into the firm, the internal 
organizational space no longer remains the same. 
 
Bélanger et al. (2003) see MNEs as complex political organizations where the 
‘management by facts’ discourse does not always prevail in corporate decision 
making. Local subsidiaries are monitored and constrained in a variety of ways and 
must necessarily engage in the internal political process. In their view, innovation 
emerges as a result of a two-way political process in which the interpretation of 
market trends and opportunities developed both at corporate and subsidiary level 
are tested and mediated. For Ferner (2000), the notion of interpretation of market 
signals brings into evidence the political dimension in the relationship between 
MNEs and subsidiaries.  
 
Also, there is strong evidence that over time a rather large fraction of subsidiaries 
develop strategies for expanding their mandates (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). An 
unintended consequence of this process is that subsidiaries are more able to grow 
and survive by pursuing subversive strategies than by sticking to their original 
mandates. Empirical evidence shows that subsidiaries are more prone to engage in 
technological innovation (and gain independence of HQ) by communicating with 
external actors in their local context than by getting along with their sister units 
(Tregaskis, 2003). Another unintended consequence of subsidiary evolution is that as 
they increasingly become insiders in their local business systems, they tend to appear 
outsiders to their parent companies (Sölvell and Zander, 1998). 
 
In this sense, Kristensen & Zeitlin (2001) suggest that beyond the initial phase, it 
becomes highly unclear what type of logic will dominate MNE’s development. The 
more subsidiaries enter into MNEs composition, the more MNEs become ground for 
mutual competition among a variety of aspirations and goals and home for 
ambiguity and heterogeneity. Conflicts and alliances that may go on within 
individual persons, professional groups, and across subsidiaries make it very unclear 
which strategic lines are dominant and which principles shall guide control, 
coordination and the division of labor within MNEs. 
 
Although terms like heterarchy do capture this situation, these multilayered networks 
are more probably the result of an unintended process where MNEs structures are 
caught in games of strategic interaction among many agents each following distinct 
logics of action. Indeed, the evolution of a MNE depends on whether this interaction 
converges towards a virtuous or vicious pattern of interaction. Key in this debate is 
the notion that the continuous success of MNEs depends on how well subsidiaries 
interact, compete and cooperate despite their differences (Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2001). 
 
For Djelic & Bensedrine (2001), political action is the processes by which common 
understandings and logics of action, reflecting the multiplicity of actors, the diversity 
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of interests, and the balance of their resources, can emerge. Even in business, 
interests are far from driven only by an economic logic, being predominantly 
political elements framed by an institutional framework in which debates take place.  
 
Pierson (2000) briefly addresses how troublesome it is to exchange economics for 
politics in the organizational debates. The metric for good performance in economic 
terms is relatively simple and observable while politics is a far murkier environment. 
It is often very hard to observe or measure important aspects of political performance 
as there may be long lags and complex causal chains connecting political actions and 
their outcomes. While we may assume that economic actors are concerned primarily 
with profits, political actors are likely to pursue multiple simultaneously untenable 
goals (Deeg, 2005).  
 
In this line, Ferris & Judge (1991) question the ability of a rational strategic approach, 
focused on structures to control activities and ensure trust and bring the interests of 
both individual and organizations across borders into a strategic ‘organizational fit’. 
They argue that the supplementary issues of competing interests, power and politics 
should be taken into account to explain the subjective evaluative reality that 
pervades coordination in complex settings. Authors in this line, argue that political 
influence, promoted by competing influential actors, exerts deep influence over 
information flows and decision criteria used across all strategic decisions.  
 
2.2- POLITICS IN ORGANIZATIONS 
 
2.2.1. Politics as an Organizational Phenomenon 
 
Authors have traditionally addressed politics within organizations in negative terms. 
Kanter & Brinkerhoff (1981) characterize organizations as “battlegrounds” where 
stakeholders with different interests compete to influence critical decision criteria on 
their benefit. For Rosen et al. (2009), organizational politics represent illegitimate self-
serving behavior which happens at expense of the welfare of the organization and 
co-workers, and is perceived as harmful, and divisive. Mintzberg (1985) sees political 
activity within organizations as intrinsically conflictive as organizational actors 
mobilize their resources to turn the balance of power on their favor.  
 
Despite his negative bias, Mintzberg (op.cit) recognizes situations under which 
politics display a functional role within organizations. Among them, he highlights: 
 
- Politics help to correct dysfunctional allocations of power; 
- Politics encourage necessary organizational change blocked by the status quo; 
- Politics allow room for different sides of an issue to be explored; 
- Politics provide alternate channels of information and promotion; 
- Politics help build legitimacy around decisions to be made. 
 
Authors like March (1962), go further by addressing firms as being intrinsically 
political entities driven by "political coalitions" (p.672). Others like Milgrom & 
Roberts (1988) consider politics a key variable within firm´s economic behaviour. 
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For Buchanan & Badham (1999), political behavior can be simultaneously deployed 
in the defense of organizational goals and for personal purposes. Therefore, 
dichotomies such as legitimate x illegitimate, sanctioned x unsanctioned and self-serving x 
altruistic are frequently inappropriate. In the same line, Ferris and Judge (1991) see 
power and politics as facts of the organizational life and political activity as a value-
neutral process, which is neither good nor inherently bad.  
 
Hickson et al. (1986) stress the important role political process display in decision 
making. Schwenk (1989) suggests that political activity affects the way group level 
alternatives reach top management level for discussion and how consensus is 
reached among top managers. Butler et al. (1991) view decision making as composed 
by a technical side (find the best solution) and a political one (resolving divergent 
interests). Under conditions of complexity and uncertainty, technical problems may 
impose a degree of subjectivity which extends the relative weight of political 
processes in decision-making. Besides, other personal level features also affect 
political influence in decision-making, such as the extent to which decision makers 
are held accountable for subordinates' decisions, the extent to which they are 
prepared for the decision task, and thus not susceptible to political influence, and 
characteristics of their personal agenda, which drives his pursuit of allegiance. 
 
For Ferris & Judge (1991), the ambiguous nature of work performance provides 
opportunity for the political management of meaning. Ouchi (1977) shows that 
performance evaluation frequently incorporates subjective attributes like 
cooperation, teamwork and attitude, which easily extrapolate into more subtle and 
personal ones such as liking, similarity and fit. In these circumstances, individuals 
monitor the environment to discover cues regarding superior’s preferences and 
social approval to boast their perceived performance. Even organizational goals can 
have their meanings politically managed. Thompson (1967) notes that in condition of 
uncertainty, preferred measures of firm effectiveness shift to satisfaction of external 
constituencies, that is, towards external legitimacy. According to Ferris & King (1991) 
the reestablishment of legitimacy during crisis is often accomplished through active 
efforts to manage collective meaning. 
 
A number of authors suggest that promotion systems and management succession 
are highly political in nature. On the one hand, the outcomes of succession are 
informative of the dominant coalitions or most influencing interests at the time. 
Dominant interests attempt perpetuation in power through promotion of supportive 
individuals (Cohen & Pfeffer, 1986). On the other hand, managers actively use reward 
allocation to increase their influence in organizations (Barton & Martin, 1990). As 
managers mediate the contact of subordinates and top management, they are in 
position to manipulate available information about their ability, reputation and fit, to 
favor those they are supportive. Once a candidate is labeled “successful”, decision-
makers are influenced towards providing more resources to these “winners” and 
making favorable future evaluations. Therefore, luck tends to favor initial winners, 
while losers are stigmatized and if allowed to compete again it is at a different level 
with reduced status and rewards (Ferris & Judge, 1991). 
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For Brass (1984), network centrality in work-related communication network is a key 
predictor of power. For Pfeffer (1992), the power that derives from information 
control derives largely from one’s position in both the formal and informal 
communication networks. According to Krackhardt (1990), however, power accrues 
not only to those who occupy central network positions in organizations but also to 
those who have an accurate perception of the information network in which they are 
embedded. Deep knowledge of the power landscape allows individuals to spot 
powerful actors, map coalitions and assess their weakness. Accurate assessment of 
the network gives an edge in anticipating resistance and in mobilizing support for 
action and change. It can also reveal weaknesses in political groups by exposing 
holes, gaps, and locations of lack of support. Therefore, one way to address political 
landscapes is by mapping the information flow in organizations. 
 
2.2.2. Politics as a Mechanism of Change 
 
McLoughlin & Badham (2005) point that many organizational dynamics and their 
consequences are the products of choice and negotiation by powerful individuals 
and groups within organizations. As such, the choices made during the process of 
change should be recognized as both temporal and hierarchical in nature, as 
involving a wide range of actors and as being shaped at each stage by the social 
dynamics produced by the prevailing distribution of power and the differing world 
view of actors. 
 
For Lucas (1987), organizations are constructed out of processes of conflict involving 
interest groups. These groups engage into political processes in order to 
accommodate their interests into a structured equilibrium, which closely approaches 
the notion of negotiated order as proposed by Strauss (1978). A negotiated order 
comprises a set of rules operating in the organization at any given moment. In this 
sense, each organization is seen as an experiment in struggle, composed by diverse 
groups trying to overcome the unintelligibility of their own diversity into a common 
situation 
 
Similarly, Ferris and Judge (1991) assume that organizations are composed of varied 
actors with diverse interests that can act deliberately to influence shared meanings in 
order to produce the outcomes desired. This frame assumes that the complexity and 
ambiguity inherent in organizations is acted upon by individuals who create and 
manipulate meanings. According to their view, shared meanings are collective 
responses to social events and the subsequent interpretations people make about 
them, and thus, provide guidelines for organizational behavior. 
 
Rodrigues (2006) suggests that politics play a key role in organizational culture 
change. She argues that as it is difficult to attain cultural consensus beyond the scope 
of particular groups. As these groups vary in their capacity to mobilize material and 
symbolic resources, one of them may become dominant, either by accommodating a 
wider range of interests or by addressing specific situations better than others. This 
subculture thus becomes “the” organizational culture, and its dominance lasts while it 
fulfills the symbolic needs of the organization or holds necessary resources or 
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external legitimacy. At this point opposing groups engage into political action to 
replace the dominant group and to elicit a new organizational culture.  
 
The literature of organizational change is fragmented and deals with political 
behavior from a range of stances. For Buchanan & Badham (1999), the 
contextual/processual approach to change is the one that better addresses the role of 
political factors in implementing organizational change, as it recognizes the non-
linear dynamics involved as well as the enabling and constraining characteristics of 
the context. In their view, the more widespread the implications of organizational 
change, the greater the political involvement required by the change agent.  
 
Thompson & Purdy (2009) see organizational politics as a multi-layered process 
involving increasingly abstract levels of power within organizations. At surface, they 
see power stemming from direct leverage over resources, with actors acquiring or 
expanding their power from tactics such as sponsoring, lording, and rule citing. 
Below surface, power is shaped by indirect influence through communication 
manipulation, resource/outcome control, and managing/resisting change, with actors 
employing tactics to frame decisions or control who participates in the decision 
making. At the lowest and most invisible level, power emerges from the deep 
structures of the organization, which reflect social and historical roots, and shape 
what actors view as possible or not (i.e.: institutional knowledge). At this level some 
actors employ tactics to favor one social reality over other possible alternatives, thus 
advantaging some interest groups at expense of others. 
 
Similarly, Lawrence et al. (2005) suggest a connection between politics and learning 
and argue that this link is able to explain why some organizations are better able to 
learn and why only few innovations are embraced by organizations. They propose a 
framework that extends Crossan et al. (1999) learning process by adding the role of 
power and politics. As a result they propose a cyclical organizational learning model 
primarily moved by political processes, where each of the four stages - intuition, 
interpretation, integration and institutionalization – are set in motion (or blocked) by 
a particular form of power and its associated political strategies. Overall, they argue 
that influence helps overcoming ambiguity and uncertainty associated with 
interpretation, force facilitates collective action during integration, domination 
overcomes resistance to change and supports institutionalization, and discipline 
enables the development of expertise necessary for intuition. 
 
Frost & Egri (1991) build further upon the notion that power exists at numerous 
levels arguing that similar process can occur between organizations as well as within 
organizations. Drawing on this argument, Elg & Johansson (1997) suggest that firms 
within a network not only make moves to pursue their interests, but also develop 
more subtle activities that prevent issues from being discussed and actions from 
being taken. They also highlight that a certain degree of stability is a precondition for 
change to occur, otherwise uncertainty would jeopardize investment made in current 
relationships as well as strategic advantages of belonging to the network. 
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Based on these assumptions, Thompson & Purdy (2009) propose a model that 
establishes a relationship among innovation, organizational context and political 
action. Drawing on Frost & Egri (1991), they assert that the more innovation is 
congruent with “deep structures”, the smaller the range and intensity of political 
action, and therefore, the higher the probability of an innovation being successfully 
implemented. Political action, thus, is the direct result of actors´ conscious or 
subconscious reactions to the fit between “deep structure” and innovation.  
 
Nevertheless, they recognize that far from being a unified construct, “deep structures” 
can embody substantial amount of conflict (i.e.: heterogeneity). In their view, the 
more “deep structured” is the conflict, the less likely perceptions of congruence will 
converge because actors are assessing innovation against different elements and 
interpretations of the deep structure. Therefore, they call upon an alternative 
construct identified as “agreement about congruence” which refers to actors´ 
perceptions of the degree to each innovation fits the deep structure.  
 
Similarly, Clemens & Cook (1999), argue that institutional change rests on an 
appreciation of the heterogeneity of institutional arrangements and the resulting 
patterns of conflict or prospects for agency. In their opinion, institutional change is 
more likely when models of action are understood to be discretionary, institutional 
heterogeneity is high and social networks are fragmented and extend across 
significant social distances. In their view, innovation is generated by networks that 
crosscut institutional boundaries while societal heterogeneity constitutes loci of 
structural indeterminacy that may be exploited by political entrepreneurs. 
 
2.2.3. Venues of Political Action 
 
Ralston (1985) suggests that political activity is likely to occur in environments or 
situations characterized by a high degree of ambiguity or at low-density knowledge. 
In the absence of clear collective evaluation criteria reliance is often placed on a more 
personal subjective one. 
 
Underlying this argument there is a distinctive kind of political action called 
institutional entrepreneurship. The essence of institutional entrepreneurship is to 
skillfully contrast, align or transpose organizational institutional forms with those 
from the outset.  Political entrepreneurship presumes a degree of fragmentation or 
the availability of alternative models for mobilization and intervention. Institutional 
entrepreneurs seek to transpose models of collective action from one social setting to 
another in order to enhance the available set of alternatives and therefore shape the 
political space. The presence of alternatives creates the space for political action and 
policy innovation.  
 
For Clemens & Cook (1999), success in articulating, passing and implementing policy 
often depends on embedding a proposed program in an array of supportive 
constituencies. In this sense, effective politicians may enhance the attractiveness of a 
particular policy by building deep analogies to already institutionalized models or 
widely held norms. Therefore, the institutional effects attributable to normative 
 60 
 
legitimacy and socialization are reinforced by the mobilization of a set of 
stakeholders and alignment of incentives. Institutional arrangements, however, have 
great capacity for eliminating alternatives. They may suppress alternatives either by 
decoupling the components necessary to enact a particular policy or by 
reinterpreting experience (Ellingson, 1995). 
 
Perhaps the best known influence tactic is ingratiation, which can take a number of 
forms such as favor doing, flattery, opinion conformity, and subservient behavior. 
Kipnis & Van der Veer (1971) provide evidence that a subordinate who engage in 
ingratiation receive above average positive performance ratings. Other type of 
influence tactics is self-promotion which involves verbal claim of responsibility for 
positive events or outcomes that have occurred even when one cannot rightfully be 
credited with such outcomes (entitlement), and attempts to exaggerate or make more 
of one’s accomplishments than is justified (enhancements). Some studies have also 
examined goal setting as a potential political influence tactic. Dosset & Greenberg 
(1981), for example, found that managers give higher performance ratings to workers 
who set higher goals, regardless of their actual performance. 
 
Dawson & Buchanan (2005) call attention to the role of organizational narratives and 
the political processes involved in creating compelling stories. In their view, narratives 
are significant carriers of knowledge and understanding within organizations and 
provide a powerful tool not only for communicating meaning, but also for 
establishing the hegemony of a particular interpretation of organizational events. In 
their view, history may be rewritten to service current political aims and to shape 
perceptions of future outcomes. As such, a compelling story can be viewed as a venue 
of influence and story-telling skills as a power resource akin to expertise and personal 
influence. 
 
Drawing on Emerson´s (1962) notion of power as a function of available alternatives, 
Gargiulo (1993) shows that actors build ties of interpersonal obligation with people 
directly affecting their performance in the organization, but whenever divergences 
emerge within ties, their focus turn to building new ties with people able to constrain 
the performance of the diverging party. Therefore, individuals try to enhance their 
power positions not only by building direct alliances to tap into resources but also by 
building indirect alliances to block the access of others to key resources. 
 
Graen et al. (1982) suggest that perhaps the most important characteristic bosses look 
for in subordinates, which leads to these subordinates being evaluated more 
positively and achieving in-group status, is the extent to which the subordinates 
think like them, mimic decisions, and provide support on matters of importance to 
bosses. Behind this assumption is the principle that similarity leads to attraction 
because it increases one’s confidence that his or her opinions are correct. Ambiguity 
contributes to conformity and consensus in beliefs because individuals actively seek 
support and legitimacy for their own ideas. Ferris & Judge (1991) remind that once 
evaluations of fit and similarity are highly subjective, they represent a substantive 
object of meaning management through political influence. 
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Kanter (1993) coined term homosocial reproduction as the characterization of 
promotion systems in which decision makers favorably evaluate and promote people 
just like themselves.  Similarly, March (1984) observes that most evaluation and 
mobility systems are essentially filters that screen people on the basis of similar 
attributes, thus serving to reduce variation and increase homogeneity among 
managers in the firm. 
 
Some authors go further by acknowledging that similarity is able to exert influence 
downstream into recruitment. Beehr & Gilmore (1982) demonstrate that physical 
attractiveness (including grooming and attire) can be considered a channel of 
influence over recruiters by conveying a sense of similarity. Gilmore & Ferris (1989) 
indicate that managers prefer recruiting individuals similar to themselves because it 
would allow them to extend more easily their coalition and build up their power 
base. Although this does not imply managers will actually use influence tactics in the 
selection process, it does suggest that political motives may underlie selection 
decisions. Cohen & Pfeffer (1986) argue that hiring standards are a visible outcome of 
competing interests trying to gain control over personnel selection decision criteria.  
 
Pfeffer & Fong (2005) argue that the principle of self-enhancement, or the tendency of 
individuals to see their actions in positive light, is at the origin of many 
organizational phenomena underlying the misuse of power and influence processes, 
such as escalating commitment, similarity attraction, avoidance of self-evaluation, 
overestimation of self-efficacy, perseverance of hierarchy and autonomy suppression 
and disinhibition.  
 
2.2.4. Limitants for Political Influence 
 
The situations shown above elaborate the argument that the intentional management 
of shared meaning can be played out quite effectively in organizations through 
personnel selection, performance evaluation and intra-organizational mobility (Ferris 
& Judge, 1991). Parker et al. (1995) argue that whether political behavior proves 
beneficial or harmful to the organization depends more on how that behavior is 
perceived rather than reality.  As such, they suggest managerial action to help reduce 
perceptions of organizational politics, like instilling a sense of organizational 
purpose, give minority groups a voice in decisions and reducing employee 
ambiguity. 
 
Political behaviors are neither equally effective nor similarly perceived. Baron et al. 
(1986) highlight that political influence attempts can backfire if taken to extreme. If 
the target interprets the attempt as a conscious effort to manipulate, they likely will 
react negatively. Ferris & Judge (1991) point that more research is needed to better 
establish the effectiveness of different tactics in different contexts. Strategic-assertive 
tactics such as prestige, status, credibility and reputation are in need of more 
longitudinal research in order to be more fully understood.  
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3.1- THE MANAGEMENT OF MNEs 
 
3.1.1- Types of MNEs 
 
A considerable number of authors (Forsgren, 1989; Hedlund & Ridderstrale, 1997; 
Harzing, 2000), regard MNEs generically as territorially and functionally 
differentiated inter-organizational networks characterized by a complex structure in 
terms of resources, loci of decisions and influence. Nevertheless, a vast literature in 
international management recognizes the existence of different types of MNEs and 
many are the terms used to distinguish them. Polycentric, Geocentric, Ethnocentric, 
Multidomestic, International, Global and Transnational are among the commonest 
expressions used to designate these different forms of acting internationally 
(Harzing, 2000). 
 
Among current typologies, the most extensively used is certainly the one proposed 
by Bartlett & Goshal (1989). In their view, companies with international operations 
could be arranged according to strategy and structure into four types: Global, 
Multinational, International and Transnational. Other alternatives have attracted 
attention as well, such as the one proposed by Prahalad & Doz (1987) in terms of 
integration and responsiveness as multidomestic (low integration/high responsiveness), 
Global (high integration/low responsiveness), transnational (high integration/high 
responsiveness), and international (low integration/low responsiveness),  or the role-
based typology proposed by Birkinshaw & Morrison (1995) which divide 
subsidiaries into local implementers, specialized contributors or world mandate. 
 
Building on Prahalad & Doz (1987), Harzing (2000) noted that despite great 
convergence of terms meanings were not consensual. Her analysis also indicated that 
convergence of meaning often took place along a continuum of circumstances where 
integration/coordination/globalization advantages were weighted against 
differentiation/responsiveness/localization ones. However, the notion that not every 
subsidiary played the same role within MNEs (Martinez & Jarillo, 1991) remained 
quite annoying and raised several questions against the accuracy of the 
strategy/structure approach. Exploring this perception, she proposes to classify 
MNEs not only in terms of strategy and structure but also in terms of responsiveness 
(extent to which subsidiaries respond to local differences in customer preferences) 
and interdependence (extent to which various unit of a MNE are dependent on each 
other). As a consequence, three concepts of MNE emerged from her analysis: 
Multidomestic, Global, and Transnational.  
 
Multidomestic companies usually operate in industries submitted to strong local 
demands, mostly determined by cultural, social and political factors. High 
responsiveness to these demands is usually obtained through local production, 
considerable proportion of local R&D and careful marketing attention. This 
intermittent adaptation require loose structures of control, generally in form of a 
decentralized network, what explain the relative independence that subsidiaries 
presents in relation to headquarters and the reduced flow of products and ideas in 
circulation. 
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Global companies operate in industries with relatively standardized consumer needs, 
where cost-efficiency based competition requires a remarkable level of 
rationalization and integration of production. Subsidiaries typically fulfilled roles as 
“pipelines” for headquarters, with sales and purchases depending heavily on its 
decisions. They are not supposed to respond to local market demands and when they 
do so odds are that it is limited to marketing adaptation and cosmetic changes in the 
product. 
 
Transnational companies, on their turn, are those who have to respond 
simultaneously to the sometimes-conflicting strategic needs of global efficiency and 
national responsiveness (Kamoche, 1996). MNEs of this kind pursue a general 
strategy based on realizing synergistic linkages between sites across borders. In this 
sense, these companies can be characterized as interdependent networks built from 
an intensive flow of people, products and knowledge stretching all over the 
organization. A combination of specialization and local market sensitivity pervades 
most of subsidiaries and the interrelations among subsidiaries outweigh those with 
headquarters. HQ in transnational firms is expected to dedicate less effort to 
constraining and directing subsidiary action, and more to evaluating and arbitrating 
such action (Edwards, 1998). 
 
Lane (2001) draws a clear line between multinationals, in a general sense, and 
transnationals. Whereas multinationals had their features linked to their home country 
institutional environment, transnationals are influenced by several countries. Their 
subsidiaries enjoy greater autonomy and a high level of discretion over local 
resources. Freed to become more embedded into their host countries, transnational 
subsidiaries are able to engage into learning processes that may lead to new 
organizational structures, practices and competences. As long as they remain 
integrated with other subsidiaries and to headquarters, their organizational and 
technological innovations can be channeled back and change the company as whole.  
 
3.1.2- Internal Dynamics and the Evolution of MNEs 
 
Edwards et al. (1996) call attention to the fact that MNEs may occupy more than one 
cell of a typology. Bélanger et al. (2003) provide evidence that even within a 
particular host-country, the pattern of HQ-subsidiary relations may vary from one 
subsidiary to another, and in relation to the same subsidiary along time. 
Relationships with some subsidiaries may reflect dependence whereas others may be 
more integrated due to the different roles they are in charge. Such intra-company 
variation is thought to reflect not only the relevance of subsidiary behavior, as is 
stressed in the contingent models, but also the accidents of history and the outcomes 
of organizational politics. 
 
Although researchers have traditionally assumed that ownership-specific advantages 
are developed at HQ and leveraged overseas (Dunning, 1981), as subsidiaries grew 
in size and developed their own set of unique capabilities, it became apparent to 
many researchers that headquarters was no longer the sole source of competitive 
advantage to the MNE. According to Birkinshaw & Hood (1998), subsidiary evolution 
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can be interpreted as the change in subsidiary mandate, as result of accumulation or 
depletion of capabilities over time. These authors emphasize the importance of 
understanding how these roles change, especially in terms of driving-circumstances 
and managerial processes. In general terms, they propose that track record, or the 
extent to which subsidiary has consistently delivered results, is one of the critical 
factors affecting subsidiary evolution.  
 
Internal competition for charters is another fundamental force behind subsidiary 
evolution. Competitive internal resource allocation can be felt through corporate-wide 
systems that are built to foments internal competition, either by allowing bids for 
new investments or by creating a system through which existing charters can be 
challenged by other units (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 1996). The concept of internal 
markets (Rugman, 1981; Caves, 1998; Buckley & Casson, 1998a) expands this view 
regarding the competition for charters to encompass the role set of exchanges within 
MNEs. The existence of internal markets, they argue, provides divisional managers 
with an opportunity to bypass weak or incompetent sections of the company, and 
provide units with competitive discipline on internal transfer prices, preventing their 
manipulation for political ends. As such, internal competition is deemed critical to the 
capability enhancement process and is thought to act as buffer to the sometimes 
destructive effects of erratic external competitive forces.  
 
Forsgren (1990) argues that one of the consequences of subsidiary evolution is that 
the hierarchical power of the corporate HQ can be counter-balanced by the resources 
gained by subsidiaries as a result of their participation in local networks. In his 
opinion, MNEs can be devised as ‘loosely coupled political systems rather than tightly 
bonded, homogeneous, hierarchically controlled systems’ (p.294). Doz & Prahalad (1991) 
also advocate that the study of resource-based power and dependence relationships 
in MNEs can complement the analysis of structural sources of power (i.e., stemming 
from position in the formal organizational hierarchy). Similarly, Ghoshal & Bartlett 
(1990) view MNEs as inter-organizational networks where power at subsidiary level 
emerges not from the role assigned by HQ, but from the position it occupies in the 
local network of stakeholders. The concepts of heterachy (Hedlund, 1986) and 
transnational (Harzing, 2000) are attempts to explain the role played by subsidiaries 
in corporate competitiveness.  
 
In this line, Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989) advocate for an evolutionary model of the MNE. 
Such evolution would start from the multidomestic form, with their dispersed and 
loosely coordinated subsidiaries, proceed to the global form, more coordinated and 
centralized, then follow to the international form and their federated structure, until 
finally reach the top of the evolution as a transnational. As such, the transnational 
status would reflect the inability of other structures to handle the inherent 
complexity of deeper modes of internationalization. Transnationality would be 
marked by different contributions stemming from various national branches, with 
knowledge being shared multidirectionally and organizational structures resembling 
more of a matrix, and less of a hierarchy. The transnational solution is an attempt to 
blend hierarchies and networks in order to retain value creation largely within the 
range of a given MNE.  
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Additionally, Malnight (1996) argues that dramatic changes in the competitive 
environment are impelling many MNEs to move from decentralized to network-
based approaches. In his opinion, two fundamental adjustments have been 
responsible for the gradual linking and integration of previously autonomous 
affiliates. First, the rationalization of duplicated resources across national markets 
towards specialized centers performing activities that meet global requirements. 
Second, the improvement of control mechanisms, beyond financial-based ones, 
prompted subsidiaries to exchange resources and capabilities further enhancing their 
level of interdependence. 
 
3.1.3- MNEs and the Management of Interdependences 
 
Traditionally, the extent to which an organization can be operated interdependently 
with other organizations was assumed to be constrained by limits imposed by 
information-processing capacity and physical distance. As information and 
communication technologies have advanced, interdependent operations become 
much more attainable, and in fact, desirable (Child & McGrath, 2001). Majumdar & 
Venkataraman (1998) highlight that a key aspect of interdependent systems is that 
the outcome for any party to a transaction is fundamentally entwined with the 
actions of and the outcomes for other players. This meshing makes the management 
of interdependent systems particularly complex. A change in one component of an 
interdependent system produces unpredictable changes in others, thus leading to 
coordination problems. 
 
According to Harzing (2000), all MNEs are characterized by some level of 
interdependence. Interdependence indicates the extent to which units of a MNE are 
dependent on each other. As Caves (1992) argues, there must be some transactional 
advantage in placing geographically dispersed operations under common 
administrative control. In his view, it is through the management of interdependences 
that MNEs accrue the necessary rents to cover the transactional costs associated with 
geographic dispersion and to reward the required investments. In this sense, 
interdependence within a MNE is not only a given condition but also a key element to 
achieve competitive advantage.  
 
Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989) suggest that the level of interdependence varies across the 
different models of MNE. Kostova & Roth (2003) credit this variability to the nature 
of the resource flows between headquarters and subsidiaries. According to these 
authors, the level of interdependence ranges from low in the multidomestic to high in 
the transnational model. The type of interdependence goes from simple to complex. 
Simple interdependence occurs when the resource flows between entities occur at few 
points and are easily specified. Complex interdependence reflects a situation where 
resource flows and exchanges are indeterminate owing to high levels of change, 
ambiguity and unpredictability. There is uncertainty as to what resources should be 
exchanged, and where and when the supporting interactions should occur.  
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While simple interdependence can be managed through structural arrangements (e.g., 
formal reporting, policies and procedures), complex interdependence limits the 
possibility for a complete a priori specification and design of formal arrangements. 
Such conditions place an increased emphasis on informal means of coordination and 
control (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). They also require supplementing the simple 
written and verbal means of interaction with more intensive and rich forms (e.g., 
face-to-face, nonverbal, shared cognitive structures), which have the capacity to 
support complex relationships (Daft & Lengel, 1986). 
 
Edward et al. (1996) devise two routes for managing the kind of interdependences 
that arise in international operations: synergetic interlocks and financial control. 
Synergetic interlocks result from the development of vertical and horizontal 
integration between operating units, together with a frequent use of meetings, the 
regular transfer of staff and a team or matrix approach to decision making. 
Financially controlled firms manage their subsidiaries through financial rewards and 
penalties (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987). However, empirical evidence demonstrates that 
firms do not fit neatly into these ideal-types, which would rather be seen as diverging 
tendencies that interplay at many different levels. 
 
3.1.4- Mechanisms of Coordination within MNEs 
 
According to Béret et al. (2003), coordination may be maintained by mechanisms that 
are formal (budgeting, auditing, committees), informal (e.g.: international mobility, 
quasi-mobility of key personnel, culture), or hybrid (e.g.: projects). These 
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and they interact to a considerable extent 
(Ferner, 2000). Such coordination is supposed to give the firm enhanced 
competitiveness, flexibility and, above all, capacity for learning.  
 
MNEs typically design appropriate mechanisms of formalization and centralization 
to mitigate uncertainty generated by internal and external sources and thus increases 
the efficiency of corporate governance. Formalization provides explicit norms (i.e., 
rules and procedures) of desirable behavior whereas centralization establishes 
legitimacy of the decision-making authority through a hierarchical design of 
governance (Roth & Morrison, 1990).  However, formal mechanisms are generally 
not sufficient to achieve the necessary level of coordination a globally oriented 
organization requires. In this line, Grant (1996a) reminds that the more firms 
resemble “institutions for integrating knowledge” the more hierarchical/formal 
coordination is expected to fail. Similarly, Whitley (2005) points that international 
coordination through planning and regular communication may be quite 
straightforward when problem solving activities follow relatively predictable 
trajectories, however it becomes more difficult as the importance of tacit knowledge 
increases and uncertainty growths. 
 
The prototypical form of collaboration enacted by most MNEs is interface 
collaboration (Lam, 1995). Interface collaboration typically involves a clear division of 
labor across the interacting organizational units. That is, each side pursue an 
independent goal in developing one part of the collaborative effort and join forces at 
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the end to link the separate development into a final work. Overall coordination 
between the partners takes place via a small number of interface managers or senior 
specialists who occasionally meet to exchange information and make critical 
decisions. Necessary communication and information exchange at the operational 
level is conducted, as far as possible, via video or telephonic conference and through 
electronic mail. Interface collaboration allows firms to manage the boundary 
relationship with caution while maintaining tight control over the flow of 
information and sensitive knowledge, and thus, happens to be the preferred method 
for cross-border collaboration.  
 
According to Lam (1995), however, interface collaboration is a potentially unstable 
form of interaction in organizational settings and presents many limitations. In her 
opinion, interface collaboration confines the flow of information and coordination to a 
small number of interface points at the senior level while, in practice, the span of 
issues involved in complex joint works tends to defy such few contact points. 
Additionally, interface collaboration constrains the rapid multidirectional exchange of 
information and makes a joint work difficult also by restricting the scope of 
collaboration between interacting parties. Finally, she argues that interface 
collaboration can also impede the development of trust and open communication as it 
restricts opportunities for actors to form close working relationships and a common 
language to address their exchange needs.  
 
Some authors (Tung, 1993; Napier, 1989) assume that mutual adaptation and 
organizational learning will bring about a ‘hybrid organization’ based on blending and 
mixing of diverse policies and practices. According to Novicevic & Harvey (2001), 
integrating personnel mechanisms such as strategic global staffing, global task forces, 
and oversight committees are mechanisms that lead to mutual adjustment. Dowling et 
al. (1999) argue that the process of lateral integration enable corporate and subsidiary 
managers to share the same strategic logic in their operating philosophies and 
orientations. The relationships derived from these mechanisms are expected to delve 
into ‘soft’ structures which function both as informal control devices. Harvey and 
Buckley (1997) also note a trend towards the use of inpatriates for coordinating roles 
in lateral integration mechanisms. They define inpatriates as local or third-country 
nationals that are carefully selected within organizations network and intensively 
developed at the regional and/or corporate level.  
 
Lam (1995) argues that differences between organizational units within MNEs are so 
ingrained with their national institutions and societal contexts (notably in terms 
historical heritage, labor market structures and education/training systems) that they 
cannot be easily reconciled through organizational learning. Organizational learning 
will only enhance understanding but not integration and firms engaged in cross-
national collaboration will have to actively deal with the persistent tension between 
different and sometimes contrasting systems of work. She also calls attention to the 
fact that integration might not necessarily be desirable as long as intra-organizational 
diversity, though tension-inducing, may contribute positively to engender 
multidimensional perspectives that are essential to help firms to cope with the 
complex and fast moving demands of global product markets. Moreover, diversity of 
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perspectives and specializations may represent an important source of hedge that 
firms can count on moments of intense product market fluctuation.  
 
In her opinion, the real challenge facing cross-national collaboration is not about the 
trade-offs between arm’s length relationships and close integration. It is about how 
to manage the boundary relationship in such way that it permits a high degree of 
permeability and reciprocal knowledge exchange in critical areas, and yet preserves 
the distinctive identity and core strengths of the different systems.  A way to address 
this need is through the gradual creation of what she calls “integrated pockets of 
collaboration”, which generally assume the form of complex large-scale projects.   
 
These “integrated pockets” involve more intense exchange of personnel at the 
operational level and formation of cross-national teams. They constitute the bases for 
the development of personal networks and become important information and 
knowledge exchange networks within and across organizations. Such cross-national 
teams are not free of the problems and tensions already discussed, and they may be 
costly, time-consuming, and limited to certain types of collaborative work as well. 
However, they are supposed to provide ‘off-line’ micro-structural mechanisms 
where new practices can be tried without threatening established systems. In her 
opinion, what remains to be seen is how far these ‘integrated pockets’ will remain 
insulated micro-structures on their own, and the extent to which they might create 
hybrid practices that extrapolates the edges of the overlapping units. 
 
3.2- TEAMS AS MECHANISMS TO ENHANCE COORDINATION 
 
3.2.1- Management by Projects 
 
It is well known in the business literature that multidisciplinary teams gathered 
around a onetime goal or project are increasingly been used as a way by which 
highly complex tasks can be accomplished (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Hoegl & Gemuenden, 2001). Management 
by projects has been part of a prodigious movement towards the sophistication of 
administrative science in which organizations achieve things more rapidly, at less 
cost, with greater order and coherence. 
 
Cohen & Bailey (1997) define project teams as time-limited, non-repetitive groups 
charged with producing a one-time output. According to Clegg & Courpasson 
(2004), by definition, projects involve well-delimited settings outside the formal 
structuring of organizations, involving the coordination of complex tasks and inter-
organizational relations. For Béret et al. (2003), the project form of management 
imposes constrains on teams, notably in terms of costs and deadlines. Management 
by projects is intended to formalize work networks and impose constrains on them.  
 
Recently, organizational theorists have increasingly endorsed management by 
projects as the definitive post-bureaucratic organizational arrangement. By 
combining elements of organic structures (Burns & Stalker, 1962) and empowerment 
and self-reliance, management by projects became a prefigurative image of future 
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modes of work, where highly complex tasks would be held by a network of highly-
skilled just-in-time workers on a contingent basis. Clegg & Courpasson (2004), 
however, are critical on this approach and argue that despite the postmodern appeal, 
project teams are strongly institutionalized arrangements. In their field observations, 
project teams displayed a strong hierarchical dimension, which vertically defines 
objectives and responsibilities, guided by a strong code of practice (Project 
Management Body of Knowledge - PMBOK) designed by an overarching 
legitimation body (Project Management Institute – PMI). 
 
The tension between the personal and the hierarchical means that project authority 
becomes based more on interdependence than on the organizational position. A 
substantial part of project leaders' power arises from his ability to communicate, 
persuade and align interests. Moreover, as projects are usually run in segregated 
spaces, away from corporate bureaucracies from which hierarchical power arises, 
project managers are in position to substitute the adherence to the rules to the 
accomplishment of objectives. In this process, they have space to use creativity and 
explore innovation to rewrite processes and negotiate a number of exceptionalities. 
 
Ferner (2000) argue that lean structures meant to react more quickly and more 
strategically to market trends and opportunities by having fewer people to consult 
do not diminish political influences but actually increases them. The concentration of 
resources in the hands of few actors, endowed to act relatively unconstrained, creates 
mutual dependences that enhance the need for instances of political mediation. 
Therefore, project teams are expected to be highly political in nature with actors 
struggling to influence the interpretation of events and decisions in order to obtain 
resources and status. 
 
Pfeffer (1981) reminds that when power is highly concentrated, system participants 
have disincentives to engage in contest for control which provokes the visible conflict 
and political activity observed when power is more equally distributed.  In this line, 
formalization can be viewed as a characteristic of centralized power systems while 
dispersed power systems can be identified as lying in interpersonal relations or on 
the possession of specific skills.  
 
Pichault (1998) agrees with this point and adds that innovation is the result of such 
loosely coupled organizational system pursuing simultaneously conflicting interests. 
In these arrangements, he sees more chance that new and unforeseeable evolution 
may arise to satisfy, simultaneously various stakeholders. As managers can be 
confronted by experts they will be inclined to accept negotiations and compromise 
between them. Informal change agents may emerge out of the professional core, 
escaping the initial objectives assigned to the project, with the implicit agreement of 
hierarchy, and contribute to improving the current structural arrangement and their 
processes. In this case, conflicts are able to contribute to renewing the current way of 
working. 
 
Clegg & Courpasson (2004), however, claim that several more subtle forms of control 
exert great influence over project teams. Reputational control, for example, refers to the 
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extent that daily tests on the skill of experts and communication abilities of project 
managers are brought into permanent tensions resulting in legitimation or 
delegitimation of their project positions. Calculative control, refers to the extent that 
performance monitoring elements can be used to reassert central control by making 
reporting essential to the project objectives and an indication of the successful 
operation of the project.  Finally, professional control, regards the extent to which a 
project managers are influenced in his action by the actions of their peers in their 
struggle to win the benefits provided by central management. 
 
In their view, project management can be viewed as a system for controlling costs 
and achieve objectives. Project managers are intermediaries between a rule-governed 
organizational body and local rationalities. Rather than abolishing hierarchic control 
project management entails the recomposition of certain aspects of it and the 
reinforcement of others Overall, project management is seen as a form of “soft-
despotism” based on the appearance of equality in the project team and the reality of 
a pervasive system of governance.  
 
3.2.2- International Project Teams 
 
For Beret et al. (2003) international project teams allow individuals who are 
geographically, professionally and culturally remote to be brought together around 
clearly identified common objectives using short-term and relatively low-cost forms 
of mobility such as exchanges and visits. In order to build project teams, managers 
and project leaders need to single out employees with strategic competences and to 
identify the contributions of the different project members. 
 
Edstrom & Galbraight (1977) have long acknowledged that both integration and 
decentralization were achievable through a policy of worldwide transfers and 
socialization, which would foster commitment to the firm and the creation of 
information networks. Such policies facilitated information flow and learning across 
the firm in addition to achieving integrative organizational control. Nonaka (1990) 
describes the use of multi-national and multi-cultural teams as a way to achieve a 
subtle balance between central and unit-level initiative.  
 
International project teams can also be seen as arrangements that contribute to the 
creation and dissemination of knowledge. For Thompson (1967), the use of teams in 
the workplace may be thought of lying on a continuum. At one end, teams with a 
low degree of interdependence would consist of employees who rarely see each 
other and perform their tasks without exchanging information and materials. At the 
other end, teams with a high degree of task interdependence would consist of 
employees who frequently interact and exchange materials and information to 
complete their tasks.  
 
Authors are unanimous in asserting that successful task accomplishment on highly 
interdependent teams depends directly on the quality of members’ interaction. In 
their study of international research teams, Teagarden and colleagues (1995) 
emphasize that trust and effective communication between team members are sine 
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qua non conditions for cross-cultural collaboration. Iles & Hayers (1997) identify some 
competency dimensions for effective multicultural team working: cultural 
awareness, communicative competence, cognitive competence, valuing difference, 
and gaining synergy from difference. Ledwith & Seymour’s (2001) suggest that 
willingness to engage with the difficulties and tensions of multicultural group-work 
is key to achieve positive results in the use of such arrangements. 
 
Many authors (Mendehall & Oddou, 1985; Ledwith & Seymour, 2001) recognize that 
although many education and training in management cover activities such as 
conducting appraisals, teamwork, leadership, performance management, and 
recruitment & selection, fewer combine these areas with an equal effort to provide 
intercultural competence, understood as the ability to work productively with those 
from different cultural backgrounds. Takeuchi et al. (2005) recognize that although 
specific knowledge of (or experience in) a different culture may be useful, it does not 
itself guarantee intercultural competence. Nevertheless, Barkema et al. (1997) 
reminds that the capacity to work within diverse settings can be learned not only 
from previous international experiences, but also from previous domestic 
experiences in handling diversity.   
 
Easterby-Smith & Malina (1999) highlight some aspects that might affect cross-
national collaborative work.  First, each national group tends to form independent 
assumptions about other group’s intentions (often in negative terms) that do not 
correspond to exact ones. Second, age, gender and nationality of interacting partners 
may be compounded by international differences, and external attributions of status 
may conflict with internal assumptions about role definition and competence area. 
Third, interacting actors are not likely to become aware of differences in their 
approaches to a determined task until they engage joint fieldwork. Differences 
become apparent only in locus and rarely can be anticipated or managed in advance. 
Overall, flexibility is essential to accommodate the unexpected and to dissipate 
misunderstandings what bring us back to the quality of the relationships. Fourth, the 
exchange of mutual perceptions can lead to reflexive insights about each group own 
assumptions and rationalities. By clarifying differences it is possible to find some 
overlapping ground between different perspectives, opening the prospects for a 
working consensus.  
 
In a similar line, Salk & Brannen (2000) provide evidence that over time nationally 
distinct groups develop a common set of precedents and experiences that become the 
foundation for a context specific, or local, working culture. In assessing this working 
culture it is important to take into account how individual team members perceived 
and reacted to emergent norms. In their opinion, the degree to which individual 
members came to accept locally negotiated norms and the investment they had made 
in adaptation can be gauged in terms of comfort and self-efficacy. 
 
A considerable number of authors (Hambrick et al., 1998; Earley & Mosakowski, 
2000; Salk & Brannen, 2000) advocate that successful heterogeneous teams create 
hybrid team cultures over time. For Earley & Mosakowski (2000), in highly 
heterogeneous groups, because few commonalities exist and the notion of primary 
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traits is not shared, members will attempt to create and establish new shared 
understandings, team process, role expectations, communication methods and so 
forth. As a result, a team culture is expected to develop after members had sufficient 
time and opportunity to form common basis of exchange and interaction. These 
authors highlight that these characteristics need not be completely shared among 
team members, but there must be significant overlap among them for these hybrid 
team cultures to come into existence.  
 
Gibson & Zellmer-Bruhn (2001) note that there are important differences in the 
concept of teamwork across different cultures, and they affect their effective 
implementation and acceptance. In their view, the metaphors used to describe 
teamwork are representative on the members’ expectations on how teams should be 
managed and how team process should unfold.  Lau & Murnigham (1998) highlight 
that demographic traits of individuals should not be disregarded in the analysis of 
team cultures. In their view, a number of demographic elements (age, race, gender, 
social class, educational and functional background) can create ‘faultlines’ and 
operate as a source of identification between team members, allowing for the 
creation of potentially disruptive subgroups.  Which characteristics members 
perceive as primary depends upon their societal, cultural, and personal backgrounds.  
 
For Montoya-Weiss et al. (2001), another key aspect of international project teams is 
the challenge of temporal coordination. New communication technologies are 
providing the means for work that are dispersed (carried out in different places) and 
asynchronous (carried out at different times). The dispersed and asynchronous 
communication context renders inoperable many of usual forms of social control, 
such as direct supervision, physical proximity, shared experience, and social trust. In 
their opinion, in the absence of the multiple cues that characterize human 
communication, consensus building becomes difficult and collaboration potentially 
conflictive.  Consequently, it is necessary to establish some mechanisms of temporal 
coordination in order to replace that cues that would be naturally be available 
through direct interaction. 
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4.1- INVESTIGATION GUIDELINES 
 
4.1.1- Theoretical Summary and Investigation Question 
 
The theoretical body presented suggests that knowledge and social organization are 
intrinsically linked and overtime develops a sort of dynamic equilibrium (red arrow in 
Fig.3). On the one side, we have environmental changes and the strategic action of 
social actors bringing into question the validity and legitimacy of institutional 
knowledge2. At the other hand, we have political action continually renewing the stock 
of knowledge to fit environmental needs and accommodate the interests of a broader 
set of social actors. All this dynamism is surrounded by zones of attraction (grey 
arrows in Fig. 3) composed by socially undesirable states of both stasis (reification) 
and disruption (anomie) elicited by power imbalances or lack of political action.   
 
In this framework, diversity, politics and innovation are intrinsically linked 
elements in a process of knowledge renewal that is essential to social adaptation and 
maintenance. Understand how these elements can be brought together in a 
functional way is key important for contemporary organizations. Therefore, the 
examination of a real instance where these elements are bind together to promote 
substantial changes in the state of a determined sort of knowledge is utmost 
important to the advancement of contemporary organizational studies. 
 
Mature MNEs, particularly those close to the transnational type, are very complex 
organizations which embody at the same time a high level of knowledge diversity and 
great room for political activity. Although empirical evidence shows that they 
increasingly respond to the challenge of managing complex settings and meet 
innovation needs through the use of international project teams, a clear theoretical 
approach explaining how these work arrangements are capable to turn two 
problematic organizational phenomena into key organizational resources remain 
elusive. Therefore, the question that drives this investigation is how international 
project teams enable MNEs to cope with knowledge diversity and political activity 
in order to unleash their innovative potential? Which social mechanisms are 
enacted during this process? Which are the key variables and how they interrelate?  
 
4.1.2- Object of Investigation and Main Objectives 
 
The object of study in the present investigation is the knowledge change process that 
takes place within international project teams. By observing how knowledge on a 
determined subject is appropriated and eventually goes into change within these 
arrangements it is possible not only to understand the elements that triggered the 
change need but also the process by which a new compromise is reached and change 
                                                
2
 Drawing on Berger & Luckmann and other authors previously mentioned, institutional knowledge herein shall be understood 
as "taken-for-granted courses of action experienced as existing over and beyond individuals, which confront them as a coercive 
fact". This stance breaks with the analytical divisions traditionally used to conceptualize knowledge along different dimensions 
(tacit x explicit) or different levels (individual, collective, social) as suggested by authors like Polanyi (1962), Nonaka (1994) and 
Nissen (2007). This concept also contrast with other uses of the expression "institutional knowledge" such as "knowledge of the 
local institutions" (Chetty et al., 2006; Erickson et al., 2007; Javernick-Will & Levitt, 2010) or "institutional memory" (Weick, 
1988; Walsh & Ungson, 1991).  
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becomes effective.  The focus on the knowledge change process aims to open up the 
sequence of events that take place in these situations and cast light on the exact role 
that diversity, politics and the project team context had in the process.  
 
Insofar, the main objective of this investigation is to arrive at a model that describes 
the mechanisms elicited by the international project team context that allow diversity 
and politics to be channeled into knowledge change, and thus innovation, in 
organizational settings. The accomplishment of the main objective depends on the 
following related objectives: 
 
a) Describe the surrounding environment and the investigative setting. 
Emphasis on the socio-historic conditions and on the economic, political and 
institutional forces in play.  
 
 
b) Outline the institutional knowledge subject in focus. Its origins, its supporters, it 
legitimacy mechanisms and the outcomes of its use in the investigated 
setting. 
 
 
c) Describe the factors that brought the institutional knowledge subject into 
question. The reaction of supporters, and pro-reform groups and the 
legitimacy claims and contestations; 
 
 
d) Describe how disputes were settled and a compromise has been reached 
around a new understanding with an emphasis on the arbitrating process and 
on the consequences of this processes to the dynamics of interaction; 
 
 
e) Describe how the changed knowledge becomes effective within project team 
limits with an emphasis on the resistance and acceptance movements 
involved and the reasons and actions underlying them; 
 
 
f) Describe how changed knowledge is received beyond project team limits by 
the organization setting at large and how it becomes institutionalized. If it 
does not, explain why that happened and which forces were in play; 
 
 
g) Identify if the assumptions described in the theoretical discussion hold in the 
empirical setting; 
 
 
h) Describe the power relations initially established in the investigative setting 
and how they evolve over time; 
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4.2- METHODOLOGY 
 
4.2.1- Epistemological Paradigm: Multi-Paradigm Interplay 
 
Considering methodology as an ensemble of procedures to approach a determined 
object of study, it is important to notice that underlying any methodological choice 
there is the worldview of a determined social group, what makes it hard to lay claims 
of scientific neutrality (Minayo, 1985). With this notion in mind, it is important first to 
unveil the epistemological stance used in this investigation which will support not 
only the methodological approach but also the selection of data collection 
instruments and the analytical focus to be applied.  
 
Within organizational studies, positivism-functionalism and interpretivism are the 
prevalent epistemological paradigms and differ in the extent to which they define an 
analytical framework prior to entering the investigation field. Post-modernism is a less 
known but increasingly important paradigm to be considered in social research. 
 
Positivism-functionalism adopts the stance of realism and relies on the assumptions of 
an objective world that can be unequivocally portrayed by scientific data and 
theories. Positivists adopt the stance of realism, that is, the existence of a tangible 
truth, and analysis is conducted by gauging the causal relations between predefined 
variables to confirm or refute hypothesis. Post-positivism slightly differs from 
positivism by holding that reality can be known only in a probabilistic way, and 
hence verification is not possible. Once verification is not attainable, the aim of post-
positivist research is to falsify prior hypotheses. Positivist-functionalist analysis 
operates primarily in a causal mode and is predominantly convergent. They move 
from a relatively unpatterned appreciation of phenomena to a more ordered and less 
bulky one. A current critic to the use of positivism in organizational studies is that it 
falsely portrait the object of study by reifying social reality as existing objectively and 
independently of the labor that actually produced those conditions. 
 
Interpretivism adopts a relativist stance, therefore multiple situated truths are 
assumed to exist. Rather than evaluating hypotheses, interpretive research seeks to 
establish how naturally occurring factors and events, at different levels of analysis, 
interact to influence observed outcomes over time in particular contexts (Dawson & 
Buchanan, 2005). Interpretivists express a strong interest in the ongoing processes of 
sense making and meaning creation, however, they rarely explore ruptures, 
discontinuity, and fragmentation of sense making. Studies in this line generally 
follow a divergent analytical process, in that the primary goal is to expand and 
enrich the analysis by constantly seeking more interpretations and associations.  
 
Postmodernism has a short story within organizational theory. It adopts the stance of 
historical realism and involves the belief that apparent realities are only social 
constructs, as they are subject to change inherent to time and place. Because they 
believe that there is no pattern of sense to be found, general theories are not 
attainable (Lyotard, 1984). Postmodernists focus on contradictions, critical incidents, 
signs, and symbols to develop structural and historical insights that portrait the 
 79 
 
temporary and fragile characters of an organizational life marked by flux and 
discontinuity. For Cooper & Burrel (1988), postmodernists are more interested on the 
processual, as opposed to structural character of human institutions. The aim of 
postmodern analysis is to uncover hidden interests and contradictions in order to 
display the power implications of meanings and encourage critical reflexivity.  
 
Quinn & Cameron (1998), acknowledge that both contrasts and connections between 
paradigms create an intellectual tension that might prove beneficial to the approach 
of complex and multifaceted phenomena. In this line, Schultz & Hatch (1996) suggest 
an interplay strategy to take advantage of the connections between paradigms and 
enable richer frameworks of analysis. In order to analyze organizational social 
phenomena, researchers have to conceive generality and contextuality, continuity 
and discontinuity, in term of each another. In their view, the application of the 
interplay strategy would involve two steps: first, the recognition of the contrasts and 
connections; second, the generation and application of interdependence and tension 
between the contrasts and connections by moving between paradigms.  
 
Management, as a positive science that search practical solutions to objective 
problems, exerts an institutional pressure over this investigation towards the use of a 
positivist-functionalist stance. The processual character of the object of investigation, 
however, demands an interpretivist stance in order to explore the full range of 
interpretations and associations possible.  However, the coercive character of 
institutional knowledge, a key construct in this investigation, invites the use of a post-
modern stance in order to unveil the power and vested interests behind its existence. 
Therefore, in considering the particular conditions of this investigation, which is 
subject to multiple disparate influences at once, a paradigm interplay approach 
seems to be the most appropriate one.  
 
In this sense, despite being predominantly guided by the object of study towards an 
interpretivist stance, following a paradigm interplay approach, the present 
investigation will lean towards a post-modern glance in its reflections regarding 
power relations in the events surrounding the knowledge change process as whole, 
as well as veer towards a more positivist stance in the overall analysis of the 
outcomes of the knowledge change process in order to provide answers and general 
guidance for practical organizational problems as required by the management 
science tradition.  
 
4.2.2- Methodological Approach: Qualitative Approach 
 
The relationship between theory and methodology is an important one. Researchers 
need to use methodologies that are consistent with the assumptions and aims of the 
theoretical view being expressed. According to Pratt (2008), it is key to explain what 
motivates the study and why the chosen method is appropriate. In this sense, the 
reasons ahead exposed explain to a large extent why a qualitative approach is the most 
suitable one for this investigation. 
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Qualitative research is multi-method research that uses an interpretative, naturalistic 
approach to achieve its goals. A number of researchers (Mintzberg, 1979; Van 
Mannen, 1983) argue that qualitative methods are well-suited for building theory 
and writing rich descriptions. Qualitative research is often designed at the same time 
it is being done. It requires highly contextualized individual judgments to progress 
and is open for unanticipated events. It allows more flexibility in what variables and 
processes are encountered and examined, and this flexibility means that qualitative 
methods provide more chances to learn information that is independent of or in 
contrast to exiting theory. 
 
In contrast to the quantitative researcher eager to discover the world “outside” him, 
the qualitative researcher is an integral part of the methodology process of socially 
creating understanding. It often studies phenomena in the environments where they 
occur and uses social actors' meanings to understand the phenomena. It is highly 
descriptive and often recounts who said what to whom as well as how, when and 
why. An emphasis on situational details unfolding overtime allows qualitative 
research to describe processes. Thus, an important value of qualitative research is 
description and understanding of the actual human interactions, meanings, and 
processes that constitute real-life organizational settings. In this sense, a qualitative 
approach provides insights that are difficult to produce with quantitative one 
(Gephart, 2004). 
 
Qualitative methods not rarely are portrayed as primitive tools compared to 
traditional quantitative methods like survey, research, analyses of archival data and 
experiments. Some researchers indeed dismiss the use of qualitative methods as 
“unscientific”. A common consequence of this prejudice against qualitative research 
involves the attempt to make qualitative research resemble quantitative and thus 
more palatable for a non-qualitative audience. In fact, quantifying the data does not 
serve most small-sample quantitative studies.  
 
Not uncommon are the situations where inductive and deductive reasoning are 
combined inappropriately, for example when some researchers engage in random 
sampling rather than theoretical or purposeful sampling or attempts to control 
sample variance. Though induction and deduction work well together on a macro-
field level, on a micro-research level they represent opposite strategies. Deductive 
reasoning arrives at a specific conclusion based on generalizations. Making 
deductions is important when we cannot directly observe a cause, and can only 
observe its consequences. Inductive reasoning progresses from observations of 
individual cases towards the development of a generality. Induction is usually 
described as moving from the specific to the general, while deduction begins with 
the general and ends with the specific. 
 
In response, Dachler (1997) argues that if for quantitative methods eliminating errors 
is all that counts, within a qualitative approach the knowledge of the process itself is 
all that counts. In this regard, he assumes that the degree to which the researcher 
influences or obscures the actual behavior of the researched and the many other 
issues related to the subjectivity and involvement with investigated subjects is crucial 
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for bringing about interesting problems and alternative explanations. Moreover, 
qualitative research critics disregard the fact that quantitative research itself posses, 
sampling and measurement error of their own kind and in many ways a far less 
more scientific than good qualitative research. 
 
For Sutton (1997), when the goal of qualitative research is theory development, the 
significance test for assessing its quality should be restricted on - whether or not - 
new, interesting and logical insights were developed. In his opinion, the intended 
product of qualitative research is new insights, not a test of those insights. One could 
argue that the open-ended nature of qualitative research is one of its key strengths, 
however, all this openness comes at a price, that is, it makes extremely difficult to 
both write and evaluate qualitative research. What is really expected in terms of 
good qualitative research is to achieve a delicate balance of writing a compelling and 
focused account that honors all possible sides regarding the investigated object, 
provides sufficient evidence for claims, and significantly contributes to extant theory. 
 
4.2.3- Investigation Method: Longitudinal Case-Study  
 
A number of researchers argue that longitudinal studies have advantages over cross-
sectional ones when the variables change over time and when the causal relationship 
between the variables needs to be determined. According to Lane (2001), an in-depth 
examination of a small number of case studies is well suited to the exploration of the 
complex company-internal dynamic of this process. Such approach is able to capture 
the tension between strategic intent and institutional constrain making evident the 
unresolved tensions between conflicting strategic goals and the sometimes unstable 
compromise between innovative strategies and institutional inertia/resistance. For 
Ferris & Judge (1991), the way politics can influence organizational life can be better 
understood through longitudinal studies which provide a better picture on how 
these processes unfold overtime. 
 
Following these advices and considering both the exploratory character of this 
investigation and the singular features of the object of investigation, a longitudinal 
case study was selected as investigation method, supported by the criteria put forth 
by Yin (1989). According to this author, a case study methodology is the most 
appropriated method when the phenomenon to be investigated constitutes a process 
involving many variables whose relationship is intrinsically complex.  
 
The case study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamic 
present within single settings (Eisenhardt, 1989). Case studies can involve either 
single or multiple cases, and numerous levels of analysis (Yin, 1989). Case studies 
typically combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, 
questionnaires, and observations. The evidence may be qualitative, quantitative or 
both. A case study describes a single event or unit of analysis determined by the 
researcher, with the use archival or documentary data along with other sources as it 
changes over time. 
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A great concern involving the use of case studies refers to the number of cases 
necessary to generate theoretical insights. Authors like Eisenhardt (1989) argue that 
this number should be situated between four and ten, with fewer likely to yield 
feeble and unconvincing theory and more being excessively complex. However, for 
Dyer & Wilkins (1991), this prescription violates the essence of case study research, 
that is, to provide a rich account of the social scene and reveal the deep structures of 
social behavior. In their view, investing in multiple cases invariably lead thinner 
descriptions, limiting the investigation to the more readily observable aspects of the 
setting and neglecting the more tacit and less obvious ones.  
 
In a reply, Eisenhardt (1991) argues that by multiple cases researchers allow for 
patterns and generalizations to be more readily observed, thus eliminating chance 
association. Multiple cases also emphasize complementary aspects of phenomena 
that pieced together allow for a wider theoretical picture.  Finally, stories represent a 
source of cognitive bias and thus shall not displace the search for better constructs. 
Pentland (1999), however, puts aside this standoff and claims that there is no trade-
off between better stories and constructs. Similar to DiMaggio (1995), he argues that in 
the domain of process theory, stories are key elements to explain relationships between 
events in a process or in a narrative, and thus functional equivalents to constructs. 
 
Overall, the central issue is not the number of cases approached but whether the 
researcher is able to understand and describe the context of the social dynamics in 
question to such a degree as to make the context intelligible to the reader and to 
generate theory in relationship to that context. More, the appropriate number of 
cases depends upon how much is known and how much new information is likely to 
be learned from incremental cases. Many researchers suggest stopping adding cases 
when theoretical saturation is reached. Theoretical saturation is simply the point which 
incremental learning is minimal because the researchers are observing phenomena 
seen before. Another practical point is that theoretical saturation often combines 
pragmatic considerations such as time and money to dictate when research ends.  
 
In this investigation, the chosen unit of analysis to be taken as single case is the project, 
understood as a “temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product, service, or 
result” (PMBOK Guide, 2004 p.5). The balance between doctoral program time 
limitations and the necessary immersion to approach the object of study restricted 
the number of cases/projects analyzed to three (3), with data being collected over a 
continuous period of approximately 24 months.  
 
Another time-related problem affecting the number of cases was the sensitive 
character of the data collection (i.e.: firm knowledge, power conflicts, political 
influence and intercultural relationships). If access to rich data turned into a lengthy 
process it could further restrict the number of cases/projects to be analyzed. This has 
been addressed by restricting all three cases/projects to the same organizational 
setting (WP) and national locus (Brazil).  
 
The threat of a feeble investigation with an unconvincing theory typical for same 
setting investigations (Eisenhardt, 1989) has been more than compensated by the 
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turbulent transitional period experienced by the organizational setting investigated, 
which has been particularly useful making more readily observable relevant 
elements to this investigation that would otherwise remain latent or imperceptible. 
Changing moments in a company life, thus, represent a privileged research 
opportunity in which subtle motivations and logics of action become apparent. 
 
Furthermore, restricting the investigation to one organizational setting allowed for a 
more precise map of the organizational power relations what would result in an 
overly exhaustive task for a single researcher (or poorer maps) if different companies 
were approached. It would also be harder to follow changes to the organizational 
power relations as a result of project outcomes or external events once cases were 
finished and the research left the different organizations.  
 
Although possible, statistical sampling of cases from the chosen population (to control 
for some variability) is unusual when building theory from case studies. In the more 
usual theoretical sampling, cases are chosen by theoretical reasons (and not statistical) 
to replicate previous cases, extend emergent theory, fill theoretical categories and 
provide extreme situations or polar types for analysis. In this sense, cases/projects 
were selected on the basis of different clients, goals, personnel and context in order to 
explore “all possible sides regarding the investigated object”, as suggested by Sutton 
(1997, p.98).  
 
4.2.4- Strengths and Weaknesses in Building Theory from Case Study Research 
 
Although theories can be built out of observations, literature analysis, common sense 
and related experience, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that it is the intimate connection 
with empirical reality that permits the development of a testable, relevant, and valid 
theory. The likelihood of valid theory is high because the theory building process is 
so intimately tied with evidence that it is very likely that the resultant theory will be 
consistent with empirical evidence. This intimate interaction often produces theory 
which closely mirrors the observed reality. 
 
The process of building theory from case study research is a strikingly iterative one. 
While an investigator may focus on one part of the process at a time, the process 
itself involves constant iteration backward and forward between steps.  Also, the 
process is alive with tensions between divergence, into new ways of understanding 
the data arising from a multitude of collection methods and searching tactics, and 
convergence, onto a single theoretical framework. Each piece of evidence is 
submitted to diverse perspectives before converging into construct definitions and a 
framework for structuring findings.  
 
The use of a case-study methodology to build theory is not free of weaknesses. At 
one extreme, intensive use of empirical evidence can lead to theory that is overly 
complex. Theorists working from case data can lose their sense of proportion as they 
confront vivid, voluminous data and be tempted to reach for an all encompassing 
theory. At the other one, cases may result in narrow and idiosyncratic theory. If the 
researcher is unable to raise the level of generalizability of the results it is posed to 
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make only a modest contribution to the field. Therefore, building theory from case 
study research is most appropriately in the early stages of research on a topic or to 
provide freshness in perspective to an already researched topic. 
 
4.2.5- Methodological Rigor in Case Study Research 
 
A critical challenge in organizational theory is how to move from surface structure to 
deep structure, or how to recover a single, objective account from multiple, partial, 
subjective, and even conflicting accounts (Pentland, 1999).  As a researcher moves 
from surface observations towards the underlying structure, he moves from 
description to explanation and so to better theory (Sutton & Staw, 1995). 
 
Gibbert et al. (2008) acknowledge that, despite its contribution to generating and 
testing theory, case study method has been prone to concerns regarding 
methodological rigor in terms of validity and reliability. While deficiencies in any 
methodology are problematic, lack of rigor in case study deserves special attention 
because initial research fragilities tend to have their effect exaggerated downstream 
with any doubts concerning research’s reliability may dim its conclusions into 
irrelevance. According to these authors, four criteria are commonly used to assess the 
rigor of field research: internal validity, construct validity, external validity and reliability. 
 
Internal validity refers to the causal relationships between variables and results. The 
issue here is to verify whether the research provides a plausible causal argument, 
logical reasoning that is powerful and compelling enough to defend the research 
conclusion. In order to enhance internal validity researchers must develop a clear 
research framework, demonstrating the causal relationships involved and explain 
why they are ruling out alternative explanations (Yin, 1989). It is also important to 
empirically compare observed patterns with those predicted by related theory or 
found in different contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Construct validity refers to the quality of the conceptualization or operationalization 
of the relevant concepts and to the extent that research procedures lead to an 
accurate observation of the reality. In this line researchers are encouraged to establish 
a clear chain of evidence to allow readers to reconstruct how the research went from 
the initial questions to the conclusions. Furthermore, researchers are expected to 
triangulate data, that is, use different data collection strategies and different data 
sources in order to appreciate the phenomenon from as many different angles as 
possible.  
 
External validity relates to ‘generalizability’, that is, the degree to which a theory can 
explain phenomena beyond the studied setting. Although case studies indeed do not 
allow for statistical generalization they do provide the means for analytical 
generalization, that is, generalize from empirical observations to theory rather than 
to a population (Yin, 1989). A way to enhance external validity is to conduct cross-
case analysis involving not only cases from different settings but also conducting 
different case studies within the same setting.  
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In this line, Eisenhardt (1989) emphasizes that qualitative research should be 
systematic rather than impressionistic, and propose guidelines about the amount and 
kind of qualitative data to gather, how to code such information, and how it should 
be analyzed to provide grounding and credibility for theory. Sutton (1997), however, 
suggests that there is no relationship between the amount of data gathered and the 
rigor to which qualitative research is done. In his opinion, though cases becomes 
more convincing as evidence grown in number, it´s their diversity in kind that 
enhance the internal validity of the proposed constructs and the strength of ongoing 
conclusions. The conclusiveness which comes from the convergence of several kinds 
of evidence reflects the fact that separate varieties of evidence can be 
reconceptualized as deductions from a basic proposition which have now been 
verified on the field (Whyte, 1999). 
 
Weick (1989) argues that rigor on qualitative research depends more on the features 
of the thinking process itself than on the properties and the quantity of the data 
collected. For Dyer & Wilkins (1991) what matters is to focus on the context and 
describe the phenomena richly. Such descriptions act as clear examples of new 
relationships, new orientations, or phenomena not yet registered. Overall, authors 
point that a strong theory-building study is grounded in compelling evidence and 
yields theory that is parsimonious, testable and logically coherent. It must yield new, 
groundbreaking insights. 
 
4.3- METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS 
 
4.3.1- Methodological Considerations for International Management Studies 
 
O’Grady & Lane (1996) argue that business people seldom reflect on and articulate 
their values, although they feel uncomfortable when these values are violated. Also, 
they are often not aware of the assumptions that underlie and guide their actions. As 
a result of different mental programming, people from various cultures, ascendances 
and educational backgrounds have different approaches and solutions to problems. 
Each tends to believe that his/her way makes the most sense and is best. Therefore, it 
is utmost important to be aware that one’s cultures can act as a barrier to accurately 
understand the environment that one is facing. This may be even more crucial when 
differences are not obvious or noticed.  
 
Easterby-Smith & Malina (1999) remind that the problem for researchers from one 
culture or context wishing to conduct qualitative research on another culture is that 
outsiders’ past experiences will not have equipped them to make sense of events in 
the same way that insiders would. As Teagarden and colleagues comment, “no one 
research can be insider in multiple cultures” (1995, p.1283). In their view, a way to equate 
this problem is through the exercise of reflexivity, that is, the researcher has to use 
information given by studied subjects to gain understand about itself and this way 
become aware of its own cultural bias.  
 
According to Pierson (2003), beneath the surface of any apparently stable 
institutional setting, cumulative processes are occurring in direction of change, what 
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Thelen (2000) previously conceptualized as institutional layering. Actors in 
disadvantage do not simply embrace the position assigned to them, on the contrary, 
they often bind to it until conditions shift and they fell free to act strategically or even 
in a subversively way to revert their situation, building new institutions that 
systematically test the limits of the current institutional order. Thus, analysts have to 
pay special attention not just to the surface level of activities but also to the 
underlying patterns of tension and conflict.  
 
4.3.2. Methodological Considerations in Organizational Politics Studies 
 
There are clear difficulties in bringing empirical data regarding organizational 
political activity given the potentially damaging outcomes involved in the disclosure 
of such information. Political activity normally involves stimulating debate, gaining 
support from key people, and even covert manipulation, actions that what in many 
organizations may be regarded as subversive or ethically objectionable. Therefore, 
most organizations and their members do not regard disclosure of these actions as a 
valuable corporate or personal publicity. Attempts to disguise political actions can 
separate accounts from their history and context, making adequate interpretation 
problematic (Buchanan & Badham, 1999).  
 
In this sense, a number of methodological problems need to be considered and 
addressed in organizational politics studies. One is the potential social desirability 
bias inherent to questions concerning sensitive topics. Because most people perceive 
politics in the pejorative sense, a powerful social bias is likely to result when people 
is questioned about their political behavior. As a result, alternative sources of 
information must be considered beyond actor’s self-report (Ferris & Judge, 1991).  
 
Because political behaviors are not readily observable and are subject to 
interpretation, some techniques should be used to enhance data credibility. 
Prolonged engagement is a vital element of credibility (Thompson & Purdy, 2009). 
Being a participant observer for the length of the study helps to support the 
legitimacy of researcher’s interpretations. This make possible to follow discussions 
between participants with different views about the process and to uncover 
arguments and intentions not necessarily expressed in interviews. Similarly, 
McLoughlin & Badham (2005, p. 839) point that any interesting methodological 
approach to political processes need to go beyond methods which enable “to get 
close to the action” into more effectively ones that “tell it like it is”. 
 
For Dawson and Buchanan (2005), narratives provide a particularly powerful tool not 
for establishing the hegemony of a particular interpretation of organizational events. 
In their view, narratives have the potential to become political resources that serve to 
maintain and advance the positions of individuals and groups, while delegitimizing 
the accounts and positions of others. As such, story-telling skills associated with 
constructing compelling and convincing accounts can be viewed as an effective 
political instrument for influencing others. Compelling stories can enable groups to 
influence decision-making and steer organizations in certain preferred directions. A 
powerful and influential story will be coherent, engaging, and robust in the sense 
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that it is resistant to subversion, and at the same time, flexible enough to be revised 
without threat to the author’s credibility. 
 
Research into process of change is enriched theoretically and practically through 
explicit attempts to identify, expose, and analyze competing narratives. Instead of 
being swept away through triangulation, deviant versions must be viewed as 
competing attempts to make sense of events and their consequences. By shedding 
light over competing narratives, researchers expose the socio-political process 
through which they were constructed and particular positions and versions of events 
corroborated. Like Dawson & Buchanan (2005), this work is interested in competing 
versions of reality and in uncovering stories that remain locked beyond public view 
through the power play of key actors, and that the embedded constrains of hierarchy 
and function. Not to forget that researchers are also authors of change narratives. 
Although the use of the narrative approach allows the author to capture some of the 
complexibility and ambiguity of the change process, the researcher has nevertheless 
sifted, selected, and interpreted data in a way that is likely to reflect its particular 
interests.  
 
Another methodological issue of considerable importance for the understanding of 
political processes is level of analysis. The interpersonal dynamics of political 
influence take place within a context that is shaped by competing interests and 
influences taking place at group and organizational levels of analysis. As such, to 
neglect these levels would render a deficient and incomplete view of the process. 
Thompson & Purdy (2009) highlight that process theories often recognize the 
recursive relationship between human agency and context overtime. In their view, a 
process approach yields a rich view of both context and agency and recognizes the 
complexity of the organizational context in which innovation and political activity 
occur, offering the means by which the full range of political actions can be 
characterized. 
 
4.4- INVESTIGATION DESIGN 
 
4.4.1- Theoretical Background 
 
Despite some claims within methodological literature that inductive research should 
be purely emergent, it is in fact not recommendable to enter the investigation field 
without at least some orienting ideas and investigative focus. Inductive and loosely 
designed studies make sense only when researchers have plenty of time and are 
exploring exotic cultures or very complex social phenomena. The looser the initial 
design, the less selective the collection of data and once the researcher awash in data 
need a lot of time to sort it out. Moreover, waiting for key constructs or regularities 
to emerge can take a long time. Therefore, it is important to provide extant literature 
review that notes the contents and limits of prior research in the field that point to 
gaps in theory that the study can address. 
 
Similarly is not uncommon for qualitative research to understate explicit goals, 
objectives or research questions behind data analysis and research outcomes. It is 
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important for qualitative research to have a clear focus on which to proceed in order 
to make a stand for the contributions being made. Where questions are clearly stated, 
the concepts underlying them may be not, and as a result, the meaning of the 
question remains elusive. Theoretical background to key concepts needs to be 
disclosed in ways that create consistency among theories, concepts research 
questions and methodologies (Gephart, 2004).  
 
Most of qualitative research lives on this delicate balance: something is known 
conceptually about the phenomenon, but not enough to house a theory. Researcher 
knows parts of the phenomenon that are not well understood, and know where to 
look for what is missing where, from who and when. He/she has a rudimentary 
conceptual framework, a set of general research questions, sampling notions and 
initial data-gathering devices.  
 
A conceptual framework explains, either graphically or in a narrative form, the main 
dimensions to be studied and the presumed relationship among them. Theoretical 
frameworks have a focusing and bounding function that helps researchers to see 
where to get information and what should be done once it has been collected. As 
qualitative researchers collected their data they revise their frameworks, making 
them more precise and adjusting relationships. Although not common in theory-
building studies to the date, a priori specification of constructs is valuable because it 
permits researchers to measure constructs more accurately. If these constructs prove 
important as the study progresses, then researchers have a firmer empirical 
grounding for the emergent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
The formulation of research questions can precede or follow the development of a 
conceptual framework, but in either case they make theoretical assumptions more 
explicit and delimitate what the researcher wants to explore, focusing attention 
towards determined variables and relationships and away from others. Research 
questions facilitate the transition from conceptual framework to consideration about 
sampling, instrumentation and analysis. In fact, sampling and instrumentation 
decisions actually work delimiting settings, actors, processes and events to be 
studied, thus constraining the range of analysis possible. In short, framework 
informs the choice of research question. The research question, in turn, informs the 
sampling frame: where one goes to get answers, to whom he talks, and to what he 
observes. 
 
The conceptual framework and research questions determine the focus and 
boundaries within which samples are selected. Qualitative research usually works 
with small samples which tend to be more purposive than random. Sampling in 
qualitative research involves not only decisions about which people to observe or 
interview, but also about settings, and processes. Sampling issues are often linked 
with 'generalizability' issues. While sampling, it is always important to consider why a 
determined informant is important. Settings, events and processes that initially look 
interesting with time may prove not to be the most pertinent or rich ones, and thus 
should be systematically reviewed. Although most information is obtained from core 
actors, it is also important to work a bit at the peripheries and talk to people that are 
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not central, dissidents, renegades or no longer involved, to get contrasting and 
comparative information. 
 
4.4.2- MNE as Investigation Context  
 
According to Pratt (2008), the choice of the investigation context must be clearly 
explained. Authors should justify their context from a sampling perspective, stating 
if it represents a prototypical or an extreme case. Authors should disclose their 
sampling strategies as well as its expected changes along the study in order to make 
explicit to readers the underlying assumptions behind the conclusions. 
 
Roth & Kostova (2003) point that MNEs have been extensively used for theory-
building and research propositions by a number of research agendas. However, the 
potential for MNE contributions for organizational research can only be fully 
realized if its conceptual distinctiveness is clearly delineated, what depends on more 
rigorous and systematic approaches strongly linked with underlying theory. 
Otherwise, the use of MNE may appear incidental or considered distinctive without 
any supporting articulation. 
 
In this sense, they point that MNE context may be used for the examination of MNE-
specific phenomena, that is, phenomena that do not exist in the purely domestic 
context, or have been modified as a result of the introduction of cross-border 
conditions (i.e.: Zaheer, 1995). In some studies, the MNE context highlights the 
limitations of the basic explanatory mechanism of existing theory and invite 
alternative explanations (i.e.: Earley and Mosakowski, 2000). Within this 
investigation, however, the MNE context is used as a proxy for intraorganizational 
heterogeneity and complexity and make the case for extreme competing pressures, 
choices and tradeoffs. In this case, the MNE context is either important for increasing 
variance in data, and thereby allowing for a rigorous test of existing theory and 
suggest new theorizing.  
 
4.4.3- The Choice of the Field 
 
Over the last decades, the service sector has become increasingly internationalized. 
As well as exporting services to other countries, firms have established a variety of 
organizational forms and networks in order to enable themselves to deliver their 
products across national borders. Whereas some consideration has been given to 
understand strategic issues, very little is known about the internationalization of 
service sector firms at the level of organization, management, and work processes. 
This is particularly true for professional service firms, which are characterized by the 
knowledge intensity, dependence on highly skilled employees and intangibility and 
customization of solutions delivered (Grosse, 1996; Morgan & Quack, 2005). 
 
Professional service firms primarily deliver problem solving to their customers, what 
involves not only the application of standardized solutions but also the development 
of new customized ones. Knowledge processes are central to these firms as they 
operate in highly context-specific environments and need to coordinate work 
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processes in which people possessing the relevant knowledge must cooperate to 
meet clients’ demands. As problems become both more extensive and complex, a key 
issue affecting these firms is how to deliver the necessary coordination in the 
presence of diverse knowledge. Even though, the way such firms deal with 
knowledge is by no means fully understood or theorized. This is even more the case 
where such firms become involved in international business.  
 
Due to their nature, such firms often suffer from two main sources of difficulties 
when going international. First, internationalization usually requires an increase in 
the number of interfaces between business actors and in the course of this process. 
Second, perceptions of what constitutes relevant knowledge and appropriate 
processes for knowledge are likely to differ considerably between countries, so they 
can no longer rely on the same degree of common understanding of rules, norms, 
and behaviors among business actors that they have been used in their home base. 
 
Extant studies highlight that professional services firms need to reconfigure existing 
structures and develop new mechanisms of organizational coordination as they 
expand across national borders, a process that involves considerable amount of 
experimentation given the complexity and velocity of change in international 
business environment. Most of these studies have developed from debates of 
professional service firms rather than the analysis of internationalization and MNEs 
and therefore provided limited explanation to how such firms develop 
internationally based competences (Morgan & Quack, 2005). 
 
Maybe even more important is that differently than other economic sectors that can 
almost insulate themselves from foreign environment when going international, 
service firms cannot choose not to interact with their context. On the contrary, deep 
interaction with the context and extensive exposition to diverse knowledge is what 
better identify international service firms.  
 
Among such firms, international engineering companies have been at the forefront of 
internationalization process since the beginning of the last century and, due to the 
strategic content of its activity, spared from the protectionism that limited the 
international expansion of other types of service firms. Due to their deep 
involvement with the many contexts they operate simultaneously, the knowledge 
intensive character of its activity and the mature state of the existing MNEs, 
international engineering companies provide the perfect field for the present 
investigation. 
 
4.4.4- Data Collection 
 
Many authors (Pratt, 2009; Gephart, 2004; Van Mannen, 1983) agree that there is no 
widely accepted template for writing up qualitative research. There is no minimum 
number of interviews and observations that should be conducted in a qualitative 
investigation. What is enough depends on what questions a researcher seeks to 
answer.  
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A huge part of the fieldwork in qualitative investigations consists of taking notes, 
recording conversations and picking up documents, products and artifacts. In this 
sense, talk about instrumentation may seem out of place. However, it is always 
useful for a qualitative researcher to have at hand orienting questions, headings for 
observations and a few forms for document qualification. For Eisenhardt (1989), a 
clear definition of the research question helps researchers to specify the kind of data 
to be gathered. Without a research focus, it is easy to become overwhelmed by the 
volume of data. 
 
It is difficult to determine how deep a researcher must go to generate good theory, 
however classic case study researchers usually spend a long time, building 
relationships from whom they could obtain information on a regular basis, make 
formal or informal interviews, participate in activities of the organization as a 
member and develop extensive work diaries. Field researchers must engage in a 
long-term contact with their subjects, so that the understanding of the actors can gain 
sufficient weight compared to theoretical prejudices of the scholar. 
 
As such, a multi-method data collection is the ideal choice for a complex 
investigation like this one as it enables the integration and triangulation of findings 
and helps to extend the levels of internal validity of the data collected and provide 
stronger substantiation for constructs and theory.  In agreement with Kristensen & 
Zeitlin (2001), what matters is to get the details right and to find coherent ways of 
recounting them in a way that do not violate actors’ own effort to make sense of what 
is going on.  
 
Following the work of Javernick-Will & Levitt (2010) on the key methods that 
international project firms use to transfer and mobilize knowledge internally, data 
collection paid attention to both formal processes (i.e.: manuals, templates, procedures, 
check-lists, available though information systems) and social processes (i.e.: meetings, 
personal discussions,  on-line communications, e-mails, personnel transfers, "leason-
learned", and "peer-reviews"). In this sense, the data collection instruments detailed 
ahead have been fundamental to the accomplishment of the objectives of this 
investigation. 
 
4.4.4.1- Researcher Standpoint 
 
Several authors argue that a more personal disclosure of author’s biases and 
involvement in particular is welcome in qualitative studies. For Miles & Huberman 
(1984), it is good for the researcher to make their preferences clear instead of letting 
the reader to intuit from which standpoint the author is operating from. According to 
Pratt (2008), the author must be very clear about his position in the field. In his 
opinion, the relationship between researcher and researched must be clearly stated. 
These details are important, as they inform readers about researcher´s approach to 
the study. 
 
As recommended by the above authors, prior to the data collection presentation, this 
researcher provides a short review of his personal, professional and academic 
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trajectory in order to make explicit to readers the worldview and societal perspective 
that guided the investigative work. Authors like Minayo (1986) suggest that bringing 
bias or prejudices into light help readers to evaluate the impersonality of the claims 
made and the reliability of the data collected, thus improving overall research 
quality. 
 
4.4.4.2- Investigation Context 
 
First, a clear and systematic view of world’s recent economic developments is key to 
understand a great deal of the macro forces that set the stage for the phenomenon 
under study. The international economic context and the local economic context have 
been examined with the help of key historicians, governmental and multilateral 
economic reports, business press and the Internet. In this part, a non-citation strategy 
has been adopted within this section to avoid repetitiveness, allow for a more fluid 
construction of the text and better amalgamation of the multiple sources. In this 
endeavor I acknowledge the help of the summarizing power of the Wikipedia 
(en.wikipedia.org), the works of historicians like Rondo & Neal (2002), Furtado 
(2007), and Prado (2006), newspapers like the Financial Times, NYTimes, La 
Vanguardia, Folha de São Paulo and Estado de Sao Paulo, business magazines like 
Exame and The Economist and public databases like EUROSTAT, IMF and IPEA. 
 
The engineering business context has been described both at international and local 
level in order to provide readers with an overview of external forces to which the 
investigated setting was submitted, with a special emphasis on economic and 
institutional ones. The international engineering business context has been reconstructed 
from specialized business magazines and Internet accounts extracted from 
engineering firms websites. The local engineering business context has been richly 
described by Brazilian authors, particularly work sociologists, which exhaustively 
debated the role of engineering in Brazilian economic development and society.  
 
Prior to the investigation context description, the field entry process is described so as 
to inform readers about the sequence of events that led to the selection the 
investigation setting, as well as to clarify the preliminary relationships established 
with it. 
 
Though the investigation has been restricted to a single locational setting, a large 
engineering office in the city of São Paulo (Brazil), it took place at a turbulent time 
where this office went through several different ownerships. In the relatively short 
period of four years this office went from a minor company in a large Brazilian 
conglomerate, to an independent company and finally to a key branch of large 
transnational company. Though challenging, the turbulent period involving the 
investigated setting proved a rich time for data collection as subtle processes became 
more apparent and their outcomes rapidly observable. This unique investigation 
setting made possible to explore how increasing diversity and power shifts affected 
firm knowledge process in a relatively short period of time.  
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As such, the investigation context description involved the examination of the 
historical contribution of these several companies to the particular features of the 
investigation context. The use of secondary data from sociological studies and public 
company documents, as suggested by Lane (2001), helped to reconstruct the socio-
historic conditions and internal forces (economic, political and institutional) affecting 
the investigation setting prior to the investigative period.  
 
For Luger et al. (2005), limiting the research on influence activities to direct face-to-
face interactions provide a too narrow focus. As the meaning of influence is also 
socially constructed, it is important to bring to light the construction process itself. 
McLoughlin & Badham (2005) highlights the importance of taking a historical 
perspective in order that the broader context of change can be understood. As such, 
information about the physical setting, the psychological state of the participants, 
demographic characteristics, or any other element capable of enriching the context 
available for examinations are also of great value. Data concerning the identities and 
relationships of the participants of a process are required, if one is to understand role 
structure and social networks in which the process is embedded. 
 
In this sense, a current account concerning the contextual state of the investigated 
setting at the time of each case/project is presented to introduce the specific 
circumstances in which they have developed.  Case context not only involved the 
internal affairs of the investigated setting but also their relationships with clients and 
partners that could influence the internal knowledge change outcomes. For this, 
archival documentation including speeches, internal memoranda, strategic plan reports 
and internal communication has been used to provide a precise account of the 
contextual background on each knowledge change process has developed. 
 
4.4.4.3- Participant Observation 
 
Through participant observation researchers gain access to members of a group or 
organization to observe behavior as it occurs, and also build relations of personal 
trust needed to elicit full and reasonably frank interview material. Ideally the 
researcher blends into the social scene in such way as to minimize the impact of his 
presence on the behavior of those observed. In that model, one hopes to accomplish 
what is not entirely possible: to describe and analyze the behavior of those studied as 
it would occur without the presence of the observer (Whyte, 1989). Yet, the very 
notion of “participant observer” must been understood through a spectrum of 
possibilities such as: complete participation, the participant doubling as observer, the 
observer doubling as a participant and the complete observer. Each observation 
strategy, however, bring its own peculiar positional problem: the participating 
observer of being a traitor, the observer participant of being a spy and the complete 
participant of concealing his character in order to preserve the observed process. 
 
Jarvie (1969) casts doubt on the assumption that to observe a social phenomenon at 
best, involves living that phenomenon. First, he questions “the inside” as privileged 
observation point by reminding that the vantage point is a matter of what the 
researcher wants to observe and why. Second, he points that by “going native” it 
 94 
 
may become impossible for researchers to objectify their experiences towards 
scientific knowledge. Another problem arises when researchers confront situations in 
which these roles violently clash. The research may come into situations where his 
system of values strongly put him at odds with the facts he is observing (i.e.: crime, 
injustice, prejudice, betrayal, physical integrity) however for the sake of the precise 
observation he must conceal his position and by doing so neglect his moral duties. 
Overall, he argues that science is better served when the observer engages into a full 
and equal relationship with the subjects of study and do not exclude from those 
relationships the tensions and clashes which enrich the living experience. 
 
Due to the complex and sensitive nature of the object of study, data collection 
involved direct and covered participant observation over a period of 24 months. Along 
this time it was possible to constantly collect data about the investigation setting 
context and the cases approached. Through this full embeddedness strategy it was 
possible to observe in detail the processes of knowledge change triggered by 
international project teams both along time and across levels (i.e.: individual, team, 
office, corporate). Key events, interactions, observations and personal feelings have 
been captured by notes in a field diary following the ethnographic tradition. 
Remarks, commentaries and observations were also noted on the field diaries for 
further reference during data presentation protocol and analysis.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish the selected data collection method from 
a class on their own of participative investigation such as action research (Thiollent, 
1997; Coghlan, 2011). Differently from this strain of research, where the research 
engages into open and direct interaction with investigated subjects with aims to 
solve organizational problems, participant observation as data collection toll aims only 
collect rich data from a privileged insider point of view. 
 
4.4.4.4- Field Notes 
 
A striking feature in theory building research is the frequent overlap of data analysis 
with data collection. Field notes, for example, are an important means of 
accomplishing this overlap. Field notes are an ongoing stream-of-consciousness 
commentary about what is happening in the research, involving both observation 
and analysis (Van Mannen, 1983). These notes can be cross-case comparison, hunches 
about relationships, anecdotes and informal observations. One key to useful field 
notes is to write down whatever impression occurs, that is, to react rather than to sift 
out what may seem important, because it is often difficult to know what will and 
what will not be useful in the future. A second key to successful field notes is to push 
thinking in these notes by asking questions to itself (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Overlapping data analysis with data collection not only gives the researcher a head 
start but, more importantly, allows researcher to take advantage of flexible data 
collection. This freedom to make adjustments in data sources and collection 
instruments enables the researcher to probe emergent themes, move focus of interest 
and take advantage of special opportunities. This flexibility is not a license to be 
unsystematic, but rather controlled opportunism in which researchers take 
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advantage of the uniqueness of a specific case and the emergence of new themes to 
improve resultant theory. 
 
4.4.4.5- Interviews 
 
Interviews are situated face-to-face interactions in which researchers typically pose 
questions that a respondent answer. Interviews mount to a condition where private 
speech can be externalized and captured by the research in order to reveal the 
subject’s interpretation on the events that they experience (Gephart, 2004). During 
the initial investigation design work and along the early investigative moments, 
interviews were supposed to be an important part of data collection as it was 
expected that subject’s perspective would contribute to understand the object of 
investigation. 
 
Reality however proved far trickier as initial interviews, though helped understand 
the investigation context and capture subject-level conflicts, yielded few if any 
specific relevant information regarding the knowledge change process itself. Non-
structured interviews with international team members predominantly displayed a 
cultural comparative focus (i.e.: here is this way, there it is this way). Where a more 
structured approach was tried to invite subject’s into deeper reflexivity, researcher 
has been inherently forced out of his covered position resulting in subject’s feeling 
observed and changing their public behavior in his presence. Due to this 
unacceptable observer bias, structured interviews were ruled out of the investigation 
as they would expose the covered character of the researcher and undermine his 
capacity to collect rich unbiased data. 
 
Another problem affecting interviews is that they systematically silenced or 
concealed details regarding power conflicts and political influence activities, which 
were vividly captured in public situations. As such, there has been either 
unawareness on the part of subjects about their role in knowledge change process or 
a disguised interest in it to be hidden. This polar sort of behavior made private 
speech either of little relevance to data collection or substantially different from 
public speech. The data collection problem faced then is that although private speech 
is conducive to the understanding of social phenomena in subject´s terms, it is public 
speech that is actionable in social interaction situations, and thus, relevant to 
understanding social rationalization processes (Habermas, 1984). Therefore, although 
differences in private and public speech revealed an underlying conflict regarding 
what subjects think and do, the objective of this investigation closely linked with the 
latter and thus better server by public speech. 
 
With these limitations in mind, this investigation restricted interviews to situations 
where subjects wanted to openly speak of events and made their opinions widely 
known, that is, under conditions that made private speech equal public speech. They 
were predominantly open-ended informal interviews, with an average of 1 hour and 
conducted on random basis with several subjects per team. They stopped being 
collected when saturation was reached, that is, when further interviews did not 
contribute to deepening the understanding of the object of investigation. Both 
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electronic recording and written notes have been used depending on written 
permission of the interviewees or strategic interest of the researcher to compare 
recorded and non-recorded interviews. 
 
To overcome the limitations imposed by private speech conditions, data collection 
focus turned to situations where public speech could be vividly observed and 
collected. Particularly important situations of public speech were meetings, informal 
conversations and e-mails.  
 
4.4.4.6- Meetings 
 
Meetings mounted to situations where project members were officially gathered to 
receive/retrieve information, discuss problems, expose their views and settle 
agreements. Meetings were usually invoked by project top ranks around specific 
topics and lasted from 30 minutes to several hours. They involved not only team 
members but also corporate wide personnel, members of other project teams in the 
company, project partners, client personnel and suppliers. Some meetings were 
carried on face-to-face situation, others through videoconference technologies, and 
others through phone-conference. Most often meetings took place in the company 
facilities. At their end usually a “minutes of minutes” (MOM) was issued in order to 
make official compromises settled and actions to be taken.  Where not, an e-mail was 
prepared and sent to all interested parties in order to provide a means for decision 
recollection and to induce action. 
 
On the course of the investigation meetings provided a rich media for data collection 
as they presented the author with a social situation where knowledge processes 
could be dynamically observed. Meetings are structured arenas of discussion in 
which participants are selected not only on the basis of their potential contribution to 
the debates but also based on their rank and potential role as legitimators. Meeting 
composition/selection represented itself a materialization of power forces in play 
along knowledge change processes. During meetings lower ranks are given voice 
towards higher ones what mounted to a unique opportunity to exert influence 
beyond its peers and immediate superiors.  
 
The real-time interaction between project members during meetings exposed not 
only the discourses, behaviors, cultural patterns and underlying rationalities of the 
participants but also the silences, the prejudices, subtle allegiances, 
legitimation/delegitimation strategies, the timing of proposition introduction or 
withdrawal, the risk taking pattern of change agents as well as the resistance 
strategies of defendants of the status quo. Meetings were also privileged situations 
where knowledge roles (i.e.: legitimators, change agents, and status quo) became 
evident. Overall, meetings make up for the bulk of political action in the knowledge 
change processes examined. 
 
Meetings were electronically recorded using a cell-phone and saved as audio files 
(*.MP4). Approximately 130 meetings along the three study cases were captured 
through this process and had their audio files subsequently examined through a 
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fluctuant attention technique and had points of interest marked on a timetable for 
later appreciation. Key meetings and points of discussions were entirely transcribed 
to digital media format (WORD files) for in depth examination. Meeting recording 
also stopped when saturation was reached, that is, when further data collection did 
not contribute to deepening the understanding of the object investigated.  
 
4.4.4.7- Informal Conversations 
 
According to Miles & Huberman (1984), informal talks can yield valuable backstage 
information. It has been no different for this investigation as informal or “corridor” 
conversations proved a rich source of information regarding the phenomena under 
investigation particularly from the standpoint a more challenging, and thus less 
public, speech and of concealed actions towards less sanctioned venues of influence. 
They provided a contrasting stance against the sanctioned and legitimate character of 
meetings in which particular and partisan views became more salient and 
underlying discourse strategies and focus of influence could be more vividly 
captured.  
 
Informal conversations made explicit information and positions strategically 
concealed in order to enlist additional partisans and gain further support before/after 
meeting debates or in order to preserve personal positions from status quo potential 
retaliation. Informal conversations happened all the time but were particularly 
relevant right before/after meetings, during lunchtime, coffee breaks or were brought 
about by chance as a cathartic impulse. Informal conversations most likely involved 
non-aligned peers, closer colleagues, and sympathetic audience. Overall, informal 
conversations made up for the bulk of strategic action in the knowledge change 
processes examined. 
 
Informal conversations have been noted on a booklet and lately incorporated to the 
field diary notes together with conversation impressions, setting details and 
subsequent observed actions. Two booklets with a sum of almost 200 pages of notes 
have been taken out of this process along data collection period.  
 
4.4.4.8- E-mails 
 
E-mails extended the public speech character of meetings beyond the range of the 
initial participants and the locational setting. E-mails had also the feature of public 
positions and official statements and thus were highly actionable. Message tone 
(harsh x polite), response time (long x short), impact (answered x ignored) and 
outcomes were significative indicators of a wider audience recognition and 
knowledge effective change. In this sense, e-mails mounted to instruments of quasi-
institutionalization in the knowledge change processes examined. 
 
Just as meeting composition/selection represented a materialization of power forces 
in play, mail listings were also representative of audiences to be influenced and 
allegiances to be met. E-mails also helped to organize data collection on a temporal 
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sequence of events, and thus helped to establish a clear causal chain among events 
along knowledge change processes. 
 
Along data collection period more than 1000 thousand electronic messages have been 
stored through MS Outlook tool and on later stage printed and examined using a 
fluctuant attention technique. Key remarks, commentaries and constructs were 
marked down for further reference, quotation and incorporation to the data 
presentation protocol and analysis. 
 
4.4.4.9- Archival Data 
 
Archival data has been extensively used to reconstruct the context of investigation and 
to support or contrast field evidences during data collection period and along the 
analysis process. Archival data collected involved public company documents, press 
releases, speeches, internal memoranda, strategic plan reports and internal 
communication. 
 
4.4.5- Data Reliability 
 
A recurrent question in qualitative research, which can be naturally directed towards 
this investigation, is how are the readers to know if the facts were as they were 
reported? Away from the increasing concerns involving fraud, the real problem rests 
with the honest research whose eventual mistakes during data gathering may 
undermine his conclusions (Whyte, 1989). In this regard, several considerations 
shown below have helped this investigation to avoid interpretive traps during 
qualitative data collection. 
 
Many items of evidence in qualitative studies consist of statements by members of 
the group under study about the observed events. However, individual’s statements 
and descriptions of events are made from a perspective which is function of his 
position in the group, and thus, must be carefully examined against a critical 
backdrop concerning his veiled interests. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that 
even when statements prove to be seriously biased, they are still conveying useful 
evidence towards unexpected relationships and conclusions.  
 
Another problem concerns the evidential value of statements whether they have 
been made independently or have directed by a question from the observer. 
Although volunteered statements seem less driven by observer’s interference than 
one which is made in response to a direct question, the observer’s very question may 
direct the informant into self-elaborating the problem and give an answer which 
might never occur to him otherwise.  
 
Statements and actions made in the presence of the sole observer may differ greatly 
from those made to an audience. More important than judging which situation is 
more reliable, it is important to view each datum as valuable itself towards a 
thoroughly understanding of the phenomenon. 
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In assessing the value of evidence one must also taken into account the observer´s 
relative role in the observed group. How subjects define researcher’s role affects 
what they tell him or let him see. If the observer carries on his research incognito, 
participating as a full-fledged member of the group, he/she will have access to 
knowledge that would normally be hidden from an outsider. He/she could properly 
interpret his experience as that of a hypothetical “typical” group member. On the 
other hand, the “strangeness” may help the observer to learn how group members 
define him and their reaction to his conditions may also be a valuable source of 
information to interpret evidence.  
 
Although a myth surrounding theory building from case studies is that the process is 
limited by researchers´ preconceptions, in fact, the constant comparison of conflicting 
realities tends to unfreeze thinking and lead to less biased research than incremental 
studies or axiomatic deduction. For Whyte (1989), the possibility of closely studying 
important changes that would not be possible from the outset far outweighs the 
potential disadvantages of researcher bias through personal involvement in the 
investigated process. 
 
For Lee (2001), the methodological context must provide enough information to 
allow a reader to understand the decision-making process that the qualitative 
research has followed. The reader may agree or disagree with the researchers 
choices, nonetheless, he is to be provided with sufficient information to 
hypothetically replicate the study’s underlying logic, comprising a sort of 
“replication standard” (p.215). 
 
Overall, reliability can be considered the measure of transparency and replicability 
used in the study that allow for subsequent researchers to hypothetically arrive at the 
same insights if they conduct the study along the same steps again. Transparency can 
be enhanced by elaborating case study protocols, that is, reports that specifies how the 
entire case has been conducted. Replicability may be accomplished by assembling a 
case study database, which should include the notes, documents and narratives 
collected during the study, organized in such a way as to facilitate retrieval or 
inspection by further researchers.  
 
4.4.6- Data Presentation 
 
Showing data is critical for accessing whether successful theorizing is plausible. One 
key mistake in writing qualitative research happens when an author rather than 
showing any raw data, give only their interpretation of the data. This analytic excess 
is problematic because no clear chain of evidence shows how the researcher moved 
from their data to their interpretations. Crafting elaborated tables and relegating all 
data to these tables is a variation of the problem. Ideally, authors should place at 
least some data within the body of the paper, what not only makes the text more 
interesting to read but also facilitates the task of establishing the necessary chain of 
events and conclusions. 
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The opposite also represents a problem. Although “thick description” may 
ultimately contribute to theory, limiting an analysis to just describe what one found 
is not likely to make it significant. Indirectly, several analytic strategies can lead to 
descriptive excesses. Organizing findings around research questions often leads to 
the use of quotes and other data to answer them, however the answers focus 
frequently supersedes the discussion focus hindering the elaboration of theoretical 
contributions. Crafting typologies may also lead to being overly descriptive in some 
circumstances. Simply sorting themes out of the data without explaining how this 
classification schemes leads to new theory or new theoretical insights makes the text 
too descriptive.  
 
For Pratt (2009), key data should be placed in the body of the text and only in 
exceptional cases in tables. These data may be in the form o “power quotes” and 
“proof-quotes”. Generally “power quotes” are the most compelling bits of data a 
qualitative research may use, once they effectively illustrate and bolster points that 
have been priory developed along the analysis. Many quotes may be provided for 
each argumentation point in order to strengthen the evidence backing author’s 
statements.  
 
Figures may also be used to help in the presentation of how the methodological 
process unfolds and for depicting more complex analyses. They are also helpful in 
capturing the chain of evidence towards one conclusion. The use of figures is 
particularly of great help for depicting process and for representing how the author 
moved from raw data to the theoretical labels or constructs used in the analysis. 
 
Within-case analysis typically involves detailed case study write-ups for each site. 
These write-ups are often simply pure descriptions, but they are central to the 
generation of insight once they allow for the investigators to become deeply familiar 
with each case before start making generalizations. In this investigation, study-case 
protocols have been organized in the format of narratives describing the process of 
knowledge change with an emphasis on context, actors and knowledge processes 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
4.4.6.1- Narratives as Case Study Protocols 
 
Process theories attempt to understand ill-defined flows and patterns of action in 
specific organizational contexts, characterized by untidy, politicized and iterative 
change process driven by a range of actors, using a combination of multi-level, 
longitudinal, qualitative data from multiple sources. It thus adopts a less tightly 
defined relationship of causality which can be equated with the contextualized and 
temporally sensitive expressions of causality conveyed by narratives (Dawson & 
Buchanan, 2005). 
 
According to Putnam et al. (1996), narratives are accounts of events, usually 
developed chronologically and sequentially to indicate causality. They are vehicles 
through which organizational values and beliefs are produced, reproduced and 
transformed. They shape organizational meanings through functioning as 
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retrospective sensemaking, serving as premises of arguments and persuasive 
appeals, acting as implicit mechanisms of social control, and constituting frames of 
reference for interpreting organizational actions. Similarly, Weick (1995) argues that 
accounts help people to connect events in a plausible and coherent way, contributing 
to the interpretation and evaluation of actions in general.  
 
Pentland (1999) argues that narratives can be a valuable source of insights about 
organizations, and thus, can provide the means for better process theories and 
explanations in case-study research. Once any narrative contains a description of a 
process or a sequence of events, so they are able to confirm the existence of a 
sequential pattern, as well as expose its antecedents and consequences. However, 
describing patterns, antecedents and consequences does not by itself explain the 
underlying process. A single process can generate many different performances, with 
many different points of views, narrated in great variety of ways. Explanations 
require researchers to go beyond the surface level of events, where accounts can be 
rather fragmented, situated, strategic and conflicting, and systematically triangulate 
and confront data from different sources towards the deepest levels where the 
generating mechanisms enable and constrain the process under examination. 
 
In using narratives to describe processes it is important not only the contents of texts 
but also their trajectories: where they emanate from, how they are used by 
organizational actors and what connections are established among texts. Such 
approach provide focus for an intensive qualitative investigation to examine the link 
between particular actions carried out in an organization that relates to legitimacy or 
sensemaking and the texts that are produced, as well as the subsequent impact of 
those texts.  
 
In creating a coherent story, it is important not only to describe themes and events, 
but how they fit together. Just as a literary story has a focal character, so too should a 
qualitative story have a focus on around which the rest of the contents gravitates. A 
narrative must provide a clear time sequence (beginning, middle and end) which 
works as a central organizing device for presenting actions and events. Excessive 
emphasis on time sequence, however, tends to enhance descriptive generalization at 
expense of meaningful explanations, once a focus on events encourages readers to 
abstract away from actors and their relations. 
 
Narratives can take many forms, however, they usually unfold around the following 
key elements: time sequence, focal actors, narrative voice, evaluative frame of 
reference, context and events. In this way they link antecedents, action and 
consequences. As noted by Dawson & Buchanan (2005), narratives are theory-laden 
because they systematically link antecedents and consequences in a relationship of 
causality. However, the theoretical background and the selection of key 
developments may not be always transparent allowing room for all sorts of political 
manipulation aimed at furthering a determined point of view. 
 
Every story is told form a particular point of view, with a particular narrative voice, 
which is not regarded as part of deep structures. The way a story is told can provide 
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additional insight into the social world under investigation as well as tellers´ point of 
view and their relationship to their audience. Stories also vary depending on who is 
doing the telling, and the details of how a story is told are worth great attention. 
Objectivity is created and sustained when researchers tell stories in their own 
scholarly voice, rather than letting their research subject do the talking. Selective 
silencing is also an unavoidable feature of narrative, as well as finding the silent 
voices and revealing the sources of power enhances its deconstructive role.  
 
Evaluative context can drive processes, enabling and constraining certain choices and 
key events. Careful attention to evaluative context also can be used to show how 
unstated assumptions influence actions and opinions and how pervasive structural 
tensions form and are handled in the setting. In this sense, researchers do not just 
observe events, they focalize them and create stories to explain them. (Dawson & 
Buchanan, 2005).  
 
4.5- DATA ANALYSIS 
 
4.5.1- Analytic Guidelines 
 
More than just presenting data, it is also important to analyze, interpret, compare 
and contrast cases to reveal conceptual similarities and differences within it. 
Moreover, authors need to revisit research questions or goals in their discussions to 
explain how their questions were answered and how their goals were achieved in the 
report research. The broader implications and importance of the findings need to be 
explained and related in terms of key management and/or social science issue. 
 
For Gephart (2004), it is important to show what was done in the research process 
and to articulate how research practices transformed observations into data, results, 
findings and insights. Researchers need to report their sources and types of data as 
well as their analysis practices. In moving from data to findings, the goal is to be 
clear about what has been done, so that readers can evaluate the veracity of the 
methods. In doing this, it’s important to explain how and in what way data were 
used during analysis and make sure the chain of evidence is clear and compelling.  
 
Similarly, this author suggests that the operation of data into concepts needs to be 
made in a clear and explicit way if the findings are to be comprehensive and credible. 
A well-developed analytical procedure ensures that data has been systematically, 
comprehensively and exhaustively reviewed. In his opinion, making these links 
explicit avoids the problem of “exampling” where a researcher addresses a few cases 
but fails to explain how these cases represent a broader data set or explain how they 
were chosen. 
 
In qualitative research, frequently thoughtful ideas and interesting ideas derive from 
unplanned questions and non-recorded observations. Given the common scientific 
norms that most researchers are socialized to, ideas resulting of these 
unplanned/unrecorded actions are usually dropped out of analysis, or concealed 
from readers view, undermining his assessment of the analytic process and on what 
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basis conclusions were reached. In this investigation, fine grained and apparently 
unconnected pieces of data have been extensively collected through the use of field 
notes which helped in the data aggregation process and in some cases to provide 
complementary support for theoretical claims. 
 
Though part of the analysis carried in this investigation display similarities with 
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) it extends this 
traditional approach by using a multi-method strategy, which give great emphasis to 
time and level dynamics. Moreover, in agreement with Sminia (2009), although the 
whole purpose of grounded theory is to construct theory from raw data in a 
systematic and traceable manner, the actual process of emergence of the codes and 
categories and how they link together in the mind of researcher remains on the verge 
of obscurity. In this sense, the object of this investigation is better served by a 
collection of methods more akin to a process theory building method.  
 
4.5.2- Process Analysis 
 
Overall, this investigation follows the guidance provided by process researchers such 
as Van de Ven & Poole (1995), Langley (1999), Dawson & Buchanan (2005), Dooley & 
Van de Ven (1999). For these authors, process research is about finding answers to 
‘how’ questions regarding the outcomes of a process or a specific phenomena. In 
general terms, these authors assume processes as an organized family of occurrences 
that are systematically linked to one another, either causally of functionally.  
 
Acccording to Van de Ven & Huber (1990), process research is concerned with 
understanding how things evolve overtime and why they evolve in a determined 
way. Process data consist of events, actions and choices ordered overtime. Differently 
from variance theories that provide explanation for phenomena in terms of 
relationships between variables (i.e.: +A  +B), process theories provide explanations 
in terms of sequence of events leading to an outcome (i.e: A  B  C). Therefore, 
understanding patterns in events is key in developing “process” theories. 
 
Process data, however, display characteristics that make them difficult to manipulate 
and analyze. First, events and actions are far more subtle and difficult to measure 
than variables. Second, process phenomena display a fluid character that spreads out 
over both time and space, turning different examination levels into a continuum 
where it becomes difficult to establish analytical boundaries.  Finally, although 
processes are usually treated in a linear fashion way, it is not uncommon to find 
situations where they display recycling between phases and parallel tracks, as well as 
multilayered and changing contexts (Langley, 1999). 
 
4.5.3- Analytic Procedures 
 
The most serious and central difficulty in the use of qualitative data is that there is no 
prototypical method of analysis. Usually most of the attention is dedicated to issues 
like gaining access and avoiding bias during data collection. For qualitative 
investigations, analytic methods are rarely reported in detail and even when 
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researchers try to be explicit about their methods, the lack of common language and 
the labor-intensiveness of the analytic process give room for great ambiguity.  
 
In this sense, it is important to describe the successive procedures used for within-
site and cross-site analyses, all the way from the initial coding of site-level notes to 
the more explanatory cross-site analyses. It is also important to detail the analytic 
steps taken, the decision rules used, the bases for drawing conclusions, the 
confidence held in the conclusions, and the strengthen and weakness of the analysis.  
 
4.5.3.1- Longitudinal Case Analysis 
 
Following Miles & Huberman (1984) qualitative data analyses consisted of three 
concurrent flows of activities: data reduction, data display and conclusion 
drawing/verification. These three streams of activities made up for an interactive, 
cyclical process, making qualitative data analysis a continuous and iterative process. 
As such, qualitative analysis has been documented as fully as possible for purpose of 
auditing but also for purpose of learning. 
 
Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, and transforming collected 
data. Researcher’s choices on how to gather and handle have analytic nature. 
Following Weick (1989), data reduction aimed to be as simple as possible, and 
applicable, however, preserving its intrinsic complexity. As such, data reduction 
involved a careful examination of data collection using a technique of fluctuant 
attention which consisted of successively reading and listening data collection several 
times taking associative notes until key actors, events and actions arise and made up 
for a clear causal link in the knowledge change process examined. Along this 
process, unrelated elements were progressively filtered, and thus, ruled out from 
main analysis. Another cognitive process that helped in data reduction was 
reflexivity, that is, the causal links preliminarily established have been back checked 
several times in situations detached from direct source data examination in order to 
eliminate chance association, and first impression bias, helping to consolidate the 
causal links discovered.  
 
Data display refers to an organized assembly of information and is a major venue to 
valid qualitative analysis. The most frequent form of display for qualitative data is 
the narrative text, although matrices, graphs, flowcharts are also useful. First, 
following Langley (1999) and Dawson & Buchanan (2005), data has been 
preliminarily displayed in the form of temporal narratives (see data presentation 
section) describing in detail the events that took place in the knowledge change 
processes examined with an emphasis in the direct and indirect actions that 
concurred to the outcomes observed.  Second, following Dooley & Van de Ven 
(1999), the two main dimensions knowledge density and power asymmetry have been 
examined  (plotted) along time series and had their points of inflection associated to 
knowledge processes theoretically expected and explained in terms of the key actions 
and events highlighted by the narrative work (see data analysis section).  
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Conclusion drawing/verification refers to the process of deciding what things means, of 
ruling out regularities, and lifting explanations, causal relations and propositions. 
Researchers should hold these conclusions lightly, maintaining openness and 
skepticism until data collection is over. The meanings emerging from a single case 
nonetheless have to be contrasted with other cases in order to gain plausibility and 
robustness, and thus achieve construct validity. As such, in the beginning of the 
analysis, a summary with preliminary observations is presented in order to highlight 
the particular contribution and specific circumstances circumscribed to this specific 
case. 
 
4.5.3.2- Cross Case Analysis 
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), cross-case analyses consist in selecting categories or 
dimensions and look for similarities and differences across different situations. 
Cross-case analysis force investigators to go beyond initial impressions, through the 
use of structured and diverse lenses on the data. These tactics improve the likelihood 
of accurate and reliable theory and enhance the probability that the investigators will 
capture the novel findings which may exist in the data. 
 
As themes, concepts, and possibly even relationships between constructs begin to 
emerge, the next step is to compare the emergent frame with the evidence from each 
case in order to assess how well they fit along the data gathered.  Sharpening 
constructs is a two-way iterative process involving construct redefinition and 
evidence building. Through constant comparison between data and causal links, 
accumulating evidence from diverse sources converges upon a single, well-defined 
causal link.  
 
Cases that confirm emergent relationships enhance confidence in their validity. Cases 
which disconfirm the relationships often can provide an opportunity to refine and 
extend theory. When a relationship is supported, qualitative data often provides a 
good understanding of the dynamics underlying that relationship. It is important to 
discover the underlying theoretical reasons for why the relationships exist because it 
helps to establish the internal validity of the findings.  
 
4.5.3.3- Model Specification 
 
One important thing about qualitative research is that analysis is carried on 
sequentially, with important parts of the analysis being made while the researcher is 
still gathering his data. This brings two consequences: First, further gathering data 
takes its direction from provisional analysis. Second, final comprehensive analyses 
may not be possible until fieldwork is complete.  In this investigation, the entire data 
examination and analysis took place AFTER fieldwork has been completed. Though 
this strategy can potentially hurt analysis by denying research from additional 
confirmatory data, this has been necessary due to doctoral program time constrains. 
 
Becker (1958) identifies four phases unfolding from qualitative research analysis. In 
the first stage, the observer selects significant events where the phenomenon under 
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study become salient and set focus for further investigation. Second, he/she checks 
the relative frequency of these events among categories of subjects and proposes 
relationships which may turn into provisional models. While provisional models 
may be charged imprecise, the observer is in position to infer what kind of evidence 
would most likely to support or refute them and go for it. Third, he/she constructs 
models of parts of the organization and seeks greater accuracy by successively 
refining the model to take account of evidence that does not fit previous formulation. 
After accumulating several models of this kind, he seeks connections between them 
towards an overall model of the organization. 
 
During model specification, some of the strategies promoted by Langley (1999)  were 
followed, such as visual mapping where findings were graphically represented to 
make key construct and relationships emerge out of researcher´s analytical process 
and the proposed model amenable to readers in general. This work also follows his 
alternating templates strategy in that initial causal links are constantly contrasted with 
alternative ones developed after direct data examination. Competing explanations 
were “tested” in a hypothetico-deductive fashion way, which gradually refuted 
weaker theorizations and consolidated the main ones. 
 
The final systematic analysis, carried on after the fieldwork is complete, consists of 
rechecking and rebuilding models as carefully and with as many safeguards as data 
will allow. At this stage, the observer carries on the model building operation more 
systematically and arrives at the final model specification.  
 
4.5.3.4- Literature Comparison 
 
Comparison with the emergent concepts with theory and extant literature is 
important for two reasons. First, if researchers ignore conflicting findings the 
confidence in them will be reduced either by incorrectness (challenge to internal 
validity) or by idiosyncrasy (challenge to generalizability). Second, the juxtaposition 
of conflicting resulting forces researchers into a more creative, groundbreaking mode 
of thinking in order to extend theory to accommodated the findings or to definitively 
challenge it. Literature discussing similar findings is important as well because it ties 
together underlying similarities in phenomena normally not associated with each 
other.  
 
Overall, tying the emergent theory to existing literature enhances the internal 
validity, generalizability, and theoretical level of theory building from case study 
research. While linking results to the literature is important in most research, it is 
particularly crucial in theory-building research because findings often rest on very 
limited number of cases so any further corroboration of internal validity and 
generalizability is an important improvement (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
4.5.3.5- Back-Checking Conclusions 
 
A controversial issue in participatory research is to allow the studied subjects to 
check facts and offer alternative explanations. For Whyte (1989), researchers have 
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traditionally reacted against criticism on the interpretations of the facts and 
conclusions by telling that subjects are just being defensive. In his opinion, to 
safeguard against researcher’s self-delusion, facts must be checked by those with 
firsthand knowledge before any written reports. 
 
In this investigation, however, back checking conclusions has been limited by the 
covered character of the investigation and also by the furtive or unconscious 
character of the processes involved in the knowledge change process. First, submit 
subjects to “theory checking” to convey their opinions would expose the covered 
character of the investigation and jeopardize future researcher relations with the 
subjects investigated. Second, even if deemed possible, subjects would rather deny 
proposed theorization than admit being caught on the course of their political 
influence processes and strategic actions. Therefore, only informal back-checkings 
have been proposed to some key informants and the results were displayed at the 
final of the analytical section. 
 
4.6- ETHICAL CONCERNS 
 
4.6.1- Identification Disclosure 
 
Under the investigation permission agreement the identification of the investigated 
companies has not been disclosed as it could potentially open up mismanagement 
claims from minority shareholders as well as easily convey insider information for 
competitors. As such focal companies investigated were identified by initials like 
WP, CCC, CNC (prior purchase), CNC/WP (after purchase) and their location offices 
when required.  
 
Differently from investigated companies, client names are an important source of 
contextual information as long as it says much about the type of business relations 
that the investigated companies try to build and how different they treat a diverse 
client based. As such, Petrobras, Eletrobras/Eletronuclear, LLX and BG (former 
British Gas) are identified as such. 
 
Investigated subjects, were also identified by a letter code (i.e.: X.Y.Z.) which do not 
have directly relationships with their names initials, though it may look. This 
procedure had the aim to preserve actor’s reputation from wider social or 
professional scrutiny, which could be harmed by inadvertently or selective use the 
information contained in this investigation.  
 
4.6.2.- Sensitive-Information Confidentiality 
 
Companies strategy and business information have been collected exclusively by 
means of public records, such as business press, investors relation reports, and 
particularly important through their corporate institutional websites. Acting this way 
the researcher was able to prevent that by any means sensitive data could be 
inadvertently disclosed alongside the investigative work. 
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Even when sensitive information were incidentally captured along data collection it 
has been kept off data presentation and analysis, unless its disclosure represented 
little risk for the investigated company and high impact in terms of explaining or 
contextualizing the investigated phenomena. Situation like these were limited to no 
more than two or three potential occurrences all over data presentation. 
 
Nevertheless, the latest data collection dates 2 years back from this doctoral 
dissertation been made public. Insofar, researcher and investigated companies 
agreed that any piece of sensitive information that may have passed through these 
filter hardly will be useful for any economic or legal concern on due date. 
 
4.6.3- Participant Anonymity and Privacy 
 
Under investigation permission agreement, investigation was not submitted to 
companies for prior appreciation before being open to the public in order to preserve 
the privacy and reputation of investigated actors. Given the hierarchical position of 
each actor on the projects investigated, firms could easily name them and use this 
information for a selective performance appraisal. Researcher understands that it is 
up to human resources department to apply official appraisals upon companies´ 
employees, using legal and egalitarian methods it has at disposal, what by no means 
can be mixed with the objectives of the present investigation.  
 
Additionally, participant behaviors not directly linked to the object of investigation 
(knowledge change process) whenever possible were not recorded and if incidentally 
recorded were kept off data presentation. Researcher understands that the individual 
conducts of the investigated subjects that do not interfere in the investigated object 
are of the sole concern of the subject and the entity that he works for. Moreover, 
moral and professional judgments run in a diametrically opposed direction to the 
impersonal scientific objectives of this investigation. 
 
In retribution for allowing this investigation and respecting participant anonymity, 
the corporate entity (WP) received a separate report suggesting points of 
improvement for both HR policies and leadership training and selection. 
 
4.6.4- Researcher Neutrality 
 
Although data presentation and analysis adopted a free discursive strategy, on a 
permanent basis, researcher neutrality has been reflexively checked, and whenever 
an element of information or piece of analysis has been considered biased towards 
researcher ethical or moral judgment the entire topic has been withdraw from 
investigation report.  
 
This procedure aimed to minimize potential biases that might have been introduced 
to the data collection or analytical work as a result of the intense exposure to the 
investigated setting the researcher was submitted to. As personal conflicts, broken 
expectations and unfair treatment may have contributed to unleash potentially 
emotional responses on the part of the research, whenever these events could 
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potentially affect its impartiality and clear judgment of the investigated facts, this 
procedure has been applied. 
 
4.6.5- Secure Data Collection Storage 
 
Full data collection (i.e.: e-mails, recorded meetings, field diaries, and documental 
evidence) is securely stored on hard-drive media away from non-authorized access 
and safeguarded from internet leakage.  
 
Copies also exist in paper and are properly archived for auditing and further 
consultation.  
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SECTION II  
DATA PRESENTATION & ANALYSIS 
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CONTEXT OF INVESTIGATION 
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5.1- ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
 
5.1.1- International Economic Context: A Turnaround in the World Economic 
Order 
 
Even to those used to the concept of dynamic environments (Schumpeter, 1934; 
Grant, 1996b; Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000), the last decade has been 
breathtaking. Unforeseen political and economic events literally turned upside-down 
long standing economic balances. According to Anderson (2011), two intertwined 
economic events radically changed the world economic landscape in recent years: 
China ascension and emerging markets (EM) economic decoupling from the 
developed world.  
 
EM economies entered the 90´s with an extraordinary set of economic imbalances 
(i.e.: high foreign debt, high deficits, dependence on foreign inflows, inflation). The 
increasingly interconnected nature of the financial system unleashed extremely 
strong market forces and an unprecedented wave of international financial crisis 
swept one by one battered EM economies like Mexico (1994), Thailand (1997), 
Indonesia (1997), South Korea (1997), Philippines (1998), Malaysia (1998), Russia 
(1998), Brazil (1998), Turkey (2000), and Argentina (2001). EM economies along this 
process were forced to float their currencies, restructure their debt, adopt fiscal 
tightening measures and run fiscal surpluses to service their foreign debt.  
 
Unlike its neighbors, most of China's foreign investment in the 90´s took the form of 
factories rather than securities. China took advantage of the economic 
disorganization that hit its Southeast Asian neighbors and took their place as reliable 
source of manufactured goods and became a prime foreign investment destination. 
In order to attract productive investment and know-how, Chinese government 
opened its huge state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to associations with MNEs, offering 
market access, attractive tax code, export facilities, full profit reintegration, cheap 
and obedient labor. Chinese local manufacturers also received strong governmental 
incentives like cheap land, low-interest loans, subsidized energy, and devaluated 
currency. As a result, China not only attracted manufacturers from its neighbors but 
also from developed countries whose MNEs quickly moved labor-intensive and low 
added-value activities to the country in order to reap productive gains and increase 
profitability (Fishman, 2004). Productive relocation has been particularly strong in 
the U.S. due to the market pressure of large-scale retailers (i.e.: Wal-Mart, JC 
Penney). 
 
Parallel to those events, US economy experienced an unprecedented period of 
growth and wealth. Contributed to such economic dynamism the transition from an 
industrial-based to a service-based economy steered by the introduction of 
information technologies (IT), booming exports resulting from aggressive free-trade 
agreements (inclusive with China), and improved fiscal management. During the 
1990s, GDP grew eight years in a row, real output increased, inflation was 
manageable and unemployment dropped to below 5% (full employment), conditions 
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only interrupted by the so-called “dot-com bubble”  (2000-2001) and the terrorist 
attacks of 9th September 2001. 
 
On the opposite side, the 90´s marked the beginning of a troublesome period for the 
Japanese economy. In the period of 1990-1992, an asset price bubble developed 
during the 80´s come to an abrupt end, dragging the whole economy into a 
deflationary trap.  Growth in Japan throughout the 90´s was slower than in other 
major developed economies, giving rise to the term “lost decade”. In the end of the 
90´s, the Southeast Asia crisis again hit hard the Japanese economy bringing the 
export –led growth model to a end, as some its main markets suddenly become fierce 
competitors. Japanese companies which for a long time were reluctant to 
internationalize were forced either to relocate or shift production into higher added-
value, if not both. This has been a particularly rich period of business research as the 
crossborder implementation of Japanese management model (i.e.: Just-in-Time, 
Kaizen, Kanban, Quality Circles) called attention to the cultural/institutional roots of 
management practices. 
 
Europe, on its turn, went through the 90´s with a relative balance of challenges and 
opportunities. On the challenges side, Germany struggled as the reunification in 1991 
proved costlier than expected, while UK experimented the exhaustion of Tatcher´s 
liberal policies and the 1992 currency crisis. France and Italy faced problems with 
public spending and budget deficits. On the opportunities side, the formalization of 
the Europe Union (EU) in 1993 stimulated trade and investment within the block 
boosting the economies of poorer countries like Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece 
and reactivating the economies of the richer partners. It was a time of economic 
stability for the EU, as it could relocate production not only through its long 
established network of MNEs but also within its borders in order to respond 
competitive pressures.  
 
In the beginning of the 2000´s, the productive distortion the Chinese government 
promoted in manufacturing was so intense that in some cases the net cost of 
exported goods barely covered the cost of the raw material used. This phenomenon 
generated downward inflationary pressures in developed countries, particularly the 
U.S., while expanded the consumption base and multinational profitability 
worldwide. A virtuous circle established as China flooded the market with cheap 
manufactures and imported specialized services and high added-value goods from 
the developed world.  
 
In the aftermath of the events of 2000-2001, the concentration of white-collar 
activities in developed countries pushed productivity upwards, particularly in the 
U.S. The consequent downward inflation tendency contributed to easy credit 
conditions, which fuelled another round of consumption and economic growth in the 
developed world. The U.S., closely followed by Europe, consolidated his position as 
the economic “engine of the world”.  Significant amounts of investment flowed 
among developed countries, curbing investment and consumption in EM markets, 
still recovering from the recent financial crisis.  
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Fig. 04– US, EU and Japan GDP growth between 1990-2010 (Source: EUROSTAT - http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). 
 
The year 2002 consolidated China as “the factory of the world” and the beginning of 
its decade-long explosion in commodity and primary resources imports. Major 
commodity exporters like the Gulf States, Brazil, Australia, Russia, Nigeria, and 
Argentina benefited enormously from Chinese growth. Aided by commodity 
revenues and productive relocation, key EM economies suddenly found themselves 
with a favorable set of macro-economic conditions (i.e.: weakened currencies, lower 
foreign debt, better banking systems, fiscal surplus), which provided a strong 
underpinning for foreign capital attraction and growth.  
 
At the same time falling interest rates and intense competition in the developed 
world made capital markets look for riskier assets and higher yields in the EM, what 
started by Asia who had recently given signs of intense economic dynamism. By 
2004, however, China was no longer an emerging market to be conquered. Decades 
of trade surplus and heavy State intervention in the economy created an awesome 
international competitor (Fishman, 2004). To keep profiting from exports, Chinese 
companies moved upwards in the productive chain manufacturing goods with 
higher added value and technological content, again with the help of technology and 
management brought by worldwide MNEs. For smaller companies it was too late to 
invest in China, as many sectors had already developed its national champions, 
which were about to go global (Perez & Robinson, 2004a/b).  
 
The quest for the next great place to invest spurred many analysis and studies, none 
as appealing as the one developed in 2001 by Jim O´Neill, chief economist for the 
investment bank Goldman Sachs. He created the acronym BRICs to refer to Brazil, 
Russia, India and China, a group of very different but rapidly growing large and 
populous countries with potential to lead world economy in a few decades.  
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Fig. 05– GDP growth forecast 2010-2050 (Source: Goldman Sachs BRIC Report) 
 
Like a self-fulfilling prophecy, BRIC countries quickly dominated the stage for 
international investment and started to receive large capital inflows after 2004. 
Foreign investment helped their economies grow much faster than developed world, 
proving O´Neill had a point. Nevertheless, an intense debate emerged about the 
BRIC dependence on the developed world demand to keep on growing. 
 
Fig. 06–GDP growth: BRICS x Advanced Economies from 2000-2011. (Source: IMF  Data Mapper) 
 
From 2004 to 2007, almost all economies around the world enjoyed some level of 
growth. China took advantage of the surging demand for manufactured goods in 
both developed and developing world and grew an astonishing 13.5% this year. As 
EM markets fuelled developed world appetite for commodities and basic goods, they 
started to run large trade surpluses and accumulate extensive amounts of foreign 
reserves. EM economies fearing that currency valuation would damage exports, 
feedback this money into the global economic system through the purchase of U.S. 
debt, issued to cover public deficit and the military campaigns in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan. These inflows were high enough to keep U.S. interest rates at extremely 
low levels, what stimulated steady consumption and kept the world growing.  
 
 
Fig. 07– Current Account Balance: EM x US x EU  from 1995-2010 (Source: IMF  Data Mapper). 
 
At the same time, low interest rates promoted a boom in the U.S. real estate market. 
Price appreciation enabled families to refinance their homes and use the additional 
money to invest or expand consumption. Lenders start to push credit further into 
higher-risk borrowers (sub-prime) using even riskier loan options and borrowing 
incentives. By 2006, a building boom led to an oversupply, which caused prices 
slightly decline in mid-2006. In an over-leveraged economy this slightly decline 
blocked the refinancing strategy and led to several non-performing sub-prime loans. 
As foreclosures increased the supply of homes, prices continue a downward spiral 
that dragged down the whole mortgage system. Defaults on other loan types also 
increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts 
of the economy, imposing heavy losses to the U.S financial system. The bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brother investment banking marks a critical point in the crisis process. 
 
Through a process called securitization, home loans were packed and sold to foreign 
investors as highly secure and profitable investment options. With housing prices 
declining, major global financial institutions started to report significant losses. The 
complex mechanisms used to distribute risk and benefits in the securitization process 
led to a great uncertainty in the financial world. As the crisis spread worldwide, 
credit markets froze, risking paralyzing even the most usual short-time productive 
credit operations. Central banks around the world acted quickly to support market 
liquidity while the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates to near-zero, bought 
unwanted securities and bail-out banks and insurance companies.  
 
The credit-crunch also exposed the fragility of several EU economies. With 
international creditors much more selective, countries like Greece, Portugal, Ireland 
and Spain found it increasingly difficult to finance their huge domestic deficits at 
discount rates. Unable to expand governmental spending these countries suffered 
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heavily from the 2008 recession and saw tax revenues dwindle further aggravating 
public debt situation. In different moments of 2010-2011, Greece had to bailed-out by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Ireland and Portugal received rescue 
packages and Spain had to commit to aggressive cuts in public spending to meet EU 
fiscal targets. Overall this crisis known as European Sovereign Credit Crisis, is still 
on course with Portugal about to receive a IMF bail-out and a growing dissent over 
the future course of the European currency, the Euro. 
 
In the aftermath of the sub-prime and sovereign debt crisis, economists worldwide 
start fearing that the following recession would unleash a round of protectionist 
measures that could cause a retrenchment in globalization with disastrous 
consequences for the world economy. (The big question: Is globalization on the 
retreat in 2011. Financial Times, 18th July 2010). Fearing the worst, leaders on the main 
economies resisted protectionism and committed to keep borders and trade open.  
 
In the early developments of the crises, EM world remained relatively untouched as 
“toxic” securities did not penetrate their unsophisticated or heavily regulated 
financial markets. With their financial markets unscathed, commentators start 
wonder that EM depended increasingly less on developed world for financing and 
trade. However, as crises intensified and the risk of a global downturn and 
incontrollable deflation promoted intense resource outflows from EMs, the safety of 
these markets become questionable. Under this threat, key EM economies followed 
the example of developed markets and used their comfortable fiscal situations to 
launch stimulus measures aiming to offset the effects of the recession and restore 
steady growth. In 2009 third quarter, the numbers of Chinese economy showed that 
US$500 billion stimuli package had worked and the country had take a different 
course than U.S. and Europe. Other EM countries also reacted favorably to these and 
other packages avoiding recession and keeping a moderate growth.  
 
In 2010, EM economies quickly recovered from the downturn of 2009 (India, 10.4%; 
China, 10,3%; Brazil, 7.5%; Turkey: 8,3%; Argentina, 9,2%) in response to the 
stimulus packages. With the decoupling thesis gaining ground, the BRIC acronym 
has come into widespread use as a symbol of the shift in global economic power 
away from the developed economies towards the EM. Development and economic 
dynamism went south and east as the picture next shows.  
 
The 2007-2011 economic events confronted traditional MNEs with a number of new 
challenges. On the one side, with developed world in retrenchment mode the trend 
in talent flow reversed. Long time expatriates begin to find their way back in the 
booming business of their home countries carrying with them global experience and 
a vast business networking. This reversal of talent posed a dual treat to established 
MNEs: first, they lost human capital when it was most needed. Second they saw 
competition strengthen in a moment of fragility. On the other side, MNEs with 
consolidated operations in EM did quite well during the crises as revenues from its 
EM subsidiaries compensate for the stagnant business in developed markets. A side 
effect of this financial reversal, however, was the increasing power of EM 
subsidiaries particularly those in BRIC countries. 
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Fig. 08– GDP growth per country 2010 (Source: IMF  Data Mapper). 
 
In a series of articles the Financial Times describes the outcomes of this decade long 
shift in the international business landscape: 
 
“As chief executives emerge from recession they are seeing some unfamiliar names scurrying around the 
global landscape. (…) These groups are climbing up the value chain with new products, services and brands, 
ranging from high-technology Chinese electronics to Indian cars and Brazilian financial services.(…) Once 
investing in EM markets mainly meant backing a particular economy’s growth potential or its capacity to 
export commodities, now it means investing in new technologies, brands and ways of doing business.” 
(Business: A Change in Gear. Financial Times, 11th May 2011) 
 
“Once, global innovation was a one-way street with multinationals developing ideas in rich countries and 
pushing them out into the rest of the world. Not anymore. In the past 20 years, emerging economies have 
become a growing source of commercial innovation in products, services and business processes. (…) 
Innovation doesn’t happen in black boxes, it happen in markets.” (Innovation: The Road to New Markets. 
Financial Times, 5th January 2011). 
 
“Not only do China, India, Brazil and other countries offer companies fast growing prospects but they also 
generate opportunities for developing new products, services, manufacturing techniques and business 
processes. (…) These innovations do not yet involve transformational technological shifts, but is spawning 
product improvements with commercial implications that are game-changing. (…) Skeptics dismiss many 
emerging market innovations as incremental improvements. But for business, that is beside the point, when 
such improvements lead to better products, services and processes. (…) The innovations may be incremental, 
but their effects are not.” (Innovation: Replicators no More. Financial Times, 5th January 2011). 
 
However, great challenges remain ahead of BRICs and their EM counterparts. China 
despite being an economic powerhouse has a totalitarian State, deep environmental 
and populational problems, unresolved border conflicts, and uncontrolled 
underground financial market. Russia is a questionable democracy, has deep 
external political conflicts, an economy too dependent on oil exports, and lacks a 
credible institutional landmark that could attract foreign productive capital. India 
although a democratic State, suffers from insurgency, ethnic and religious internal 
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conflicts, an open external conflict with Pakistan, deep populational problems 
aggravated by tradition. Almost on the opposite side, Brazil is a fully fledged 
democracy, developed a solid institutional and legal landmark, and has no potential 
internal or external conflicts, however it displays a different class of problems like 
latent social inequality, low educational level, endemic crime and corruption, 
creeping infra-structure and State interventionism which threaten long-term 
sustainable growth. 
 
Recently, BRICs and other EM countries have been victims of their own success. 
Their growth prospects attracted most of the liquidity employed to reactivate 
developed world economies. Now currency valuation threatens both their internal 
production and exports. With EM economies under increasing pressure and 
developed world beginning to recover, food and oil prices soared, sparking inflation 
and social unrest in poorer countries. Urbanization and abundant credit are fuelling 
asset bubbles in the EM markets that might repeat the fate of developed world 
disrupting the current economic order once again. 
 
5.1.2. Local Economic Context: Brazilian Economy  
 
Brazil emergence has been (still is) the result of a long and painful process of 
economic learning. The foundations of its recent development can be traced back into 
the 90´s when a set of political-economic measures gradually institutionalized 
instruments to balance historical economic distortions which began on the 30´s.  
By 1930, Brazilian industry was incipient and concentrated in textiles, non-durable 
goods and food processing. Overall, economy depended heavily on agriculture, 
particularly on coffee exports. With the Great Depression (1929), the coffee export 
business collapsed and the government realized that could no longer rely on exports 
of primary goods. Consensus emerged that it was necessary to promote economic 
diversification.  
The shortage of industrial products during World War II (1939-1945) and abundant 
work fleeing coffee farms to urban centers like Sao Paulo, set the basis for import-
substitution industrialization. During the dictatorship of the Estado Novo (1937-
1945), President Getulio Vargas initiated this process by establishing the first large 
government enterprise, an integrated steel mill, Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional 
(CSN), inaugurated in 1941, and to supply iron ore to CSN he also created Vale, in 
1942. In 1953, during his second term, Getulio Vargas created another large state-
owned enterprise, Petrobras, to explore recently discovered oil fields in Bahia state. 
In 1954, he proposed Eletrobras, to command power generation and distribution. 
In the second half of the 50s, under the presidency of Juscelino Kubitschek, the 
government invested in infrastructure (roads, ports and power) and gave strong 
industrial incentives, notably to the base industry (automotive, cement, steel, 
aluminum, cellulose, heavy machinery, and chemical industries). This period saw the 
emergence of large Brazilian groups like Gerdau (steel), Votorantim (cement), 
Camargo Correa (construction), WEG (electrical), Suzano (Paper), Romi (machinery) 
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and the arrival of key international players like Volkswagen (automotive); Mercedes-
Benz (automotive), Scania (automotive), IBM (automation), General Electric 
(electrical equipment and home appliances), and Shell (oil retailer). 
Until early 60´s Brazil experienced rapid growth and attained considerable economic 
diversification. Such rapid growth, however, generated inflation, and substantial 
trade deficit, as inputs and machinery imports were not offset by the exports of low 
cost primary goods. During this period two problems added to the long-standing 
current account problem: international debt, used to finance infrastructure, and MNE 
profit remittances. With problems mounting, a time of intense political turmoil 
paralyzed the country and curbed growth. In 1964, the military took power and 
imposed financial and structural reforms with the objective to fight inflation and 
current account deficit. The wages have been frozen to cut consumption, currency 
devaluated to promote exports and state-owned companies were freed to profit from 
their monopoly position in order to generate revenues for the central government. 
After a deep but short recession, inflation lowered, exports grew, particularly in 
manufactured goods, and public finances improved allowing for state-led 
investment. 
From 1968 to 1973, years of the “Brazilian miracle”, economy grew annually 11% on 
average. The industrial sector experienced not only rapid growth but also 
considerable sophistication. More State-owned enterprises were created like 
Petroquisa (petrochemical), Embraer (aviation), Telebras (telecommunications) or 
empowered like Eletrobras (power generation and distribution). New Brazilian 
conglomerates emerged like Itau (banking), Coteminas (textiles), Metalfrio 
(industrial machinery) and new multinationals arrived like Fiat (automotive), Ford 
(automotive), Dow (chemicals), and Voith (industrial machinery). However, once 
again the economy overheated and the currency overvalued, putting pressure on the 
account balance.  
The oil shock of 1973, cut exports at the same time that amplified oil import expenses 
generating strong account deficit. Higher oil prices also sparked inflation and strong 
social unrest. The military government decided to borrow internationally to keep on 
investing in the base industry (steel, energy and petrochemical) and in the 
infrastructure in order stimulate growth. Abundant international credit also fostered 
ambitious mega-projects (i.e.: Itaipu hydropower, Angra nuclearpower, 
Transamazon highway, Rio-Niteroi bridge) aimed at boosting the international 
image of Brazil as an emergent power, however, with questionable economic results. 
Along the late 70´s, growth was kept steady but international debt soared. When the 
second oil crisis hit in 1979, it also brought higher interest rates. 
Despite the intense economic growth, the economic policies implemented during the 
“Brazilian miracle” strongly aggravated income inequality in Brazil. To support 
industrialization and curb consumption, government let inflation erode wages, 
which gradually lost their purchase power. Inflation also hit harder lower than 
higher social strata because of the latter access to interest accounts in banks, which 
protected their savings. Public education focused on elite universities rather than on 
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basic and technical schools, created a large educational gap between classes. 
Moreover, thanks to better infrastructure and supply of skilled workers, economic 
expansion took place more vigorously in the Center-South region, while a 
combination of a harsh climate, concentrated land, and elite resistance prevented the 
North-Northeast from developing. 
 
Fig. 09– Brazil average annual GDP growth rate (Source: IPEA - http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/Default.aspx) 
In the 80´s, Brazilian industrialization already provided the economy with a large, 
diversified and integrated productive base. However, its import reduction effects 
arrived too late to avoid the international debt crisis that hit the country. When 
Mexico defaulted in 1982, international markets closed for Brazil, foreign reserves 
ran out quickly, and the current account balance became unsustainable. Brazil was 
bailed-out by the IMF and forced to follow an austerity program. To generate large 
trade surpluses and service foreign debt, government closed the economy to imports 
and constantly devaluated the currency, measures that brought long time 
inflationary and recessive effects. In 1985, under increasing social unrest caused by 
the economic measures, the military allowed elections and left the power.  
 
During the rest of the 80´s, both Brazilian companies and MNEs operating in the 
country were prompted to look for business opportunities overseas in order to offset 
the effects of the internal financial problems and to obtain valuable foreign revenues. 
In this first internationalization push, construction companies as well as automotive, 
steel, food processing and electrical industries become successful exporters and 
Brazilian trade balance boomed for sometime alleviating the chronicle current 
account problems. The quality of international trade also enhanced and for the first 
time industrialized items dominated the list of exports. Internally, however, 
automatic price adjustment mechanisms made inflation extremely resilient and 
economic growth felt gradually.  
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All along the 80´s and early 90´s, several “heterodox” economic plans tried 
unsuccessfully tackle inflation. With increasing foreign debt, uncontrolled public 
deficit and low internal savings nothing seemed to work. With each plan came a 
boom and bust and the population realized that there would be no easy way out. 
 
 
Fig. 10 – Brazil exports composition 1964-2010 (Source: SECEX - http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br). 
In 1994, during the presidency of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, economic 
orthodoxy finally prevailed. Foreign debt was renegotiated into longer and softer 
terms. Then came the “Real plan”, which created a new currency pegged to the U.S. 
dollar (the current value reference), and eliminated most automatic price adjustment 
mechanisms. Central government assumed the debt of states and public entities but 
prohibited them by law to further contract debt to expand expenses and investments.  
Government also restructured and privatized state-owned companies to reduce 
public debt, attract foreign inflows and dynamize the economy. In private hands, 
former state companies like Vale, Embraer, and CSN, quickly became key economic 
agents in the country and first mover Brazilian international investors.  
Communication companies, like Telebras and Embratel, and public banks, like 
Banespa, were purchased by international groups, particularly Spanish and 
Portuguese ones, which invested heavy in infrastructure and governance. With the 
help of the BNDES (national development bank), petrochemicals and power 
distributors were kept in Brazilian private hands. Petrobras, Eletrobras, Banco do 
Brasil, due to their size and economic implications, had their capital opened in stock 
exchanges, keeping government as controlling shareholder.  
With the currency stabilized, the Central Bank gained autonomy to lift interest rates 
and fight inflation through a mechanism knows as “inflation target”. Repressed 
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demand and price pressures were met by opening the economy to imports with 
foreign reserves obtained during privatization providing a buffer against resulting 
current account deficit. Without inflation, however, many private banks faced 
financial problems as they heavily depended on inflation for revenues. Government 
helped troubled banks to restructure and merge with healthier institutions assuming 
part of their debt.  
Large inflows attracted by privatization overvalued the currency and helped fight 
inflation, however, the consequent falling trade balance together with debt 
concentration in the central government put the current account under mounting 
pressure. The international crisis of late 90´s caught the country in the middle of the 
process of currency and current account adjustment. When the public pensions 
system reform failed to get Congress approval, international markets perceived that 
government would have to choose between internal debt and currency control, and 
bet heavily against the Real. As the Central Bank tried to protect the currency, 
foreign reserves dried up leading to a currency crisis. Government was forced to let 
the currency free float and to ask for an IMF emergency loan.  
 
Fig. 11 – Brazil balance of payments 1970-2010 (Source: Banco Central- http://www.bcb.gov.br/?SERIEBALPAG) 
The IMF urged government to cut public debt to generate surpluses of at least 2.5% 
GDP.  To end the currency crisis, regain market support and shield against new 
international crisis Brazilian government offered 3,5% GDP. The strong fiscal 
adjustment forced government to cut public service wages, raise taxes, interest rates 
and lift utility prices (electricity, gas, oil) above inflation so that profit in remaining 
public companies like Petrobras, Eletrobras helped the public surplus. These 
measures curbed economic growth raised unemployment and generated great 
popular dissatisfaction which, kept alive by the power shortage in 2001, opened 
room for opposition victory in 2002 elections. 
 126 
 
The election of Lula, a former metalworker and union leader, was seen with 
skepticism by international finance markets which withdrew large amounts of 
capital months before the elections. Unexpectedly, Lula reinforced the orthodox 
economic policies from his predecessor by hiking interest rates and further lifting 
public surplus to 4.5% GDP. The steep devaluation of the Real, together with the 
increasing Chinese demand for commodities, made trade surplus surge from 2002 to 
2008. With inflation low and public savings up, the abundant foreign currency was 
rapidly incorporated into national reserves shielding the country from further 
current account crisis. As the foreign reserves grew, risk premiums fall and 
government renegotiated most of its debt in far better conditions. With the public 
finance in good shape Lula was able to boost direct income transfer programs of his 
predecessor, correct minimum national wage above inflation and expand credit and 
regular employment into lower social strata.  
In clear opposition to the policies of the “Brazilian miracle”, these measures 
stimulated and broadened consumption in the base of the economy, bringing 
millions out of poverty, building up internal market and further enhancing public 
finance. After more than 75 years of economic development, the problematic balance 
between low internal savings and the need for high investment rates reached 
equilibrium under an institutionalized mechanism of price and investment 
adjustment. Since then free-floating exchange rate, inflation target and fiscal surplus 
turn out to be known as “macro-economic stability pillars”. Not even the U.S. 
property bubble of 2008 unsettled this balance once the constant public surplus 
obtained through internal market growth can be used either to cool (i.e.: interest rate 
hike) or heat (i.e.: public investment) the economy.  
The decades of turmoil left the country with a legacy of strong popular economic 
awareness and enterprise creativity as common citizens and businessmen had to 
make sense and quickly adapt to the almost daily economic and political changes. It 
also developed an intensive negotiation capacity, as ordinary Brazilians were 
encouraged to skip the complex institutional system and solve their problems 
directly at personal level. Personalism also became a way to overcome the highly 
hierarchical economic relations, where “good relationship” is used to tap into 
opportunities. Parallel, entrepreneurship has largely developed as a way to set free 
from the same asymmetrical economical relations prevalent in Brazilian society 
(Brazil Great Expectations: Financial Times, 28th September 2009).  
Nevertheless, the ancient relation between business and politics has been 
exacerbated by decades of State intervention and by the youth of democratic 
institutions. With annual budget of almost US$100 billion (25% of 2009 annual 
Brazilian projected investment), BNDES (Brazilian Economic and Development 
Bank) is the very visible handle of government in Brazilian investment market. 
Through its private equity arm, BNDESpar, the bank has chairs in the boards of 
almost all largest Brazilian companies traded in stocks. So forth, a strong legacy of 
ties interlocking the interests of businessmen and politicians pervades Brazilian 
business environment, blurring the division between public and private and creating 
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distortions that affect the competitiveness of newcomers in face of incumbent 
interests (Lanzarinni, 2010). 
Along this period, although Brazilian economy attained a considerable level of 
international participation, hosting subsidiaries from almost all major MNEs, it 
produced far fewer international companies than would be expected. By 2003, only 6 
of the 20 major Brazilian companies displayed any level of internationalization and 
outward FDI averaged US$ 1billion a year (Lima, 2001). Several reasons accounted 
for this lack of interest. Historically, the inward orientation of Brazilian companies 
due to the decades of import-substitution industrialization, protectionism and 
economic instability; structurally, investment capacity largely subdued by high 
internal capital cost; and culturally, local management features like centralization, 
short-term vision, and State dependency precluded international expansion.  
However, the few companies that took advantage from the export boom in the 80´s, 
and from the economy opening in the 90´s to set international operations benefited 
greatly from cheaper capital and market diversification (Exame, 08th August 2003). 
Among the main drivers for internationalization we find: internal market saturation, 
need to overcome trade barriers, better credit conditions abroad, and productive 
limitations related to exchange rate and poor infrastructure. (Múltis Brasileiras 
investem mais no exterior: Folha de São Paulo, 18th February 2003). 
Fig. 12– Foreign MNEs participation in Brazilian Economy (Source: Exame Maiores e Melhores 2009). 
During early 2000´s, almost all international economies enjoyed high growth based 
on the opening of new markets and the return of cheap capital. In Brazil, however, 
growth barely reached half of world average. Harsh business conditions with 
elevated taxes, high interests rates, poor infrastructure, and excessive bureaucracy, 
stringent work legislation, together with the imports opening of the late 90´s and 
early 2000´s, pushed companies into a survival rush. For local companies options 
were to use the economic opening to gain efficiency or to go abroad and enjoy better 
business conditions. For subsidiaries the option was to go deeper into the local 
market or sell its distinctive competences in company’s internal markets.  
From 2004 to 2008, several Brazilian companies breached internal resistances and 
took advantage of the growth differential between Brazil and the rest of the world to 
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expand abroad. The average outward FDI reached US$14billion a year during the 
period. Gerdau (steel) and Votoratim (cement) purchased troubled companies in the 
U.S. to turn over management and profit from the housing boom. Odebrecht, 
Andrade Gutierrez, and Camargo Correa, used their political abilities to gain support 
of governments in Latin American, Middle-East and Africa to breach their heavy 
construction markets. Vale, a former state-owned company, gained scale and 
diversified its mineral production buying several mining companies around the 
world. Clifford Krauss in an article to the NYTimes describes this process: 
“The new “multi-latinas” are aggressive, resourceful enterprises that are a byproduct of the market 
liberalization that swept Latin American economies in the 1990´s. (…) After the Argentine economy 
collapse in 2001, many multinationals pulled out of the region. That left the field opened to private Latin 
American companies, which knew the terrain and went bargain hunting. Many first invested around the 
region, and then looked to the United States and beyond.” (Latin American Companies Make Big U.S. 
Gains: NYTimes, 2nd May 2007) 
The process that began with capital-intensive sectors, soon reached more marketing-
sensitive ones. WEG (electrical equipment), Sadia (food processor), and Marcopolo 
(transportation), quickly expanded abroad and by 2008 had almost half of their 
revenues coming from foreign operations. Another measure of dynamism, after the 
merger and acquisition boom of the 90´s, Brazilian executives protagonized several 
examples of reverse takeovers (where purchased company executives end by 
controlling the purchaser) like the case of ABInbev (Exame 26th October  2005; 
Financial Times, 16th June 2008) and Coteminas (Exame, 26th October 2005).  
After the global crisis in 2008, internationalization of Brazilian companies developed 
through massive governmental investments to create “national champions” in 
sectors were Brazilian participation is considered strategic. Central government used 
BNDES to provide money for mergers and international acquisitions. Almost US$10 
billion were directed to consolidate “national champions” in sectors like 
petrochemical, paper, telecommunications and food processing. Examples of this 
process were the emergence of Votorantim, JBS Friboi and Brasil Foods to the top of 
Brazilian multinational ranking (BNDES gasta R$8bi em um ano para criar ‘campeãs 
nacionais´: Estado de São Paulo, 27th September 2009).  
RANK 2006 2009 
1 Vale Vale 
2 Petrobras Petrobras 
3 Gerdau  Gerdau  
4 Embraer  Votorantim 
5 Votorantim JBS-Friboi 
6 CSN CCC* 
7 CCC* Marfrig 
8 Odebrecht Ultrapar 
9 Aracruz Embraer 
10 WEG WEG 
11 Marcopolo Brasil Foods 
Table 1: Largest Brazilian MNEs per sales. (Source: Lima (2001). SOBEET – Sociedade Brasileira de Estudos de 
Empresas Transnacionais e da Globalização Econômica. *Name changed due to company privacy requirements.) 
 
In 2008, outward FDI reached US$20 billion, and the Brazilian stock of outward 
investment reached US$158 billion, with U.S., Spain, Argentina and Uruguay as the 
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main destinations (Lima, 2010). The top 20 multinationals had 25% of their sales and 
almost 27% of total employees abroad. 
 
Fig. 13 – Brazil FDI flows 1990-2010 (Source: UNCTAD, Annex Tables of World Investment Report. In Lima (2010), 
SOBEET – Sociedade Brasileira de Estudos de Empresas Transnacionais e da Globalização Econômica.) 
 
On the other side, Brazilian subsidiaries have been traditionally set as exploration 
units and as implementers of strategies developed at headquarters. In the 90´s 
however, subsidiaries start to be seen as extensions that could improve global 
multinational productivity as whole. Only recently, however, the evolutionary 
process accelerate as many of Brazilian subsidiaries gradually moved from the 
position of local adaptators and start to develop their own line of products, and in 
some cases, products for other subsidiaries or to the company as a whole. In his work 
with Brazilian subsidiaries, Boehe (2007) already indicate a change in this profile as 
he quantifies in 50% of Brazilian subsidiaries are local adaptators, 37% are local 
innovators, while only 13% can be considered as international innovators, with 6% 
falling in the category of emergent market innovator, showing that the role of a 
determined subsidiary not only vary hierarchically but also geographically.  
 
Parallel, authors like Amatucci & Bernardes (2007) recognize that some sectors of 
Brazilian economy display some features like such as scale, segmentation, severity, 
trained workforce, and governmental incentives, that provide a consistent backdrop 
for the development of locally rooted competences and the evolution of subsidiary 
role into more innovative activities. Oliveira et al. (2009) highlight the fact that 
organizational factors play an important role in determining subsidiaries strategic 
position. Among them they ask for especial attention to interface management 
competences, integration and entrepreneurial orientation. This implies that for 
Brazilian subsidiaries the key challenge is not decision-making autonomy, but 
persuading headquarters about the value of its innovations, process that is 
complicated by internal competition among subsidiaries and the complex network of 
relations with multinational structure. 
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Brazilian subsidiaries also saw their influence grow after the global crisis. As 
headquarters saw themselves into financial trouble, revenues from key subsidiaries, 
particularly in BRIC countries, managed to keep them afloat. Moreover, many 
subsidiaries saw themselves as more independent as their financial healthy and 
accumulated competence enabled them to keep planning ahead of the crisis. In 
Brazil, automotive subsidiaries like General Motors, and Fiat were vital for 
headquarters survival. Headquarters also developed larger respect for subsidiaries´ 
local competences as a way to offset weaknesses in traditional markets and to tap 
into new opportunities of EM which recognizedly depends on subsidiary capacities. 
 
Another recent development taking place in the Brazilian context is that despite the 
stringent laws that apply to foreign work in Brazil, from 2006 to 2010 the number of 
visa requests doubled during the period. The phenomenon is partly explained by the 
ongoing opening of Brazilian economy which require specialized professionals to 
install imported machinery and equipment, operate subcontracted oil rigs, as well as 
artists and athletes (Mão de obra estrangeira no Brasil cresce 19% no 1º semestre: 
Folha de São Paulo, 23th August, 2009). However, there is also the increasing interest 
on Brazilian business and employment opportunities. With the currency overvalued, 
executive salaries also became attractive (End the Party before Brazil´s bubble bursts: 
Financial Times, 1st June 2011) 
 
Fig. 14 – Work visas issued to foreign workers in Brazil 2006-2010 ( Source: Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego- 
http://www.mte.gov.br/trab_estrang/est_origem.pdf) 
 
The laws under which foreign citizens can apply to work in Brazil are very tough 
and their main motivation is the offset the “social dumping” of bringing workers 
from countries with lower salaries and rights to compete with Brazilian ones (Carelli, 
2007). Examples of the requirements follow: 
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1) Brazilian companies must comply at least 2/3 of Brazilian workers (Decreto-
Lei 5452/43 art. 354); 
2) Brazilian workers at equivalent hierarchical level cannot be paid less than 
foreign counterparts (Decreto-Lei 5452/43 art. 358); 
3) Scarcity of Brazilian worker with equivalent knowledge (Lei 5194/66 art.2). 
4) Foreign Specialists shall be followed by a Brazilian apprentice (Lei 5194/66 
art.85). 
5) Authorization shall be approved by the competent authorities, Ministry of 
Foreign Relations and Ministry of Work and Employment upon 
documentation reception and after due diligence. 
 
 
5.2- BUSINESS CONTEXT: ENGINEERING SERVICES SECTOR 
 
5.2.1- Engineering Services Background 
 
The concept of engineering has existed since ancient times as humans devised 
fundamental inventions such as the pulley, lever, and wheel. Each of these 
inventions is consistent with the modern definition of engineering, exploiting basic 
mechanical principles to develop useful tools and objects. In general, engineers use 
their knowledge of science, mathematics, logic, economics, and appropriate 
experience or tacit knowledge to find suitable solutions to a problem. Usually 
multiple reasonable solutions exist, so engineers must evaluate the different design 
choices on their merits and choose the solution that best meets their requirements. 
 
Engineering, much like other sciences, is a broad discipline which is often broken 
down into several sub-disciplines. These disciplines concern themselves with 
differing areas of engineering work. Although initially an engineer will usually be 
trained in a specific discipline, throughout an engineer's career the engineer may 
become multi-disciplined, having worked in several of the outlined areas. 
Engineering is often characterized as having four main branches: Civil, Mechanical, 
Chemical and Electrical. 
Regulation of the engineering profession is established by various jurisdictions 
around the world to protect the safety, well-being and other interests of the general 
public, and to define the licensure process through which an engineer becomes 
authorized to provide professional services to the public. In the U.S., ABET 
(Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology) is the official professional 
regulator, in the U.K., it is the ECUK (Engineering Council), and in Brazil, CREA 
(Conselho Regional de Engenharia e Arquitetura). Additionally, in Brazil, 
engineering activity is regulated by law (Lei 5194/66).  
5.2.2- International Engineering Business Context 
In international terms, engineering business evolved on the backdrop of almost 
uninterrupted technological and economic changes in the recent history of humanity. 
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The first phase of modern engineering emerged as a result of the scientific 
revolution. The adoption of a systematic approach to practical problems made 
engineering scientific rather than intuitive. Technical training shifted from 
apprenticeship to university education.  In 1747, the first engineering school, École 
des Pontes et Chaussé, opens in France, with Karlsruhe (1825), Viena (1815) and 
Zurich (1824) schools opening little later. In the U.S., the Rensselaer Polythecnic 
Institute opened in 1824. Information flowed more quickly in organized meetings 
and journal publications as professional societies emerged. This phase lasted through 
the Industrial Revolution (1760-1830), with engineering embedding into bigger 
business and also developing small, specialized firms to building machines, and to 
develop transportation means and constructive methods (Telles, 1994).  
 
During the second industrial revolution (1860-1914) technological and economic 
progress gained momentum with the development of steam-powered ships, 
railways, the internal combustion engine and electrical power generation. Chemical 
and electrical engineering played vital roles in the rise of chemical, electrical, and 
telecommunication industries. Industrial engineers designed and managed mass 
production and distribution systems. Companies like U.S. Steel, Bayer, Standard Oil, 
Daimler-Benz, Ford, Siemens, General Electric emerged out of technological and 
managerial advances of the time.  
 
This period also set the stage for the first large scale engineering companies, which 
took advantage of the recent developments and historical circumstance to expand 
and diversify, providing technical support to many different industries. Bechtel 
began in 1889 taking advantage of the U.S. westward construction effort. Foster 
Wheeler resulted from the merger of two steam-machine makers in 1891. Fluor began 
in 1890 with Swiss migrants building a paper mill. Kvaerner, in 1853, as a shipbuilder 
in Norway. Amec Plc. began in 1883 with a construction business in UK.  SNC-
Lavalin began in 1911 as a small civil engineering office in Montreal. UHDE in 
Germany began 1921 as a fertilizer maker. U.S engineering companies engaged west 
expansion and military efforts during the first-half of XX century and strongly build 
up their operations. 
 
Research and development boomed in all fields of science and technology after 
World War II. Microelectronics, telecommunications, and computer joined forces to 
precipitate the information revolution in which intellectual tasks were increasingly 
alleviated by information processing machines. After the war many U.S engineering 
firms expanded towards European to take advantage of the reconstruction effort. The 
construction of nuclear power plants in U.S. also generated big contracts. This period 
also marked a strong international expansion for U.S. engineering companies with 
clients ranging from Iran to South Korea. In the 1960s, many engineering companies 
start to use computers throughout its offices for both engineering projects and 
managing operations. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, international engineering companies benefited 
greatly from the boom oil and utility power industries, achieving excellent profit 
margins and contracts.  U.S. companies focused in the Middle-East and European 
companies into Africa, South America as well as the exploration of North Sea oil 
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reserves. During this period, Fluor developed the concept of task force management, 
under which individual projects receive all tools, personnel, and resources to get jobs 
done, and the project director had full authority and responsibility for the entire 
project. The involvement of engineering companies in national and international 
politics to tap into government sponsored business opportunities and gain political 
influence upon major clients and competitors also became increasingly visible. 
 
In mid-1980s, industry’s heavy overbuilding resulted in a reversal for engineering 
companies. Even in the Middle-East, big construction projects were no longer the 
norm, thanks largely to significant lower oil prices. The lack of big projects, led 
international engineering firms into projects previously regarded as too small, 
including unfinished competitors jobs, modernization of existing plants, and finally 
with the creation of operating services divisions to keep skilled experts at work in 
their fields, mostly in ongoing maintenance facilities. Traditional U.S. firms also saw 
faced increasing competition from European, South Korean, and Japanese companies 
and saw their share of large scale projects fall substantially. In order to face the crisis, 
international engineering firms reorganized into more decentralized structures to 
more closely serve their different markets (i.e.: process, power, hydrocarbons, 
mineral, infrastructure, and defense).  
 
In the 90´s, with the necessary modernization of the countries of the old communist 
block and the reconstruction process after the Gulf War, engineering demand 
rebounded. U.S and E.U. cleaner energy requirements also lifted demand for 
engineering services. International engineering companies were also boosted by 
emerging markets, first during the Southeast Asia boom and then by China rising. 
Large engineering firms recovered from the 80s crisis, and strongly diversified both 
in industry markets and geographic regions, mainly through acquisitions. 
 
A fourth phase of engineering companies development can be identified after 2000s 
with the emergence of the global information networks such as the Internet. The 
increasing use of fixed-price contracts and worldwide competition made engineering 
a very risky business, with even large contracts yielding little if any profits. Now 
highly specialized firms located close to scientific clusters or pools of specialized 
work developed a worldwide network of engineering solution suppliers, which have 
to be assembled together in optimal conditions to deliver the necessary engineering 
services. In this scenario, international engineering companies were forced into 
becoming consulting and contract management firms, away from their traditional 
technical role. Alternatively, many international engineering companies decided to 
go into the opposite direction focusing on smaller, high-tech, higher margin 
contracts, migrating from business such as minerals, fertilizers and petrochemicals 
into pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and environmental services.  
 
In 2009, total revenue of world top 100 engineering firms reached US$105.7 Billion, 
with at least US$46.7 Billion (44%) originating from overseas operations, evidencing 
the remarkable internationalization of the sector. The financial woes of the past two 
years hit hard the global engineering market with sales down 4.2% from 2008-2009. 
The U.S. recession and the EU debt troubles made engineering firms struggle. In 
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opposition to the fall in developed markets (-0.5% in U.S. and –7.1% in Europe), EM 
provided some relief, with North Africa revenues jumping 34.7% and Latin America 
up 21.7%, taking from Asia (+1.3%) its traditional hotspot title. (The Top 200 
International Design Firms: Engineering News-Record, 26th July 2010, 
http://enr.construction.com). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 15 – Largest engineering companies worldwide profile (Source: The Top 200 International Design Firms: 
Engineering News-Record, 26th July 2010, http://enr.construction.com) 
 
5.2.3- Local Engineering Business Context 
 
The history of engineering in Brazil began in 1810, when the first engineering school 
in Brazil was founded, the Academia Real Militar in Rio de Janeiro. Despite the early 
opening, it was mainly a military school dedicated to the design of fortresses and 
mapping. In 1874, the Academia Real Militar opened places to civil students and 
became Escola Politécnica do Rio de Janeiro. From 1890-1900, several other 
engineering schools opened in Brazil, among them the traditional Escola Politécnica 
de São Paulo and the Mackenzie College both in São Paulo. (Telles, 1994) 
  
According to Prado (2006), by the end of the XIX century, growing coffee business 
fostered an incipient industrialization in order to process and pack the product as 
well as to build the infrastructure necessary for its transportation. Engineering 
business opportunities first appeared in the railway, power, building and public 
services. Brazilian engineering schools adopted the French pragmatic orientation of 
first providing generalist and theoretical knowledge to only then allow for 
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specialization in later courses. Such orientation, however, conflicted with the 
knowledge limitations of the country and was not able to provide the highly 
specialized skills necessary for further specialization or industrial applications.  To 
bridge this knowledge gap, technically specialized engineers were frequently hired 
abroad and brought to Brazil to help in the more complex tasks. Brazilian engineers 
were left with the task of organizing and managing the work processes in 
compliance to imported technology (Laudares & Ribeiro, 2000).  
 
The creation of large industrial State companies in the 40´s (CSN, Vale, Petrobras and 
Eletrobras), redirected Brazilian engineering from infrastructure to industry, and 
from imports implementation to local supply development. This movement has been 
further reinforced during the 50´s through the “import substitution industrialization” 
effort. Many multinationals arrived during this period and promoted the exchange of 
engineering professionals between Brazil, U.S., France and Germany. Such in-
company exchange programs helped to provide specialist skills to the generalist 
formation available in Brazil.  
 
In the 60´s and 70´s, under military government new technologically advanced State 
companies (i.e.: Petroquisa, Embraer, Telebras, Embratel) required even more 
specialized engineers. Government created two of its most important technical 
universities ITA (Aeronautical Technological Institute) to support the development 
of aerospatial industry and UNICAMP to further enhance the telecommunications 
and petrochemical industry. With a surge in infrastructure and industrialization, 
Brazilian engineering experienced a boom and engineers start to occupy not only 
important technical positions but also increasingly important executive ones. This 
movement reached its maximum during the “Brazilian miracle”, with the 
establishment of a powerful ‘technocracy’ formed by engineers firmly occupying key 
business positions in Brazilian dominant State-companies (Suarez, 1986).  
 
The sequence of crises during the 80´s and 90´s, hit hard engineering companies in 
Brazil. National companies either diversified (i.e.: Promon, Jaakko-Poyry), merged 
with construction companies (i.e.: TENENGE) or simple bankrupt (i.e: Araujo, 
Natron). Almost all international companies left Brazil during this period (i.e.: 
UHDE, KBR, Lummus, Foster Wheeler, Fluor Daniel). Technicians laid-off during 
this process (i.e.: Natron, Promon, Jaakko-Poyry) reagruped into smaller engineering 
companies and retrenched into the main refineries and petrochemical complexes to 
award maintenance contracts or small improvement projects. As companies shrank, 
split, and closed, much of what has been technically developed by Brazilian 
engineering has been lost and forgotten. Engineers with years of experience have 
been forced to look for management jobs or into retirement. 
 
During this period, the rationalization of work processes and the implementation of 
computational tools split the engineer role in Brazil into two: one technical 
supervisory, with direct involvement in production, implementing new 
technological tools and production methods, managing sub-contracts and 
responding for investments under his supervision; and other, predominant 
managerial, with almost no contact with production, where engineers generalist 
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knowledge and mathematical skills were used by non-engineering sectors such as 
banks and management consulting firms to implement rationalization in non-
technical environments (Laudares & Ribeiro, 2000).  
 
From 2004 to 2009, heavy investments planned by the government, Petrobras, and 
Eletrobras, tied to minimum national content, reactivated the internal engineering 
market and improved substantially the revenues of project and consulting 
companies, which grew 274% in five years. In 2009, even depressed by the global 
crises, overall engineering and construction market in Brazil grew 11.8%. Private 
companies, like Vale and Votorantim, which do not abide by minimum national 
content rules, awarded engineering contracts abroad searching for the best price 
among specialist firms.  
 
During this period several new companies emerged (i.e.: Mana, CH2M Hill, 
Projectus, Genpro, Progen, EPC, Alusa, Chemtech, Minerconsult) challenging the few 
survivors of the lost decades (i.e.: IESA, Promon, CNC, Poyry, Engevix, Techinp, 
UTC). On the one side, new firms positioned themselves to provide engineering at 
lower cost, high flexibility, however, with a backdrop of extended schedule and low 
quality due to their lack of structure and consolidated methods. On the other side, 
traditional companies positioned themselves to benefit from their structures and 
experience to provide high quality engineering and on schedule execution at a 
comparatively higher price.   
 
Although traditional companies were the first ones to benefit from the engineering 
surge in 2004, thanks to its better structural conditions, quickly the new ones catch 
up to the governmental bidding requirements and start to compete head to head 
with traditional companies.  Further changes in governmental bidding criteria 
involving higher liabilities for cost and schedule overrun dragged the engineering 
business under influence of the much larger construction companies, which were 
able to face such costs. As the price of traditional more structured companies raised 
to incorporate the additional risk, they increasingly were shun off bidding consortia 
by larger construction companies in favor of smaller companies. Therefore, by 2009 
most of the new contracts awarded by the government and the largest State 
companies fell in the hands of non-traditional players in the engineering business. 
 
In 2010, total revenue of Brazil top 40 engineering firms reached US$ 4.16 billion 
(4.4% world engineering business). Among them, only six companies are foreign 
controlled, with US$ 1.1 billion revenues and 24% market share, what segregating 
recent foreign acquisitions of important local companies, indicates the predominance 
of local players in Brazilian engineering business. This year, also marked an intense 
period of sector consolidation with several merger and acquisitions concluded 
involving local and international players. Odebrecht, the largest construction 
company in Brazil, partially acquired Genpro, a mid-sized engineering company. 
SNC Lavalin, world 10th largest engineering company, acquired Minerconsult, a local 
mining specialist company, and Marte Engenharia, a local nuclear engineering 
company. WP, world 6th largest engineering company, acquired CNC, Brazilian 4th 
largest. Progen, a mid-sized engineering company aquired several smaller 
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specialized companies. Techint, the largest Argentinean construction company, spun 
off and created its own engineering company to multiply its bidding consortia 
alternatives. 
 
 
Fig. 16 – Engineering Sector in Brazil by annual revenues 1995-2010 (Source: Revista “O Empreiteiro”. 500 Grandes 
da Construção, July 2010 - http://www.revistaoempreiteiro.com.br/) 
 
5.3- INVESTIGATION CONTEXT 
 
5.3.1- Researcher Standpoint 
 
The aim of this section is to disclose the personal bias and social cues through which 
the researcher approached the object of his investigation.   
 
I was born in 1975, on an affluent mid-sized hub city in the state of Minas Gerais, 
Brazil. Rose by a low-middle class family in a place dominated by landowners, 
lawyers and doctors, very early in my life I was encouraged to embrace study and 
work as tools for social mobility and recognition. This ideology has been reinforced 
by examples of social and economic failure within family and facilitate by the 
considerable educational infrastructure available due to the hub character of my 
hometown. During my childhood I gravitated between the flair of local elite colleges 
and the hardships of working on a mechanic shop with my father. I assume that this 
participation in contrasting social contexts create a urge for upward mobility which 
drove me away from the expected cultural bias of a Brazilian family of Portuguese 
ascendance (collectivism, conformity, uncertainty avoidance and low assertiveness in 
Hofstede terms) and closer to a more of individualist, challenging, and assertive 
ethos. One thing a get used to hear from my father was that he would never save on 
the education, and I remember that at some point he spent about half of his income 
in private schools for his kids. 
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This educational push finally paid off in 1993 when right from the secondary school I 
succeeded in two of the most competitive undergraduate selection tests in Brazil: 
UNICAMP and FUVEST (for UFSCAR). I decided to move to Campinas (400km) and 
join the Chemical Engineering course at UNICAMP, the best in field in Brazil until 
today. The reasoning behind this choice was that by living in Campinas (1 million 
hab.) I would both enjoy a more exciting life and improve my chances of getting a 
good job after graduation. Unexpected though was a singular and determinant 
character of UNICAMP. Differently from most Brazilian public universities, which 
selected locally, UNICAMP selected nationally. As a result, UNICAMP comprised a 
melting pot of different national accents, slangs, tastes, habits, behaviors and 
approaches. Away from their home, family and friends, the great majority of 
students had no other choice than to “manage these differences” not only to share 
housing and transportation but also to create new social ties and to overcome the 
heavy academic routine, which frequently involved collective work and evaluation. 
Overall, the immensely rich experience of living away from home with people from 
some different places and social backgrounds marked those times and I could 
certainly say that by absorbing the unique experiences provided by all that national 
diversity I truly became a Brazilian.  
 
Eventually students from overseas added to it, but in considerably smaller number. 
Although Brazilian public universities reserve places for international students and 
provide fairly good mobility conditions, admission processes attracted only few 
applicants from countries like Cabo Verde, Angola, Mozambique, Peru and 
Colombia. Intriguing to me, at that time, was how fast those foreigners were 
engulfed by this process of “managing differences” and how fast they integrated 
themselves into that diverse Brazilian set. Segregation and clique formation rather 
than a characteristic of foreigners was much more common among local affluent 
students who privileged their local social ties in face of those at university. 
 
By 1996, declining airline fares and undergraduate exchanging programs like 
IAESTE (International Association for the Exchange of Students for Technical 
Experience) made possible for Brazilian middle-class students (particularly for those 
enrolled at public universities, who enjoyed full tuition weave), to legally go abroad 
in search of international academic or professional experience. In 1997 around 30% of 
my classmates went abroad for periods larger than three months. By 1998, more than 
70% of the bachelors in the last year of Chemical Engineering had enrolled into an 
international exchange programs. At this point, extending the course for one 
additional year to go abroad become standard for engineering students at 
UNICAMP.  
 
Unfortunately, that was not my case. Not only I didn´t have the means but I 
desperately needed to focus at finishing graduation and start working in order to get 
by. An internship on a large Brazilian corporation helped in the expenses for some 
time, however when I realized I wasn’t learning anything useful for my career I 
decided to quit and focus in the final exams and selection processes. At the date of 
my graduation, beyond almost bankrupting my family, I owed at the bank, an 
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amount of R$1000 (US$ 750), almost one month’s engineer salary at the time. Money 
spent on language schools, extracurricular courses and living expenses away from 
home. 
 
I clearly remember my closest friends telling me on their return from the US or 
Europe how nice was to live abroad, compared to the hardships of living in Brazil 
(i.e.: disorganization, low salaries, job insecurity, crime). Most of them expressed 
their wish to go back to live in the “first world” permanently. Many of them did not 
adapt on their return and moved overseas after graduation or for a second 
internship. The 90`s, maybe even more than the 80’s, certainly were a time of low 
national self-esteem. Inflation control in 1994, squeezed national incoming and 
retracted both private and public investment, bringing a shortage of opportunities. 
Many times this middle-class delusion with the country violently clashed with my 
excitement about all the diversity and possibilities I saw. I clearly had not bought 
into the story that Brazil was a lost case. This impression was reinforced by 
conversations with foreign students who shared the same optimistic view about 
Brazil.  
 
Thus, beyond the prospect of a good time abroad and enhancing language skills, 
students were also moved by a dwindling economy and tightening competition for 
better jobs, usually at large multinational corporations, like Shell, Unilever, Rhone-
Poulenc, Nestle, Phillip Morris, Citibank, McKinsey, Booz-Allen & Hamilton and 
Accenture, who annually came at UNICAMP to hire last year engineering students. 
Large private Brazilian companies at the time like, like Banco Itau, Embraer, 
Unibanco also took part on this hiring spree however with much less appeal. 
Common place among undergraduates at the time (I included) was to join a trainee 
program in a multinational company, to become manager in three years, go for a 
company-sponsored MBA program in the US or Europe to join an international 
career program where "the sky was the limit". All this, they believed, would be 
paved by an international exchanging program. 
 
Reality though proved more complex. Differently from the previous years when the 
local branches of large industrial multinationals like Unilever and Rhone-Poulenc 
(now Aventis) were capable of hiring all 42 UNICAMP graduating chemical 
engineers at once, 1997 offered a very different story. Though all my classmates 
(except for one who decided to go abroad exactly in the beginning of the recruitment 
season) left university with a job position, this has been a long and extenuating 
process. I remember to have submitted more than 50 job applications and joined 
many recruitment process unsuccessfully just like my colleagues. With almost no 
investment, rampant rationalization programs, and declining import tariffs to 
combat inflation, it was a hard time for engineers in Brazil.  
Nevertheless, an unexpected way out emerged when the financial companies in 
order to survive the end of their inflationary revenues decide to hire engineers to 
carry on radical modernization programs. I remember to hear on a presentation of an 
important Brazilian investment bank to say that banking industry preferred 
engineers over business graduates because they were good at numbers and mastered 
technology. International consulting firms also flourished at this time on the trail of 
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intensive rationalization of Brazilian companies and a round of industry 
consolidation through merger and acquisitions started. As a result, from a class of 42 
engineers maybe fewer than 5 followed the technical career. I myself started working 
for a small marketing consultancy in Sao Paulo.  
 
The data processing and analytic skills I received at university certainly helped me to 
overcome the lack of experience in the field of marketing. In less than 3 months, I had 
conducted important studies at this consultancy and attracted manager’s attention. 
However my professional immaturity, the low wage, the extenuating work schedule 
(14 hours a day), the precarious living conditions I could afford, the personal 
disillusion for not being able to get a good “multinational job” weighted on me to the 
point that I decided to quit and go back to my hometown and start to look for a 
technical job. 
 
Particularly strange to me nowadays is to recover the reasoning behind the decision 
of searching for a technical job. I never questioned the importance of a technical 
education, or regretted to have joined an engineering school, however, all the time at 
university I mentally prepared myself to be a manager rather than an engineer. Part 
of this apparent paradox probably came from the internalization of a common 
discourse in Brazil that engineers come up to be better managers. Such discourse has 
its roots in the military dictatorship (1964 – 1985) when fast government-led 
investment was conducted by an elite of “technocrats”. Although strongly opposing 
the dictatorship, UNICAMP provided a firm ground to this discourse because, 
lacking a business school, technical staff occupied its key management posts. More 
important maybe was my personal inclination for “doing” instead of “selling”. At 
the time, it was repulsive to me the idea of going out selling something. In a certain 
sense, becoming an “engineer”, or “the one who people look for solutions”, has been 
a way to distance myself from the figure of the “salesman”, or “the one who bother 
people offering things”. But as a junior marketing analyst in a small consultancy, it 
was virtually impossible to avoid public exposition and services sale pressure. This 
strong sales pressure pushed me towards a radical reaction of abandoning the 
incipient business career and retrenching back to my technical profile, where - I 
thought - no one could make me work on something I radically opposed. 
 
After three months at home, jobs were increasingly scarce as private investments 
were discouraged by government’s strategy to use an overvalued currency to fight 
inflation, flooding the market with cheap imports. Just when my savings were about 
to run out, I found a job in the local representation (SIG, henceforth) of a large U.S. 
multinational software house (INGR, henceforth). Back in Sao Paulo, I have been 
located in the unit responsible for selling and supporting clients in the process, oil & 
gas industry. Few days past, my excitement in getting back to work on a more 
technical field, within a multinational corporation faded away together with my 
hope of an international carrier. SIG was no more than an ordinary Brazilian 
company with minor sales ties with INGR. Once again I had to face the same 
problems that made me quit the previous job: low wage, no carrier opportunity, 
unaffordable living conditions in Sao Paulo and so on. This time however, I decided 
not to quit and stay put while looking for alternatives. However, disappointed with 
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the possibilities that have been presented to me after graduation, this time I was not 
so sure where to go. I thought about returning to university for a master degree in 
organizational studies and put things back on line, however with a poor business 
curriculum and with no savings to afford the 2 additional years with no revenue, this 
option looked unreachable. While I wondered what to do, an exchange rate crisis hit 
the country and companies simply stopped hiring.  
 
During this recessive period SIG survived basically upon orders from state-run 
companies. They have a particularly profitable relationship with Petrobras and its 
local service suppliers, who were contractually forced to work on a specific 
engineering application supplied by INGR. Despite the fact that I have studied 
chemical engineering and Petrobras dominated Brazilian process industry, at that 
time, it was a much closed institution, and paradoxically it was my first professional 
contact with the company. The relationship between SIG and Petrobras was a 
turbulent one and I was in the middle of that. Under license agreement, SIG supplied 
top INGR hardware, software and training to Petrobras but commanded premium 
prices. As a state-run company and with minor shareholder pressures, Petrobras 
invested heavily (and sometimes carelessly) to be in the forefront of technology but 
frequently complained of the disproportionately high prices practiced by INGR and 
SIG in Brazil. Even though, Petrobras offered year long contracts to acquire software, 
hardware and training from SIG which were delivered on demand. For one year and 
a half I traveled across Brazil to give private classes for Petrobras employees on the 
latest 3D engineering design systems. Many times to people that only were sent to fill 
in the classes and would never use the software again. Service suppliers, on their 
turn, resisted paying for SIG training as they considered it expensive, time 
consuming, and detached from practice. This relationship come to a halt when SIG, 
to take advantage of a contract about to past due, decided to sold a single INGR 
workstation by US$1.000.000 which did not work at all. Worst, after years buying 
expensive INGR workstations on the belief that they were the only ones with 
processing capacity to run INGR software, costumers increasingly realized that 
commercial desktops could well replaced them by a tiny fraction of the price. Crisis 
came for SIG and I was at risk of being laid off. My reactions were mixed. I did not 
want to stay, but without a job and any savings I would not be able  
 
A surge in exports a month later, boosted by a currency devaluation of 
approximately 50%, reactivated Brazilian economy and investment. Not only the risk 
of being laid off disappeared but job prospects at SIG enhanced and it was signaled 
to me that I would be sent to the US to receive training at headquarters to lead a new 
line of products. Too late. Tired of being overlooked and with my finances 
struggling, I decided to take advantage of the favorable moment and sent my résumé 
to clients that I knew were hiring. Few weeks later I received two job offers that 
tripled my salary.  When I left SIG, a hard phase of my life, marked by financial 
strain and social inertia, had finally ended.   
 
Out of this period I took several lessons. First, I should never quit a job without an 
alternative at hand. Second, I should not bet my future on a single profession, 
particularly a seasonal one like engineering. This made me decided to invest all the 
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money and effort necessary to be accepted on a graduate business program. This 
way I could reconcile with my past aspirations while grabbing a new professional 
specialization. Third, I could never escape becoming a “salesmen”, because in the 
essence any work involves “selling” something, an idea at least.  
 
After a turmoil of events I moved to the south of Brazil to work as factory engineer in 
a large company of the South Petrochemical Complex. What initially sounded as a 
great professional and personal opportunity, once southern state capitals were 
leading Brazilian development and life standards at the time, proved an adaptation 
challenge. Cultural values, social cues, identity traits, and personal habits of the 
“Gauchos” not only were different from my southeastern-average Brazilian ones but 
were defined in opposition to them. In a certain sense, to live in Porto Alegre (Rio 
Grande do Sul state capital) was almost like living abroad. During four years there a 
barely made six friends, none of them from the capital.  
 
Until that, wherever I had gone in Brazil I had always been “welcomed” and  
“invited” to join the local culture, in a relation between equals. At Rio Grande do Sul 
state, in some situations I felt like “tolerated”, while in others “compelled” to 
embrace the local culture, always presented as superior and more praiseworthy. 
According to the “Gauchos”, their food were the best, their women the most 
beautiful, their man the bravest and even their sunset the most beautiful. Not few 
times I had even heard that they should separate from the rest of the country, 
something they never did a single step to. Whoever questioned their “superiority” 
would face strong debate and collective distrust. Since I had just moved from a 
metropolis Sao Paulo and knew quite well the rest of the country, this collective 
imaginary sounded particularly naïve and hard to be accepted. Striking to me was 
that most of this fierce defense of the “gaucho superiority” has held by people who 
never had never left the state or, at best, had been to the neighboring state of Santa 
Catarina. In the beginning, I was frequently caught into comparative discussions that 
Gauchos used to reinforce their superiority, particularly in the presence of outsiders. 
With time, I learnt how to avoid such provocation and to distance myself from any 
form of cultural controversy.  
 
In my mind, anyway, I was there temporarily just to earn some money and go back 
to Sao Paulo to join a master’s degree. Indeed, the better job conditions and the 
relative solitude allowed me to dedicate more time and resources to apply for the 
graduate program of the Faculty of Economy and Business at USP (University of Sao 
Paulo). After six months preparing myself and having succeeded in the preliminary 
tests, I was told during an 15-minute interview, which cost me a trip to Sao Paulo, 
that I should be aware that “there were other candidates which were well known by 
the faculty and thus were in advantage during the selection process”.  
 
Back to Porto Alegre I was resolute in reacting to such a blow and decided, in the last 
minute, to apply for the Master of Science in Business Administration program in the 
also traditional UFRGS (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul). A desperate 
measure I thought, because if in the meritocratic USP I had been defeated by 
personal linkages, what could I expect from a university embedded in such a closed 
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culture? Against all odds, however, I was accepted in the program. It was also an 
opportune moment to find another activity. The company I worked for started to feel 
confident to implement a series of measures designed to reduce the salary of contract 
professionals like me. As I threatened to quit and dedicate to my studies, they gave 
up implementing any change.   
 
This way I finally settled down and started to make a living at Porto Alegre. I rented 
an apartment in a fancy and traditional neighborhood and accept the fait of a long 
stay in the south. Despite the hardships of working and studying at the same time, it 
was a delightful time to me. For the first time I was studying something I really 
enjoyed. I avidly participated in the classes and devoured the papers and books 
teachers recommended, particularly those involving the subjects that fascinated me 
at the time: organizational forms, practices and work performance.  
 
My chosen field of specialization was Human Resources and soon a distinctive 
characteristic of the Master of Business at UFRGS became increasingly salient and 
clashed with my engineering background: the strong humanistic bias of the course. 
Far beyond Taylor, Porter, Mintzberg and Schein, traditional business writers that 
permeate graduate business courses, during organizational behavior seminars we 
discussed Derrida, Baumann, Deleuze and Foucault, in anthropology we read 
Malinowski, Pritchard, Levi-Strauss and Geertz, in organizational sociology we 
debated over Weber, Marx, Bourdieu, Castells, Sahlins. Even Freud, Lacan and Jung 
frequented my classes since two of my professors and a classmate were 
psychoanalysts. This immersion into the human sciences classics melted down any 
engineering positivist bias I could ever had and definitively changed my way to see 
people and their organizations. From practices and organizational forms my interests 
moved first to organizational culture and then to culture in organizations. From 
work performance I moved to study competence.  
 
In my master’s dissertation I presented a longitudinal study covering three distinct 
phases in the twenty-five year history of one of the largest petrochemical companies 
in Brazil. This work shows how multiple levels of culture (local, regional, national) 
dynamically interact with organization’s history to inform the actions and identities 
of organizational members. It also displays how a determined cultural set reacts to 
different management models and the multifaceted character of this relation. Finally, 
It demonstrates how cultural manipulation may adversely affect organizational 
functioning. It has received the maximum qualification from its evaluators and was 
recommended to receive a “cum laude” mention. Curiously, this investigative work 
had a therapeutical side effect as it helped me to cope with the incoherent and 
sometimes unfair behaviors I observed. In a certain sense, the master’s degree made 
organizations and other social settings more transparent as it gave me conceptual 
tools to appreciate and understand its inner works. 
 
By this time, the investigative bug had definitively caught me. As soon I received my 
master’s degree I decided to apply to a doctoral program. My investigation interests 
expanded towards a more encompassing notion of cultural interaction (international) 
and change (innovation). Differently from most Brazilian doctoral students that go 
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abroad on the mid-term of the course for one-year government sponsored stay, I 
decided to go on my own and enroll on a full time doctoral program. One year later, 
I quit my job and moved to Barcelona to begin my doctoral studies at the Universitat 
Politécnica de Catalunya (UPC) and have my long wanted international experience. 
 
By 2004, Spain was the brightest star in the European Union constellation. It reverted 
decades of poverty and closure into a wealthy, multicultural and vibrant society. 
From the outset, it was especially noteworthy how fast its companies 
internationalized, ranking Spain among the key international investors, particularly 
in Latin America. Moreover, Spain was increasingly recognized as an innovation hub 
in many areas of knowledge. It was certainly the place to be at the time. In my view, 
cultural similarities made Spain a proxy for Brazil’s future. Studying in Spain 
represented an opportunity to learn about this development process and to find 
elements to challenge the hegemonic anglo-saxon business thought. Furthermore, it 
was also an opportunity to enhance my language skills, and acquire an international 
experience in a hot, interesting and friendly country.  
 
Indeed, Spain did not let me down, except to the fact that I was not exactly in Spain 
but in Catalunya, as I was frequently reminded by the local language, the Catalan. I 
arrived at Barcelona in a very special moment. It had just hosted the Summer 
Olympic Games and the Universal Forum of Cultures (www.barcelona2004.org) with 
grandiosity and innovation. The world was fascinated with Spain as a whole and 
with Barcelona and Catalunya in special, and so were the Spanish (and Catalan) 
companies with the idea of conquering the world with their aggressive and 
challenging businesses. For anyone interested in studying multiculturalism and 
innovation Barcelona was certainly the hotspot.  
 
In the spring of 2004, 12 students enrolled the full time doctoral program. We were 2 
Catalans, 2 Spaniards (Madrid and Basque Country), 2 Colombians, 2 Mexicans, 1 
Peruvian, 1 Chilean, 1 Venezuelan and 1 Brazilian (me). Most of us shared the same 
ethos of having an international experience and embedding ourselves into all that 
dynamism to become agents of change in our countries. Despite the linguistic 
differences and the long held position of Brazil to give its back to the continent, I 
could feel a genuine sense common identity and proximity with my Latin classmates. 
It was interesting to see how well we get together and shared the same worries and 
aspirations. Just as the university experience made me feel more Brazilian, doctoral 
classes made me feel more Latin American.  
 
The academic environment reflected the intense governmental effort to make Catalan 
universities worldwide recognized, and their research, internationally relevant. Such 
drive involved investments in infrastructure (facilities and interconnected libraries), 
publication incentives, research training and strengthening ties with other European 
universities and attracting foreign students. However, all this effort was undermined 
by the research focus on local affairs and the timid academic production in English. 
This situation produced a relative disconnection from the main international research 
networks, which more dramatically weakened the field of organizational research, an 
alien agenda in a technical university.  
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In response, UPC business doctoral program promoted the same tools and research 
philosophy students at top universities were used to. As such, parallel to more 
traditional seminars and business subjects, we were introduced to academic 
databases, key scientific publications, bibliographic metrics, reference managers, 
cross citation strategies, and all the sort of tools to track investigation hotspots and to 
build cohesive theory. Additionally, we went deep into the bases of epistemology, 
methodology, and techniques of investigation to bring about rich and relevant data. 
This critic and instrumental formation has unequivocally contributed to my 
academic formation in general and to this work in special. 
 
Outside university, I adapted very fast to Barcelona. Even faster than I had adapted 
to some places I lived in Brazil. I have never felt an outsider during conversations as 
Catalans automatically switched to Castellan in the presence of a non-Catalan 
speaker. Though I did not made many friends I still believe my integration was 
satisfactory observed the conditions involved. I hardly experienced any form of 
cultural shock in daily situations, thanks maybe to the cultural similarities, the 
partial domain of the Castellan, and my respectfulness, which most Catalans praised. 
In a certain sense, I strongly identified myself with Spanish (and Catalan) cultural 
features like the rush for innovation, respect for tradition, boldness, temper and 
passion. I was capable of understanding their local affairs and even capture the 
subtle humor in their phrases. After a few months I actually forgot I lived in a 
country that wasn’t mine and start to feel the unusual sensation of being home 
whenever I get back from my short trips (even from Portugal, my ancestors land). 
Specially interesting, in this multicultural venture, was the experience of sharing 
housing with three French undergraduates, which made experience diversity in 
culture, class, age, gender, and educational level all at once. Against all odds, we get 
on quite well. I credit the success in this challenge to the many housing arrangements 
I have experienced in Brazil, whose knowledge help me to overcome many 
situations. 
 
Overall, some observations surprised me at the time. First, how different the 
Catalans saw themselves from other Spaniards while, despite of the language, they 
had far more in common than Paulistas and Cariocas (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro 
dwellers, respectively). Second, how Catalans were able to care so much for their 
identities and at the same time being such an open society. Also attracted my 
attention how Catalans were tolerant with foreigners taking over their public spaces, 
sometimes in ways that most Brazilians despite all their world famous receptivity 
would never accept.  
 
However, at some point I could feel a sense of exhaustion in all that openness and 
tolerance. As a massive numbers of foreigners arrived Spain every day, they stop 
making part of the landscape and started to compete with locals for employment, 
housing and public services. This situation was especially disturbing in Barcelona a 
city that attracted most of the foreigners. Increasingly, news published cases of crime 
among Eastern Europeans, Chinese competition closing traditional businesses, 
insecurity with Islamic extremists among Pakistanis, and Latin Americans 
overstretching the public service infrastructure. This incipient sense of upheaval has 
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invaded even the university. I clearly remember a classmate contesting a professor 
during a seminar that as UPC was a Catalan university, seminars should all be in 
Catalan, and Catalans should be majority in class, just to hear the professor saying 
that UPC selection was public, international and meritocratic, and the language that 
pleased students most would be the chosen one.  
 
By mid-2005, the surging living costs in Barcelona and the completion of all seminars 
make me realize that it was time to move on. At this time the United Kingdom was in 
a rush to attract skilled professionals worldwide to supply their booming business 
particularly in the prime service sectors (financial, engineering, and consulting), the 
intended focus of my investigation. My initial plan was to obtain a high-skilled 
migrant visa, to get an engineering job and to set a foothold there in order to start my 
investigation and obtain credits for the EUDOKMA (European Doctor) title with the 
help of a British business school. The first part was easy. Spending about US$2000 
and being patient to collect and translate all the documentation required, it took me 
less than two months to get the visa. The second part, to find a job, proved much 
harder as British companies preferred Asian nationals to fill in their placements as 
much of the world economy was leaning to that part of the world. At this time Brazil 
and Latin America attracted little attention and seen with skepticism. 
 
Even though, the hard fiscal adjustment implemented in the first two years of Lula’s 
government in Brazil start showing results. As the confidence of the markets 
returned and the capital inflows to Brazil resumed, companies in the country started 
planning investments and hiring once again. In this scenario, while looking for a job 
in UK, I received a job offer to go to Salvador, the 2 million habitants capital of Bahia 
state, a traditional summer destination in northeast Brazil. Though determined to go 
to the UK, the financial depletion I was starting to suffer and the seduction of a 
beachfront job offer weighted and I decided to accept the offer. Initially, I planned 
just to enjoy a sunny 4-6 months "remunerated vacation" in Salvador to once again 
resume my UK plans, particularly because of the doctoral work that would certainly 
gain from an exposure to the British environment. 
 
What happened, however, was quite different. Thanks to tourism revenues economic 
dynamism in northeast Brazil anticipated that of other places in the country. By 
August 2005, when I arrived Salvador, a Miami-like metropolis had already replaced 
the colonial city I used to know. Living conditions in the new middle-class 
neighborhoods of Salvador far exceed those I would find in equivalent zones of 
Barcelona and London.  
 
In this wakening of the Brazilian economy, developed economies start to show clear 
signs of overheating. Surging living costs gradually forced production and services 
into lower cost locations. Six months later, I could hardly find a job in the UK that 
compensate for my return. Discounted taxes and living costs, I would earn more in 
the emerging Salvador than in booming London. As such, what started just as an 
affair became a sort of marriage. In the end, I spent one year and a half living in 
Salvador and completely dropped the plans to go to the UK. 
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During this period I worked for an ambitious emerging engineering company whose 
focus was to expand its operations by means of technological innovation. Thanks to 
my experience in project automation, I was hired to be number two in the recently 
created "Nucleo de Desenvolvimento de Tecnologias” (technology development 
department), or simply NDT. In a few weeks the company moved from a tiny and 
improvised space, to occupy three entire floors in a fancy building near the main 
business hub of the city. The NDT itself occupied a special area of this new office and 
has been designed to be a world-class working space, equipped with planned 
furniture, special illumination, top hardware and even a 3D virtual reality 
auditorium.  
 
The head and architect of NDT was a systems engineer, who gained the trust of the 
company’s owner and went from desktop supplier to Engineering Automation 
Manager in just two years. He developed an operational strategy (and efficiently sold 
it to the board of directors) which basically saw innovation as a top-down process to 
be developed within his NDT to only then gain production. This way, he was able to 
concentrate in his hands all engineering technological resources of the company, and 
control what would be done, when and who would participate. In a business 
environment where knowledge differentials were determinant for the mobility, wage 
and status of a professional, this meant a lot of power. This top-down strategy, 
however, yielded poor results as technological resources were developed 
disconnected from production needs and their return in terms of quality, efficiency 
and revenue was disastrous.  
 
In this scenario, he took my presence as a threat to his position and established an 
intense rivalry with me. While I worked together with production trying to fix this 
flawed strategy, he constantly confronted my opinions and suggestions during 
technical forums, removed any resource from my control, and blocked my contact 
with clients and directors. He controlled so many resources, had such a sharp mind 
and developed such a discourse that he was able to influence anyone in his favor.  
He was so convincing that sometimes I even questioned myself if I was really right. 
This tension kept for a long time as we developed a symbiotic relationship where he 
depended on me to have things done (and keep playing top manager), and I 
depended on him to keep accessing valuable knowledge in order to enhance my 
prospects of a way out. During this period the relation between power, politics and 
innovation, became evident to me as I realized how politicized could be a technical 
working environment and saw the role of political influence in determining winning 
ideas, the meaning of key events and agenda setting.  
 
In February 2007, I left this company and moved to São Paulo to provide engineering 
consulting services for a couple of companies, among them an engineering branch 
(CNC) of a giant Brazilian construction conglomerate (CCC). As CCC operated in 
many countries and was one of the first Brazilian MNEs, I believed that at some 
point it would offer great investigation opportunities and in fact I was right. 
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5.3.2- Field Selection 
 
By June 2007, I concluded my doctoral research project and clearly set my object of 
investigation; the relation between knowledge diversity political processes and 
innovation. A choice that reflects the many influences and points of interest I have 
been through the doctoral period.  
 
According to my theoretical developments, in order to vividly capture this 
relationship I should look for workspaces where dynamic power relations and 
knowledge diversity coexisted. Hardly I could find a better place to investigate this 
relation than in international project teams. The temporal and relational character of 
these work settings create situations that make power relations change along time 
and space involving project and company hierarchic levels as well as clients, 
suppliers, and regulation agencies, all of them interacting to influence project 
outcomes. Knowledge diversity, on its turn, is inherent to project teams, which can 
be devised as working arrangements where specialized knowledge from different 
areas is put together to the accomplishment of a unique task. In engineering projects, 
however, knowledge diversity frequently involves crossborder exchanges with 
actors from other nationalities, taking knowledge diversity to an extreme. 
 
My initial plan was to use my participation at CNC as a platform to access people, at 
CCC and related companies, enrolled in international engineering projects to obtain 
the necessary data for my investigation. However, a unexpected chain of events put 
me at the forefront of this process as CNC itself took part in several international 
projects and end up being purchased by one of its foreign partners (WP), becoming 
in this process an important subsidiary (CNC/WP, henceforth) of the largest 
engineering company in the world (WP). 
 
I confronted this situation both as challenge and opportunity. The challenge was to 
add to the project complexity the influence of the corporate changes involving the 
company as a whole. In return, the same corporate changes brought the opportunity 
to watch not only how innovations emerged within projects but also how they 
survived and evolved within company structure after project conclusion. To cope 
with this challenge I decided to work in two different levels of analysis; the company 
at macro-level, and selected projects at micro-level.  
 
As such, the investigation setting is CNC, a Brazilian company that along the 2 years 
of data collection left the legacy of being a satellite company within a large local 
conglomerate (CCC), to gain operational independence and then became a 
subsidiary of a large transnational engineering company (WP).  
 
If company selection was result of chance and opportunity, at micro level project 
sampling aimed to maximize variability in order to test emergent theory across 
different project circumstances. Therefore, although all projects in the investigation 
timeline contribute to understand the investigation setting as a whole, the three 
selected projects contribute to the understanding of the object of investigation. The 
cases are: 
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 Project Industry CNC/WP 
Activity 
Nationalities 
Involved 
Case 
Length 
Management 
Innovation  
Project Size  
(US$ million) 
Case 
I 
PDY Petrochemical FEED 
United States 
Brazil 
8 months 
International 
Workshare 
US$8,400 
Case 
II 
UNA3 Energy Bidder 
United States 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
4 Months 
Global Price 
Contracting 
US$6,000 
Case 
III 
BGB Oil & Gas 
Conceptual 
Project 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Brazil 
3 Months 
Fast Track 
Schedule 
US$1,100 
Table 2: Case study  profile. 
 
Following an interplay strategy (Schultz & Hatch, 1996), the investigation moved its 
focus along the different levels of analysis (i.e.: project, company, corporate) 
whenever necessary to gain wider understanding of the knowledge change process 
in question and to follow unfolding consequences.  
 
5.3.3- CCC 
 
The company began in 1936 as an association of two Brazilian entrepreneurs already 
carrying the name CCC. By 1939, CCC got its first major contract from São Paulo 
State Highway Department: the earthmoving work of 12kms stretching two small 
cities in the countryside. For this it acquires its first tractor. In 1942, the second large 
contract the excavation of a carbon mine in the neighboring state of Parana. From 
1943 to 1945, CCC undertake earthmoving and paving in two airports under Air 
Force requirement. In 1948 it diversifies into railways and manufacturing 
construction. 
 
During the 50´s and 60´s, CCC consolidated its position in the highway and airport 
sector while strongly expanding into the construction of hydropowers. In 1955 it is 
hired by the government to execute earthmoving to the construction of Brasilia. In 
1968, CCC enters the cement industry. In 1969, it is awarded with earthmoving and 
tank farms for a Petrobras oil refinery in Campinas and acquires CNC to form its 
engineering arm. Also 1964, one of the initial entrepreneurs left the company, 
consolidating the familiar control of CCC. 
 
Along the 70´s, CCC intensively participated in the “Brazilian miracle”, undertaking 
several governmental mega-projects such as Itaipu and Tucuruí Hydropowers, 
Transamazon highway, Rio-Niteroi bridge, São Paulo subway. In 1978, CCC 
undertakes its first international contract, a mid-sized hydropower in Venezuela. In 
the 80´s, the company acquires stakes in industrial companies like Alpargatas, a 
traditional Brazilian footwear, and Alcoa, the largest aluminum producers in the 
world, and further diversifies into energy transmission and distribution systems. 
 
In early 2000´s, CCC group reaches 15 companies, 32,000 direct employees and 
reports gross operating revenues of US$3.9 Billion. In 2005, CCC set up an 
international subsidiary to undertake several projects in Peru, Venezuela, Colombia 
and Bolivia. In the following year it extended its activities into Africa. In 2006, CCC 
enters housing construction building with an entire neighborhood in south side São 
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Paulo and in naval construction building a shipyard in northeast Brazil and being 
awarded by Petrobras with 10 Suezmax ships. It also participates in the concession of 
São Paulo state highways (Brazil´s best) and begins in the concession management 
business. All over 2000´s, CCC controlled companies increasingly acquire foreign 
competitors to expand industrial foreign operations particularly in cement, and 
textiles industries, and form joint ventures with international companies to explore 
local opportunities. In 2010, CCC made its most expensive foreign acquisition, 
EUR$1.4billion, for 33% stake in Cimpor, the largest cement maker in Portugal and 
one of the largest in the world, becoming its controlling shareholder. 
 
In 2010, CCC group reached 30 companies, 62,000 direct employees and reports gross 
operating revenues of US$12.2 Billion. Its operations now are consolidated around 
construction (heavy, naval and housing), industry (steel, textiles, cement) and 
concessions (roads, airports and power distribution). The board is composed by four 
members: one market professional (CEO) and three family representatives, one for 
each of founders three sisters (the remaining founder died in 1994). 
 
5.3.4- WP 
 
The history of the company is woven around the vision and efforts of the man who is 
currently its Chief Executive Officer. He started his career in 1968 in Exxon Australia, 
until 1971 when he left the company to join a society of engineers and help establish 
a small Australian engineering consultancy by 1976. This small company grew 
steadily throughout the 1970’s and ‘80’s and in 1987 acquired the Australian interests 
of W, an American based engineering firm with a strong reputation in the offshore 
gas and oil arena. The company, then, changed its name to W and from this point 
began expanding steadily, securing long term contracts in Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Singapore, and creating local joint ventures. By 2000, W was well poised to 
continue its industry sector and geographic expansion with 30 offices and 3,000 
personnel globally. Such intense growth enabled W to diversify further through 
additional partnerships and acquisitions. Through a policy of diversification W grew 
from the hydrocarbons sector into the power, infrastructure and environment, and 
minerals and metals sectors.  
 
In 2002, W became a publicly listed company on the Australian Stock Exchange 
leading to a period of acquisitions of increasing magnitude around the globe, 
including companies in Canada, Oman, and China.  In 2004, W acquired P, a 
Californian engineering and construction company, global leader in downstream 
hydrocarbons with a widely recognized reputation for its high quality project 
services to the Power, Oil and Gas, Refining, Petrochemicals and Chemicals sectors.  
As P had its own impressive history stemming back to 1944, W merged operations 
with P and changed his name to WP.  
 
Further acquisitions in environment, gas, power, infrastructure and mineral & metals 
sector, continued to deepen and broaden WP capability and geographic presence. In 
2006, WP entered the Latin American market through a joint venture with a Chilean 
leading base metals and infrastructure engineering firm. In 2007, Canada’s largest 
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engineering and project services firm also became part of the WP. In November 2007, 
WP complemented its capability in the nuclear consulting and analysis with the 
acquisition of two U.S.-based nuclear engineering companies. Further, the 
acquisition of a leading international deepwater engineering company, in April 2008 
positioned the company to provide solutions for large-scale offshore facilities, subsea 
and marine systems projects alike. Later, the acquisition of a leading Canadian based 
marine and port facility, bulk material handling and transportation specialist, further 
extended its infrastructure and minerals & metals capabilities.  
 
 
Fig.17: WP growth (Source: WP Presentation) 
 
In 2008, after almost 10 years without working in Brazil, WP is awarded a US$ 110 
million contract with Petrobras, to provided basic engineering services for the off-site 
installations of Rio de Janeiro Petrochemical Complex (PDY). Two years later, in 
early 2010, WP acquired CNC in Brazil for US$ 104.9 million. This acquisition 
complemented the existing capabilities of WP in resource and energy businesses, 
providing a strategic base for growth across South America. Almost at the same time 
WP extended its stake in BM-WP, a joint engineering company in China, to 80%, a 
business worth US$ 38 million. 
 
Nowadays, with sales worth US$ 3.31Billion, WP is the 1st engineering company in 
the oil & gas and power generation sectors, the world 2nd most internationalized 
(78% of revenues from overseas operations) and the 6th largest engineering & 
construction company (E&C) overall. Today the global enterprise has 140 operating 
offices in 40 countries with around 30,000 personnel. (The Top 200 International 
Design Firms: Engineering News-Record, 26th July 2010, http://enr.construction.com). 
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Fig.18: WP personnel distribution worldwide (Source: WP Presentation) 
 
WP main shareholders are international banks HSBC (14.2%), JP Morgan (12.7%) 
although its founder and CEO still retains around 10%.  The board comprises 11 
directors with seven, including the Chairman, as independent, non-executive 
directors. The board composition is determined in accordance with the principle of 
independence, and each non-executive member is audited periodically to consider 
whether there are any circumstances that could materially interfere with the 
director’s ability to act in the Company’s best interests. 
 
 
Fig.19: WP Corporate Structure (Source WP Presentation). 
 
5.3.5- CNC 
 
The company began in 1959, founded by teachers and graduates of the traditional 
Escola Politécnica (University of São Paulo´s Engineering School). In 1969, CNC was 
incorporated by CCC as its founder believed construction should be closely 
supported by engineering. Since then, CNC has built a regional and international 
reputation in hydroelectric and thermoelectric plants, wastewater, urban 
development, environmental services, and lately industrial plants, refining and 
distributing of oil, gas, and petrochemicals throughout Brazil, Latin America, and 
Africa. 
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Thanks to large scale governmental hydroelectric investments, the hydraulic 
engineering area dominated the company for a long time. Along two decades, CNC 
provided projects for more than 40 GW (60% Brazilian power consumption) of power 
generation, including some of the largest hydropowers in the world. As these 
investments dwindle during the 80´s, the company diversified into smaller 
hydroelectric units for private clients, which sequentially moved the company into 
its first thermoelectric units. Later complementary activities to the power generation 
business such as environmental studies, and urban development grew enough to 
become separate business units within company.  
 
The relationship of CCC, its parent company, and a giant aluminum multinational, 
ALCOA, brought its first large scale industrial project, a aluminum processor in the 
north of the country. The project in association with a Canadian engineering firm 
credentiated the company into the industrial engineering area, an important 
diversification move at the time.   
 
Surging investments from Petrobras in early 2000´s stretched even further this 
diversification move into the oil & gas industry. Several projects involving refining 
and gas processing dominated the company during the period 2002-2010 and 
revenues from the oil sector overcame those of power projects which remained 
stagnant at 30% level. During the period revenues grew steadily to US$233 million, a 
three-fold increase within a decade.  
 
CNC sale came just after its first international move, an office in Buenos Aires, 
opened as internationalization plan encouraged by CCC. The company was 
purchased in cash by almost US$ 104 million, seven times its 2010 net profits (US$ 15 
million), a price considered high by specialists. Defending the business the following 
official declarations were offered: 
 
“Quando iniciamos a estratégia de internacionalização, sentimos a necessidade de nos capacitar para a área 
de refino de petróleo, onde ainda não tínhamos conhecimento suficiente, apesar da experiência que havíamos 
adquirido com a elaboração de projetos de petróleo e gás. (...) nos deparamos com duas alternativas: comprar 
ou ser comprados. Acabamos ficando com a segunda opção. Daqui para  frente a CCC vai se focar em 
construção e nas outras áreas nas quais já atua” (CNC president, to Brasil Economico, 5th Jan 2010). 
 
(When we started the internationalization strategy, we felt the need to build capabilities in the 
area of petroleum refining, where we had not enough knowledge, despite the experience we had 
gained from development of oil and gas projects. (…) then we were confronted with two 
alternatives: buy or be bought. We ended up with the second option. Henceforth, CCC will focus 
on construction and other areas where it already works – author translation). 
 
"A CNEC é fundamental para a nossa estratégia de expansão na América Latina e para a ampliação da 
nossa presença nas áreas de óleo, gás e energia hidrelétrica, dois mercados que têm grande potencial. (...)A 
união da nossa experiência com a da CNEC vai trazer sinergias que podem criar muitas oportunidades”. 
(WP regional vice-president, to Brasil Economico, 5th Jan 2010). 
 
(CNC is key to our expansion strategy in Latin America and to expand our presence in the oil, gas 
and hydroelectric power, two markets with great potential. (...) The combination of our experience 
with the CNC ones will bring synergies and create many opportunities – author translation) 
 
Later, in another public interview, CNC president complemented that the link with 
CNC made it hard for CCC to make deals with other companies, since they fear the 
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leak of classified information. He also pointed that Brazilian law (Lei 8666/93, art 9º) 
prevented government to hire construction and engineering services within the same 
group. As engineering bid happened before the construction one, he explained, 
many times CNC declined bid participation to avoid blocking CCC from major 
construction contracts3. Moreover, he argues, CNC never enjoyed engineering 
exclusivity in CCC construction projects, and although the CCC founder believed it 
was better to have engineering closer to construction, group vision now was to focus 
on its core businesses. Nevertheless, as he tells: “Relationship between CNC and CCC 
will not disappear but will happen on a case basis, project to project” (“CNC é adquirida 
pelo grupo australiano WP”, Revista Grandes Construções, 12th January, 2010). 
 
 
Fig.20: WP & CNC expected synergy (Source: WP Presentation). 
 
 
5.4- FIELD ENTRY 
 
In February 2002, I have been contracted to provide engineering consulting services 
for CNC as a plan to reinforce company’s expertise before it joining a winning 
consortium of a US$260 million Petrobras onshore gas project (UTGCA) located in 
the north shore of São Paulo state. The winning consortium was composed by CCC 
(42,5%), Queiroz Galvão (42.5%), another large Brazilian construction company, and 
IESA (15%), a traditional off-shore Brazilian engineering company. As long as CNC 
was responsible for the previous FEED4 phase of the project, and IESA was about to 
be awarded a larger offshore project, CCC start to negotiate the replacement of IESA 
by CNC in the consortium. After two months, negotiations collapsed as IESA 
decided to exercise its share in the consortium and CNC was left out of the job.  
                                                
3
 Usually construction and procurement contracts represent 95% of entire entrepreneurship cost, with remaining 5% 
corresponding to engineering services. 
4
 FEED (Front End Engineering & Design): Pre-detailing phase of a project used to further cost and design definitions in order to 
obtain final project sanction, to require permits and to define contractual basis. Usually, is an intermediate phase coming after 
conceptual engineering and before detailed engineering and construction. 
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Little time later, and in very similar conditions, CNC overtook another engineering 
company in the winning consortium of a US$480 million Petrobras RPBC refinery 
expansion, where it also developed the previous FEED phase of the project. The head 
of the winning consortium was TCT, the largest Argentinean construction company 
and a fierce CCC competitor. TCT decided to subcontract CNC on the assumption 
that its previous knowledge on the project and quick start-up capability what could 
help saving money on Petrobras tight margin contracts.  
 
A conflict emerged when CCC commanded CNC to lend some of its key engineers to 
his UTGCA consortium, however, CNC needed these professionals to develop the 
RPBC project for the TCT consortium. Although unable to officially rebuff the 
request, CNC made no effort in that direction, leaving each professional to opt in or 
out. UTGCA consortium managers played hard to attract CNC professionals 
proposing cash, benefits and, in the end all sort of professional threats.  Most 
engineers knew that those promises would not last much once they break-up with 
CNC, a well-established company, to join the CCC consortium whose existence 
would last as long as the project. As a result only one professional in almost twenty 
chose to go to CCC consortium. 
 
BY this time, I was eager to join the RPBC project and start collecting data for my first 
case stud, however, other professional duties delayed the transfer for almost 4 
months. When I first approached RPBC project it was too late to collect any relevant 
data and build a case study, since most agreements and procedures between the two 
companies had already being settled and Argentineans start being replaced by 
Brazilian professionals locally hired by TCT.  During the few time I spent there with 
some of the Argentinean expatriates I felt like despite the friendly and encouraging 
relation they developed with Brazilians most of them presented adaptation problems 
to São Paulo, a city far less friendly than Buenos Aires, and were stressed by the 
constant trips to visit relatives and friends. In different occasions I testified 
telephonic discussions between an Argentinean engineer and his fiancée and 
perceived many unexplained absences among them. One month later, only one 
Argentinean manager was left behind, one who was already living in Brazil for 
decades.  
 
The substitution of the Argentinean supervisors by Brazilian ones unleashed tensions 
previously concealed by the poor communication and “cultural uncertainty”5. Small 
project problems, prompted by Petrobras engineering interference quickly escalate 
into an open war between CNC and TCT. In its most acute phase, TCT start to 
sabotage CNC schedule to force a project delay in order to hide its procurement 
problems and transfer contract penalties to CNC. The constant stand-offs and mutual 
accusations intoxicated so much the project atmosphere that many professionals had 
to be internally transferred to other projects.  
 
                                                
5
 In this work I define “cultural uncertainty” as the difficulty an actor has in anticipating the effects of his actions when 
interacting with another actor from a different cultural background. 
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CNC also had problems with other two other joint projects: the USM thermoelectric 
(with CCC) and UTE thermoelectric (with the Argentinean branch of SKANSKA, a 
Swedish construction company). Delays in both projects resulted in harsh measures 
on the part of the leading construction partners. In USM case, entire project team had 
to move to the construction site until project conclusion. In UTE case, SKANSKA 
project director demanded the withdrawal of CNC project manager alleging his 
incompetence in fulfilling the task. 
 
When current RPBC project manager moved to a competitor, this project manager 
gained support to move into the open place. His arrival at the RPBC project marked a 
period of excruciating politicking. Instead of defending CNC terms against TCT, he 
did the opposite as he directly vented and amplified to CNC board of directors all 
internal project problems, usually defending TCT side. Astonishingly, the board 
responded by putting pressure on technical managers to force their subordinates to 
cope with TCT demands. This move was interpreted by many as a way to escape the 
heavy organizational duties of a project manager and to please the client in order to 
be hired after project conclusion, what indeed happened.  
 
As a result, TCT demands surged to the point of halting CNC work progress. 
Confronted with the board urge to demonstrate strength and fire whoever necessary, 
S.P.H a key technical manager, literally moved to the project and did not take long to 
understand what was happening within RPBC project. However, as he began to 
oppose A.F., he noticed the heavy politicking game on play, and chose to retreat. 
Instead of facing A.F. in the board meetings he decided to make his subordinates 
work almost 24x7 in order to cope with all TCT demands and to keep the project 
going. This action preserved jobs but ruined relationships within the project team. As 
I admonished him on these measures, our roles went on collision course. This 
stalemate caused a shift in our professional relationship from full confidence to 
almost complete disregard tainted with a dose of rivalry.  
 
Along this process, relationship difficulties between CNC and CCC start to emerge. 
Since mid-2007, CNC had been increasingly stimulated by CCC to become more 
independent. Not much later, a president has been appointed to CNC (until then the 
company where managed by a CCC body of executives) that henceforth became a 
business unit apart from CCC. As a measure of isolation, in the end of 2007, the 
almost 350 CNC´s employees were not allowed to join the traditional CCC group 
year-end party, a huge event involving more than 2000 people only in São Paulo.  
 
In the beginning of 2008, with the sub-prime crisis ramping up, demand for 
engineering services in Brazil came to a halt and CNC saw its service backlog 
dwindle below the 12-months safe limit. Along the year, professionals no longer 
required in RPBC project were “lent” to CCC to take part in a consortium with 
PROMON, CNC´s strongest competitor. Frequently, PROMON “cherry-picked” 
CNC professionals through CCC intervention, usually asking for highly specialized 
professionals. This process also allowed PROMON to try professionals without 
having to pay premium fees in order to attract them.  Upon this observation, some 
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people who I talked to, admitted that “to be lend” to CCC meant that a professional 
is not part of CNC plans and this was equivalent to be “fired on the middle-term”. 
 
With the end of the RPBC project approaching and no new large projects on the go 
my relationship with CNC was at risk. S.P.H. offered me two harsh options: to join a 
unfeasible 3-month project (RNM) in the far north Amazon state under his direct 
command or to be “lent” to TCT in order to provide engineering assistance in the 
construction field. I questioned him if there weren´t other options like PDY and RNE 
projects that were running on the neighboring building, or any of the many needed 
procedures or technical developments that were much needed within the company. 
He argued that the PDY and RNE projects were not requiring people at that time and 
that the company no longer worked with “overhead6”.  I understood the options as a 
message that I was no longer “core” in his assessments. Nevertheless, this idea 
seemed quite personalistic and I decided to start lobbying people within company to 
keep my relationship with the company afloat.  
 
At the very same day, I went for a coffee break with a close colleague, A.R.A., who 
had worked with me in the beginning of RPBC project but now was assigned to the 
PDY project. As I explained to him the oddity of my situation I noticed that he was 
also in distress due to work overload. As he further explained the problem I realized 
that I could help him, provided that I went to the PDY project. I long wished to go to 
the PDY project because I believed that the international joint character of this project 
would yield a great investigation opportunity, however my duties in the current 
project again prevented me from the move. Then I asked him to vent to his 
coordinator, D.D.C, and even to his project manager, K.G., that I was about to leave 
the PRBC project and could be of much help to solve the problem they faced in PDY 
project for almost a year and a half.   
 
Next, I talked to a close colleague in the RPBC project and as he said to me he was 
very interested in going to the construction field provide support for TCT, I realized 
that I had an additional argument to weaken S.P.H. stance. When I met him little 
later I explained that I did not want to follow TCT specially because there were 
people in the team that were more willing to do so. Again, he looked clearly 
dissatisfied with my position but reaffirmed that he would never force a professional 
into an unwilling assignment and we should wait to see if other opportunities came 
by. In the very next day, K.G. called S.P.H and required my immediate displacement 
to PDY project in order to help A.R.A to overcome the serious problems they were 
facing. Down beaten by my intervention, S.P.H had no other option than let me go.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6
 In this context, the word “overhead” is used to denote work without a specific project assignment. 
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Fig. 21: Investigation timeline. 
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6.1- PROJECT OBJECT 
 
PDY is nowadays the largest independent investment program within Petrobras, and 
one of the world’s largest in the oil sector, mounting up to US$8,4 billion, 108 million 
man-hours and 17,000 workers at peak (Petrobras presentation, Nov 2007). It was 
initially conceived as an integrated petrochemical complex capable of processing the 
165.000 barrels per day of heavy-crude from the nearby Campos basin into fuel (30%) 
and 1st and 2nd generation basic petrochemicals (70%). PDY also marks the full return 
of the giant oil state company to the petrochemical sector after the privatization 
programs during which Petrobras had to sell his petrochemical assets to other large 
Brazilian groups to become only a minority shareholder in the business. 
 
PDY complex would be built in partnership with Group Ultra (3rd largest Brazilian 
petrochemical group at the time) with two main objectives: balance future supply of 
1st and 2nd generation basic petrochemicals and use low-value heavy-crude to save 
US$ 2 billion/year in petrochemical imports. During the initial feasibility and 
conceptual studies Petrobras selected the municipality of Itaboraí, 50km away from 
Rio de Janeiro city, to be the construction site of PDY (Petrobras Presentation - 
ABEMI Meeting, Aug. 2008). 
 
 
Fig.22: PDY location (Source: Google Maps) 
 
An initial change in course of PDY initiated in 2005 when BNDES, in a market report, 
set the landmark for a complex process of national petrochemical sector 
consolidation: 
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“In considering that the sustained economic growth will require additional productive investments in the 
order of US$12 billion, to match the petrochemical products demand until 2013, it is key to equate financial 
sources to enable the achievement of many scheduled projects (...) The definitive solution to the issue of raw 
material can be the construction of new integrated complexes, from the refinery until the second generation, 
using domestic oil (heavy) as raw material. (...) The contribution of BNDES for the petrochemical industry 
should be established by supporting the implementation of new projects and funding for capacity expansion 
and modernization of current. Additionally, investments in R & D and restructuring movements should be 
encouraged so that the sector will increase the capacity for technological innovation and is consolidated in the 
most competitive companies.” (author translation from GOMES et. al., 2005 - Industria Petroquímica 
Brasileira, situação atual e perspectivas. BNDES report). 
 
The seven-year consolidation of the Brazilian petrochemical business ended with the 
three smaller players, Suzano, Ipiranga and Ultrapar, being purchased by Braskem 
and Petrobras, with the help of BNDES. As a result, Petrobras concentrated its entire 
petrochemical assets, previously held by Petroquisa (Petrobras petrochemical 
investment operator), into Braskem a giant private company (US$20 billion) fully 
national owned with a 40% Petrobras stake. 
 
 
Fig.23: Brazilian petrochemical sector consolidation process. 
 
In end of 2009, the confirmation of large light-crude oil deposits in the so-called “pre-
salt” fields and the end of long round of petrochemical sector consolidation 
sponsored by the government completely changed the initial plans. The large 
quantity of light-crude and gas in the new fields required Petrobras to quickly build 
up its oil refining and gas processing capacity. By early 2010, in the end of the case 
study, Petrobras decided to concentrate PDY activities into oil refining and let 
Braskem responsible for all petrochemical activities within the complex what 
marginally affected the result of the project and its relation with WP the engineering 
company in charge of PDY basic engineering assessment.  
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6.2- PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS 
 
6.2.1- The Client: Petrobras 
 
Petrobras was established in 1953, during the second term of the developmentalist 
government of President Getulio Vargas, to undertake the monopoly in the oil sector 
activities in Brazil on behalf of the state. The campaign for Petrobras creation, 
however, started in 1946 under the slogan: “The oil is ours”. In his inaugural speech 
Getulio reinforced the nationalist discourse behind the company creation saying: “It 
is, therefore, with great satisfaction and patriotic pride that I sanctioned the bill approved by 
the legislative which is a milestone in our economic independence”. The new company, 
assumed responsibility above all oil exploratory activities and two small refineries 
privately owned.  
 
The dream of oil independence was challenged in 1960 when a senior American 
geologist Walter K. Link, reported the impossibility of producing relevant amounts 
of oil from Brazilian on-shore basins (the so-called Link Report). The document 
questioned the rationality of wasting resources on daring exploratory programs and 
set a pessimistic view about Brazilian oil potential. Additionally, the report stated 
that further geological information could change this scenario for the off-shore 
exploration, however, he was also pessimistic about Petrobras capability of 
overcoming the challenges of off-shore exploration.  
 
In the urge to refute the Link Report and legitimate its existence, Petrobras 
technicians set an aggressive path for oil exploration in Brazil. Although some 
significant results were obtained in on-shore fields, it was the off-shore fields that 
surprised. With the construction of its first large scale oil refinery (REDUC) in 1961 
and the beginning of off-shore exploration with the Brasilia oil rig, Petrobras set an 
important foothold for its existence and legitimacy. To meet the technological 
demands necessary to further extend oil exploration, in 1968 Petrobras created 
CENPES, a research and development center, today largest Latin America research 
center and patent holder. 
 
Despite the investments, in 1997 Brazil was still producing less than 60% of the oil 
consumed domestically. In that year, president Fernando Henrique Cardoso signed a 
law 9.478/97 ending Petrobras' monopoly in oil exploration and created the National 
Petroleum Agency (ANP), to mediate conflicts among business, government and 
consumers. The law also established the concession system where ANP goes public 
to offer oil prospecting areas. In this system, the highest bidder, be it a national or 
international companies, pays the federal government to win full exploration rights 
under certain conditions (i.e.: local content, investment targets, production 
schedules), that if not met, result in concession revoking and re-auctioning. The less 
the risk the higher the bonus paid for a determined area. 
 
The aim behind the end of state oil monopoly was to produce an investment shock in 
the Brazilian oil sector upon the arrival of new competitors and enhance state 
revenues limited by Petrobras exploration capacity. It also aimed to submit 
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Petrobras, seen at time as large and inefficient company, into competitive pressure to 
modernize their operations. Overall, the concession system was successful as it 
stimulated the national oil production from 900.000 barrels/day in 1997 into more 
than 2.000.000 barrels/day by 2010, attracted almost 35 large international oil 
companies and generated around US$ 4,5 billion in government revenues (ANP 
website: www.brasil-rounds.gov.br). Nevertheless, Petrobras remained a dominant 
player in the internal oil market as it deeply knew the Brazilian geology and had the 
financial and political means to keep control over the most interesting exploration 
areas. In the riskier or higher investment areas Petrobras established joint ventures 
with mid-sized foreign oil companies like Repsol (Spain), BG (UK), Statoil (Norway) 
and Galp (Portugal).  
 
Nowadays, Petrobras is the largest company in Latin America by market 
capitalization and revenue, and the largest company headquartered in the Southern 
Hemisphere by market value (8th worldwide in market value). Petrobras has up to 
132 production platforms, 16 refineries, 16 thermoelectric plants, 30,000 kilometers of 
pipelines and more than 6,000 service stations in Brazil. Petrobras controls significant 
oil and energy assets in 29 countries in Africa, North America, South America, 
Europe and Asia. These holdings as well as properties in Brazil give it total assets of 
$133.5 billion. Petrobras is a world leader in development of advanced technology 
from deep-water water oil production (company website: www.petrobras.com.br).  
 
Beyond its roles as an oil company and State revenue generator, Petrobras also 
behaves as an economic development agency. Through its PIDD-P&G policy, 
acronym for “Política Industrial Dirigida por Demanda” (Demand-Driven Industrial 
Policy), Petrobras uses its purchase power to enhance organization and growth of 
local suppliers as well as the entry of international players. As show in the chart 
ahead, the program has the following objectives:  
 
(1) Expand productive capacity in sectors considered highly competitive (i.e.: steel, 
piping, pumping equipment, subsea equipment, steam turbines, generators and 
electric engines; substations and heavy electrical equipment); 
 
(2) Expand productive capacity and technologically develop sectors considered 
intermediately competitive (i.e.: piping connections, heavy equipment, alternative 
compressors, gas and diesel engines, cranes and lifting equipment, industrial valves, 
engineering services, construction services. 
 
(3) Stimulate entry of new local and foreign suppliers, as well as foster associations 
between them, in sectors without local production (i.e.: centrifugal compressors, 
large engines, turbines, instrumentation. 
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Fig.24: PIDD – P&G Petrobras Strategy. (Source: Lenart, 2011. Cadeia Produtiva de Petróleo, Gás e Energia Petrobras 
presentation - Encontro de Negócios da Cadeia de Fornecedores de Petróleo, Gás e Energia, Bacabeira –MA, Brazil) 
 
With an investment budget of US$ 58.5 Billion and a resulting “national content 
policy” hovering 70%, it exerts a considerable impact in the Brazilian economy, by 
providing strong demand to the national industry in the sectors of transport, steel, 
shipbuilding and heavy equipment. It also provides a considerable stimulus for 
services like engineering, construction and maintenance where national content 
reach almost 100%.  
 
Beyond the internal demand drive and the building of a closer supplier network, the 
PIDD-P&G policy also aim to offset the risks of Dutch disease7 due to a surge in 
primary products exports, a current problem in Brazilian economy. Another side 
effect of PIDD-P&G is that Petrobras requirements exerts a considerable institutional 
pressure over a considerable part of Brazilian industrial sector, shaping their 
operational modes and technological choices on its own terms and limitations. 
 
6.2.2-The Contractor: WP-Houston 
 
Due to the complexity of the PDY project, Petrobras had to submit the project to an 
international bidding process, involving direct invitation to companies with proven 
expertise in taking large scale petrochemical projects. Such bidding processes involve 
a far different approach to what Petrobras usually does at national level, and beyond 
                                                
7
 Dutch disease is a concept that explains the apparent relationship between the increase in exploitation of natural resources and 
a decline in the manufacturing sector. Its underlying assumption is that an increase in revenues from natural resources makes a 
given currency stronger compared to the ones from trading partners, resulting in exports becoming more expensive and the 
manufacturing sector less competitive. 
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best price, it also perform technical evaluations upon the type of technology to be 
developed during the basic project phase, with energetic and raw material 
consumption, product yield and ownership costs also taken into consideration in the 
final offer.  
 
In November 2007, WP announced that it had been selected by Petrobras to perform 
integration and project management services, execute front-end engineering design 
(FEED) for utilities and offsite in the largest industrial undertaking in the history of 
Petrobras in Brazil, the PDY complex. The contract valued at approximately US$ 110 
million covered the integration of the overall project, preparation of planning for the 
implementation phase, cost estimation, documentation for bidding process of 
detailed design, procurement, and construction of the facilities. Contract 
management and project execution was left in the hands of the WP-Houston office, 
which have elaborated the winning proposal. 
 
The many years supplying engineering services to key oil companies around the 
world specially in the Gulf of Mexico, Middle East (i.e.: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq) and Asia (i.e.: China, Kazakhstan) turned WP-Houston into a 
very confident subsidiary of WP deeply specialized in oil & gas projects. The 
“excellence center” status granted by the HQ further extended this over-confidence 
and WP-Houston operated almost like an independent company.  WP-Houston 
knew the job, had proven methods, qualified professionals and the necessary 
technological skills to successfully fulfill the task. 
 
WP-Houston embraced considerable diverse people (i.e.: women, Afro-descendent, 
Latin-descendent, young, elder), not only U.S. citizens but also from many different 
origins (i.e.: Mexico, Colombia, Philippines, Egypt, China), which eventually 
required U.S. citizenship during the economic boom years. WP-Houston members 
were ultimate examples of business globetrotters, holding several short and long-
term international assignments along their careers. Technical education and, above 
all, long time experience in doing the same job provided a high level of expertise and 
fast response from WP-Houston members. All of them official employees from WP 
enjoying considerable benefits (i.e.: Medical care, parking lot, 4 days work week) and 
in being hourly remunerated developed a sort of financial relation with the company 
(“I work as much as I get paid”, E.R.K).  
 
Nevertheless, WP-Houston members knew little if something about Petrobras and 
Brazil. The decades of political and economic turmoil in Brazil limited the interest of 
average North Americans about the country and in this vacuum of knowledge 
stereotypes proliferated, reducing Brazil to the Amazon, samba, soccer and poverty. 
Along year 2007, however, a dramatic shift started taking place. With the sub-prime 
crisis building up and several service orders being suspended, the PDY project 
became a lifeline to WP-Houston.  
 
This situation somehow represented an unusual power reversal on the traditional 
“package” approach that international engineering companies apply to EM clients. In 
the “package” approach, the overall engineering service is offered at a discount rate 
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provided that clients accept the technological “package” with only minor 
adaptations. Each individual plant operator, however, has a different set of 
economic, raw material, and energetic limitations which require plant adaptations to 
realize the tight margins that such large investments involve. As long as accepting a 
“package” means either a dysfunctional operation or future high adaptation costs, 
clients are induced to anticipate all package changes prior to contracting, an 
impractical task as most of the limitations come out on the course of basic 
engineering development. Although “package” contracts allow for a certain amount 
of adaptation, these limits are usually poorly defined and debatable leaving space for 
international engineering companies charge additional hourly fees which make up 
for the bulk of their profits.  Petrobras was aware of that and despite the turbulent 
history it had with international engineering companies, took advantage of the 
situation and exerted intense schedule and project adaptation pressures upon WP. 
 
The international bidding processes of PDY also required the foreign winning 
company to hire a local partner in order to share part of the contract. WP saw a local 
partner as a nuisance, and delayed it as much as possible. However, with 
communication problems mounting, and Petrobras increasingly upset due to WP 
literal stance on contract management, this requirement could no longer be 
postponed. For WP, hiring a local partner became an essential move in order to 
create a mediating stance, despite the cost of managing an interface with a local, and 
probably less experienced company. After several months of negotiation, in early 
2008, WP decided to hire CNC as its local partner, following Petrobras advice.  
 
6.2.3-Local partner: CNC 
 
Though new to the game and coming from a very different engineering tradition, 
CNC has been able to find a place for itself in the oil & gas sector. Its deep relations 
with CCC enabled CNC to keep its lean and professional structure relatively 
untouched along the economic crisis period, providing the company with an edge 
over its competitors when Petrobras unleashed the first phase of its recent 
investment program. From 2004 to 2008, CNC was awarded increasingly complex 
projects from Petrobras: 
 
- 2004: UTGCA (FEED) – US$ 10 million*                                     * Overall contract value 
- 2005: RPBC (FEED) – US$ 15 million* 
- 2006: UTE-RN (Detailing Engineering) – US$ 160 million* 
- 2006: UTE-RPBC (Detailing Engineering) – US$ 180 million* 
- 2007: RPBC (Detailing Engineering) – US$ 460 million* 
- 2008: RNEST (Detailing Engineering) – US$ 1,1 billion* 
 
Along this period CNC built, through its São Paulo office, a considerable reputation 
within Petrobras and the loyalty of some of the best professionals in Brazilian 
engineering market. At the time of the partnership, CNC held several large projects 
mounting to a backlog of more than two years. Market for engineering professionals 
where red hot and the company feared not to have enough people and office space to 
handle all that projects at once.  
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Relations with Petrobras although tense were manageable particularly due to skillful 
operation of CNC project managers and coordinators. CNC knew that Petrobras was 
a demanding and erratic client to be sometimes confronted and sometimes pleased. 
Beyond financial gains, the partnership with WP was considered strategic. Not only 
in terms of the expected transfer of knowledge, and international projection but also 
because it would allow CNC to replicated its successful model of taking part in basic 
engineering have a edge in the detailing phase in a multibillion undertaking. 
 
Differently from WP-Houston, CNC personnel presented a far less diverse setting, 
being predominantly male, white and Brazilian. The few highly experienced 
technicians where outnumbered by colleagues with university degrees, what 
conferred a more multifunctional profile to CNC personnel. While lower ranks stood 
as officially registered employee (with benefits and taxes), the majority of higher 
rank professionals preferred contract employment (no benefits and lower taxes). 
Nevertheless, CNC members saw themselves as equals and enjoying for a relatively 
stable employment relationship developed a sense of company belonging and 
partnership, extending working hours without payment of additional benefits. 
International assignments where uncommon among CNC employees and when in 
contact with foreigners they invariably reacted with embarrassment or overexposure. 
Language skills, where existing, lacked fluency.  
 
Even tough, Brazilians were far more used to U.S. than North Americans to Brazil. 
Most of Brazilians grew up looking at the U.S. as an example of developed society 
and even as cultural reference. From the 80´s to mid 2000´s, any form of relationship 
with the U.S., be it educational stays, vacations, relatives, a car or a cloth from an 
American brand, even learning and speaking English in public, was keenly seen as 
symbol of status among Brazilians. Attention to the U.S. used to be so intense that 
U.S. related news received a lot of coverage on TV. This relation increased and 
became more asymmetric when Brazilians begin to move to the U.S. to live “the 
American dream”, and became anomalous characters within the “Latino” stereotype.  
 
Overall, CNC members assigned to PDY project saw the partnership with WP in 
very positive terms. An opportunity to get in contact with foreign professionals and 
learn new methods and skills, emulating somehow what would be expected from an 
international experience.  
 
6.3- CASE CONTEXT 
 
6.3.1- “International Workshare” Current State of Knowledge.  
 
Established the partnership between WP and CNC, they had to decide how to share 
the work. The split of work between partners was set as forth: 
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 BASIC ENGINEERING FEED 
 WP CNC WP CNC 
PROCESS X  X  
PIPING X  X  
MECHANICAL X  X  
INSTRUMENTATION X  X  
ELECTRICAL  X   X 
HVAC  X  X 
ARCHITECTURE  X  X 
CIVIL/METALIC  X  X 
Table 3: PDY Project split of work 
 
Such division of work, concentrating CNC role in Civil and Electrical design, 
probably reflected the WP vision over CNC capabilities, at the time, as profoundly 
linked to its past as an hydropower engineering company. It also embedded a 
privileged position for WP which reserved an independent upstream position in the 
engineering process for itself whereas CNC had to fit into a downstream position, 
and thus, become fully dependent on WP information to work. It also cannot be 
ruled out that WP had further subcontracted parts or entire sections of his job to any 
other office or third-party company around the world, once its internal operating 
processes were opaque to external viewers. 
 
 
 
Fig 25: Simplified interdisciplinary information workflow in oil & gas projects.  
 
In the first half of the project, CNC enjoyed a comfortable position as the project 
balance concentrated activities in the WP-Houston office. A small but highly 
specialized task force has been mobilized in CNC but remained almost idle for a 
several months. Along this time only one project coordinator (P.D.J.) has been 
assigned to WP-Houston in order to follow project execution and if possible 
anticipate information for CNC work. Project manager, coordinators and discipline 
 169 
 
supervisors also participated in videoconferences between Petrobras and WP-
Houston on a weekly basis. 
 
As the project execution advanced in the WP-Houston office, more and more 
information was available to be released to CNC. With a growing amount of 
information considered released by WP, P.D.J. returned to CNC and a WP project 
coordinator (V.S.) was sent to Brazil to provide support to CNC work. Depending on 
the nature of the information it was nested into different media formats.  
 
Property data and logical information, which were textually and symbolic 
represented, went directly to the “digital paper” format to be assembled into 
“engineering documents” (i.e.: design basis, specifications, spreadsheets, and 
diagrams). Such “engineering documents” then were formalized and made 
accessible8 for project members through electronic document management systems. 
Once they were electronically “issued”, CNC was able to use the embedded 
information as reference for its downstream work. 
 
 
Fig. 26: Traditional supports for engineering information.  
 
Registry data and physical information, which were spatially and objectively 
represented, contractually required9 the use of 3D “virtual environment” format 
using the commercial plant design system PDMS10 (Plant Design Management 
System) during development phase. Only after interdisciplinary review and 
                                                
8
 The process by which engineering documents are formalized and made accessible are also known as “issue”. 
9
 Petrobras requires the use of PDMS in order to ensure proper material selection (from certified material databases) and precise 
spatial distribution of plant elements, improving the quality and time execution of the project. 
10
 PDMS is a proprietary system of  the British software house AVEVA Group Plc. (http://www.aveva.com). 
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consolidation this information could be brought into the “digital paper” format by a 
specific functionality of the PDMS, which transformed information from the 3D 
“virtual environment” format into a 2D dimensional document called “drawing”, up 
to be “issued” through the electronic document management system.  
 
 
Fig. 27: New supports for engineering information. 
 
Although the application of plant design systems in oil & gas projects is widespread, 
a clear approach on how engineering disciplines must interact within 3D “virtual 
environment” to fully realize the benefits offered by such systems remains elusive. In 
the absence of a consolidated knowledge on the subject most companies allow 
interdisciplinary spats to be negotiated among discipline members on an ad hoc basis 
under mediation of a project coordinator. Such random approach, however, 
overlooks the risks associated with late detection of interdisciplinary problems which 
ultimately result in schedule overrun or costly re-works. This situation is further 
complicated by the fact that engineering disciplines operate on different timeframes, 
if not interactively, with several feedback rounds needed before an optimal solution 
is reached. As such, if formalize, distribute and consolidate information in 3D 
“virtual environment” format were already challenging in internal environments, 
across different stakeholders, geographically, culturally and financially separated it 
proved yet more challenging.  
 
Intuitively, the most obvious way to overcome this problem was to anticipate the 
process of transforming information from 3D “virtual environment” format into 
“drawings”, and send them up to CNC through the electronic document 
management system. However, physical information is far more subject to change 
than properties and logical information. Subsequent changes would require several 
drawing revisions, escalating the costs and time delays associated with the process of 
information transfer. Furthermore producing and issuing drawings also carried the 
risk of information lag time, that is, upon arrival information is already overdue. An 
additional problem with this approach is that drawings are composed of multiple 
elements, requiring that all elements within a drawing were ready for release prior to 
drawing issue, further delaying information arrival at CNC.  
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Fig. 28: 3D model transformation to 2D engineering documents. 
 
Despite the fact that CNC was a far more experienced PDMS user, WP-Houston took 
the lead in addressing this problem. 3D “virtual environment” information was 
populated and stored in two identical databases physically located in WP-Houston 
and CNC-SãoPaulo offices, which were paired overnight enabling partners see each 
other work with a maximum lag of one day. WP-Houston then decided to segregate 
CNC scope elements in database areas whose name spotted the suffix “TEMP”. 
When such elements were ready for CNC examination, a database attribute was 
changed and the released element acquired the color red on the screen. The next day, 
when accessing the 3D “virtual environment”, CNC project members could spot the 
released element by its color and began their part of the work, reviewing 
interdisciplinary implications, obtaining the necessary spatial information, to further 
detailing and consolidating the design element initiated by WP.  
 
The so-called “look at the model” approach, although requiring additional work on 
the CNC part, initially performed relatively well, thus building up confidence in the 
solution. In the beginning of the project as there were only few elements modeled, it 
was a boring but relatively simple task to visually screen the 3D “virtual 
environment” for changes in the color of the elements whose name carried the mark 
“TEMP”. As a minor partner and frequently downplayed in technical discussions. 
CNC members did not complain of the additional task nor proposed any other 
procedure in order to improve the process of physical information turn over. WP-
Houston, on its turn, considered the problem solved and the minor setbacks as due 
to CNC lack of experience or inability in working in the 3D “virtual environment”. 
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Fig. 29: Schematic representation of the “look at the model” approach. 
 
As WP-Houston worked progressed, 3D “virtual environment” element population 
grew exponentially, making the screening task increasingly difficult. In response, 
more and more CNC people dedicated time to the task of checking for released 
elements within 3D “virtual environment”. At a certain point a selected professional 
(G.A.J) integrally assumed the task. As he heavily relied on his attention and 
memory to spot released elements, beyond time consuming the task became 
imprecise. In addition, a systems engineer (A.R.A.) was appointed to help him by 
creating database filters capable of reducing the number of elements to be screened. 
Nevertheless, the amount left was still considerable.  
 
CNC additionally faced another lateral effect caused by the lack of a systematic 
approach to physical information turn over. After WP released and CNC analysis, 
the element remained in WP control, allowing further adjustments and corrections. 
As WP inadvertently changed priory released elements, it forced CNC into re-work 
to adjust the project to Petrobras expectations materialized in the 3D “virtual 
environment”. When questioned about last-minute changes WP-Houston bluntly 
denied letting the financial burden of re-work fall completely upon CNC.  
 
With the “look at the model” approach increasingly dysfunctional, problems start to 
hit the quality and the schedule of CNC work. WP-Houston hard stance towards the 
correctness of its procedure locked CNC into internally find ways to overcome the 
problem unsuccessfully. At some point, WP-Houston started to threaten CNC to 
send personnel to Brazil in order to show how it should work with the 3D “virtual 
environment” to accomplish its task, embarrassing CNC leaders and threatening 
CNC reputation.  K.G., PDY CNC project manager, assigned a project coordinator 
specific to the problem, D.C.C. Few weeks later I joined the team. 
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6.3.2- Entering the Field 
 
My first contact with the PDY project team was in 21st of September 2009 when K.G. 
talked to me for the first time. He looked busy and after a couple of interruptions on 
which he made me wait for 20 minutes and testify his fluency in German and English 
we start to talk about the project. He acknowledged that the partnership between WP 
and CNC suffered from coordination problems and without furthering much more 
information or his opinions asked me to follow him into an internal coordination 
meeting that was taking place in the next room. Field diary notes show my 
impressions over the meeting: 
  
“In that meeting room I saw only white haired people, mostly CNC project coordinators, previously 
unknown to me. I was presented by K.G. as a PDMS expert that would be incorporated into the 
project to help in the coordination work. I was coldly welcomed and could perceive a sense of 
disbelief in my ability to help in the project problems. When I left the room and get back to K.G. 
desk I noticed hanging on wall a note saying: “As vezes só a violência gera a compreensão.” 
(Sometimes only violence brings understanding, author translation). Never had heard anything 
“violent” about him. In fact, apart of his German-like formality, the few times we had been in 
contact conveyed an impression of determination and openness. Nevertheless, such message 
sounded quite scary and made me thing about the limits in getting things done.” (Field Diary, 21st 
September 2009) 
 
Two days later I was urged to attend to a videoconference involving six people took 
place to officially discuss the problem. The field diary notes show the content of the 
meeting: 
 
From CNC, there were D.C.C. and A.R.A. From WP, V.S., and 3 more Houston technicians. I stood 
by as a watcher, since I assumed a simply advisory role. The meeting was fully conduced in 
English. Before the meeting, with the telecom system off, V.S. admitted that he personally could not 
help much on the risk of behaving like an “armchair quarterback11”. However, he would participate 
in the meeting to help communication became more clear to both sides. 
 
D.C.C. opened the meeting with a 15-minute presentation explaining the hardships CNC was 
facing in extracting data out of the 3D “virtual environment” and the consequences it had on 
measuring project progress and planning. He come out with an example of how hard was to the 
CNC Civil team to figure out how many equipments it should provide supporting bases. To 
support his argument he displayed a complex set of spreadsheets showing that information 
preliminarily made available in “paper format” was not aligned with the “3D virtual environment”. 
His English, however, proved poor and the frequent word misplacements made it hard for the 
English-speaking audience to follow the explanation. The opacity of the spreadsheets also did not 
help. 
 
WP technicians argued that the spatial representation and the timing of the releases followed WP 
designer’s interpretation what could explain the mismatch between what was seen in the 3D 
environment and found in the “digital paper” format. WP technicians insisted they were doing 
their job right and it was just to pay attention on the naming convention (elements with “TEMP” in 
the name) and “look at the model” to see the releases. Confronted with the argument that 
previously released elements were changed after release they blamed the PDMS system on being 
“too opened12” compared to the PDS system that they were used in WP-Houston. Though they 
conceded some deviation on the releasing process they rebuffed the idea that this was a major issue. 
The poor quality of the videoconference sound system also made it hard for the Brazilians to 
                                                
11
 A person who offers advice or an opinion on something in which they have no expertise or involvement 
(http://dictionary.reference.com) 
12
 System engineers refer to open systems as those systems that allow for more user discretion while inputing (or not) data. 
Closed systems on their turn require the user to abid by pre-configured system rules while inputing data, which under 
circumstances (consistency checks) might prevent users either from inputing mismatch data or leaving data unpopulated. Usually 
open systems are easier to configure and more user friendly, while closed systems are more difficult to configure and less user 
friendly.  
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understand what WP personnel said. V.S. amended saying that “time was running out” and a 
compromise should be reached. 
 
D.C.C. discontent on the stalemate was visible. He urged that people involved in the problem 
should “go back to standards” and that this compromise should involve the work of CNC and WP 
around a more structured procedure on how information should be turned over. WP technicians 
looked bored and displayed a certain lack of interest in problem. In face of that, D.C.C. assumed the 
job to correct and align the information turned over process. WP technicians replied that anything 
CNC proposed to improve the turned over process would receive their immediate support and 
steady implementation. (Field Diary, 23st September 2009). 
 
    
Fig. 30: Early spreadsheets used to control the information turnover process 
 
After V.S. left the room, CNC members remained and in a private talk could not hide 
their criticism on WP-Houston managed the whole information turned over process, 
not only in relation to the “3D virtual environment” format but also in relation to 
“digital paper” format. In their opinion, WP-Houston had not, nor did want to have, 
any control over the downstream information flow. Out of this first “multicultural” 
meeting it became clear to me that beyond communication and cultural problems, 
the project suffered from poorly defined interface relationship.  
 
Besides, I realized that the information turn over problem was more acute in the 
Civil discipline, though the Electrical discipline worried quite much. D.C.C and 
A.R.A argued that since the beginning of the project the Electrical team proved much 
more proactive in working in the “3D virtual environment” and thus managed by 
themselves to workout the information turn over problem. The other two disciplines 
Architecture and HVAC (ventilation) experienced little problem as most of their 
work was confined to the “digital paper” format domain. 
 
A week later, still allocated in the RPBC project, I managed to talk to P.R.W., Civil 
coordinator, in order to gain deeper understand on how the turn over problem 
affected their work. He acknowledged that this was the first time he was forced to 
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work departing from information embedded in a “3D virtual environment” and was 
uneasy on how he should manage this process. Such uncertainty, he said, made it 
difficult to plan and allocate resources. He raised questions beyond his coordination 
role, including how he should orientate their supervisors to proceed. He also 
demonstrated uncertain about my activity in the project and how I would be able to 
help them. As this conversation did not add much to my understanding of the 
problem, I decided to talk to project supervisors individually as soon as officially 
arrived at the project. After intense pressure to anticipate my displacement from 
RPBC to PDY, I settle down that I would definitively move on the 5th October, 2009 
after completing some obligations in RPBC. 
 
6.3.3-Project Organization 
 
In the Brazilian engineering environment, the transition period among “hot” projects 
require a considerable effort on the part of the professionals to attend to different 
structures within the company for a certain time. The prior project management try 
to extract as much as possible from the former project member because as soon as he 
leaves the project and stop charging hours on their budget, their very specialized 
helps comes for free. On the other side, as much as the recently arrived project 
member dedicates to tasks other than those of the new project they represent a 
financial burden and not an additional resource. As project members prefer not to 
turn their backs to a project manager on the risk of being turned down in his future 
projects, more likely the professional has to cope for some time with extended work 
hours, usually unpaid.  
 
As I entered the PDY project I could confirm the tale that PDY was the “no stress” 
project. With loose management, stretched schedules, and additional working hours 
paid in cash, project members indeed could emulate a relaxed work environment, 
way different from the RPBC project marked by constant discussions, complaints, 
and heavy workload. Nevertheless, this was about to change as the calm in the 
surface of the project hide the turbulent business environment behind the 
entrepreneurship. With Petrobras and the three other Brazilian petrochemical groups 
fighting a silent war, the unpredictable result of the consolidation process started to 
affect the very basic function of the PDY complex, ranging from a fully dedicated 
petrochemical complex to a large scale refinery.  
 
The fact that I previously knew a few project CNC project members made my 
integration easier. These long time colleagues introduced me to the unknown ones 
and along the days. As CNC office followed a open office philosophy, desks had 
very low height divisions and were placed one in front of the other, in groups of 
four, what did not allowed much privacy and stimulated neighbors to talk while 
working. As such it was inevitable to take part in some conversations most of them 
with one colleague teasing the other. With the unknown ones conversation more 
frequently involved work related issues or superficial personal questions.  
 
Among the structural characteristic of the project organization attracted my attention 
the fact that most of the contact between CNC and WP occurred among higher ranks 
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with CNC lower ranks relying of their superiors' interpretation of both 
organizational and technical information. Very differently from an international joint 
project (at least as I would expect) exchanges and contacts were minimum. Not to 
mention about technology transfer and learning. Clearly the most important and 
complex part of the project, the “lyon´s part”, was in charge of WP with CNC 
restricted to give shape to what was conceived in Houston. With restricted contracts 
and almost no shared experience, the promise of an exciting place to work remained 
elusive for most CNC team members. Exception for A.R.A. who helped to implement 
the PDMS Global (workshare enabled), the first implementation in Brazil. 
 
The overall project structure, as I came gradually to know (see fig. 31), was a double 
shell hierarchy, with CNC hierarchy subordinated to the WP hierarchy, with few 
apparent direct interface connections (dotted lines).  
 
 
Fig 31: PDY project organization as per 05th October 2009.  
 
The relative position of CNC in the PDY project by the time of field entry can be 
gauged by the content of K.G. discourse during a project balance presentation that 
coincide with my arrival at the project and was almost self-explicative on the project 
situation I found: 
 
“Very briefly, I´d like to inform you about the progress of our project. Won´t take long… Most of you perceived 
that in the last month we made a great effort in identifying and defining what has been left to do in or project. It 
involved many scope alternatives and schedule alternatives and this process is reaching an end. Today, O.F., 
Petrobras manager, will be here to negotiate a schedule for this scope. I´d like to keep everybody informed in 
order to keep the anxiety level down. 
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Here we have our progress graphic until today… so today we are around 60% physical progress in our 
project…and we have 40% to further advance, according to the last accomplishment effort estimation to 
complete the scope. What´s the scope? The scope is the same scope, without any reduction. We have been 
discussing possible reductions with Petrobras, but in the end we reached conclusion that we should keep the 
scope the way it is… progress graphic shows that until… May next year (2010), particularly until April next 
year, we a lot of work to do and in an very aggressive manner will try… will need consistent progress around 
6% to 7% per month… so it a very aggressive target and will have to mobilize additional resources to the 
present ones. So to succeeded in the task, the company will free space in the 2nd floor, block A, so we can proceed 
with this mobilization, therefore nobody needs to worry about work for the next 8 months, well the contrary. 
Translated in terms of engineering documents, it represents a very bold target, we are here today with almost 
6000 issued documents in our project, and we still have a similar number ahead. In terms of applied resources, 
we also have to complete a very expressive mobilization, reaching almost 200 people in the project team, 
counting  on internal and external resources… so almost the double we have today… 70% beyond current 
team. 
 
Well... it´s like that... I guess that may let us very satisfied… happy…hummm… at least we know that the 
engineering market is somehow shaken, with many companies laying people off because they lack work, so this 
won´t be our problem… our problem is different…. is to accomplished that all and that… we cannot hide that 
we also have some problems. Our project history until now let us, managers and coordinators, worried if we 
will effectively succeed. So let´s take a look at the monthly quality report that I had just received so you will be 
able to see where are the problems. You might have noticed that in the project entrance, I asked D.X. to hang 
our quality graphs per discipline, and if we take a look we can see that in a not so large universe the total 
number of error in the documents, although improving, is still disappointing. We are talking about a formal 
document quality evaluation… number, stamp data, format.., we do not evaluate technical content, this one we 
take for granted because of the issuer technical expertise. You will see that is not exactly the case, unfortunately. 
So, this is a point that requires extensive work to improve this score…. 
 
What worries me most is our productivity. How is productivity measured? It´s the physical progress that I 
should have according to the hours estimates that I receive from each discipline against the effective physical 
progress. And if we look our history, from March to July, that´s when we halted the score calculation, because 
we begin discussing the scope, so…without a clear scope it is not possible to calculate the score… but you can 
see our score tumbling down… he had already started above expectations… what should be expected a score of 
0.95. We are far from this score and getting worse month to month, what´s worst….so, we do not foresee an 
improvement.  
 
So forth this has passed unnoticed because Petrobras was paying us for worked hours, and did not questioned 
this at any moment, by luck. From now on, back into the beginning of September, this contract turned into a 
global price contract, that is, we are committed to do what has been left in our scope on a fixed price. There is no 
easy way now guys. So the way this contract and the work of each one of you is managed will also change 
radically. We have to ensure that within our agreement with the client we will be able to do the work and the 
company will profit…. Because that´s the company’s goal. So we are going to implement controls for hours 
spent for documents and hours spent per person on a document to accomplish this task.  
 
One of our main problems has to do with quality and productivity are the “mark-ups”. I know there are a 
number of explanations, but essentially what is written in this numbers is that we have an enormous quantity 
of “mark-ups” that are not answered within the contractual time limit, whatsoever the reason. So if we look in 
the project as a whole and in each discipline, we will find an expressive number of documents that suffered 
many revisions, or were not approved on a client comment process the way they should be, and take much more 
time than previously expected. Our commitment is to answer a “mark-up” in 10 days and we will comply with 
that, otherwise our estimations will be tore apart. As an incentive to all of you and those who will come to the 
team to abide by the time estimates in a more consistent way, we are thinking about implementing a 
remuneration bonus plan linked to the quality and productivity. I do not have this formulate right now but I am 
committed that until the end of the month I will made it public a plan that to those who effectively participate, 
will represent a substantial gain in the end of the project. As a counterpart, we are limiting to extreme cases the 
use of additional hours. Both our hour estimations and project schedule take in consideration 168hours/month. 
And that’s what we are committed to. So, additional hours will only exist on a voluntary basis to those who 
perceive that they won´t be able to reach for the schedule or in emergence cases. 
 
So people that’s what I had to say. I think we have a great challenge ahead, I count on everyone so we can face 
that. Our project today is the one that sustain the company, it’s the largest that the company ever had in its 
industrial area, apart from the ALUMAR, which was mainly a workforce lease and not that much a project. So, 
I think that this project that add to anyone of us in terms of curriculum and in terms of technical challenge, ad I 
hope you will be with me in that”. ( (CNC) K.G., recorded meeting, 07th October 2009 – Author 
Translation) 
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6.4- THE KNOWLEDGE CHANGE PROCESS 
 
6.4.1- Current Knowledge Weakening 
 
Well before the number of CNC scope elements in “TEMP” areas toped 30473 
individual elements, the approached collapsed and no longer partners could precise 
how many elements truly belonged to CNC scope, which they were, and if they were 
released or not. 
 
In a reserved talk with me and A.R.A., D.C.C. expressed his worry about how to 
adequate the control and the planning of engineering production to the “3D virtual 
environment” information turn over. He reminded us that in our last 
videoconference with WP-Houston they did not know how to do it, and apparently 
did not want to know at all, leaving it to the Brazilian team to organize the flow of 
information downstream. Then he asked us how to fit the “3D virtual environment” 
information generated at the US team with the standard controls of a “traditional 
project”, and illustrated the picture below: 
 
 
 
Fig. 32: Schematic representation of the information flow in the traditional engineering process.  
 
Noteworthy in his argument was how ingrained the traditional modus operandi was 
even in the head that was supposed to unravel it, as the excerpt below demonstrates: 
 
“It´s been two months that we are trying to desperately hunt down these elements that we have to chase. (…) 
Because our work is intrinsically liked to a set of input data (…) they have to come inside a set of reference 
documents… because information when the client turns over, whoever it might be, has to come in a platform 
(…) this a have in a set of documents. These are the taken-for-granted platforms of engineering… engineering 
documents. So, the reference documents uphold this basic information and let us aggregate knowledge, qualities 
and attitudes, and come out  with another set of documents that are the platforms that carry both things, basic 
data and my knowledge, ability and attitude. Ok, that´s a platform that I measure. I measure and I charge. My 
list of reference documents today has 6,660 documents, OK?! (…) these are the basic documents that I have to 
use to do my project (…) these are the documents that carry the information that I have to process. They 
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generate here at CNC, 13,303 documents (…) It has to get out of here and arrive here. There is no other way to 
do project in the mother-fucking life. It´s like this. ( (CNC) D.C.C., recorded meeting, 05th October 2009 – 
Author Translation) 
 
Attempts to reduce the complexity of the new situation to make it fit back into the 
traditional model generated confusion and stalemate, as in the excerpt below: 
 
Therefore, this is what you’re looking at is the beginning and the end of the Project. In the middle there is a 
PDMS. This PDMS, you have to do what? Get exactly all this input and output information and make them 
speak the same language of PW. Because this is the set of documents that I am charging. So, my PDMS cannot 
speak a different language… it must have an intrinsic relationship with my input documents. (…) I have to 
know how many, who they are and where are they (“3D virtual environment” information elements). (...) today 
He says to me: “ Hey fellow… it´s green in the model! You can finish it”. This is a stupid statement! Because I 
don´t have the totality. How will I be able to calculate my work setting? I don´t know! I need to know the total.” 
((CNC) D.C.C., recorded meeting, 05th October 2009 – Author Translation) 
 
And also in the following dialogue: 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.:” So, M.S.P has been charged it a heavy load of work. (…) and where is he going to control? He is 
going to control through the drawings. So, which are the (information) elements that I will place in this index? 
(…) what I will put in this control? I will put exactly his drawings. “ Have you already done the drainage of this 
shit?”… “Damn, I didn´t received this…” (…) And what do I have to receive of information regarding this? 
Then I go to M.S.P. “What do you need to receive?” (…) He has to tell me exactly what he wants. (…) The 
information that he needs. Why? Because it has to come in the middle of these 6,660 documents. If he did not find 
this in these 6,660 documents where is he find it?” 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: “They (WP) are going to tell this is in the model…” 
 
(CNC) A.R.A: (Laughs) 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: “It cannot be!”  
 
(CNC) A.R.A: “So, it cannot be…that´s what we were talking about…” 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: “It cannot be… It is not in the model. I am talking about basic information. So, this is the 
relation... you see the list of engineering documents  and the list of reference documents. PDMS is in the 
middle…it is not an end in itself. It is only a tool. And its based on the management that it has to operate. 
Because, I don´t even care about drawings, I don´t even want to see it…I want to know it is in the index. That´s 
why we need his index well done. (…)” (recorded meeting, 05th October 2009 – Author Translation) 
 
 
Out of that, the impression was that team leaders where trying to mend an outdated 
frame of reference into a new situation. Neither the WP nor CNC teams where used 
to work with the information arrangement embedded in the contract (and enforced) 
by Petrobras, without knowing its exact implications. The traditional frame of 
reference made it harder to assess the present one. 
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Fig. 33: Schematic representation of the information flow found at the PDY project. 
 
Nevertheless, as more people joined the meeting important concepts emerged: 
 
“What we settled with them (WP) in terms of structures… it applies to piperacks, to all…they model a 
structure anyway...out of their minds (…) what matter to us? The level of the pipes, the axis of the pillars, of 
the frames, … we have to obey that… we cannot change their scope, that is the pipes and equipments…the 
rest is ours. Next, we are going to model our beams, our pillars and tell WP “section X has been modeled”. He 
goes there and remove his (elements) and only ours stays.” ((CNC) P.R.W., recorded meeting, 05th 
October 2009 – Author Translation) 
 
 “It comes from WP “element X” and an image. You assign a tag to it, open a registry in the index, and work 
as you like. From now on…until the end of the project, it will carry this tag.  ((CNC) L.M.A., recorded 
meeting, 05th October 2009 – Author Translation) 
 
After they (WP) release a structure, they can change everything that A.R.A will not perceive. ((CNC) M.A, 
recorded meeting, 05th October 2009 – Author Translation)  
 
“The problem in this all is that you cannot evaluate the progress upon an cyclical element. It advances to 70% 
then it returns to 50% (…) There must be a model event where the guy there (WP) beat hammer and says this 
is how it is. (…) We have a document event (issue), we will need a model event.(…) The same way we will 
need an event on model arrival, we will need another one on model delivery. We are issuing that document 
based on the model that day. If the model change the model afterwards he makes the document invalid. 
((CNC) L.M.A., recorded meeting, 05th October 2009 – Author Translation) 
 
Even though, the initial idea was to develop a strong set of procedures and database 
filters in order to associate information elements in the “3D virtual environment” to 
tangible input/output documents, and thus, make them easier to be spotted during 
the screening process. 
 
On the 6th of October, A.R.A. extracted from the PDMS database a list of potential 
CNC information elements using a set of filter it had designed, and sent it for D.C.C 
to work on.  On the 7th October 2009, D.C.C. sent an e-mail attaching the information 
and associations he had found around a new set of documents he had created. He 
sent the following e-mail all supervisors and coordinator, and copied it to the project 
manager (K.G.): 
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Dear sirs 
  
This is to issue the following document: PDMS STATUS REPORT – 91001 
This file comprehends the following spreadsheets: 
  
1.      PDMS-SOW  
Scope and Split of Work. Shows CNC understanding about its scope of work plus people in 
charge and dates according to present schedule. 
        2.      SIC  
Scan and Insertion Control. Shows periodically status of PDMS according to Scan process. 
Elements to be controlled are very important. 
                          3.      Extraction – oct-01-2009  
Idem. Shows scan PDMS process (in case referred to oct/01/2009) 
4.      Summary  
Idem. Shows accounting on scanned elements. 
  
From now on, CNC will issue this report once a week (on Fridays, referring to Thursdays database released 
by WP). 
   
Regards, 
 
(CNC) D.C.C. 
 
Below it is possible to see the four initial controls created by D.C.C. and A.R.A. to 
track changes in the status of information elements within the “3D virtual 
environment” (fig.34: Extraction), how responsibilities were spotted (fig.35: SOW), 
element registry (fig. 36: SIC) and a quantitative control (fig. 36: Summary). 
 
 
Fig. 34: Extraction 
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Fig.  35: SOW (Scope of Work) 
 
  
Fig.  36: SIC (Scan and Insertion Control) and Summary Spreadsheet    
 
Through the combination of these four tables it was possible to detect changes in the 
number of information elements (Extraction), address responsibility (SOW), build a 
registry (SIC), and finally evaluate the quantity of information elements released 
within “3D virtual environment”(Summary). This system made up for an incipient 
form of control, more on the side of the graphic elements than in the information 
they carried. Nevertheless, it served to outline an initial approach to the control of 
information flow as shown ahead: 
 183 
 
 
Fig.  37: Schematic representation of the information flow with the first set of controls 
 
It also proved difficult to implement due to several limitations. First, the diversity of 
information elements within made it hard to generate association rules capable of 
covering the full range of possible information element versus document association. 
Not to mention that this association is a very discretionary one.  Second, attribute 
setting on the part of WP-Houston proved lousy, and without precise data, the 
results of the filtering process were disappointing. The nature of information 
elements were hard to be identified based on their name (fig.38) once WP failed to 
enforce a naming convention among its designers. Elements that were CNC 
responsibility passed unnoticed while elements belonging to WP scope appeared as 
CNC ones, as we can see in the dialogue below: 
 
(CNC) A.R.A: Theoretically that´s where we should find our work (elements in area TEMP). But I don´t 
guarantee…I can not confirm…But that is what we have to look for… 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: So…I don´t trust but that´s is what I have… (..)  inside that mess we should find something 
that allow us to do something… all that is in TEMP…(… )let´s see this guy (information element) here… 
 
(CNC) A.R.A.: You will not find it in the TEMP… 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: Of course I will not find it in the temp…evident I will not find it in the TEMP…Things like 
this… with this face… I would find at TEMP?(…) 
 
(CNC) A.R.A.: Can you see?? Rack, platform, metallic structure…all that would be an input to us … They are 
telling “this is what you (CNC) detail… I´m just showing more or less what I want and you will detail. (…) 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: Dou you agree that I am looking to disaster?  
 
(CNC) A.R.A.: A disaster… that´s what we talked to them. They have not defined a naming convention… 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: We are looking at a disaster… because nobody there is doing shit…(Recorded meeting, 14th 
October 2009 – Author Translation) 
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Fig.  38: Tag discrepancies 
 
In some cases a single database element was composed of several physical objects 
(fig.39) violating the principle of registry uniqueness. This limitation was particularly 
problematic since it made CNC to underestimate the real number of elements it had 
to work on. 
 
 
Fig.  39: Classification discrepancies 
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Moreover, this initial strategy overlooked two essential features necessary for an 
effective information control: a relationship between information elements within 
and destination engineering documents to be issued, and a way to feed information 
back to WP concerning detection and execution. Another problem is that although 
this system was capable of controlling changes in the number of the elements, this 
approach was unable to detect the very essential change in the information they 
carried which was also very important. 
 
Above all the approach was too complex to catch on. As it involved several 
interlinked control instruments (i.e.; SOW, SIC, Extraction and Summary), it was 
hard to navigate through. It was necessary a strong involvement in the control 
process to understand how information registry flowed among them and what 
supervisors have to do. 
 
In a reserved conversation involving A.R.A., D.C.C., and me on the 7th October 2009, 
some concepts gained strength while others were added to the overall solution 
framework, as we can see in the excerpts below: 
 
(…) First, I disassembled concrete and metallic (split of work) … we are not much sure about what to place in 
metallic, did I understand?…we are not much sure but it´s certain there will be (something) … (…) So, 
absolutely anything that is raised through its forum has to go to this control, and when it goes to this control, it 
has an owner. Somebody will do this concrete structure…somebody will be responsible to the metallic 
structure… so every item here (in the control) will have to have a guy here inside. This guy here tells what do I 
have to do and who will do. The owner…((CNC) D.C.C., recorded meeting, 07th October 2009 – Author 
Translation) 
 
There is the “frozen” stuff…right?…I will made the hell out of it…put a very strong effort… so that it becomes 
something called “issue”… “frozen” in reality is not different from a “issue event”. I am already pushing this 
subject when I say that I will do a screening in the model once in a week. I pushing this subject…I don´t care 
about what you did along the week…only what will you do on Friday´s…. Therefore, it is equivalent to “weekly 
issue events”, right?! ((CNC) D.C.C., recorded meeting, 07th October 2009 – Author Translation) 
 
(…) but the screening I think I can do this…(…) You know why is it better that I do this, because if come out 
any “freaks” in the middle  of the way (D.C.C. laughs…) It might happen to come out anything that disturbs 
this planning I’ll be able to alert promptly. (…) so we have more working that is not being filtered yet. (…) 
Along this is screening process that I will do A.R.A. I get in contact with the supervisor and I already assign a 
tag to that element then he enters the D.C.C. spreadsheet (…) ((CNC) A.R.A, Recorded meeting, 7th 
October 2009 – Author Translation) 
 
By the 08th of October, pressure over the CNC Civil team increased to the point that 
K.G. asked for a meeting in attempt to have a broader understanding of the problem. 
The dialogue below gives a snapshot of the questions involved: 
 
(CNC) K.G.: “One of the points in our Civil work that is being criticized by WP, is the fact that, we don´t 
design directly into the model (“3D virtual environment”), no PDMS. The idea of this project has been that 
we made a rupture from the traditional form of CNC to work with the model, that required the Piping 
personnel to receive inputs in 2D (drawings) from the other disciplines and proceed modeling, and here, we 
would like to set a step further, and assign the modeling to each discipline. Because of that, far in the 
beginning, on F.L. (former Civil discipline manager) time, we did a considerable effort in training personnel 
from the many disciplines, and in the case of the Electrical we had a considerable success…Electrical 
nowadays work direct into the model…. For sure it is simpler …we are talking about cable trays and 
connection boxes …the idea of the meeting is to discuss what are the difficulties for we to do that in the Civil, 
where it holds still, what do we have to do go ahead. WP wants to send a bunch of guys to teach as to model. 
A think it is not what is missing, there must be another thing. (…) 
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(CNC) P.R.W: To design it directly into the model, in the G.S.G. area its impossible... because of the 
deadlines.  
 
(CNC) K.G.: The vision of WP is that the fact of not designing (directly) into the model is what leads to the 
extension of the deadlines. 
 
(CNC) P.R.W: This if we had started back in time…To start today its is impossible. Personnel is already 
delivering product, we received 40 drawings yesterday, (…) all the rest is going ahead, I cannot stop…cannot 
change the procedure now otherwise we won´t deliver. 
 
(CNC) K.G.: Piperack involves the work of third-party… 
 
(CNC) P.R.W: Yes…one part inside and two other parts made outside. 
 
(CNC) G.S.G: I had three people there (on the team) that are very good in modeling, however, we have to 
substitute this personnel by others to keep on designing…understand? Because, today…what am I doing? 
I´m supporting the third-party that are outside…the third-party do not have access to the model.  So, we will 
have to keep on working this way. I model as soon as we finish (the drawing). (Recorded meeting, 08th 
October 2009 – Author Translation) 
 
The dialogue above demonstrate that the turn over problem made part of a larger 
question concerning the ability of the CNC Civil team to work on the “3D virtual 
environment”, just like other disciplines like Piping and Electrical. It also illustrates 
two complicating factors that the Civil team presented in its operation: the tight 
schedules and the high level of subcontracting, elements that made the information 
processing capability of the team under even more pressure.  
 
With pressure mounting, it was necessary to quickly address the information turn 
over problems. The overall picture and how to streamline the process in a fast and 
effective way was still unclear. As we begin to work with a “frozen” database 
extracted on a determined date we detected further misalignments, involving WP 
information coming from different sources, as illustrate below: 
 
 
Fig.  40: Database discrepancies. 
 
In comparing the number of equipments in the reference documents and in the “3D 
virtual environment” we found several discrepancies. Same information elements 
were tagged differently, some were missing in one format, some in the other one. 
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Noteworthy, however, was that some information elements modeled as equipments 
did not appeared in any place of the reference documentation about equipments. 
During the screening process we realized that some of these unregistered 
equipments were in fact Civil structure elements, thus objects belonging to CNC 
Civil team. The filtering process relied on the assumption that it was possible to 
separate information elements from WP and CNC based on database attributes such 
as tag/name.  
 
6.4.2- The Innovation Moment 
 
As we realized that not only the separation between WP and CNC information 
elements were faulty but also we could not rely in much of the information provided 
by WP as reference to organize it, no other option was left other than to require WP 
to create an attribute to formally assign each information elements to its responsible 
partner. Once identified, these elements would be immediately transported to the 
CNC database and registered in a list to be built from scratch which would serve as a 
map for CNC supervisors to guide their work. The exact moment in which such 
solution arose follow below: 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: He have to mark these elements so that we can generate reports of them. Either we create an 
attribute called “type”, and assign the letter (which denote the item classification) so that it comes out in the 
report or we change its tag in a manner that we build a traceable tag.(…) We have to see what is “legal” in 
Petrobras terms. (…) “O” is civil equipment, we mark it … when you generate a report you say: select 
everything that is an “O”. It (PDMS) will give you exactly what is here and all that is new and comes after 
will receive this attribute. Or we change its tag and add an element that is traceable. 
 
(CNC) A.R.A: The problem of this tag is that we are talking about a WP database. We have to work with them. 
To do this we have to ask them. 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: And this talk of the attribute? 
 
(CNC) A.R.A: This too. This is their database. I cannot write one single thing…(…) they can say: “I can do 
nothing”…they will not grant access for us… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: So what we can do is to copy those elements to the Civil area (CNC database) and we go ahead. 
But it will be duplicated, it will be in their EQUI area….Civil equipments are not meant to be in EQUI. 
 
(CNC) A.R.A: Let´s talk to them. We do this. (…) We say to them, “we are going to copy all elements to the 
Civil area, because these elements are not equipments”…So, OK!? … By the time we copy that they eliminate 
in their database. But, they can say “no, we need to revise something”… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: No, they revise on the Civil Area… 
 
(CNC) A.R.A.: No, they also cannot…Only one of the sides can. If he (K.D.H.) needs to change something he 
will to ask us and then we pass it to him. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: That´s even better, because if he changes we can track what has been changed. 
 
(CNC) A.R.A: A question that remains (…) Are these elements(Civil Equipments) ours? 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: That it! I don´t know! 
 
(CNC) A.R.A.: We have to ask P.R.W…. 
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(CNC) D.C.C.: Do you know why? Because I don’t have any other place in the planet…(…) That’s what we 
talked before…Where should this mess be? In a list… There should be a list…These circumstances make me 
think that once again … the only place a have this information is in the PDMS. 
 
(…) 
 
(CNC) A.R.A.: We can say “Petrobras, we need an attribute here to identify our elements!”   
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: Let´s do! Can we do? 
 
(CNC) A.R.A.: We can do. 
 
(CNC) D.C.C: Let´s do! Forcefully, if necessary… there is no other way… otherwise we don´t get out of this 
place. 
 
(…) 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: I am going to tell you something… I will adopt a procedure here… it´s maybe not the best, not 
the most correct….but I don´t see any other form that we act…(…) there is a cognitive dissonance. We don´t 
have a decent communication protocol… I don´t believe we are going to build this communication protocol on a 
efficient manner on time… By our conversation on Monday (5th October, 2009), we won´t get nothing. We 
would really need a quite strong interaction, its not about one day or two…(…) Do you feel how hard is to talk 
to me because of lack of knowledge…(…) So I see no other way than we do it forcefully…if we have this 
possibility, of building an attribute…place an attribute on a file ... so we can filter to build this list …let´s do! 
And how do we inform it? We inform exactly during the (list) “issue”. I am going to say ”these guys 
(information elements) are here (at CNC)” (Recorded meeting, 14th October 2009 – Author Translation) 
  
Also during this conversation, a key distinction was made which help us to better 
understand the information turn over structure. Once we have been able to see that 
information elements possessed two different natures we were able to grasp a better 
picture of the problem and of possible solutions. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: But I think we are talking about different things. We are mixing what is a “transfer element” 
with things that belong to them but imply in work in our scope. Do you understand? (…) This table that I sent 
is a table of things that “imply” work for us. What A.R.A is showing us are things that they placed there so we 
can get here.(…) These are elements that they placed in their area but in fact belong to us… Therefore, they 
send work to us in two different manners…or they create something inside the TEMP, or they create something 
here that imply in work (…)  
 
(CNC) A.R.A.: But you got things that in fact do not imply in work… they are ours. That´s what you got in 
your analysis. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: No… Now I am not sure… All that is in that table imply in work for us…the equipment is 
theirs but the bases are ours…But here, the platforms is in their EQUI but its ours, the element is ours…it is 
only temporarily in their area… 
  
(CNC) A.R.A.: Exact…I understood since beginning that it is not an equipment… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A: Get me some paper…Look, there is two universes of project. (…) There is two groups of things 
to… (…) I have to draw… it must be drawn otherwise D.C.C. will not understand. (…) Our project has two 
universes…  that do not intercept…WP and CN. Here there is EQUI and TUBE, its their two databases… and 
here we have the CIV and ELE, our two databases…(…) he create an object but this implies that I create a base 
here… so there is a correspondence in here, this implies that… and there is another way that he wants that I do 
something here, so he places in his database something … it does not imply. It must be transferred… 
 
(CNC) A.R.A: So these BBCs (an example of information element), if a get here the “PURP”…you see 
“ESTA”, “DYNA”…that´s here that he committed a mistake…if this is a basin, it cannot be a “ESTA”…   
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: It should be what?? 
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(CNC) A.R.A.: I don´t know… That´s the problem… He is attributing carelessly… It should be anything but 
“ESTA”, DYNA”, “PACK”…that is my trouble…If he (K.D.H.) told me in that meeting “We are going to 
attribute all the zones (database areas) as temporary, and what it third-party will be “VLPT”.  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: He should have a work transfer list to us…otherwise it will be left in this madness.(…) We are 
mining data about what to do… he should send this to us… (Recorded meeting, 14th October 2009 – 
Author Translation) 
 
Such “marking” mechanism would place the responsibility assignment back into WP 
hands and away from the need of CNC data mining. In the case of the implied items, 
CNC would have to them by itself, however, in the case the transfer elements, WP 
would have to go at each of the 30473 elements in the database and tell if it was WP, 
CNC or third-party responsibility, a considerable workload. As this approach was 
expected to find resistance in WP, so D.C.C went for support of K.G. and asked him 
to take the lead in this process. On the 16th October, D.C.C. wrote an e-mail 
formalizing this requirement to K.G.:  
 
(CNC) K.G., 
 
The firm identification of elements on PDMS to be detailed by CNC is critical to achieve established goals 
according to the contract. It is being very hard CNC to perform this identification according to the instructions 
released by WP up to now. This leads to unacceptable misunderstandings and risks at this stage of the project. 
 So, it is demanded from WP to introduce a mark on the PDMS Data Base elements that allow us to perform 
this identification in a clear and unmistakable way. This must be done by means of an attribute defined by WP 
(CNC can help) taking in account that this is ruled by I-ET-6000.67-0000-941-PDY-017, rev. H. Both WP and 
CNC must be in accordance in such adjustments. 
  
The two great groups of elements are: 
  
1) Transfer element. Executive project element identified as needed by WP, whose detailing, however is CNC 
scope of work. (ex.: Pipe-rack). 
  
2) Imply element. Executive project element detailed by WP that needs CNC action to detail additional 
elements to complete the installation. (ex.: Vessel that demands equipment basis).” 
 
(CNC) D.C.C. 
 
On the 19th October (three days later), K.G. re-wrote the message on its own terms, to 
the WP-Houston project manager (F.G.), copied to all coordinators and managers on 
both sides, as we can see below: 
 
(WP) F.G., 
  
It is essential for CNC work that the elements of each discipline to be modeled are precisely known, identified, 
and defined. It is not possible to perform this identification just by “looking into the model”, good engineering 
practice requires that each element is listed and specified/described in an adequate manner. Equipment for 
example is supposed to be listed in an Equipment List, and adequately described in Data Sheets, Specs, etc.  
 
We made an effort to identify these elements, using the data base of the model and the documents available on 
Sharepoint, which, as per Coordination Procedure, should contain all documents issued for the project. As 
you can see from the attached spreadsheet (Tab “Comparative Analysis DS”), we could find 1547 elements. 
From these, 943 are contained in 28 identified equipment lists, although 158 out of those are not modeled. 
There are also 416 modeled but not listed, without counting what we called Civil Equipment (130 elements) 
and Special Equipment (58) 
  
It is being very difficult for CNC to perform this identification without having proper basis. This may lead to 
dangerous misunderstandings and risks at this stage of the project.  To mitigate this situation we propose WP 
to introduce a mark on the PDMS Data Base elements that allow us to perform this identification in a clear 
and unmistakable way. This must be done by means of an attribute defined by WP (CNC can help) taking in 
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account that this is ruled by I-ET-6000.67-0000-941-PDY-017, rev. H. Both WP and CNC must be in 
accordance in such adjustments. 
  
The two great groups of elements are: 
  
1) Transfer element. Executive project element identified as needed by WP, whose detailing is CNC’s 
scope of work. (ex.: Pipe-rack). 
  
2) Imply element. Executive project element detailed by WP that needs CNC action to detail additional 
elements to complete the installation. (ex.: vessel that requires equipment base, ladder, platform, etc.). 
  
I propose to have the issue discussed briefly between the PDMS people of both companies, to implement the 
system asap. 
  
 Regards, 
  
(CNC)  K.G. 
 
The very same day, S.B.D., WP-Houston engineering manager, answered:  
 
“This issue will be item number one on the videoconference agenda for tomorrow morning at 7 am Houston, 
10 am Sao Paulo.” 
 
In the videoconference of 20th October the D.C.C. and A.R.A tried to explain the 
problem and ask for a change in procedure. Key dialogues in this meeting follow 
below: 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: So we make this analysis here and we have…have the needed…that you put in the 
PDMS…first…how we can match this data… documents...basic documents…how do we match these basic 
documents with PDMS? Is the first question, the second question is we have to be sure what we have inside 
the model to work because it´s very hard to identify this things in the model. So we have two experts here… to 
show to you how we should receive from you the PDMS…a mark of each register there. Because if we don´t 
have this information the risk of work… in the wrong equipments and the wrong elements in very high. Did 
you understand what my problem is?  
 
(WP) S.B.D.: Yes. We understand the problem. 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: If you don´t have any questions for this explanation about basic equipment..the basic 
documents and PDMS…I´d like to put Mr. A.R.A to explain what we need to receive from you. 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: OK! Go ahead. Put them on. 
 
(WP) L.H.: I have a question….A.R.A, what report criteria are you using in PDMS to determine that 
something has been modeled as a piece of equipment but is not in the equipment list. 
 
(CNC) A.R.A: We use that one that we talk about once is that all equipment on a zone identified as EQUI 
with purpose “ESTA”, “PACK” and “DYNA”….so this was…the…the… rule we used… O.K.?! 
 
(WP) L.H.: O.K. 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: Do you understand what they are looking at?  
 
(WP) L.H.: Yes. 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: Do you agree?  
 
(WP) L.H.: Yeah, I agree. So, its just the matter we had things mislabeled as modeled. Which the owner 
should pickup and the designer should correct. 
 
(…) 
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(CNC) L.M.A.: What happens is that some elements that are identified as equipments but…apparently its not 
an equipment it’s a basin, it’s a sump pit…so its an element that must be detailed by the Civil discipline. Am 
I correct? 
 
(WP) C.H.: Yes. That´s correct. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: What have we found is that the way he are separating things between you and our teams… it 
works for a part of the elements but it´s not working for the rest of the elements. So what we want you to do…  
For equipments we can easily separate what we have to do or what we don´t have to do. But for the other 
elements it´s kind a hard to do. For example, the basins… the basins if you keep using the old rule we are 
using they would not be done by us…for example. 
 
(WP) C.H.: Rule? What rule? 
 
(CNC) A.R.A.: That rule, about “ESTA”,  “DYNA” and “PACK”of equipment…if we understand it is 
equipment we just need to create a base and not to detail by Civil. This is a problem. 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: Are we propose…We are showing to you the problem we have…but we have a…the first 
we…we have a proposal to do… the first hard “tough” we had was identify this. If you had put a mark in the 
database here, I don´t know in the database the first task becomes a little bit easy to us to identify the 
things…if we identify the things, scope of our work, the further questions are easily to make to you. It´s has 
been a very “tough” task to identify this…A.R.A. has to make a lot of filters in the database to achieve this 
bunch of tags. Let´s say… I would like to discuss the solution we have… 
 
 (CNC) L.M.A.: What we need is an attribute that show us the responsibility of work of that element. For 
example…if you put an attribute called responsibility you can fill in with CNC, or WP and we know this is 
ours, it´s not ours  
 
(WP) K.H.D.: I think there is already too many attributes to identify work for CNC. The first attribute is 
“release to CNC”, and the other one is the purpose set to TEMP.  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Yeah, but the problem is that things are passing through these filters and attributes… and for 
example…if you have few elements passing through we have to control all the elements in order to find these 
few elements. So it´s kind hard to find these few elements that are passing through our scheme. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: David, what…our feeling is that it´s …the way we are controlling passing the work from WP 
to CNC it´s kind a little hard for implementing. What we are asking you is to clearly mark each element are 
responsible for WP, CNC or Vendor… Three responsibilities possible, then we filter just this attributes and 
we keep on working in our elements. (…) for vendor it´s OK, there is no problem with vendor stuff but for 
breaking it for WP to CNC we are still finding some trouble. The filter are not working properly and the few 
elements that are passing through are getting our work very messy. 
 
(WP) L.H.: Will change the whole system… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: I believe that if we place an attribute called “responsibility” and mark it as VPLT is clearly 
vendor, WP is clearly WP, and CNC clearly from CNC. We just filter this and keep going working. 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: Can you get me an example of something that we should mark…clearly done by WP? 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Yes, for example a pump… if you get a pump it´s clearly WP (…) if you place a basin…they 
you are putting basins right now make we think this basins are not ours.  
 
(WP) C.H.: All the basins are theirs… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: OK, but they way we are doing things today they seem like them are yours. But we know that 
it is not. 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: You think they are WP because the basins are coming as pieces of equipments. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: For us they are static equipments… 
 
(…)  
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(WP) L.H.: That is on the P&ID! 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: And I agree with you…however, however… inside the PDMS model… we are…it appears to 
me that we are tagging the basins with the same type of identifier as a pump, or as a heat exchanger… 
 
(WP) L.H.: That is on the P&ID!  
 
(WP) S.B.D.: I understand… 
 
(WP) L.H..: When I extract the Plot Plan...that´s were it has to come from to get the naming conventionon 
the Plot Plan. The Plot Plan has to match with the P&IDs. OK?! Their naming convention  
 
(WP) S.B.D.: But the basins don´t come on the qeuipment list… 
 
(WP) L.H..: Yes they do! 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: On the mechanical equipment list? 
 
(WP) L.H..: No, on the Plot Plan. 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: I understand…however… we are creating some confusion with CNC with these basins having 
a tag...of being identified the same way in the list as a pump… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Yes, yes, we are reaching the problem… the problem is that the naming convention that you 
are using…used to work it does not split the work between WP and CNC clearly. And what we are proposing 
to forget the naming convention, you keep on using the naming convention you use to generate Plot Plans 
but we mark with an attribute the elements that should be done by WP and CNC. We stop using naming 
convention for this and start using an attribute. 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: OK! Hang on a second… Let just me ask you (L.H.) a question…Can we just find and replace 
what we have TEMP and type CNC instead of that? 
 
(WP) L.H.: I think there is two issues. The TEMP is not working because there is states in our model that are 
marked TEMP and shouldn´t be.  
 
(…) 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: Can I replace TEMP with CNC? 
 
(WP) L.H.: Yeah. Or we can do another attribute just to (…) but them we need to check to make sure they are 
only valid objects should be going to CNC.  
 
(WP) S.B.D.: Well, somehow, someway… 
 
(WP) L.H. I don’t pick that… 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: Either way we I think we have to change TEMP to CNC or put another attribute that says 
CNC. 
 
(…) 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: Our proposal is to put an attribute in another field…yes, this is mine… looking for this…Is 
this CNC or no?   
 
(WP) K.D.H.: I guess what you are saying that everything that has the attribute TEMP is CNC. 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: We are proposing to chance because we are not sure of this attribute here. This is the reason of 
this meeting.  
 
(WP) S.B.D.: Yes, we understand…so, we are going to make another column, with another attribute, and we 
are going to identify WP and CNC. 
 
(CNC) D.C.C: Perfect! The rest is over to us. 
(Recorded meeting, 20th October 2009 – Exact Transcription) 
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My impressions after the meeting can be gauged through the following field diary 
notes: 
 
“In many way, this videoconference surprisingly came up with a completely different outcome than 
expected. First, called my attention the fact that the English domain of the Brazilian side was very 
poor. It was very hard to understand what was being said by them, not only because they lacked 
the English spoken skills but even worst was they capability to frame their ideas in a way that could 
be understood by their American audience. Flat and direct, I presumed. At some point of the 
discussion I panicked, because putting me in their (WP) position I knew I would not had 
understood a word. However, it happened that despite of the jeopardizing ideas thrown on them in 
a poor English, they managed to pick up a few key words and expressions and framed the problem 
themselves in a quite precise way, almost as if all had been said correctly and precisely framed.  
 
At the end of a calm and straight meeting they came to accept the CNC demand that there must be 
an attributed that clearly separate the responsibility of elements among WP, CNEC or Vendor. Even 
the hard part of the discussion that was to explain why the current methodology to separate the 
work (through Naming Convention) settled months ago was flawed (that was quite difficult to 
capture even to us that were insiders to the problem) and let many items wrongly assigned was 
understood straightforwardly. Somehow those guys on the other side of the screen managed to 
overcome the hardships, of communication technologies, language and framing in order to get a 
precise picture of the problem and quickly settled it down despite the amount of re-working it 
represented.” (Field Diary, 20th October 2009) 
 
At the end of the day an e-mail was sent by the American team informing the 
measures adopted. 
 
All, 
  
A new PDMS attribute has been added to PIPE, EQUI, and STRU.  The attribute is called :WORKRESP 
(Work Responsibility).  This attribute is to indicate who has design responsibility for items in the PDMS 
mode.  The attribute will better enable CNC to determine what work in the model is their design 
responsibility.  There are three values for the attribute: 
  
WP       WP Responsibility 
CNC   CNC Responsibility 
VEND   By Vendor 
  
The default value is WP.  During the PDMS outage, a macro was run to set the value of :WORKRESP based 
on the purpose value of the ZONE.  The value for all STRU and EQUI in a ZONE with PURP set to TEMP 
was set to CNEC.  The value for all STRU and EQUI in a ZONE with PURP set to VPLT was set to VEND. 
  
We need to make sure that all of the items in the TEMP ZONE’s are definitely being turned over to CNC for 
design continuation.  All EQUI and STRU residing in a TEMP ZONE have had their PURP attribute 
changed to TEMP. 
  
The work can be checked by running the report template WORK-RESPONSIBILITY.tmp. 
  
Please let me know if you encounter any problems or have any questions.  The modify attribute form will be 
modified after lunch.  The value may be set at EQUI, PIPE, or STRU by typing: 
  
:WORKRESP ‘value’  (e.g. :WORKRESP ‘CNC’) 
  
Thank you for your cooperation, you may go back into PDMS. 
  
(WP) K.D.H. 
 
On the 28th of October the consolidated procedure was communicated by A.R.A. 
through the following e-mail to K.D.H and L.H.: 
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Gentlemen, 
  
Now we have a consolidated procedure to follow, where it is easily possible to identify what on PDMS is CNC 
scope, we want to walk one more step. 
  
The action CNC needs now is to own WP inputs whose :WORKRESP is set to “CNC” and :RELCNEC is 
“TRUE”. 
  
For this we are going to copy these elements and request you to delete yours from WP DBs. We are going to 
provide a List with elements we have already copied for you to know what you need to delete. 
  
In the first time, the elements copied by CNC are going to have “Copy-of-” on their names. Please, it is very 
important for us that you delete yours as soon as we request it. 
  
Please, let me know if you have any question.  
  
Thank you 
 
(CNC) A.R.A. 
 
6.4.3- New Knowledge Expansion 
 
Beginning on the 28th October, every Friday, A.R.A. extracted from the database 
elements whose attribute WORKRESP was set to CNC and the release status 
(RELCNC) set to TRUE. These elements were visually checked and copied to the 
CNC database. After the copy process, the information element, now in the CNC 
database, received an official tag and were registered in the new unique control 
document (new-SIC), with the date of the copy process considered as the “issue” 
date of the information element.  
 
Once the element had been copied to CNC database, A.R.A. sent an alert to K.D.H. 
and L.H. in Houston to delete the element from the WP database to avoid duplicity. 
After that, WP designers still could see exactly the same element, with the same 
information he added, however, they no longer could change it inadvertently. This 
way, the information carried by the 3D elements became “frozen”. Any further 
change then would require WP personnel to ask back for the information element so 
they could updated it and once again release it to CNC. In case they introduced a 
novel element with the necessary updates, the operation would be unmasked by the 
appearance of duplicity (WP new element X CNC priorly copied element).  
 
Next, these information elements were disclosed to supervisors so they could extract 
the information they need and associate to them a corresponding CNC engineering 
document. As the design work progressed within CNC, these information elements 
could be updated to consolidate the project. Depending on the match of the element 
in relation to its final document a status level was assigned enabling the 
measurement of the overall “3D virtual environment” project progress. With 
elements identified, frozen, assigned, and with their progress measured, the control 
process become complete and could be periodically feedback into WP for planning. 
 
The diagram ahead is representative of how the procedure took shape around a 
unique document, the new-SIC, continuously fed with the weekly extractions made 
by A.R.A., submitted to the procedure explained above: 
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Fig.  41: New workshare flow. 
 
 
Fig.  42: New SIC spreadsheet 
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Below we can see an outline of the resulting approach to the control of information 
previously represented compared to the former ones: 
 
 
 
Fig.  43: New information workflow 
 
Overall, the implementation process proceeded quite smoothly both considering its 
impact in WP and CNC work. On the part of WP, few reinforcement e-mails 
concerning the removal of copied items were enough for the procedure caught on. 
As the amount of information elements to be checked and have their responsibility 
re-assigned was very large, this process mounted to be a gradual one and thus did 
not flooded CNC with an impractical amount of things to be checked, copied and 
registered. In the new information turn over procedure it was much easier to identify 
the problems in “3D virtual environment” information flow coming from WP and 
was easier to require changes what was done by e-mail, instead of videoconferences, 
what made communication clear and faster. Ahead follows an example of e-mails 
exchanged on the 23rd November, 2009: 
 
 
 
(WP) L.H., 
  
Please, take a look on the elements below. They have the Purpose VPLT and :WORKRESP CNC on the same 
time. 
  
Could you please verify Purpose and :WORKRESP of these elements? 
  
  
 Thank you, 
  
(CNC) A.R.A 
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(WP) L.H., 
  
Sorry I’m insisting on this subject, but we need to issue SIC today and this information is important for us to 
have it consistent. 
Could you please inform which is the correct one: the Purpose or the :WORKRESP? 
  
Thank you again, 
  
(CNC) A.R.A. 
 
(CNC) A.R.A, 
  
These are Vendor supplied items, not CNC’s responsibility. 
  
Thanks, 
 
(WP) L.H. 
 
On CNC side, however, the range of operational details concerning the operation of 
the new information control system in the CNC Civil team were more extensive.  
 
The first problem was to align CNC project advancements within PDMS so that WP 
could see the CNC work in the “3D virtual environment” clearly flowing. To take the 
pressure out of CNC project management, it was necessary to get people mobilized 
for that work, however, as the information control system was still under 
implementation, a great amount of uncertainty still surrounded the work. It was 
necessary to buy time to keep on improving the system before a severe test was 
placed, otherwise the tool could be discredited. This became clear in a meeting 
involving CNC Project management and Civil discipline key personnel the 
discussions were as follows: 
 
(CNC) K.G.: (…) The problem keep on being the same. Apparently Civil modeling did not move yet…they we 
expected…I am waiting that someone solve my problem but until now, evident nothing happened…and WP keep 
on complaining that Civil modeling update does not show up…I´d like to know how it goes on… You asked an 
intervention to try to organize that… (…) 
 
(CNC) C.C.: All that D.C.C. said is this side… he developed a system to obtain an inventory of what should be 
designed by Civil in a controlled way…ok… when things come from WP the inputs in the model. What we have 
to discuss here… this stage has been won…D.C.C has made this tool here … He have now…Things get into the 
Civil project departing from the inventory of the inputs, that can be WP and 8000 area, the project comes from 
2D for Petrobras issue, and has to come out in 3D the model update. We are discussing now the resources. How 
to update the model? We already won this stage, now we have to mobilize people to update that. 
 
(CNC) D.C.C: (…) we had imagined to get to the end of the registry (SIC), it would be more convenient, (…) we 
will have to do something in parallel. ,… this we are going to see how we are going to do… inside this today here 
is that a need an army to do this in the PDMS. (…) It does not help to place a bunch of people… because it there 
is too much people it’s more people to get stuck on the problem. (…) 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: What happens… there are two work lines… we attacking the line that has origin at WP. W have 
another line whose origin is CNC. The bigger problem is the interface with WP because there is a complicated 
information flow that is still being defined (…) They throw out things in their database anyway, does not help to 
run, because while its I their database we can do nothing, cannot erase, cannot rename, cannot transpose, cannot 
remove… 
 
(CNC) K.G.: We have to get out of this corner…take WP from the comfortable position…We just get beating by 
them…And when we go at the details its depending on WP… so make this to be known. (…) Look I can model if 
you do not do this and that, and you have the ball… 
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(CNC) L.M.A.: In the last days we transposed 3500 elements from their databases…3500 things without tag, 
with nothing…I did not know if it was a ladder, a building, a substation…it´s throw out there…it´s their tagged 
with a database number… I don´t know what is that… while we do not click on that to see what it is, bring to our 
database, and get into the list we cannot pass the work on… This is WP line…What is CNC line it´s just the 
supervisors to pass me tag of the things… 
 
(CNC) C.L.E.:  And handle the 2D documents… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Yes, handle 2D documents…a calculation, a initial issue, an final issue…that depends on the 
supervisors they have to feed us with information (…)”I want 10 structures…  give me tag for them…” I go 
there in PDMS create structure 1, 2, 3,… give a description and say G.L.G. model this one and that one. Assign 
check-in date, when he finishes I assign a check-out date and tell the supervisor its modeled. Here I don´t see any 
problem… We just need to be fed adequately by the supervisors. 
 
(CNC) K.G.: P.R.W. and C.L.E. are telling that there is a considerable volume of information that can be handed 
to you to be modeled.  
 
(CNC) C.L.E.:  By several supervisors… be it piperack, be it buildings, be it substations, be it many things… we 
have all in 2D that are still not in 3D. What  we need is put this on the model….according with the 2D. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Substations and buildings is controlled, we are tracking the documentation, we just need to 
assign the task for someone to do… 
 
(CNC) C.L.E.:  Someone who? 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: I don´t know… any guy.. 
 
(CNC) C.L.E.:  That’s where we must arrive… who are the people who execute that. 
(Recorded meeting, 11th November, 2009 – Author translation) 
 
As a result of these meeting we got more time to work on the problematic WP 
transfer elements while provided that we start working with “CNC born” elements 
into the “3D virtual environment”. Unexpectedly, however, resource mobilization to 
accomplish this task proved very challenging. With CNC running many 
simultaneous projects, hard-work skilled professionals were avidly sought by project 
leaders among discipline managers. In the Civil team few professionals had PDMS 
skills, and the few who knew it were so deeply involved in 2D project tasks that 
supervisors do not accepted to lend them. First, PDY coordinators asked Civil 
discipline manager for these professionals but she replied she had no such 
professional available and it would be impossible to hire them on time. Then they 
asked for the Piping discipline manager, who had the largest pool of PDMS skilled 
professionals, to provide personnel to the task. He also declined arguing he also need 
some as the RMAN project was about to start. In the end, three CNC professionals, 
one from the Piping discipline and the two other from the Civil discipline were 
assigned to the task with more to be sub-contracted from a third-party company.  
 
On the 12th November, under D.C.C. request, we created a small presentation 
explaining how information was turned over through the PDMS before and after the 
procedure changes and sent for K.G. comments, which returned excited: 
 
Gentleman, 
  
I ´ve prepared a presentation in PowerPoint that maybe help not only WP personnel but also ours to better 
understand the organization work we are doing in the PDMS. 
  
Any doubt or correction just talk to me.  
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   (CNC) L.M.A. 
 
Very Good! 
  
How did you plan to propagate this presentation, particularly to WP? Next week I´ll be in Houston with C.C., 
that would be a good opportunity to present it - talk to me.  
  
(CNC) K.G. 
 
In the mean time, along the first week of November, WP sent five professionals to 
CNC office to provide faster assistance to eventual project doubts. Their arrival 
moved CNC as it long waited to work directly with WP professionals. 
 
Noteworthy also was the arrival of the members of the American team which came to Brazil to 
support the last months of the project. Four guys in their early 40´s and mid 50´s dressed on 
common clothes and carrying their backpacks freely circulated from one meeting to another 
escorted by V.S. during whole morning. By the end of the afternoon they finally arrived at the floor 
and start to occupy their new desks. As they walked into the office, English could be heard more 
and more frequently, even among Brazilian team members as they somehow to sharpen their 
English by joking to one another. First the coordinators, them the supervisors and even the 
secretary talked to the newly arrived in order to compliment or to solve final arrangements for their 
stay. While they were unpacking their things and getting used to the office, a small meeting 
gathered around them and together with some members of the Brazilian team they (a group of 8 to 
9 people) subtly engaged into a conversation. Not much of this meeting could be heard from my 
place but the overall atmosphere was one of understanding and cordiality. (Field Diary, 3rd 
November 2009) 
 
Upon their arrival project structures changed towards a more interactive role as 
shows the following chart:  
 
 
Fig.44: PDY project organization as per 05th November 2009. 
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I end up by sitting side by side with two of them: G.A., a Colombian radicated in the 
U.S., and E.R.K., an Afro-American. Both electrical technicians. They did not 
introduce themselves, so it took many days so that we get to know each other. 
Moreover, the first time I talked to G.A. it was not as cordial as it should be, like the 
field diary notes below shows: 
 
As the guy arrived back at his desk he spoke something to himself and few seconds later turned to me 
and angrily said something like: “Next time you disconnect the cable from my computer, please ask 
me!” I was taken by surprise with that tone and that charge and it took me sometime to think of an 
answer. I then said: “Sorry, but I did nothing. I just opened the compartment in order to ...(lost the 
word from pulling out)...arrange my network cable, but I did not touched any other thing” (…)He then 
softened the tone just a little and started to speak in  Spanish, probably because he was not 
understanding my truncated English and kept on complaining that someone had unplugged his power 
cable. I also started to talk in Spanish and said “Es que no lo he hecho. No lo he hecho!” and offered 
help to find another plug for his computer. The other guy didn´t said a word and just kept observing 
us. (…) I asked them in English to check his side of the desk divison, if he could find a place for his 
power cable and then we started to have a confusing conversation using both English and Spanish 
terms trying to convey as best as possible our ideas with few success. Little later he left but saying” 
goodbye” quite gently easing the clout that has just happened. (Field Diary, 4th November 2009) 
 
This bad first impression faded away as G.A. gradually started talking to me asking 
for help in translations, and then about travel tips and doubts about the way things 
work at CNC. While talking to him I was never sure about using English or Spanish, 
however, there was good communication. Soon, he revealed he had a good 
impression of work with the Brazilians as he considered them receptive and open-
minded. With time he showed up quite an open character as we can see next: 
 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Y cuéntame... tu que has viajado tanto por diversos sitios, has trabajado con tantas personas, te 
parece que aprendes algo con ellas, o estas siempre enseñado algo??? 
 
(WP) G.A.: Oh, si... cada sitio una cosa... siempre estamos aprendiendo. Lenguas por ejemplo... yo estoy aquí en 
Brasil ahora y quiero aprender portugués. Yo te cuento que... no sé porque no he estudiado lenguas en la 
universidad... no que me arrepienta porque mi carrera en ingeniería me dado todo lo que tengo y comodidad a mi 
familia pero es que me gusta demasiado las lenguas. Y además no es sólo la lengua, simplemente como forma de 
comunicarse, pero la lengua como parte de la cultura, de cómo la gente piensa, como hacen las cosas, las cosas que 
les gustan...(Interview, 4th November 2009 – Exact Transcription) 
 
Differently, E.R.K., barely talked to me and many much effort towards other desk 
neighbors. Nevertheless, I could see that he developed a considerable friendship 
with several other project members, even from unrelated professional activities.  
 
In the beginning, they were quite upset about CNC delays. Sometimes they 
expressed impatience over the relaxed stance towards national holidays in face of 
schedule overruns. They also frequently complained about the Internet infrastructure 
and frequently left to work in the hotel. Apart from the early idiomatic and cultural 
misunderstandings as well as initial prejudices on both sides, WP team members 
apparently felt very comfortable in CNC, and thus, communications improved fast 
and a relationship grew up. Working meetings were very frequent and apparently 
cordial, with very a technical and collaborative atmosphere. Soon they recognized 
that Petrobras imposed several limitations to how fast CNC could do its work and 
understood that many delays were not due to unfinished work but due to the strict 
and personalistic approval conditions imposed by Petrobras inspectors. 
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Although quite reserved, they were frequently involved in small cordial meetings 
across de project floor with their Brazilian counterparts. With time more and more 
Brazilian colleagues went to talk to them, inviting for lunch, a ride across the city, a 
night out, or helping them with travel tips. Many Brazilian members went to talk to 
them just to practice English what they understood and tried to help. In the end, G.A. 
end up taking Portuguese classes as he wished to qualify to for future job offers in 
Brazil. 
 
Noteworthy on their behavior was how much time they spent talking on the 
telephone, dealing with personal problems back in the U.S. They even used handset 
in their heads all the time. This contrasted with Brazilians, for which to talk too much 
on the phone over non-job related subjects is seen as loafing. Also characteristic was 
there strictly adherence to the work schedule, arriving and living together and 
punctually at the time expected (7:00-16:00, with one hour lunch), while Brazilians 
practiced a much more flexible schedule, arriving and living randomly. 
 
A key element in their relationship with WP appeared on an interview with G.A.: 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Pero lo que preguntaba era, si de los sítios donde has ído, cuál es lo que gustó más? Cuál el sitio 
donde te siente más cómodo? 
 
(WP) G.A: Más cómodo... no sé... no he estado en mucho sitios.... Irak, China, Casaquistán, Canadá y ahora en 
Brasil....  No me gustaría quedar en China... es que los chinos fuman demasiado... y en todos los sitios... no ves el 
sol... la impresión que tienes es que estás en un .... gran cenicero.... Imagínate que la gente fumaba dentro de las 
oficinas... y en China hace mucho frío, está todo cerrado siempre.... ellos elegían una sala de reunión y allí 
transformaban en un sitio de fumadores, entonces cuando abrían y cerraban la puerta salía el olor y por debajo de 
la puerta también pasaba el humo... y yo detesto cigarrillas, no soporto el olor del humo. Pero...pero lo peor 
seguramente es el oriente medio. En Saudí....oohhh!... tu no puede tocar en ellos. Estás contaminado, eres infiel, te 
toman por inferior, por sucio. Si tu no has nacido en Saudí no eres árabe y por tanto no tiene derechos, no eres 
gente. No interesa que tu mamá y tu papá son árabes, si no has nacido allí no eres nada. Son como los alemanes, 
se tu padre es alemán y su madre es Italiana aunque haya nacido en Alemania no eres alemán. Se estás 
conduciendo tu coche y viene un árabe y se choca contra su coche, tu eres el culpable (lo cuenta bastante exaltado) 
porque una vez que tu no eres de Saudí, se tu entrastes en Saudí para lo que sea y estás allí, tu eres el culpable por 
estar en aquél sitio y tu por estar allí provocaste el accidente. Los extranjeros tienen que vivir en “compounds” 
donde tienen todo lo que necesitan. Pero eso no es vida... No podría vivir así...  São Paulo...es una ciudad un tanto 
ordenada. Tiene... un tamaño parecido con Bogotá.... que tiene 8 millones de habitantes... aquí cuantos son? 
 
(...) 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: E a ti te parece que la WP reconoce todo este trabajo de desplazarse por el mundo con los 
proyectos? Tienes alguna compensación en términos de rango o financiera? Tu te sientes que tienes la confianza 
de tus jefes e eso reverte en algo para ti? 
 
(WP) G.A: Si....tengo la confianza de mis jefes... pues que ellos saben que pueden contar conmigo para hacer lo 
que se necesita.... no que sea un experto, un genio como ingeniero... así como (¿?) ... como (¿?) (miembros de el 
equipo de eléctrica de Brasil) que saben mucho... son genios... pero es que hoy estoy en un punto donde sé lo que 
hacer.... yo estoy listo... puedo llegar y sé donde comenzar el trabajo y lo que hay que hacer... Las compensaciones 
financieras si que las hay pero no es tanto así que justifique... Yo ya gano bién... en mi rango de salario, la 
mayoría ingenieros, no hay más de un 5 por cien de todo equipo técnico... yo ya llegué a jefe de el equipo de 
eléctrica.  Entonces no es mucho por el dinero. Es que un trabajo y como los otros. Si que estoy lejos de casa pero 
uno se acostumbra. Yo me quedo aquí en la oficina hasta las 9 de la noche, cuando salgo me voy al hotel, como, 
duermo y vuelvo a la oficina, no hace falta que esté en mi casa. Pero hay mucha gente que está cómoda en la 
empresa y cuando aparecen estas oportunidades de trabajo a ellos no interesan y yo nunca he recusado un pedido 
de desplazamiento que me haya pedido un jefe.... siempre que tiene que ir me voy.... siempre... ahí que cuando hay 
cortes, como ahora en la crisis, todos están allí muy inseguros y mi jefe llega para mí y dice: “Queda tranquilo que 
a ti nadie te va a tocar”. Entonces eso es un tipo de reconocimiento. (Interview, 4th November 2009 – Exact 
Transcription). 
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On the 18th of November, while K.G. and C.C. were in WP-Houston, a 
videoconference was set to present the information turnover systematic to the newly 
arrived WP professionals in São Paulo and to the WP managers in Houston. Asked 
by S.B.D about their understanding of the whole process, WP-Houston personnel 
provided very positive views on the procedure as we can see in the dialogue below: 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: Can you get me a minute??? Do you (K.H.D.) understand everything? 
 
(WP) K.H.D.: That they just presented…We are already doing this… 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: So you have been working with D.C.C., A.R.A and L.M.A., on this already.  
 
(WP) K.H.D.:: What I do is pick attributes and L.H. guys set the attributes.(…) 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: So we are using this process already … 
 
(WP) L.H..::There is only one issue that we have… 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: And it´s kind of working very well… 
 
(WP) K.H.D.: Yeah, I get a list back kind that I´m showing to you...I get a list back of what they moved to 
their area so we can (…) 
 
(…)  
 
(WP) L.H..: Under the net it´s seems working fine… We get a list when they copy them over (…) 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: We don´t have any questions on this??? We understand the concepts??? 
 
(WP) L.H..::No, I think it works faster… 
 
(…) 
 
(WP) S.B.D.: That is a very good presentation made me understand much much better. You made it simple 
enough that I can understand the problem, so thank you. 
 
(CNC) K.G..: Please, distribute a copy of the presentation to all presents here.  
 
(Recorded meeting, 18th November 2009 – Exact Transcription) 
 
The only issue mentioned by WP personnel was that once released the information 
element they could not change it anymore and in some situations it was needed. 
However, that was exactly to avoid these last minute changes that the system was 
developed and implemented. In the end of the videoconference, one of the WP 
professionals in São Paulo, suggested a procedure for turning back elements for WP 
adjustment, something that could easily be done by e-mail since it was copied to the 
responsible supervisor.  
 
Overall the new information control systematic improved a lot the workshare 
capability among project offices. The series of e-mails from 24th to 25th of November 
gives an example on how smooth communications concerning the work in the “3D 
virtual environment” became: 
 
L.H., 
  
Looking at the U-4400 and 4400D model there are extra base supports for the exchanger P-4400007 done by 
CNC. 
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They copied from our EQUI model twice and placed one set 1.55m north of the original location. 
Not sure if you’re let them know, but…. See attached. I highlighted the base support in red. 
 
R.L. - Piping Designer 
 
R.L., 
  
Attached is a pic from the model where CNEC is modeling the supports (in red) and they have duplicated. I’m not 
sure who on our team needs to hand this. 
 
 
 Fig. 45: Image annex to the e-mail 
  
L.H.  
 
A.M., 
  
Please take a look on the attached picture that shows duplicated supports for exchanger. Please make necessary 
changes on the 3d model. Thanks 
 
Regards, 
  
R.F.  
 
L.M.A 
  
Attached comments from parsons for the unit 4400. 
  
Attached too the civil design for this structure. 
  
Regards, 
  
A.M. 
 
A.M. 
  
Structures and piperacks at Unit 4400 are being update right now based on recently released documentation.  
  
As some equipment bases became part of the structures in CNEC detailing, some duplication might appear for a 
while because WP has modeled bases as separate itens  
  
As soon as we finish the modelling of the CNEC structures the initial bases added by WP will be deleted and the 
duplication will be resolved. 
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R.F.  
  
As we´re implementing new procedures on modelling CNEC elements, let me know anything people at WP might 
think of strange within PDMS. 
  
Att, 
  
L.M.A 
 
L.M.A., 
  
Thank you for your explanation regarding this issue. I also forwarded this email to WP Houston to inform them 
of the situation. 
   
Regards, 
  
R.F. 
 
 
Although the new approach worked fine with the outset, internally there were still 
challenges to be met. As the system exposed previously unseen elements turned over 
by WP, it gradually increased the amount of work under the responsibility of already 
overstretched supervisors. Confronted with additional work they initially resisted to 
use the SIC as a work release reference and kept on working with elements released 
through meetings, phone calls or videoconferences. This way they could concentrate 
their work on the larger elements and sweep out the smaller ones easing their 
burden. This strategy, however, left hundredths of information elements 
incorporated into the SIC control without owners and destination documents, 
undermining the control and measurement functions of the control system. A 
problem that persisted while our efforts have been diverted to other urgent needs. 
 
By the end of November, the information control system was put to a hard test. A 
particular area of the PDY project, known as “8000”, was suddenly moved to the top 
of Petrobras priorities. Due to the particular characteristics of this project area, Civil 
and Electric (CNC) elements were to be designed first so that as Piping and 
Mechanical (WP) elements could thereafter be accommodated, inverting the usual 
information flow used since beginning.  
 
Minutes later P.R.W. came out of a meeting with C.C. and asked us to focus the modeling work on 
Units 8000. I said that this was exactly the last part of the modeling was planning to deal with to the 
peculiarities of the underground project. He asserted that WP was required urgency in this modeling 
work so as they could go ahead with their work in Houston. I said I was not much aware of the 
progress in this unit because I had no yet put their elements under control. But I told him that few 
things beyond underground have been released from WP to CNC. He strongly disagreed and said 
that the work in that units were already about to finish and that plenty of documentation was 
available. (…) A.R.A. then explained to me that 8000 units were entirely designed by CNC without 
any input from WP. Then it all made sense because the workflow for these units were the opposite 
from the other ones, that is, they started with CNC and were to be finished by WP. (Field Diary, 23rd  
November, 2009) 
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Fig. 46: Area 8000 plan and perspective. 
  
This was a very large area composed of administrative buildings, streets, piperacks, 
and extensive underground work (i.e.: drainage, electrical channels, sewage system). 
A great challenge that would require not only skilled and hard work professionals, 
but also tool improvements and extensive organization so we could sent the 
information elements developed at CNC in time to WP met the schedule.  
 
With its project backlog declining, CNC increasingly resisted to hire people and 
commit to further expenses. In that scenario, competition for resources among 
projects became more common, as can be seen in the field notes below: 
 
When I started my computer and clicked at the PDMS icon, it returned a message that there were no 
licenses left even with two designers still on the go was exact the kind of problem I feared today. A 
issue that would be properly handled by A.R.A. who has everything concerning PDMS under 
control, turned into a two hour battle to me until a get exactly what was going on. (…) 
 
Then , finally, it made sense. S.P.H, who was my boss and were in charge of the RMAN project had 
inappropriately suppressed 7 of our licenses, while BASF has taken 1. With 12 licenses only 
production personnel at PDY could keep working. I decided to call S.P.H and cautiously ask him to 
hand back at least two of the 7 licenses he had taken.  He said his project was terrible late, working 24 
hours, and in need of more licenses and so on and so forth. I said I had two professionals out of work 
and in my project it meant complete inactivity for them because I had no work outside PDMS. He 
said he also had two professionals without I license and he was already having much trouble and I 
should go easy on him and not bother about these licenses he had taken. I felt upset but I could do 
nothing against him, because at this point he was both my boss and competitor for resources.  I saw 
at this point that for the second time in the last months he deliberated rushed into my pool of 
resources without asking and without regret just for the sake of being my boss and have a 
overwhelmingly power over my earnings and future assignments. (Field Diary, 18th January 2009) 
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With the human resources settled, the 8000 area task received our full attention. With 
the information flow operating in reverse mode (CNC  WP), WP pressure upon 
CNC quickly built up. Fortunately, this role reversal coincided with the arrival of 
four sub-contracted 3D designers, hired to help detailing CNC information elements 
back into “3D virtual environment”. Together, we decided to concentrate our work 
in sectors so we could release complete areas for WP to be working in parallel. 
Naming conventions were extended to accommodate the unconventional elements to 
be modeled, new element/document relationships had to be developed to fit into the 
SIC control, and finally, communication between CNC and WP concerning the “3D 
virtual environment” has been fully tested. 
 
The area has been divided in three sectors that were released sequentially to WP. On 
the 17Th December (SW Sector), 22th December (NW Sector) and on the 15th January 
(NE sector), S.C.J., design task job leader, sent e-mails containing pictures of the work 
developed and a list of information elements released by CNC for WP work These e-
mails were copied to S.C.J. counterpart and copied to all CNC and WP people 
involved, including the project managers on both sides (K.G. and S.L.J). 
Communication flow was surprising, and WP work proceeded straightforwardly.   
 
Around 400 information elements were catalogued, modeled and sent trough the 
“3D virtual environment” to WP work in less than 30 days (Christmas and New Year 
eve holiday in between). The final adjustments in the control system made during 
this task allowed for the last step in development process of ths SIC control system, 
which was to measure work progress in a periodic and consistent way. Beginning on 
the 11th January 2010, graphics showing the work progress within “3D virtual 
environment” were made using SIC information and for the first time we were able 
to precisely know where we was and how fast we should go to end the job on 
schedule.  
 
 
Fig. 47: Model progress curve. 
 
This important information tool however, suffered a setback and end up being 
hidden from WP, as the field diary excerpt shows: 
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(…) D.C.C called me at his desk and after a short explain told me that although that graphic was 
exactly what everybody was waiting for he would not show it to WP personnel. That affirmation 
puzzled me not more than it made me upset. In my opinion the modeling progress graphic was the 
ultimate proof that we had everything under control and on the way to cope with the project 
deadline. D.C.C. argued that as there were many elements without documental reference inside the 
SIC control and because of that there were too much uncertainty in the resulting graphic, and for now 
it would cause WP to flood us with questions..(…) I then said that if it were for him to wait for all 
elements to be addresses to a determined element he would have to wait so long that the graphic 
would lose its importance, (…) I tried to persuade him showing that most of the unreferenced 
elements were tiny and unimportant elements with few weight in the overall job (…) He stuck at his 
point in saying that there was still too much uncertainty for we present the graphic as a part of the 
SIC control and at most we would have to talk to K.G. in order to evaluate the impact of such a 
graphic at WP. (Field Diary, 12th January 2009) 
 
Little later an additional graphic was created to accommodate the variation in the 
workload coming from WP as a result of the dynamic nature of the work.  
 
 
Fig. 48: Work gap curve. 
 
So forth, updated graphics were weekly sent only to the project manager, all 
coordinators, supervisors and enrolled discipline managers without WP awareness. 
6.5- KNOWLEDGE CHANGE OUTCOMES 
 
The 8000 job result however has been eclipsed by the turmoil that succeeded the 
purchase of CNC by WP on the first working day of 2010. In 4th January, 2001, G.A. 
sent me an e-mail from WP-Houston, copying the official announcement: 
 
WP to acquire CNC Engenharia S/A 
WP and Brazilian conglomerate CCC today announced an agreement for WP to acquire CNC 
Engenharia (CNC), the standalone engineering and project management operation of the CCC E&C 
division. 
The purchase price will be BRL170.0 million comprising BRL130.0 million in consideration and 
BRL40.0 million which will be initially retained by the business as a non-core asset. The business' pro-
forma EBITDA (earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortization) for the year ending June 
2010 is estimated to be BRL24.5 million. 
The capability of CNC, based in Sao Paulo, Brazil complements the existing capabilities of WP’ 
resource and energy businesses and provides a springboard for the next phase of WP’ growth across 
South America.  CNC has built a regional and international reputation in thermoelectric and 
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hydroelectric plants, subways, ports, airports, highways, wastewater, industrial plants, refining and 
distributing oil and gas, petrochemical and urban development throughout Brazil and in Latin 
America and Africa . 
R.E., Managing Director of WP’ United States and Latin America region commented: “The 
acquisition of CNC is key to WP achieving growth and expanding our hydrocarbons, power, 
infrastructure, mining and metals capability by incorporating CNC’s globally recognized multi-
discipline capabilities. CNC will be a significant enhancement to WP’ Latin American group. 
Also commenting, the President of CNC, C.A.J. said: “Joining WP is an exciting development for 
CNC, which celebrated its 50th year of business just last year.  This merger of complementary talent 
will enable CNC to grow geographically while adding to our core technical areas of expertise 
enabling us to provide our clients with a more comprehensive service both domestically and 
internationally.” 
  
AboutCNC 
CNC is part of the Engineering & Construction (E&C) Division of the Brazilian conglomerate CCC 
and became a wholly owned subsidiary in the 1990s.  CNC services the downstream hydrocarbons, 
minerals and metals, hydroelectric, infrastructure (transport, water/wastewater) and environmental 
industries of Brazil . It is an established leader in Brazil hydropower, with a world-class capability. 
The company has around 700 employees with established offices in Brazil; located in the states of Sao 
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Maranhao, Para, Santa Catarina, and Distrito Federal; Argentina and Peru. The 
head office is in Sao Paulo and the company has a geographic presence in attractive South American 
markets.  
 
Rumors about an association involving WP and CNC circulated for months, 
however, a full takeover was completely unexpected. The very same day, C.A.J., the 
former CNC president (now CNC/WP president), went floor to floor to speak about 
the takeover. He tried to calm down CNC/WP employees and affirmed several times 
that WP had been formed around several purchases and because of that it had policy 
of respecting the local business culture. Moreover this purchase no way would result 
in lay-offs, on the contrary, that CNC/WP would have to hire more and more people 
to support a aggressive expansion plan. As a demonstration of respect on the local 
business culture, he said, CNC purchase has been conditioned to the maintenance of 
the whole management team that would allow for a smooth transition. It was said 
that CNC/WP and CCC would keep a special relationship that would span into new 
project bids, otherwise CNC/WP would be freed to join any other construction 
company it wished. 
 
After that, colleagues all around the floor showed mixed feelings about the purchase. 
Some were excited that would make part of an international company, with better 
training, technology and business prospects, with a plus of job opportunities abroad. 
Some people believed that away from CCC influence, it would be easier to CNC win 
and keep contracts, which were previously refrained and diverted by CCC. Others 
feared this would mean the end of job security and relaxed management. From my 
standpoint, the partnership established for the PDY project, which resembled a 
“almost equal partnership” (Field Diary notes, 27th November, 2009), would probably 
be extended to other projects and situations. Until the end of the month, however, 
apart from the arrival of a very young manager responsible for the transition process 
and several meetings and seminars involving high rank CNC and WP personnel 
(including a visit from G.J., WP CEO, hardly anything changed. Logo, e-mail 
addresses, website, badges, all remained as nothing have happened.  
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In the 29th January 2010, another turbulence hit the project.  Petrobras had finally 
reached an agreement with Braskem over the future of the PDY complex. As a result 
of the agreement PDY plant would change from a single-train refinery and a 
petrochemical central to a dual-train refinery. Braskem became fully responsible to 
build and operate a petrochemical central within the complex. After initial fears of 
project cancellation Petrobras decided to finish developing the areas related to the 
refinery and cancel those linked to petrochemical central. WP/CNC scope was 
reduced and the project deadline anticipated in two months to 25th April.   
 
When PDY personnel from CNC/WP begin to be decommissioned, the first striking 
contrast with the period under CCC ownership could be felt. With no other large 
project on sight, senior and specialized professionals which usually would be 
retained and redirected to support CCC business proposals, were immediate laid-off. 
Almost at the same time equivalent amounts of staff personnel (IT, HR, marketing, 
legal, finance) were hired to replace the services priorly shared within CCC group. 
Both movements were associated to the WP purchase and rumors spread that 
CNC/WP was expected to become a project management consultancy and not an 
engineering company anymore. In a red-hot engineering job market provided by 
extensive number of Petrobras projects in the hands of non-traditional engineering 
players, CNC/WP started losing as many professionals to the competition as were 
laid-off. In two events (C.A.J (President) webconference and M.A.C. (Managing 
Director) group meeting), management tried to calm employees down and point to a 
better future, however, discontent among technical staff was just growing, and with 
that   
 
In that heavy atmosphere, came out the first international business contact provided 
by new ownership. WP-Edmonton (Canada) had just joined a giant mining project 
for Vale and its Project Director (A.J.S.) came to São Paulo to evaluate company 
infrastructure and skills towards a partnership that could take up the growing slack. 
Along this visit, PDY was presented as a flagship project and the collaborative work 
between WP-Houston and CNC/WP built around the SIC methodology, an example 
of what could be provided to WP-Edmonton. This way, most of the A.J.S. visit was 
directed by K.G. followed by S.S.H., CNC/WP industry superintendent. In order to 
demonstrate CNC/WP familiarity with 3D project tools and the recently developed 
“workshare capability”, K.G. asked us (D.C.C., A.R.A. and I) to prepare a quick 
presentation for A.J.S. what we did adding a little more information to the prior WP-
Houston presentation. 
 
The next day (2nd February, 2010), when we arrived at the meeting room we saw it 
filled up with all high ranks of CNC/WP industry division together with PDY 
coordinators and project management (from both WP-Houston and CNC/WP). 
S.P.H. avidly attended to that meeting and took its key supervisor with him, S.S.S. 
The meeting opened with K.G. showing how large was PDY project and al the range 
of activities that CNC/WP took part. A.J.S. showed interest in the volume of 
drawings produced and told that he was planning to use WP-Beijing for the 
drawings job. The talks however leaned up towards workshare as shown above and 
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as the presentation evolved several subjects attracted his attention and were largely 
debated. The presentation was enriched by the testimony of S.L.J., WP-Houston 
project manager, who told about the challenging circumstances involved in the 
workshare with CNC/WP, which involved working in parallel rather than 
sequentially as traditionally done, what surprised A.S.J. After the presentation he 
required us to stay and participate into another meeting that extended through the 
day.   
 
As a result of these meetings, A.J.S. look very excited with the possibility to work 
with CNC/WP. He asked for a communication bridge involving technical personnel 
in CNC/WP and WP-Houston and this gave rise to the following sequence of 
communications: 
 
Mr(s)., 
  
Yesterday (02-Feb) we began initial contacts towards increasing collaboration between WP Edmonton (Canada) 
and CNC (São Paulo, Brazil) offices.  
  
The aim of this e-mail is to establish a venue of communication between professionals at these two offices in order 
to supply local expertise for a major Vale mining project awarded to the WP Edmonton office. 
  
Two collaboration groups have been created and one awaits for the first contact and initial conversations 
(Architecture). They are: 
  
CAE: 
  
(WP-Edmonton) S.L. (Engineering Manager)  
(WP-Edmonton) D.H. (Piping/CAE Manager)  
(CNC) A.R.A. (Systems Administrator)  
(CNC) L.M.A. (Project Engineer)  
 
Civil: 
  
(CNC) L.Y.L (Concrete Structures Supervisor)  
(CNC) A.R. (Steel Structures Supervisor)  
  
(WP-Edmonton) D.C. (Civil & Structural Manager)  
(WP-Edmonton) S.L (Engineering Manager)  
 
Architecture: 
 
(CNC) X.A.C. (Arch. Supervisor)  
  
(WP-Edmonton) D.C. (Civil & Structural Manager)  
(WP-Edmonton) S.L. (Engineering Manager) 
 
Dear Mr S.S.H (CNC) 
 
We wish to thank you n your team for your kind hospitality and a great welcome accorded to us yesterday.  
 
We think, that presentations were very well laid out and the teleconference calls between the two engineering 
teams in Edmonton and Sao Paulo was productive.  
 
The efforts of Mr K.G., L.M.A n other participating members are highly appreciated.  
The day long presentations, clarification towards development of a structured long term cooperation and work 
share opportunities between the two WP entities was very well received by our both project teams in Edmonton 
and Belo Horizonte.  
 
In the meanwhile, effective immediately as a part of communication protocol, we would propose Mr Luciano 
CNEC project engineer, S.L. Engineering Manager, Y.N. Project Engineer (both Edmonton based), C.F. Project 
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coordination Manager and E.G. Project Engineer (both Belo Horizonte based) to be the communication focal 
points for the intial phase through the finalizing of WP- IEWO (Inter Entity Work order) it is a term for the final 
formal contract/agreement between two WP entities before the start of work.  
 
We would like to propose S.L. Engineering Manager to visit your office during his next visit to Brazil in the last 
week of this month.  
 
Hope this will kick start a successful journey towards long term mutual cooperation and joint success.  
 
Thank you 
A.J.S. 
Project Director 
WP-Edmonton (Canada) 
 
Dear Mr. A.J.S.(WP-Edmonton) 
 
Thank you for your kind words. 
CNEC will be pleased to cooperate with Edmonton Office in future Projects for Vale and others. Please copy 
myself and Mr R.F.  in all correspondence  related to this subject . 
We look forward receiving the visit of Mr. S.L.  in  São Paulo. Please inform his traveling plans . 
We will work with C.F. to expedite the WP-IEWO and start working with Edmonton. 
Looking for successfully future cooperation in new Projects. 
Best Regards 
  
S.S.H. 
Projects Superintendent Industry 
CNC/WP  
 
This message has been copied to all high ranks of CNC/WP, including the president 
C.A.J., and WP-Edmonton. In a parallel correspondence, however, I have been 
warned by K.G., and later, by S.S.H, that R.F. should have appointed the linkage 
contacts. I argued that I just wrote what A.J.S. asked for a things could go changing 
as they progressed. Then, S.S.H. wrote the following e-mail to K.G. copied to me, and 
K.G.: 
 
(CNC) R.F. 
 
“Ok, let´s validate the subject next week in the meeting about process integration and the implementation 
plan of BH (Belo Horizonte) office.  
 
Let´s revise the budget of BH office implementation and we adjust the issue of Vale project with the Brazilian 
Project manager (C.F.) I am coping S.W. the contract manager with this proposal.   
 
(CNC) S.S.H. 
 
In 16th February 2010, a workflow has been sent by a WP-Edmonton member asking 
for comments. This time, I asked both R.F. and S.S.H. for permission to act. S.S.H. 
told me to wait until a meeting in two days that would decided about the format of 
the collaboration (which did not happened or I was not invited to).  R.F. however 
told me to go ahead and answer Y.N. Next on the 3rd March 2010, Y.N. sent a second 
information request, which R.F. took control and redirected to other professionals. 
As each day I got less involved into the process, I considered myself off-line. After 
some time, I came to know that CNC/WP would only supply some professionals do 
the WP-Belo Horizonte (Brazil) office, what end up being just one professional 
(L.Y.L). Several times I tried to collect more information about the issue however in 
my conversation with R.F. he was always vague telling that everything was running 
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through WP-Belo Horizonte office that acted completely independent from CNC/WP 
in São Paulo. Despite a common “chairman”, if it were to CNC/WP to participate in 
that, it would be necessary to enroll in the project almost as a different company.  
 
Also in the beginning of March 2010, another international business opportunity 
came out. An e-mail was sent to the industry division of CNC/WP asking for 
resumés of professionals interested in joining a temporary assignment in Abu Dhabi, 
UAE (United Arab Emirates). Although completely vague about the opportunity, the 
offer attracted many candidates interested in securing their jobs and grabbing a 
international opportunity. 5th March, an e-mail bringing a little more information was 
sent to those interested, as shown below: 
 
I.J. (Abu Dhabi); E.D (Houston); H.G. (Singapore) 
  
E.D. and I have been working the issue of support for AME/ME projects from CNC.  We understand that 
packets of work from the ME may not soon come to Brazil (but maybe one day).  F.C.  told us yesterday, 
however, that CNC probably has several personnel who would welcome a 3 to 12 month assignment in the ME, 
since workload in Sao Paulo is dropping. 
  
(…) 
  
B.G.E.(Houston) 
Managing Director 
Global Hydrocarbons 
 
 
I.J. (Abu Dhabi);  H.G. (Singapore) 
  
In response to the attached message, see the list of resumes of professionals which may be assigned from 3 to 12 months 
on your projects Please, let me know your evaluation of those resumes(…) 
  
Thank you 
 
(CNC) F.C.  
 
 
Hi (CNC) F.C. 
  
Thanks for the summary. 
  
I am not sure if you have the background about the imported labour in the Middle East, so I thought that I share 
with you a brief summary. If further details are required, please give us a buzz. 
  
Majority of technical engineers and designer are Eastern Expatriates with most being Indian Nationals with 
Filipinos being second. For Engineering work in the office, we tend to use a higher percentage of eastern 
expatriates (over 80% to remain competitive), while for the Project Management Consultancy (PMC), we tend to 
use 60-70% eastern expatriates and the remaining are western expatriates which includes Aussies, US, 
European, etc. Most western expatriates take on the roles of PM, PCM, CM, Contracts Managers, HSE 
Managers, etc. 
  
For us to determine best utilization of the Brazilian Engineers, we need to understand their current commercial 
packages and expectations to come abroad. This will help us determine whether they fit with the Eastern 
Expatriates or the Western. 
  
Please note that I am currently travelling, so I copied my colleague L.J. if you want to have a chat. 
  
Regards 
  
I.J. (Abu Dhabi);   
 
 213 
 
 
I.J., L.J. 
  
Thanks for your prompt reply. 
  
To provide you with their commercial packages and expectations, it would be important to understand what are 
the current relocation policies for both (western and eastern) expats you normally apply on projects you have 
assigned them 
  
This will help us to get back to you  
  
Regards 
(CNC) F.C. 
 
 
Hi (CNC) F.C. 
  
R.D.S. our HR Manager will get back to you with an outline of what is normally provided. 
 
(…) 
  
Regards 
  
L.J. 
General Manager. 
WP-Abu Dhabi 
 
 
Dear (CNC) F.C. 
 
My name is R.D.S. and I am the Human Resources Manager for WorleyParsons in the United Arab Emirates.  
 
Currently we hire candidates for Engineering (In-house) and Project Management Consultancy work (PMC).  
The engineering staff are considered long term and PMC are considered project hires.  Whenever the project 
comes to an end, we tend to move them to new projects, subject to new project availability clients approval.  
 
For Engineering we provide staff with single status or married status employment contracts.   The difference 
between the single status and married status is; single status staff are provided with 3 economy class tickets per 
year to their point of origin, whereas the married status staff receive only one ticket per annum, they also receive 
one ticket each for their spouse and up to 2 children less than 18 years of age.  Married status staff are also 
eligible to receive medical insurance in the UAE and company pays for their UAE visa costs.   
 
PMC staff are provided with only single status, as they are expected to travel to other countries and/or leave at 
site locations.  
 
Regardless of the status, every employee is eligible for the following: (…) 
 
R.D.S. 
Human Resources Manager 
WP-Abu Dhabi 
 
These contacts came to nowhere, and once again, nothing happened, as CNC/WP did 
not provide any professional to international assignments. Rumors gave an account 
that WP Abu Dhabi office thought Brazilian professionals were too expensive, 
although they did not account the comparison criteria (Asian – technical workers X 
European/American – managers).  
 
Parallel to that integration process, the correct implementation of the SIC 
methodology had to be reinforced internally as we perceived that supervisors 
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excessive workload and tight schedules made it difficult to them to embrace the 
methodology. After several requests were made by D.C.C. for the supervisors to 
identify the correct owner and the destination document of identified but unassigned 
elements what in 4th February 2010 generated a harsh e-mail from K.G. copied to all 
senior professionals in the project, both at CNC and WP: 
 
Gentlemen, 
 
In a recent conversation with D.C.C. and W.L.C. we realized that many of you, despite having received 
periodically the SIC, never looked to its content. This is inadmissible as a managerial behavior. The document 
reflects information collected that must be analyzed and commented by you, because this makes part of your 
supervision task. 
 
(CNC) K.G. 
 
After that, supervisors made an extra effort to address the problem and P.R.W. settle 
down that elements that did not find reference in issued drawing would be 
referenced towards material lists, to indicate that they were taking into account for 
quantitative evaluation.  
 
The “look at the model” procedure also proved persistent as some supervisors kept 
on searching the “3D virtual environment” in order to find their work even after 
being presented to the new system. The e-mail below from 14th of December, 2010 
shows an example: 
 
Good Morning (CNC) A.R.A: 
  
By the way the pictures taken from área of U-5412 are ready with the color differentiation for CNEC scope? 
Please inform. 
  
Thanks, 
 
(CNC) L.Y.L 
 
This situation in some cases persisted until 05th February when D.C.C. decided to talk 
to P.R.W. in search for action: 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: Yesterday, L.M.A. brought me a situation that let me very apprehensive. Involving the SIC, the 
control of PDMS…L.Y.L look for him apparently… completely unaware of what would be the SIC. And this let 
me very apprehensive because it is the instrument of PDMS control. And he still keep talking about colors… 
apparently he not looking at the control index. (…). 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: (...) the question that L.Y.L. brought demonstrate it is not clear what the SIC is. L.Y.L. come to 
ask me the following: “We are working on a structure on area 6310 and I asked J.C. to take some images and 
dimensions and we started working and so on …then I needed to confirm something and when I got there was an 
additional level…It cannot be…” I said, it cannot? Wait a minute… let´s take a look at the PDMS, we find the 
structure… “yes, this is the one! This level was not here yesterday”, he said….so a query the database to check 
the attributes, what I found? WP responsibility… Then I said, “L.Y.L you cannot work on it. It´s WP”. He 
replied “ No, but this is ours, this is ours, I´ve been to a meeting yesterday and the guy said it was ours…” I 
relied “L.Y.L. it´s WP and is no released!” …”Oh! But I looked there and that was green”… I said “L.Y.L there 
is no more color code anymore…Who says what you have to do is the SIC…the SIC opens your work 
responsibility…. (…) If you go to a video conference and he tell you that it is released and you go their at the SIC 
and it is not…then you have to come to me and A.R.A and ask us to charge them attribute and bring the object to 
our database” … But he argued, “No, but I can´t wait…” …I replied, “But you have to wait…Why? Because as 
you don´t tell us and me bring it here, they will keep on changing things…(…) you “life insurance” against last-
minute changes is let us to bring it here…(…) while I do not bring it here, registry in the SIC and release, you 
cannot work on it…that´s not because of me… that´s because if you work, it is subject to further change and you 
lose you work”(…)  
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(CNC) L.M.A: Then I looked for D.C.C. and talk to him that in the meeting, at least in that part I participated, I 
believe the issue has been approached from the middle to the end, and then it looks that people did not make a 
connection.  
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: Given that the system is already known…. So, my doubt is…  if isn´t it worth to gather the 
people in the room and give a refresh… 
 
(CNC) P.R.W.: They are probably not looking at it…damn, such things are tough… 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: This explanation will not take long. 
 
(CNC) P.R.W.: Will have to do this… 
 
(…) 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: We wanted to work on structure that in reality is not up to be worked… 
 
(CNC) P.R.W.: But it is ours.. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Until this point is not… while they do not attribute it an we bring it here it is not… 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: Otherwise it is a big risk… we are trying to eliminate the risk… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: The guys relapsed to him (in the meeting), but it was not ready… they run and finished the 
structure, added more things in that.. and he started to working onto something … he bought the good faith of the 
guys (WP)… he cannot go on that… 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: He cannot go on that…  
 
(CNC) P.R.W.: He cannot … they change even what has already been released… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: What is released that cannot change. Do you know why? Because we bring it to our database and 
it´s game over… the structure disappears from their database… they cannot erase, copy, and change… 
 
(CNC) P.R.W.: Ohhh…. That is the big advantage of the system… I talked so much to G.S.G.. do like this … he 
did not and get fucked up… we are still fucked up because of this… 
 
(CNC) D.C.C.: So the system has been assimilated by the owner there (WP), they understood, (…) they are doing 
just fine…So there is no way we can get out of the procedure…my suggestion is let´s make a specific meeting to 
further clarify this…(Recorded meeting, 05th February 2010 – Author Translation) 
 
During a first specific meetings, all Civil and Electrical coordinators where invited to 
receive a more detailed explanation of how the system worked to better directed its 
supervisors. Attracted my attention during this meeting P.D.J., a coordinator that left 
much of its relevance when WP-Houston members came to Brazil, has been critical of 
the system almost without having participation in the process of development and 
tests, nor had been hit by any of its benefits.  
 
After the general reprimand and the meeting supervisors reinforced the use of the 
SIC control before looking into the model, what can be demonstrated by the e-mail 
below of 12th February 2010: 
 
(CNC) P.R.W., 
  
For your information and action: 
  
According to SIC – 2010FEB08, the platform of support for following exchangers are not release yet.   
  
U-6310 BASE P-6310001-BASE   PROPYLENE 
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U-6310 BASE P-6310002-BASE   PROPYLENE 
U-6310 BASE P-6310005-BASE   ETHYLENE VAPORIZER 
  
             (CNC)  L.Y.L. 
 
Early March 2010, with the SIC methodology consolidated and operating 
accordingly, two initiatives towards knowledge reproduction take place.  
 
In 3rd March 2010, S.P.H. (RMAN de facto project manager) caved into the pressure 
made by K.G. (RMAN official project manager) to adopt in the RMAN project a 
similar form of control as in the PDY project. The objective of RMAN project was to 
generate an updated 3D model of an old refinery in Manaus (northern state of 
Amazon) based on laser scanning measurements. This project was supposed to take 
3 months but has heading to its seventh month completely out of control with no 
ending perspective13. As we could not involve directly with this task two 
professional have been sent to training. in order to learn the operation of the SIC 
system and try to implement it on RMAN.  
 
As the knowledge embedded in the SIC system were very subtle and flexible (as all 
projects display different features), there was no such thing as an off-the-shelf 
procedure to be taken out and implemented. It was necessary to understand how it 
worked, appropriate what would be similar and adapt the rest. As such both training 
and explanations were based on the very essentials of 3D modeling and project 
control. Emphasis was in capturing the information flow, identify elements to be 
controlled and the key work processes to only them adapted the methodology to the 
new situation. Something that would certainly work immediately but we could assist 
in the development. Few weeks after the training, however, both young professionals 
required their bosses to reassign them to other tasks in other projects. This 
apparently happened due their lack of experience in working with “3D virtual 
environment”, to the critical situation in which the project find itself, and to the 
authoritative character of S.P.H. which did not abide to the idea of controls.  
 
In the 5th March 2010, D.C.C. put forth the idea of disseminating the knowledge and 
the reflections obtained through the development of the project control system across 
the industry division in order to improve the project management prospects of 
CNC/WP. In a e-mail sent to R.F., CNC/WP production manager, and copied to 
S.P.H., D.C.C. makes acknowledgements and suggests the organization of a 
workshop dedicate to spread the knowledge developed:  
 
(CNC) R.F., 
 
As required, follows topic suggestion to be approached in the requested Workshop (Workshop - PDMS 
Management). The material to be used is being prepared (…) 
 
The focal point is the control instrument developed and implemented with recognized success within PDY (SIC – 
Scan & Inserction Control _ technically a control index) This control allows to precisely extract the state of the 
                                                
13
 RMAN Project ended in January 2011, with a 12 month delay. Despite hard negotiations and contract extensions given by 
Petrobras, this project brought a US$ 1,5 million loss to CNC in contract fines and additional unpaid hour, almost the same value 
of the contract. Even though, S.P.H. has been hailed at top ranks as a company innovator due to implementation of laser scanning 
technology. 
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modeling work, in terms of physical progress, beyond helping in the planning work, eliminating subjectivities 
and objectively pointing deviations and helping management decision making. 
 
Important to observe that the success of such work in PDY could only be reached through the dedication and 
effort applied upon this challenge by the engineers, A.R.A and L.M.A. 
 
These two professionals are fully capacitated to disseminate this knowledge through the technical staff, as 
CNC/WP multiplication agents. It is also of fundamental importance has been the sponsorship of the PDY 
management, Eng. K.G., to the development of the system.  (…) 
 
(CNC) D.C.C. 
 
In an e-mail sent two days later (7thMarch 2010) S.P.H. wrote: 
 
Gentlemen, 
 
It´s a reason of proud, not only mine, but from the whole Piping team, have the work of these two young 
engineers recognized. 
 
Once again congratulations, to both of you, and thank you very much. 
(CNC) S.P.H. 
 
By 9th of March 2010, 27 professionals from CNC/WP industry division were invited. 
Among them all discipline and project managers as well as project coordinators and 
key supervisors. The workshop was first dated to 22th of March and then to 5th April 
as the training room was requested by CNC/WP presidency. To our surprise 
however, F.R. required the workshop to be run from 4:00PM to 6:00PM and that one 
hour would be given by the company but the other would have to be compensated 
by each professional by extending in half-hour the exit time for as much as a week. 
During this time the number of people appointed to attend to the workshop grew up 
to 40 to include people of all ranks and we decided to split into two sessions with 
different focus, one on the 05th April and the other on the 12th April.  
 
After all delays and inclusions the first workshop, on the 5th April, who was 
supposed to attract 20 people all project managers, project coordinators and 
discipline manager joined only 6 people (four discipline managers, and two 
coordination assistants). Apparently, R.F., who was supposed to sponsor the 
workshop, was busy with another meeting and did not mind to reinforce it to the 
attendance. Even tough, the presentation approached the fundamental concepts of 
project management used in approaching the PDY problem and to the development 
and consolidation of the SIC. In addition we proposed to extend the use of the SIC 
system towards the traditional problem of interdisciplinary interdependence. 
 
Despite the strong argument that if the system had worked to coordinate the work 
between different disciplines across two different offices it could provide a much 
greater help to improve the local interdisciplinary workflow, discipline managers as 
a whole displayed little interest and received the idea with skepticism. They looked 
more concerned over practical problems like the lack of qualified personnel and who 
would pay for that implementation if they did not had hours enough even for the 
project work.  
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Particularly notable has been the oppositional stance of S.P.H., the piping manager, 
whose discipline traditionally had responsibility over all “3D virtual environment” 
work within projects ran by CNC. Along the presentation, he nodded negatively 
many times and seemed uneasy in his chair to show discontent and disagreement. 
He also argued that the system was no novelty since in other projects it was usual to 
measure the “3D virtual environment” to receive payments from Petrobras. Though 
we agreed that the very origin of the SIC was the “3D virtual environment” 
measurement practiced by Petrobras we explained it was a further development out 
of that and had a much important role in project management as we conceived. The 
concepts competition established helped to lift the complexity of the issue (which 
were not usual to the other participants) and further weaken the overall knowledge 
impact of the presentation. 
 
During the second presentation, on the 12th April, dedicated to supervisors and 
higher technical staff, attendance was even lower. Only 5 people appeared and 
among them there were no key personnel. This time, in the presentation, we clearly 
differentiated model measurement from the SIC system to avoid further 
misunderstandings. The initiative was then abandoned by D.C.C., which could not 
hide his disappointment with the people lack of interest. 
 
By 23rd March 2010, WP personnel in São Paulo begin their return to Houston. This 
same day, G.A. looked for me almost by the end of the day and said he almost did 
not have words to thank for such a warming and friendly stay, and added that I have 
been his first friend in Brazil and invited me to stay with his family anytime I went to 
Houston. The next day, R.F. to whom I had very few contact, also came and 
personally thank for the good time he spent in Brazil and said he enjoyed very much 
to work with all of us, and expected to come back someday for more.  This feeling 
was been extended to several other Brazilian project colleagues. E.R.K. and S.J.L. also 
went across the floor thanking those people who had been more close to them.  
 
Few weeks later, by 13th April 2010, WP-Houston personnel begin to be 
decommissioned from PDY towards other projects in other locations, as we can see 
in the e-mail below:. 
 
(WP) L.H. – Understand your still in Houston and haven’t left yet for the big sand box in Iraq. Safe travels & 
good luck Pal.  
  
(WP) K.H.D. - Please let us know if there is anything additional needed from A.R.A. and team down here and if 
not, please forecast a completion date for the below listed activities. 
  
Thanks, 
(WP) L.S.J 
 
I was particularly impressed by how good relationships with WP-Houston 
developed around the PDY project.  The initial north-American distrust and the 
Brazilian oppositional stance progressively turned into a quite collaborative 
relationship. This two opposing forces neutralized each other when a stage of closer 
collaboration work began. The same way north-American distrust was met with 
energy and confidence on the Brazilian side, their pragmatic approach to the 
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problems, opened room for new ideas and firm commitment to agreed solutions no 
matter where they came from, what helped in the assimilation of Brazilian-led 
initiatives.  This cordial and open aura grabbed even those team members which 
have never met, as shows de e-mail below: 
 
13/04/2010 
 
(CNC) L.M.A, 
  
Please it is no bother.  Please contact me anytime you have any questions or needs. 
  
(WP) K.D.H. 
 
 
(WP) K.D.H. 
  
We are working on the 6310/6312 right now and I believe for these areas the scope is quite clear. I´ve instructed 
guys here that whenever the find object that are CNC but are eventually marked as WP to inform A.R.A. that 
will collect this information and send you at completion of these units to eliminate duplications, OK?! 
  
We are running at 85% of our modeling work so we will make an extra effort to keep things as straightforward 
as possible and not bother you much until 10/May. 
  
(CNC) L.M.A. 
 
Also remarkable was that north-American managers did not missed a opportunity to 
congratulate over a good job and were polite enough to bring Brazilians into 
responsibility whenever necessary without damaging the relationship.  
 
(CNC) C.C.  
 
Really important for Jairo and team to stay on track and complete the other quadrants as forecasted. 
  
Thank you, 
  
(WP) L.S.J. 
 
(E-mail 17th December  2009) 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
 
All, 
  
Just FYI. All revised documents related to Auxiliary Units and Substations have been reviewed and approved 
by Petrobras (30/3) and will be issued into SIGEM by close of business today (1/4).  
  
C.C. and team – Job well done, many thanks. 
  
Regards, 
   
(WP) L.S.J. 
 
 
 Very good! 
  
Thanks to everyone. 
  
(WP) L.H.E. 
Project Director 
 
(E-mail 1st April, 2010) 
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Parallel to those events, technical people lay-offs and mass departure continued as 
well as high level management hires. Two new superintends were hired (Sales and 
Finance) as well as the two employees in charge of human resources and technology 
information who previously just channeled CNC administrative problems to CCC 
resolution, were suddenly promoted to the status of managers and awarded with a 
considerable staff. The transition site has been launched bringing information about 
the changes underway, however, towards the middle and lower ranks nothing 
changed apart to the impression that CNC/WP administrative staff of the company 
benefited from the transition far more than technical one. More and more CNC/WP 
looked like a traditional company and not like the flat and technically advanced 
company it used to be. My personal impression at the time was that the good parts of 
CCC have left while bad ones remained and took over. 
 
As the project approached its end, final adjustments had to be done in the SIC system 
to match all elements to its respective engineering documents and close out the job at 
100%. Currently at 97%, the persistence of D.C.C. in enforcing some minor controls 
he created unilaterally, made it difficult to achieve 100% without direct participation 
of the supervisors what would hardly be achieved as they had already left the 
project. When D.C.C. realized his controls had been eliminated he became furious 
and shouted “when you be in the coordination chair you can do what you want but now it´s 
like this and it´s enough!” (Field Diary notes, 24th May 2010). We were surprised by his 
intransigence and mesmerized by his attitude, which did not fit into his behavior 
along the whole project. He urged A.R.A. to return it to the previous state and I was 
sidelined from further SIC discussions. It came to my mind how easy it was at that 
point to shout and impose ideas. How easy it was to be intransigent with problems 
97% solved.  
In 28th of May, all Civil modeling work has been completed and our participation in 
the PDY project has reached an end.  
 
Gentlemen, 
 
I inform that we finished we successfully finished in the programmed date the modeling Civil works of PDY. 
 
To all in the team ( quote the names) I thank the excellent job done. 
 
Thank you all. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A. 
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Fig. 49: 3D information turnover progress graphics as per 28th May 2010 
 
In response K.G. sent the following e-mail to all PDMS team members with copy to 
all superiors involved: 
 
Thank you all for the effort, and congratulations for the excellent work done. 
 
(CNC) K.G. 
 
In 20th may 2010, K.G. assumed his new assignment as head of the new Petrobras 
PRM Refinery proposal, again in a joint work with WP-Houston. He immediately 
required S.P.H. that I continued to work with him and assume the Piping and 3D 
design supervision of the proposal what was accepted. A.R.A went to RMAN project 
and D.C.C. also was also appointed as one of the coordinator in the proposal. With 
K.G. facing wealth problems and increasingly distanced from the proposal, 
communications abruptly broke up and the task force was dismissed. Due to my 
knowledge in another 3D design system (PDS) I was required to join the UNA3 
proposal by another project manager, T.D. 
 
Two months later, during a routine examination, K.G. discovered he had lung cancer 
in advanced stage. He died 3 weeks later, in 2nd August 2010. With few supporters in 
the company and anticipating a lay-off, D.C.C. decided to leave for a competitor a 
few weeks later.  
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7.1- PROJECT OBJECT 
 
UNA3 is planned to be the third nuclear power plant built by Eletrobras 
Eletronuclear in the Almirante Alvaro Alberto nuclear complex (CNAAA), located in 
Itaorna beach, municipality of Angra dos Reis (Rio de Janeiro state, Brazil). When 
ready, UNA3 will generate 1,405 Mw and together with its two older sisters (UNA1 
and UNA2) will be responsible for most of the electricity available in the Rio de 
Janeiro state, the second most populous in Brazil.  
 
The entrepreneurship also represents the full return of the Brazilian Nuclear Plan 
(PNB), which involves the construction of a nuclear submarine (together with 
France), the completion of a full capable uranium enrichment unit and the 
consolidation of a nuclear supply chain initiated with the creation of Nuclep, a heavy 
metal industry responsible for a considerable part of the equipment necessary for the 
construction of the nuclear equipment. UNA3 investment is estimated at US$ 6,0 
billion with almost US$ 750 million already spent with earthwork preparations and 
equipment purchases prior to the project interruption in 1986.  
 
 
Fig.50: UNA3 location (Source: Google Maps). 
 
In early 80´s, Eletrobras Eletronuclear divided UNA3 project into several bid 
packages to be publicly auctioned. In 1981, Andrade Gutierrez (a giant Brazilian 
construction conglomerate) was awarded the first block, a US$ 780 million contract 
for civil construction. Works began on 1984, with foundation and drainage services 
which were interrupted two years later due to lack of public resources resulting from 
internal economic crisis, to doubts concerning the Brazilian energetic matrix and to 
the public concern resulting from the Chernobyl accident in April 1986. 
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Fig.51: UNA3 initial earthworks as per April 1986 (Source: www.eletronuclear.gov.br) 
 
Several UNA3 equipments and materials have also been purchased from 
Siemens/KWU (now Areva), which was awarded with a EUR 770 million (US$ 1.08 
billion) contract to supply basic engineering, heavy equipment, control systems and 
specialized services. Other local heavy industry suppliers like Nuclep, Bardella and 
Confab also were awarded contracts for specific equipments. With the interruption 
of the project, imported equipments were stored facilities close to the construction 
site and kept under careful conservation at a cost of estimated in US$20million a 
year.  
 
 
Fig.52: UNA3  imported equipment storage and conservation (Source: www.eletronuclear.gov.br). 
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Fig.53: UNA3  important material and equipment storage and conservation (Source: www.eletronuclear.gov.br). 
 
During 1998 to 2001, Eletrobras Eletronuclear did an intense lobby effort for the 
continuation of the UNA3 program, conducting several feasibility studies together 
with national and international entities. Parallel, it did a great effort to address all 
environmental and safety concerns involving the project. In July 2003, project debates 
restarted involving commissions of four Ministries (Mines & Energy, Planning, 
Science & Technology, and Environment). In 2005, a new environmental impact 
study has been submitted to IBAMA (Brazilian environmental protection agency) for 
preliminary approval.  
 
In the late 2007, the intensification of economic growth in Brazil sparked fears of an 
imminent energetic disruption. With environmental licenses for hydroelectric plants 
increasingly difficult to obtain under new stricter environmental rules, projects with 
undergoing licensing processes were quickly brought back on table. Soaring energy 
prices, European (mainly France and Germany) interest in further providing 
technology and financing to the project and a nationalistic development push from 
the incumbent federal government converged into positive reevaluation of UNA3 
and helped to accelerate its environmental licensing process. 
 
In July 2008, a preliminary authorization for the plant construction has been issued 
and in March 2009, after an extensive renegotiation with Andrade Gutierrez, civil 
works were resumed. Early earthworks were adapted to the new environmental 
requirements and completed. Parallel, several awarded contracts were renegotiated 
among equipment and civil engineering suppliers. With the Brazilian economy 
weathering the economic turmoil of late 2008, and foreign companies increasingly 
eager to recover lost orders in the developed economies, the project plans were kept 
at full pace. In early 2010, a final construction license has been issued while Andrade 
Gutierrez had further advanced in the delicate foundation works for the plant core.  
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Fig.54: UNA3 foundation works as per July 2010 (Source: www.eletronuclear.gov.br). 
 
In mid-2010, the international bidding processes for the rest of the project packages 
were also resumed. Among the large scale services to be auctioned were engineering 
(US$370million), electromechanical assembly (US$617million), and additional 
equipment purchases (US$1.78billion). Engineering services were split in four bid 
packages: reactor (nuclear package), generator (non-nuclear package), utilities and 
off-sites. Worth US$150million and requiring approximately 350.000 man-hours of 
engineering work, along estimated 6 years, taken its size only, the nuclear package 
was by far the most tempting one. Other project characteristics, however, made it 
even more interesting as engineering business opportunity: the bid format and the 
future business prospects. 
 
First, alleging task complexity, Eletrobras Eletronuclear devised a bidding process 
with both price and technical criteria, limiting bidders to only those wealthy enough 
and with prior nuclear experience. However, UNA3 has been planned as a copy of 
UNA2 with only minor modifications to attend recent IAEA (International Atomic 
Energy Agency) requirements, what provided a considerable reduction in the risk 
and complexity involved in the project, thus embedding a premium in the contract.  
Not to mention that the technical criteria may as well accommodate a considerable 
level of subjectivity. Second, through Federal government sponsorship, Eletrobras 
Eletronuclear has plans of building 5 more nuclear power plants until 2025, all using 
the same technology of UNA2 and UNA3, increasing chances of further contracts 
and additional gains based on asset mass efficiencies.  
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7.2- PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS 
 
7.2.1- The Client: Eletrobras Eletronuclear 
 
The creation of Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras (Eletrobras) was proposed in 1954 by 
President Getúlio Vargas. The Bill faced opposition and was only passed after seven 
years in the National Congress. The company officially started on June 11, 1962, with 
the role of fostering studies, construction projects and operation of generating plants, 
transmission lines and substations designed to provide electric power to the country. 
The company decisively contributed to the expansion of electric power offer and 
development of the country. Institutional reforms and privatizations in the 90’s 
caused the company to lose some of its functions and to have its profile changed. In 
this period, the company also started to operate, by legal and transitory order, in the 
distribution of electric power, through companies in some states. In 2004, new 
regulation of the sector excluded Eletrobras from the National Privatization Program 
(PND). 
 
Nowadays, Eletrobras is a mixed economy and open capital stock corporation, with 
shares traded at São Paulo, Madrid and New York Stock Exchange. The Brazilian 
federal government is the controlling stockholder with 53,3% of voting stock, 
however only a 16% of non-voting stocking. Eletrobras has installed capacity to 
produce 39,453 MW, including 50% of the power of Itaipu plant belonging to Brazil, 
and has approximately 60,000 kilometers of transmission lines. It is also responsible 
for 37% of Brazil’s total generation capacity, owing 29 hydroelectric plants, 15 
thermoelectric plants and 2 thermonuclear plants (UNA1 and UNA2). Eletrobras 
controls six subsidiary companies, six distribution companies, the Electric Power 
Research Center (Eletrobras Cepel), Eletrobras Participações S.A. (Eletrobras 
Eletropar), 50% stake in Itaipu Binacional and many other minority participations in 
private electric generation and distribution companies. In 2010, the holding revenues 
reached US$ 17.1 billion and profits US$ 1.35 billion. 
 
 
Fig.55: Eletrobras Holding structure (Source: www.eletronuclear.gov.br). 
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Eletrobras Eletronuclear is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Eletrobras Holding 
established in 1997 with the purpose of operating and building thermal nuclear 
power plants in Brazil. Eletrobras Eletronuclear originated from the merger of the  
two state-owned companies: the nuclear division of Furnas Centrais Eletricas S/A, 
responsible for UNA1 operation and for the construction of UNA2, with Nuclen – 
Nuclebras Engenharia S/A, the engineering company responsible for the technology 
employed in UNA2. The result was a vertical company capable of designing, 
constructing and operating nuclear power plants.  
 
The history of Eletrobras Eletronuclear, however, is better understood through the 
developments of the Brazilian nuclear program (PNB), described by Kuramoto & 
Appoloni (2002). The program dates back to the 1930s, when scientists began 
researching nuclear fission, however, only after 1945 nuclear energy became a 
recurrent issue in Brazilian affairs. After World War II, North Americans were the 
only ones to hold the nuclear technology and by law were prohibited to exchange 
nuclear information with the rest of the world. At the same time U.S. needed access 
to radioactive material, which were abundant in Brazil, and, in 1946, an export 
agreement of radioactive material was established between the two countries.  
 
The strategic importance of the nuclear energy was quickly understood by the 
military, who found in the Admiral Alvaro Alberto da Mota e Silva, a key 
interlocutor. In 1951, under his guidance, the nuclear research program was 
incorporated into the creation of the Research National Council (CNPq). He also 
tried to move ahead with a programme in which U.S. would compensate Brazil for 
radioactive material exports with technology transfer unsuccessfully. In 1953, the 
same Admiral Alvaro Alberto close a secret deal with Germany to purchase 
equipment necessary to developed uranium enrichment process, however, 
information leaks and the U.S. blocks the operation.  In 1955, faced with the decision 
to exchange radioactive material with the U.S. for wheat, the Admiral resigns from 
CNPq. 
 
In 1956, during the nationalist government of Juscelino Kubitschek, the debates 
about radioactive material exports start over again. He creates the National Council 
of Nuclear Energy (CNEN), agency linked to the Ministry of Sciences and 
Technology, to be responsible for planning and controlling nuclear activities in the 
country. In 1959, the first movements towards the construction of a nuclear reactor 
began restricted however by the availability of enriched material from which the 
country was dependent on the U.S. 
 
In 1964, the military took the power and so the nuclear agenda. Four year later, 
CNEN signed a agreement with Furnas (a Eletrobras subsidiary) which became 
responsible for the construction of the first nuclear power plant (UNA1). In 1965, 
Brazil signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. guaranteeing it a power 
plant. Putting aside nationalist plans, in 1971, the first nuclear reactor (PWR – 
Pressurized Water Reactor) was purchased from Westinghouse (U.S.) to use with 
imported enriched uranium. The contract, however, did not include any technology 
transfer. Construction began in 1972, but only in 1984 the plant started to operate 
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commercially. UNA1 construction and operation has been marked by a long 
trajectory of incidents and project mistakes. Several key imported equipments 
required to be changed and redesigned locally to overcome operational limitations. 
In 1974, the lack of support in the plant commissioning and the embargo of enriched 
uranium exports broke up nuclear cooperation with the U.S. It also resulted in a 
complete revision of the nuclear program towards a more nationalistic stance, with 
the objective of internally develop the complete nuclear power generation cycle.  
 
In 1975, still under the military, a new nuclear agreement was signed with Germany. 
On the one side, there was the state-owned engineering company, Nuclebras, on the 
other, the German private company SIEMENS\KWU. The agreement included 
supply of equipments and technology to design, build and operate eight new nuclear 
power plants, two of them (UNA2 and UNA3) immediately. The agreement also 
included the transfer of the outdated jet-nozzle uranium enrichment technology in 
place of the more modern ultracentrifuge process. In exchange, Germany would 
have access to Brazilian uranium and open a captive market for its nuclear industry, 
which faced increasing scrutiny at home. Brazilian government was required to sign 
an agreement with IAEA to not use any this technology to build weapons.  
 
The first power plant built under the Brazilian-German agreement was UNA2. Its 
civil works began on 1976, while construction itself started only in 1981. In 1983, due 
to intense economic crisis, its pace of construction has been delayed until total 
interruption. In 1991, government decided to resume construction but only in 1996 
the electromechanical assembly began. UNA2 was finished only in 2000 (24 years 
after beginning) and became commercially operational in 2001. The nuclear fuel to be 
used in the two power plants would be enriched at certain level in the Nuclebras 
installations to a certain level and then sent to Germany or Canada for final 
enrichment.  
 
In the late 1970s, with the jet nozzle nuclear enrichment program leading to 
frustrating results, Brazilian President Figueiredo (the last military one) approved a 
clandestine parallel nuclear program. Several research facilities were built to pursuit 
different technologies until the Navy, in 1987, reached the level of uranium 
enrichment necessary for power generation using a nationally developed technology 
based on allegedly smuggled German ultracentrifuges. After that, the Brazilian 
nuclear program underwent increased transparency as a direct result of the 
redemocratization process. During the 90´s, the program stalled on the lack of 
financing, and only in 2007, under the presidency of Luis Inácio Lula, received 
substantial financing for conclusion. Nowadays the Navy program has split into a 
civil commercial enrichment plant in Resende (for local power plant supply and 
future exports) and a technological complex in Aramar to build a nuclear reactor for 
submarine propulsion. 
 
Parallel to the development of the nuclear fuel problematic, Eletrobras Eletronuclear 
personnel struggled to improve the problematic operational performance of UNA 1 
and set UNA2 into operation in an environment marked by lack of resources and 
hostility to the nuclear power generation and all that remembered the military 
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government.  Nevertheless, the relative insulation and lack of resources helped to 
create a genuine national nuclear power capability at least concerning the PWR 
technology. After several improvements UNA2 capacity was extended in 10% and in 
2008, UNA 2 was considered by WANO (World Association of Nuclear Operators) 
one of the ten most efficient power plants in the world.  
 
Since UNA2 conclusion, in 2001, Eletrobras Eletronuclear dedicated its efforts to 
consolidate a favorable stance towards the construction of UNA3, what involved: 
 
- Nuclear licensing; 
- Environmental licensing; 
- Feasibility studies; 
- Renegotiation of prior contracts; 
- Construction planning updates; 
- Construction field preparation; 
- Reference documentation updated; 
- Definition of contractual marks; 
- Control System specifications; 
- Mechanical specifications; 
- Electrical specifications; 
- Software customization 
(General Report 2007 excerpt – Author Translation. Source: Eletrobras Eletronuclear) 
 
With a methodology of continuous improvement in mind and an increasingly 
confident staff it was a matter of time for the Eletrobras Eletronuclear to resume 
UNA3 project. 
 
7.2.2- International Partner I: WP-Reading (U.S.) 
 
Nuclear power in the United States is provided by 104 commercial reactors licensed 
to operate at 65 nuclear power plants, producing a total of 806.2 GWh of electricity, 
19.6% of the nation's total electric energy generation in 2008.   
 
The first nuclear power plant in U.S. started to operate in 1958, in Shippingport, 
Pennsylvania. Along two decades, from 1960 to 1970, construction boomed to make 
nuclear energy America's second largest source of energy, only exceeded by coal. 
However, concerns over its risks and the environmental damage caused by 
radioactive waste have led to a complete halt in its expansion.  After the incident in 
Three Mile Island in 1978, no new nuclear power plants have been built in the U.S., 
and a considerable number have been decommissioned well before their design 
lifetime.  
 
The decline of nuclear power in the U.S. let many specialized engineering companies 
adrift, competing for the remaining improvement and maintenance services with 
large corporations, like General Electric (BWR) and Westinghouse (PWR), which 
supplied key equipments and thus exerted firm controlled over the technical 
packages, restricting even more their working field. As such, these companies ended 
incorporated by other multidisciplinary engineering firms. It is against this 
background that the WP-Reading office has emerged. 
 
 232 
 
The origins of WP-Reading office, dates back to 1906, when the engineering firm W.S. 
Barstow and Co. opens in New York. It is the in-house engineering arm for a group 
of power companies in the young electric-utility industry under the ownership of 
General Gas and Electric Co. William S. Barstow was an associate of Thomas Edison, 
and a pioneer in the history of electrical engineering. Barstow supervised the 
construction and operation of some of the first U.S. electrical power plants. 
 
In 1917, Barstow opens an office in Reading starting with 20 employees to provide 
service to local power utilities. In 1933, following the retirement of Barstow, the 
firm’s name is changed to E.M. Gilbert Engineering Corp. in honor of Ernest M. 
Gilbert, president and chief engineer. Gilbert established itself as the engineer of 
choice for the scores of companies and their successors that it had served under 
General Gas and Associated Gas. From 1940s into the 1970s, well before global 
economy became a buzzword, Gilbert’s work was in demand on an international 
scale. Its divisions included utilities, environmental, industrial, construction services, 
operations, management consulting, quality assurance and computer applications. 
 
In 1973, Gilbert acquires Commonwealth Associates to become the 
Gilbert/Commonwealt Associates employing more than 2000 people. In 1979, the 
accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear generating plant occurs. Gilbert had 
designed the Unit One reactor, the part not affected by the accident. Even though, the 
firm’s profits plunge to US$2.7 million from US$9.0 million in the previous year. A 
subsequent increase in compliance-related work initially increases work for the 
company, roughly 60 percent of whose revenues were tied to nuclear-related plants, 
but ultimately has a negative effect as the nuclear-power industry declines in the 
United States. The firm’s overreliance on nuclear-related work, a sector that had 
resulted in the tremendous expansion of its work force, left it ill-equipped to deal 
with the sudden decline in nuclear-plant construction in the United States and 
elsewhere. 
 
In 1980, Gilbert attempts to diversify by buying non-engineering companies and 
venture itself into telecommunication business. The diversification however, fails 
and in 1995, Gilbert/Commonwealth Associates is sold to WP to form the WP-
Reading office, nowadays considered excellence center of WP in nuclear energy. 
 
7.2.3- International Partner II: WP-Sofia (Bulgaria) 
 
In 1994, WP first venture in Bulgaria was made through its Reading (U.S.) office, 
which used an international team to carry on improvement studies for the Kozloduy 
nuclear plant. In 1998, WP established a permanent office in the country (WP-Sofia) 
to support the modernization process of the same plant, an investment worth US$ 
713million (EUR 492million). Starting from 2001, WP-Sofia conducted several 
modernization studies under EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community) 
requirement. In 2003 it was also hired to carry on feasibility and environmental 
studies for the new Belene nuclear power plant, and in 2005 it was selected for its 
complete design and construction a 9 year long contract worth EUR 3.9 billion. In 
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2006, WP-Sofia has been awarded a contract for a feasibility study for the expansion 
of Mochove nuclear plant in Slovakia. 
 
The office that had initially opened to attend a single contract and employed only 40 
people (mostly foreigners) grew up to 200 permanent people in 2010. Although was 
conceived as operational platform of WP-Reading, WP-Sofia evolved into an 
independent multi-task unit, and nowadays is considered a key resource provider 
inside the WP group for nuclear power projects. The experience acquired with WP-
Reading professionals allowed WP-Sofia to expand its engineering business over the 
Eastern Europe what resulted in several contracts and even a branch of its own in 
Bratislava (Slovakia).  
 
WP-Sofia took advantage of the Bulgarian government limitation of a maximum of 
10% of foreign employees to quickly build up its management and technical 
capabilities by hiring and training a considerable set of young engineer that today 
make up for 50% of its workforce. The relationship with WP-Reading is still alive and 
nowadays both offices are developing a joint project for SIEMENS in Belgium for a 
last generation combined cycle thermoelectric plant. In this opportunity several WP-
Sofia technical staff went to the U.S. for six weeks of training in the most advanced 
project technology and currently many other visit the Reading office to follow the 
management meetings and decision processes that affect the remote work executed 
in Bulgaria. This new capability under development is expected to yield further 
businesses opportunities for the WP-Sofia in the coming years.. 
 
7.3- CASE CONTEXT 
 
7.3.1- CNC/WP Debut 
 
The period between PDY and UNA3 was a turbulent one for CNC/WP as the 
company struggled to fit into the new corporate structure.  Management decoupling 
from daily activities reflected in the outcomes of events like the PRM bid and RMAN 
contract extension. CNC/WP debut as an effective WP entity happened in 26th of 
May 2010, by virtue of a Petrobras international bidding process requiring basic 
engineering and FEED services for two identical new oil refineries to be constructed 
in the northern Brazilian states of Maranhão and Ceará (PRM1 and PRM2). 
 
Petrobras invited for the bidding process three international oil refining technology 
providers: UOP (U.S.), Chevron (U.S.) and Axens (France). As the bid required also 
basic engineering and FEED services, and none of them could provide the entire 
service package, consortia have been built around these three competitors. Under an 
international agreement, UOP invited WP-Houston to be the bid integrator and take 
part of the engineering service. WP-Houston following the partnership established 
during the PDY project, took CNC/WP as its local partner. Engineering estimation 
work has been divided like in the PDY project, WP-Houston with basic engineering 
and CNC/WP with FEED detailing. The UOP consortium also involved other 
international companies and their respective local partners in total of nine 
companies. 
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Fig.56: UOP consortium arrangement (Source: WP presentation) 
 
Although CNC/WP team was composed by the same professionals that participated 
in the PDY project, the WP-Houston team was, with few exceptions, completely 
different. Initial contacts were marked by a competitive, almost hostile, stance on the 
part of WP-Houston technical staff, materialized in the watermark of WP-Houston 
kick-off presentation saying: “when the experience counts”. This was particularly 
problematic in this case because, due to budget limitations, there were few project 
management hours available, and thus, communication and arbitrations heavily 
relied on a peer-to-peer, less controllable basis.   
 
Instead of providing the necessary information downstream for CNC/WP estimation, 
WP-Houston adopted a reactive stance in the information flow, well exemplified by 
the expression “What do you want?” used by the WP-Houston Civil leader to open the 
kick-off discussions. This lack of commitment to anticipated CNC/WP information 
needs resulted in fragmented, truncated and missing information what jeopardized 
CNC/WP estimation work. 
 
Moreover, the FEED estimation in charge of CNC/WP depended on a considerable 
larger amount of definitions compared to the basic engineering estimation, up to 
WP-Houston. Most definitions were supposed to come from WP-Houston, which 
would hardly be able (or put an effort) to precise at that conceptual stage. In the 
absence of clear definitions coming from WP-Houston and UOP, instructions were to 
premise based on PDY. The fact that CNC/WP knew Petrobras far better than 
incumbent WP-Houston personnel translated into quite a different hours estimate 
than expected as it included several provisions. In a demonstration of distrust, WP-
Houston technical staff took time to replicate CNC/WP estimation and arrived at less 
than half of expected hours. 
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Fig.57: Hours per PRM1 unit estimated by CNC/WP (CNC) and WP-Houston (WP). 
 
The divergence in the estimates exacerbated WP-Houston competitiveness, which 
turn into lecturing the Brazilian team in a harsh tone like shown in the e-mail next: 
 
 
 
(CNC) X.A.C.                   
  
Per our conference discussion this morning am responding to the greenbelt and urbanization issues.  Must state 
again that we only want to give Petrobras what they ask for and no more.  We have to win first. This is a 
competitive bid and we can always request change orders when they ask for more.   
  
Item 2.1.6 – Preliminary drawings for roads, paving, and urbanized areas.  The main focus here is 
preliminary.  You must define and show enough that a quantitative estimate can be done, but no great detail or 
small scale drawings.  Simple and preliminary.  Must also define as such. 
  
2.1.22 – Description and Pre-specification of the Greenbelt – Need a general written description of the greenbelt 
design, philosophy and function, including use of native plants, no irrigation, and bio-swales to collect and detain 
water.  Again note that it is a pre-specification. 
  
2.1.23 – Preliminary drawings for Greenbelt-Distribution – Again it is preliminary.  No small scale drawings, 
only large scale preliminary drawings. 
  
2.1.24 - List of Quantities of Elements for Greenbelt – Only need a list with quantities/number of, or square 
meters of, planting materials.  General and simple with native plants. 
  
Did I mention preliminary, simple, no small scale, and to define what you are producing?  Did you understand to 
clearly state what you are providing, which is not more than Petrobras is asking, and keep it short?  Did I make it 
clear?   Was I ambiguous?   Was it kind of fuzzy?  Am I not making sense?  Clarify, win, change? 
  
We call this the KISS method.  Keep It Simple Stupid. 
  
Thank you. 
H.R.T.  
Principal Architect  
WP-Houston 
 
(E-mail sent on, 24th June 2010, copied to WP-Houston discipline leader and project management  – Exact 
transcription, sender highlights) 
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Project management on both sides had to intervene to control the situation and peer-
to-peer communications were partially interrupted. CNC/WP was required to re-
elaborate the estimations without allowing for provisions. As resulting numbers 
were still not satisfactory from WP-Houston point of view, project division was 
further modified to include new participants at expense of CNC/WP participation.  
Some important units under CNC/WP scope where claimed back by WP-Houston, 
while other were redirect to other sister offices like WP-Monrovia (California).  In a 
critical moment of proposal consolidation, WP-Houston urged CNC/WP to give up 
on 30% of its remaining scope to open room for the participation of WP-Beijing 
(China).  
 
In 5th of October, UOP was the selected as PRM technology provider in a contract 
estimated in more than US$100million. UOP, however, turned its back to WP and 
decided to sub-contract GENPRO (an emerging local engineering company owned 
by the giant construction conglomerate Odebrecht) to assume the FEED package.  
 
7.3.2- “Global Price Contracting” Current State of Knowledge. 
 
Brazilian law (8.666/93) require that state-controlled enterprises shall contract 
engineering & construction (E&C) services beyond R$ 1.5million (US$1million) 
through a public bidding processes called “competition” (art.23-1:c). The competition 
is used for large-scale contracts and it runs largely in public in order to ensure the 
participation of all interested entities. It does not require previous registration of the 
proponents with the bidder, provided they accomplish with the requirements made 
explicit through the “bidding instructions” document. 
 
 
Fig.58: Bidding Instructions Document (Source: Eletrobras Eletronuclear). 
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The general judgment criterion for competitions is smaller global price. Under the 
specific conditions and requirement provided by the “bidding instructions” and 
through the examination of the technical documentation made available, competitors 
define a global price for the whole undertaking, and submit it to the contractor 
evaluation in a public session on due date. Among qualified offers, the cheapest one 
is declared winner and the others are made publicly.  
 
In special cases and when justified, bidding process may involve judgment criteria 
different from smaller global price. Best technique is used for predominantly intellectual 
services such as calculations and preliminary technical studies. Technique & price is a 
combination of the last and take as judgment criterion a weighted relation between 
points obtained in both price and technical proposals, and under law 8666/93 is the 
obligatory criteria for the selection of IT services in state-controlled companies. 
 
Although not directly restrictive to the participation of foreign companies, the law 
8666/93 in its art. 42 require that, to allow foreign participation, bidding instructions 
shall comply with the directives of the  “monetary authority, foreign commerce, 
competent entities” what does not always happens and end up blocking their 
participation if they do not have a official representation in the country. Therefore, 
international bidding processes are those specially designed to attract international 
participants even in the absence of a local representation. Usually, this happens 
when the number of local competitors is considered low in face of the bidding 
requirements. 
 
Nevertheless, law 8666/93 in at least two of its articles displays a developmentalist 
bias that privileges Brazilian interests in detriment of foreign ones. In art. 3 § 2, it 
make provisions that in case of a draw preference should fall over made in Brazil 
(1º), made by a Brazilian company (2º), or made by a company which invest in 
research & development in the country (3º). More important maybe is art. 3 § 5, 
which allow for the requirement of a variable percentage of national content in 
products and services supplied. That means, even though a foreign company win a 
bidding process contract may required it to generate its products and services locally. 
Alternatively, if a local company wins a determined contract it cannot further 
subcontract the services or products in the international markets.  
 
On top of that, a common practice among Brazilian E&C companies make it even 
harder for foreign companies to win a competition. As the great majority of E&C 
competitions in Brazil involve smaller global price criteria and local content 
requirements of 70% on average (the remaining barely covers equipment imports), 
they usually are crowded out by non-traditional local players that drive prices down 
until such impractical level, that international companies unable to relocate the 
service to lower cost locations are forced out of the dispute. Once they win the 
competition with unrealistic prices, these non-traditional players usually run the 
contract until a “point-of-no-return” when, blaming on changing conditions or 
problems in the conceptual project, ask for contract extensions.  
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Another hardships that E&C companies face in doing business in Brazil, and these 
ones not limited to the public sector competitions, is the high level of operational 
flexibility required in the projects and the complex fiscal and labor institutional set. 
The first problem preclude international E&C companies from offering “closed  
packages”, that is, mature projects sold with minor changes to several clients, thus 
enabling the companies to reduce service prices through scale economies. Brazilian 
engineers require so much modifications to allow for a flexible and independent 
operation that “closed packages” end up being “taylor-made projects” with a 
substantial price increase. Second, its is very hard for an international E&C company 
to navigate in the fiscal and labor Brazilian institutional field without the help of a 
local company. The costs that this almost unavoidable partnership incurs usually 
reap a substantial part of its technical comparative advantage in relation to local E&C 
companies.  
 
In the first rumors of UNA3 project reactivation, WP-Reading eagerly asked for a 
meeting with Eletrobras Eletronuclear (granted with CNC/WP help) to present WP 
nuclear expertise and to evaluate business prospects. After that meeting and while 
the bidding conditions were unknown, an initial arrangement was set that WP-
Reading would lead eventual works supported by CNC/WP, which although did not 
have any nuclear engineering experience, was highly regarded in Eletrobras as it had 
designed most of its hydropowers.  
 
However, when bidding instructions were finally disclosed conditions showed up 
more challenging. UNA3 competition has been conceived as an international bidding 
process, under a technique & price criteria and with a minimum national content 
requirement of 80%. The national content requirement represented a blow to WP-
Reading ambitions, however, the technical evaluation criteria relentlessly tied it up to 
the venture. To compensate for the loss of attractiveness of the proposal for WP-
Reading and the lack of nuclear credentials in CNC/WP, WP-Sofia office was brought 
into the task force to help in the proposal design.  
 
Henceforth, although apparently plain and clear, bidding instruction implicitly 
embedded conflicting requirements that jeopardized the way WP traditionally 
handled proposals.  These three offices had to engage into intense negotiations 
among themselves and other corporate entities in order to overcome the limitations 
imposed by the current WP way of doing business towards new standards that 
enabled a viable proposal. 
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Fig. 59: UNA3 schematic bid guidelines 
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7.3.3- Entering the Field 
 
The first contact with the UNA3 problematic happened during a technical visit to 
CNC/WP of a senior WP staff, in March 2010. Followed by C.C., he came to my desk 
so as to verify CNC/WP expertise in working with 3D design. We showed him some 
aspects of the PDY work done using PDMS and also discussed about CNC/WP 
expertise in another 3D plant design system, called PDS14. As he showed interest in 
CNC/WP 3D design capabilities, I recommended them to visit RMAN project to 
check for the use of laser-scanning technology, which was at a quite advanced stage. 
After the brief meeting and without further explanations he handled me a visit card 
where I could read: G.L.G., Vice-President, Director of Nuclear Projects, WP-
Reading. 
 
After a few weeks, S.P.H. asked for a private conversation as described in the field 
notes below: 
 
(…) He asked me it would be technically possible to develop a tool capable of creating PDS 3D 
models directly out of 2D paper drawings. I argued that it would not be possible due to fundamental 
information limitations existing in 2D drawings. He replied that he said that in a meeting and people 
(that I interpreted as being WP-Reading) insisted that indeed there was a tool capable of that. I 
contested saying that indeed, PDS had a tool capable of reading binary data and converted it to 3D 
models, however, no way these binary data could be extracted out of 2D drawings. He said he knew 
that. I continued and said it such tool existed it would be the “philosopher’s stone” of project 
engineering and I would love to see how it worked. He agreed. Them he asked me to keep in 
complete secret and told me that as something about UNA3. I thought there was something about the 
WP-Reading visit I joked and said that the only tool capable of turning 2D drawings into 3D models 
where a huge Chinese team of designers, reading and manually modeling. As we discussed a top  
CNC/WP sales manager passed by and questioned S.P.H. that at that point he could not talk to me 
about the subject and he left. I have the impression that WP-Reading is promising something “magic” 
to Eletrobras Eletronuclear in order to reap the job in the name of CNC/WP and send it to WP-Beijing 
as it is trendy nowadays. (…) (Field Diary, 29th April 2010). 
 
The same day, I and S.P.H. were required to meet T.D., the project manager in charge 
of the issue, to received further information.  
 
(…) T.D. told that UNA3 bid was about to come out and he needed to estimate hours to establish a 
PV (sales price) for such a project. He said he did not have bidding instructions yet, however, he 
would send us a spreadsheet containing a list of services to be done and their quantities for 
estimation. We both argued that it would be difficult to evaluate that without further information 
about the characteristics of the project and the tools to be used. T.D. confirmed the rumors about the 
“magic” tool and said that he had inside information (from Eletrobras Eletronuclear) that it existed 
and we should consider that it worked because it would be supplied by Eletrobras Eletronuclear who 
had developed it. (…)  (Field Diary, 29th April 2010). 
 
In the end of the day, a unidentified spreadsheet was sent us me and S.P.H. and 
planning department personnel.  
 
                                                
14
 PDS is a proprietary system of  the American sotwarehouse INTERGRAPH Corp. (http://www.intergraph.com) 
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Fig. 60: Initial man-hour estimation spreadsheet.  
 
Through the night I worked on a very detailed man-hour estimation taking into 
consideration several premises according to what was said by T.D., and sent it to 
S.P.H. for evaluation. The next day he answered me as follows: 
 
(CNC) L.M.A., 
 
Very good work. Congratulations. 
 
Estimate is a little lower, maybe I won´t do a new one and take advantage of yours with a few corrections. 
When I finish, I´ll send it to T.D. and copy you. 
 
Thanks, 
(CNC) S.P.H. 
 
(E-mail sent on, 01st May 2010 - Author Translation) 
 
While I was wondering based in which assumptions he thought it was “a little lower”, 
he sent another e-mail correcting: 
 
(CNC) L.M.A., 
 
Disconsider the comment “a little lower”, I saw the value (…) and I thought it was for (…) but I think it is 
just for (…), is it?(…) 
 
Thanks, 
(CNC) S.P.H. 
 
(E-mail sent on, 03rd  May 2010 - Author Translation) 
 
The very same day he complemented the spreadsheet and sent it to T.D. copying me. 
Only minor changes were made concerning professional category distribution but 
changes in the overall estimate were almost imperceptibly. No further movement 
happened until 1st June 2011 when bid instructions were finally disclosed by 
Eletrobras Eletronuclear. 
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7.4- THE KNOWLEDGE CHANGE PROCESS 
 
7.4.1- Current Knowledge Resilience 
 
In 7th June 2011, T.D. set up a meeting with R.M.Z. (project coordinator), G.H. 
(electrical discipline manager), A.G.R. (senior planning analyst), S.P.H. and I, to 
resume proposal activities. He required that all participants should read the bidding 
instructions and adjust their estimates as well as bring the doubts to the next 
meeting. All should be done as fast as possible because estimates should be 
submitted to WP for comments. As S.P.H. was already working in other refining 
proposals and UNA3 showed up a very heavy workload (more than 150 pages of 
thoroughly reading) he was forced to step aside and let me ran this estimate review. 
Nevertheless, again, he urged to check the results prior to T.D. release.  
 
The next day, the complete bidding instructions were made available and the 
uncertainty regarding competition rules finally began to fade. In the first step of the 
UNA3 bidding, companies were required to comply with the “eligibility documents” 
which set the level playing field of the competitors. To have their proposals 
considered, proponents should fulfill certain financial and technical conditions. It 
was required to show evidence of net equity position (assets minus liabilities) of at 
least R$15million (US$ 10million) and evidence of holding at least one large scale 
project of at least 250.000 man hours (a full sized refinery). Since there were no such 
large contracts in Brazil for almost 20 years, these two requirements completely ruled 
out the participation of non-traditional local engineering players.  
 
 
 
 
Fig.61: Eligibility requirements (Source: Eletrobras Eletronuclear). 
 
The bidding process divided into “technical bid” and “commercial bid”, with 
considerable higher weight for the technical criteria (75%) over commercial ones 
(25%). 
 
 
Fig.62: Bid weighing (Source: Eletrobras Eletronuclear). 
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Despite the fact that a higher weight of the technical criteria strengthen WP-Reading 
role, a strict national content requirement of 80%, represented a blow to its 
leadership ambitions and placed CNC/WP at the forefront of the proposal.   
 
 
 
Fig.63: Execution requirements (Source: Eletrobras Eletronuclear). 
 
Nevertheless, the criteria set for awarding technical points, relentlessly tied WP-
Reading to the proposal as it put company’s experience and staff experience as the 
most valuable item in the scorecard (fig. 64, in red). WP-Reading walking-out would 
mean the end of the proposal for both offices and an opportunity lost for the whole 
company.  
 
 
Fig.64: Technical Scoring Criteria (Source: Eletrobras Eletronuclear). 
 
This set of rules completely jeopardized the initial structure planned by WP for the 
proposal and eventual venture. The initial plan, which involved WP-Reading 
leadership and CNC/WP support, reverted into CNC/WP leadership and WP-
Reading support. However, due to technical point awarding criteria, it was necessary 
to keep WP-Reading formally as leader of the proposal even though in the future it 
would both have a subdued role and be forced to create a corporate competitor. WP-
Reading reacted stepping aside and tried to enroll only into minor documental 
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support for the proposal. CNC/WP, however, needed more help as a considerable 
number of technical points were to be awarded for technical documents (write-ups) 
describing in details how the proponent would run the undertaking (fig. 64, in 
green), something it thought would heavily rely on WP-Reading. 
 
The thoroughly reading of the bidding instructions helped to further understand the 
scope of the work and demonstrated that most of the project involved redesigning 
UNA2 into “3D virtual environment” and then adapt it to UNA3 requirements. In 
terms of man-hours estimate, it meant that project automation knowledge alone 
would be much more important in price terms than the sum of all other technical 
knowledge. In the UNA 3 competition, project automation comprised 60% of the 
work, against only 25% of piping project, very different from traditional work 
distribution (15% for project automation and 40% for piping project).  
 
Despite of the information supplied by the bidding instructions, a great uncertainty 
still surrounded many tasks, as CNC/WP did not have any nuclear engineering 
experience. Even more problematic, Eletrobras Eletronuclear used proper methods 
and terms which were unknown to even to experienced people enrolled in the 
company. Therefore, the expected costs for each activity helped understand the level 
of complexity of the unknown activities what helped in the inference of what they 
would be and further enhance CNC/WP estimates.  
 
 
 
 
Fig.65: Pricing Criteria (Source: Eletrobras Eletronuclear) 
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In 8th June 2010, T.D. asked for a meeting with CNC/WP top personnel to be involved 
in the proposal to align their activities. Production managers from both industry and 
infrastructure division, HR manager, Planning Manager, IT manager and all 
discipline related managers (Piping, Electrical, Mechanical) were invited to the 
meeting. S.P.H. which was enrolled in a key RMAN activity sent an e-mail on behalf 
of the team as an attempt to change the meeting schedule. He wrote: 
 
Piping personnel will be in COMOS training the whole day until the end of the month. I suggest that all 
meetings will be in the end of the day, beginning at 16:00. 
 
Reagards, 
 
(CNC) S.P.H. 
(E-mail sent on, 08th June 2010 - Author Translation) 
 
T.D. answered two days later as such: 
 
My dear colleagues, 
 
I know that some of the invited have duties scheduled for this afternoon, however I cannot change the agenda 
because of available space and personnel availability.  
 
The objective of the meeting is to clarify doubts concerning the budget estimation and present /discuss the 
structure of how will be estimated the hours, equipments and so on… 
 
I request those invited to the Conduct code presentation this afternoon to get in contact with HR and ask for a 
change to the next session tomorrow morning. 
 
Thanks, 
 
(CNC) T.D. 
 
(E-mail sent on, 10th June 2010 - Author Translation) 
 
People attendance to the meeting was expressive, approximately 20 people, most of 
them difficult to see simultaneously on the same room, what demonstrated the 
appeal of the proposal. Some people have even advanced through e-mail questions 
regarding the proposal. Impressions over the meeting follow in the field notes below: 
 
The room was filled with important people, some difficult to see gathered together. Even S.S.H. 
(industry superintendent) inadvertently showed up at the meeting for a few minutes. His presence 
made people more eager to participate and they fired up several questions and concerns to T.D. T.D., 
however, did not answered any individual question as he did not want to hold people for long. He 
clarified the scope and the importance of the proposal and asked for a quick estimation and 
documental work. He went through the main guidelines to be followed and said individual questions 
should be brought to him and R.M.Z. (an industry coordinator that would be helping in the 
proposal). For the technical documents they would have the help of F.M.C. which worked for the 
infrastructure division and was very used to writing documents for technical proposals. The meeting 
was a short one and I was impressed by the mobilization involved which looked compatible to the 
size and importance of the competition (Field Diary, 9th June  2009). 
 
In the 14th June 2010, I transferred the man-hour estimates to the standard CNC/WP 
sheet (the same previously used by CNC) and sent it to A.G.R. which were in charge 
of consolidating the estimates.  In the 23th June, T.D. sent the consolidated man-hour 
estimate for WP-Sofia for evaluation, which was quickly responded as can be seen 
next: 
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Hi L.S.V. (WP-Sofia) 
  
3D MODELING 
  
My first intension is that these hours are very strickted. For modeling of isometrics they estimate 
1,33MH/Sheet (codes 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2) it seems very short time for this task. So I made a test - I picked up 7 
isometrics (with different complecsity) from T-Power and model them for 1 hour (just pipes, fittings, flanges, 
valves; without supports). In conclusion I would say that if we have a complete isometric which needs only to be 
incorporated into the 3D model, and the complecsity is low then it is doable. I did the same and for supports 
(codes 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2), with the same conclusion. Very important thing is that I used a pipe spec which was 
already done. 
  
The same with rest of the codes: 2.3.1.3, 2.3.1.4, 2.3.1.5, 2.3.1.6, 2.3.2.3, 2.3.2.4, 2.3.2.5, 2.3.2.6, 2.3.2.7, the 
hours look not enough but if everything is done and complete it's another story. 
  
On the other hand all of this hours (143895) are for the next buildings: UJA, UJB, UJE, UJF, UJG, UKA, 
UKH, 1/2UKY and 1/4UQZ and they might be enough. But I need some more time to see what is avilable on a 
previous projects and say it for sure. 
  
PIPING DESIGN 
  
Something strange is that for stress analysis the engineers work is 10%, designers's 50% and the drafters's 
40%. Stress analysis is an engineering work, but maybe they include supports design after the stress analysis is 
completed. Other things should be discussed. 
  
L.S.V. 
Very important thing! Try to take some isometrics and supports drawings, if it is possible off course. WP-Sofia, 
3d model, complecsity of the model, how inteligent is the model, things that can give us a better idea of what 
they have and what they want. 
  
Best regards, 
  
(WP-Sofia) G.G. 
Piping Engineer 
 
(E-mail sent on, 23h June 2010 – Exact transcription) 
 
The speed and the content of the response demonstrated that WP-Sofia personnel 
have only superficially approached the problem without further entering into the 
details of the bidding instructions. WP-Sofia personnel evaluated the estimates made 
by CNC/WP for UNA3 task plainly as a traditional project using traditional tools 
whereas in the bidding instructions it was clearly explained that it would be a “clone 
project” from UNA2 with several minor operational details and using project 
automation tools developed by Eletronuclear specially for this purpose.  
 
On the 24th June 2010, L.S.V., engineering manager from WP-Sofia, and G.J., project 
manager from WP-Reading, arrived at CNC/WP for several meetings. R.M.Z. invited 
us to discuss with them the parameters used in the evaluation on both sides. The 
meeting content can be gauged by the field notes below: 
 
(…) As we arrived at the meeting we have been presented to both L.S.V. and G.J. L.S.V. looked uneasy 
to discuss estimate reviews with two young engineers like me and F.F.M. Right from the start L.S.V. 
argued that his team in WP-Sofia thought that man-hours for the project automation and piping job 
were underestimated and he also thought so. Then we asked him if they had thoroughly read the 
bidding instructions and analyzed the exact scope of work. He argued that they had just received the 
bidding instructions in English and have gone through this generally. Then we told that we were 
confident on our estimates because we realized through the bidding instructions that there would be a 
lot of document repetition in the project as the reactor was composed of 4 redundancies, and the same 
was supposed to apply to pipe supports. Moreover, some documents like piping stress analysis that 
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usually take a lot of time, in the case of UNA3 project, would only have to be some of them re-checked 
against additional minor constrains and re-issued saving a lot of time. L.S.V. said that they were basing 
their observations on their project experience. We argued however that we should take a closer look to 
what bidding instruction said, instead. AS we stood by our estimate, L.S.V. somehow felt intimidated 
and most of the time talked to R.M.Z. and G.J. My impression was that we were talking about different 
things: they about a conventional project and we about the specific UNA3 project. G.J. who remained 
most of the time listening to the conversation, after the meeting handled me a visit card and asked me 
to send my curriculum what I understood as recognition of our upper-hand in the argument. (Field 
Diary, 24th June 2010). 
 
On the 30th June, I asked for a confirmation that we (CNC/WP) would be in charge of 
the “knowledge of the object” document while the “methodology and work plan 
would be in charge of WP, however T.D. did not answer me and only required that I 
should attend the next day to a meeting involving WP and SIG (local representation 
of Intergraph Corp., PDS supplier). The next day, however, I was not called for the 
former meeting, which was wholly conducted by the IT manager.  
 
Also in 1st July 2010, several points were discussed in a CNC/WP meeting involving 
T.D., R.M.Z., F.F.M., F.M.C. disclosing the intrinsic relations and roles expected for 
the team in charge of the UNA 3 proposal, as can be seen in the meeting notes below: 
 
On write-up responsibility: 
 
(CNC) T.D.: (…) So, our scope is practically to design… to model in 3D and make the plants of these piping…. 
all these isometrics… and do the duct part… the ventilation, and electrical trays, that interfere in the space. Is it? 
That is the scope of the service. And we have a proposal that follows the Law 8666, something that there isn´t in 
the industry (CNC/WP industry division)…practically…because the largest client is Petrobras, and Petrobras is 
not government. Despite there is State participation it is not government. So the contracting process of Petrobras 
is different. So they follow certain things but don´t … so what happens, we a proposal … he are going to handle 
three envelopes: one envelope is the eligibility…WP is taking care of this we are helping them…the other envelope 
is technical proposal, the other envelope is commercial. In the technical propose they will assign a score, and there 
is three requirements… three chapter… that is that chapter… “knowledge of the object”, “work methodology” 
and the other “organization”…  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: In truth, there is four... “knowledge of the object”, “methodology and work plan”, 
“organizational structure” and “technology transfer plan”…. 
 
(CNC) T.D.: Yes… so… that´s this one….there are four… So what happens…WP said the following… As we 
dig deep in the bidding instructions to quantify man-hours, to evaluate the scope, they said: “you there  know the 
scope better than us, so do first the draft” …our responsibility is to make the better draft as possible. Is to write 
what we understand to subsidized them. Then, they will come out with further stuff … “technology transfer 
plan” I don´t even want to know. They will have to write, unless we have any contribution to provide. (…) but 
maybe in the methodology part, we can… we must say something on how it´s going to happen this technology 
transfer.  
 
On F.M.C. role: 
 
(CNC) T.D.: Is from Infra (CNC/WP infrastructure division), he is in the house for a long time, so he know ways 
that you don´t know here inside. Even I don´t know…so, maybe he is going to say “There is a proposal that we 
did there in the environment (CNC/WP division), with has a chapter about…” If he did not know right away he 
knows the people who he can ask during a coffee…(…) He know where to copy things from… The important 
today is to bring things… So, maybe there is a chapter about quality written, then we get that and adapt (…) 
 
On WP-Reading role: 
 
(CNC) T.D.: For example, WP suggested us the following. The big manager of the project, or project 
director...whatever…should be CNC/WP. Why? Because this guy is the guy that will directly relate with the 
client and to the future ventures, it is better to have this relationship…Portuguese-Portuguese…Brazil, so… But, 
below this guy, there is what they call “engineering manager”.  This engineering manager, that is the guy that 
will run the engineering, this guy will have to be a nuclear curriculum that big, to say “ they put a heavy weight 
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that know about nuclear”, this guy is WP. And below him, comes the disciplines, so there would be a coordinator 
for each discipline, lets say so… or supervisor…this guy also specific from the discipline that think we have to put 
the curriculum of the guy of WP….these coordinators…but this guy from WP, will not come to stay 7 years in 
Brazil…so this guy has to have a CNC/WP guy together with him, and like this process part of the technology 
transfer, to the point that after one year, this guy can go away and at distance.. or let´s say, come from time to 
time… (…) The technology transfer is not to Eletronuclear is for the Brazilian sub-contractor…(…) The 
expectation is that in the future… no so distant, I expect, there will be more nuclear plant in Brazil (…) and they 
(Eletrobras Eletronuclear) wants to qualify Brazilian companies to make nuclear projects. (…) So, in fact, WP is 
thinking about putting 7 guys in our organizational structure, that are the great guys they have, (…) and attach 
a Brazilian professional to each one of them (…) Particularly because, in reality… in reality, the guy comes here 
and the guy don´t want to know … he explains everything….the experience I have is the following… but he don´t 
want to know that there is “20 drawings to finish tomorrow”… They to bit into this… Production, manage the 
team is not up to them…they want to discuss the technical subjects, orientate how is it done… production end up 
being to us…(…) 
  
On CNC/WP strategy to the write-up´s: 
 
(CNC) T.D.: My strategy is the following one; the more this draft remain in our hands, creates the expectation… 
they would say “You have a long time to do something perfect.” Do you agree? Let´s say we take one month to do 
this drafts…so I prefer… let´s send what we have until next Thursday (11 days)… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: I am going to do a critic right now. You please excuse me, but we did an enormous effort to build 
the man-hours estimates… We did a man-hour evaluation very careful, very complete … the guys came here (G.J. 
and L.S.V) just took a look and said…”I think its low!”… “But did you take this into consideration?”… 
“No.”…”And this?”… “No.”….  ”And this?”… “No.”….  So.. 
 
(CNC) T.D.: Yeah… with these guys we run this risk…  
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: But we a know-how of working with WP. What he wants to say is something different. I don´t 
know… I don’t think these guy will work like WP-Houston in PDY.  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Which guys? 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: L.S.V., G.J. and B.M…. They are different… don´t think they are just like Houston guys …laid 
back… So, what I think T.D. is arguing is that… I think it´s super important… I would go further … my 
opinion is the following… Let´s send it to the guys … because if there is something wrong, he will come up 
“Damn, it´s rubbish! Don´t you know how to do?” … Then we say…“ We know how to do like this. Did you 
like? If not do it yourself!” Then if he says, you are on the way, it´s going fine… then he might help, aggregate… 
 
(CNC) T.D.: It´s missing here, it´s missing there… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: I agree with you... but I got really pissed off to make a proposal (man-hour estimate) and sent to 
the guy validate and the guy did not have any conviction to validate that. 
 
On WP-Sofia role:  
 
(CNC) T.D.: L.M.A, let me explain to you? The L.S.V., that is the manager of the nuclear projects (WP-Sofia), The guy 
has just arrived from his vacations on the 16th…and 17th he was already traveling to Brazil…(…) so, on the other hand, 
for you to see how they are taking it seriously… What did he do? He talked to you. We gave him (the estimates) one 
day… the next day he asked to talk to us, he called the guys there in Bulgaria and said so “Measure the time it takes to 
pass an isometric from 2D to 3D”, ok?!.. and the guys there did 7 to 8 isometrics to measure how much time they 
spent” if that estimate you did was ok, gave him feedback…. So they looking all this… So I think that these guys from 
Bulgaria that inclusive are probably the guys that will work more with us…Because, they are doing plants (nuclear) in 
Egypt, in Jordan… 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: In Jordan and Saudi Arabia… 
 
(CNC) T.D.: Jordan and Saudi Arabia…So, they guys in the U.S…. 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: They haven’t done any nuclear plant for more than 10 years…in the U.S. 
 
(CNC) T.D.: And they are cheaper than the Americans. So, if we’re going to be helped… maybe (…) 
 
(Recorded meeting, 01st  July 2010 - Author Translation) 
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On the 5th July 2010, WP-Sofia made additional comments that although 
acknowledged some points discussed on the 24th of June 2010 with L.S.V. (in green) 
still did not reflect a full understanding of the bidding instructions (in red), as can be 
seen in the e-mail below: 
 
(WP-Sofia) L.S.V. 
 
Few thoughts related to UNA3 bid: 
- the scope of work for UNA3 is “torn out” from regular engineering/design work on a normal project. 
Our work on UNA3 will require a lot of work related to existing/UNA2 piping specs, p&ids, dbm, design basis, 
adjustment of structural supports etc… this extra work most likely is not adequately reflected in our present 
man-hour estimate.  
- for crosschecking purposes standard WP piping man-hour estimates could be used. It could be used to 
check if all types of work or activities have been included. Excel file is attached. Probably similar templates exist 
for HVAC and electrical man-hour estimate.  
- there are existing EMS procedures for Engineering Isometric Procedure EPP-0151 and Stress Isometric 
Procedure EPP-0155. We should check if we can follow these procedures for Angra 3 or we have to 
create alternative approach. (…) 
- at the moment our Brasil office does not have experience in 3D modeling in PDS and SmartPlant. 
SmartPlant is considered future standard platform for WP design. I guess it is better to train people 
for SmartPlant now, rather than train people for PDS now and retrain them for SmartPlant again in 
2-3 years. 
- from the ratio of assumed number of isos (~21000) and pipe supports (~24000) it could turn out that isos are 
very simple comparing to a “regular” iso (…) so that could indicate that isometrics are: either very simple 
comparing to the “regular” one, or that assumed number of isometrics, or more likely supports, is 
incorrect. If possible, we should clarify/further investigate this with Eletrobras.  
(…) 
 Regards, 
(WP-Sofia) S.J. 
(E-mail sent on, 5th July 2010  - Exact Transcription – Author highlights) 
 
 
Fig. 66: Standard WP estimation spreadsheet. 
 
The corporative discipline of WP-Sofia in trying to apply WP corporate estimation 
tools to a completely atypical project like UNA3 was noteworthy. Together with the 
e-mail above they sent a WP standard estimation form so as CNC/WP could apply to 
its estimates as they believed it should be done. However, most of the activities 
needed for the UNA3 project could not find a match to those detailed in there. Even 
worst, the standard WP estimation form did not match with the work breakdown as 
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required in the bidding instructions. Response e-mail has been written to T.D. and 
copied to R.M.Z. to be sent to S.J. and L.S.V. clarifying the items discussed as 
understood by CNC/WP, however, there is no evidence that this has ever been sent 
to WP-Sofia.  
 
In the 5th of July, F.M.C. in reply to the “knowledge of the object” sent in Portuguese 
by F.F.M., and me, the same document “goggle translated” and with a different 
cover page. In terms of content it remained untouched with several items depending 
on HR, planning and project management contributions to be completed. Required 
to help in the making of the “methodology and work plan” document, in 6th July 
2010, L.S.V. sent to T.D. and R.M.Z. procedures posted in the WP EMS (Electronic 
Management System) to which CNC/WP did not have access.  
 
 
Fig. 67: Standard WP Workflow for 3D modeling and Piping Modeling. 
 
 
On the 7th July 2010, L.S.V. suggested several approaches to the “methodology and 
work plan” document, which ranged from a simple replication from what was 
already described in the bidding instructions to adding some information: 
 
 
Gentlemen, 
 
The methodology and work plan part is developed in details in Appendix VI – Technical specification. Items 
B.16.1 and B.16.2 are almost fully presented. What is the best approach: 
- just to confirm that we’ll follow this methodology and add information concerning other items,  
- to rearrange the text given in Appendix VI and add information concerning other items, 
- used 1:1 wording from Appendix VI and add information concerning other items. 
Please check Appendix VI and send me your comments and advices.  
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Regards, 
 
(WP-Sofia) L.S.V 
 
(E-mail sent on, 7h July 2010 – Exact Transcription) 
 
In response to this e-mail we argued: 
 
Guys, 
 
I don´t believe that things are that simple. Annex VI is covered with ambiguities and hides some traps. Moreover, 
activities are only grouped, they don´t comprise a logic chain, and that is what I believe they want to see. 
Whoever reads this (in Eletrobras Eletronuclear) has to be confident that we know what we are dealing with. The 
procedures sent by WP contribute for some topics and relationships, however, it does not fix the problem because 
the bidding instructions are very specific in relation to the steps to be worked through. 
 
We are working in this text and tomorrow we expect to have something minimally detailed to distribute. 
Att. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A. 
(E-mail sent on, 7h July 2010 – Author translation) 
 
This time R.M.Z. answered to our observations and wrote: 
 
Ok, in my opinion you go ahead. You commented well L.S.V. position, I understand your position, go ahead. 
Att, 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z. 
(E-mail sent on, 7h July 2010 – Author translation) 
 
Adding to the uncertainty surrounding the write-up´s elaboration, a fresh debate 
sparked concerning the 3D plant design tool to be used in the project. Despite clear 
indication in the bidding instructions requiring the use of PDS as the main 3D plant 
design system, WP-Reading and WP-Sofia begin to promote the use of another 
software from the same supplier (Intergraph) called, SmartPlant 3D15. The argument 
behind this endorsement was that PDS was on the verge of obsolescence, and 
SmartPlant 3D which represented its natural evolution, should be offered to 
Eletrobras Eletronuclear as plus in the proposal, as a way to indirectly embed 
productive gains on behalf of WP. Such reasoning, however, assumed that Eletrobras 
Eletronuclear was stuck in time with a tool it knew well and was resistant to change 
into another technology it did not knew. 
 
On the 06th July 2010, a conference call was set involving several offices to discuss the 
issue. The difficulties in coordinating and extracting useful contributions from this 
event could be seen in the following dialogue: 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.:Why can´t we change the meeting schedule (9:00Am)? 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: I want but T.D. doesn´t. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Just switch to 10:30AM…Where are the guys? 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: In Bulgaria its 5:00PM. They are leaving office… We cannot anticipated that because in the 
U.S. it´s 5:00AM…Pay attention, it´s 6:00AM in the U.S. and 5:00PM in Bulgaria… 
                                                
15
 SmartPlant 3D is a proprietary system of  the American sotwarehouse INTERGRAPH Corp. (http://www.intergraph.com) 
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(CNC) L.M.A.: I still did not understand... what it has to do with our proposal… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: I don´t know… it has to do with the use of SmartPlant and doubts of PDS… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: But it does not affect the proposal... 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: The guys from SIG will talk to the guys there… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: I don´t see how does it affect nothing that we are doing here... because the bid is PDS…there is 
no other way… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: They say there are some problems in the SmartPlant in Australia and U.S. and in Sofia… The 
guy said today morning, what I understood, that looks like the problems that there were in the SmartPlant they 
have already corrected. So, tomorrow they will see if it is possible to use the SmartPlant …something like this… 
(…) 
 
(CNC) F.F.M. :The discussion will be among the guys from SIG and people from???… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: From Sofia and….Reading…people from the U.S…. I am not sure if Reading but I think there 
is also Houston… and maybe I guy from Australia… and they will talk about PDS. 
 
(Recorded meeting, 6h July 2010 – Exact Transcription) 
 
Out of this meeting, a compliance matrix (document which described activity, 
responsible and deadline) has been designed by WP (Sofia and Reading) towards the 
proposal completion. In that document, however, although paper work required for 
eligibility and commercial parts were quite well defined and assigned, technical 
documents (write-ups), which accounted for 75% of the proposal score, were only 
broadly defined (with all individual items together) and assigned (to the offices and 
not to people).  
 
 
Fig. 68: UNA3 compatibility matrix – Items Methodology and Organizational Structure (calendar and punch list). 
 
On the 07th July 2010, right after the conference call, which according to R.M.Z. only 
served to discuss problems concerning previous uses of SmartPlant on WP offices, 
T.D. set another meeting with SIG sales (H.C.L.) and technical (F.L.P.) managers, 
S.M.C (CNC/WP IT manager), and R.M.Z. to discuss commercial advantages and 
eventual strategies to offer SmartPlant to Eletrobras Eletronuclear.  
 253 
 
(CNC) T.D.: The discussion concerning PDS x SmartPlant pass through three elements… in my point of 
view…One, to know if the man-hour estimate we did hold to the SmartPlant solution or PDS. OK?! He (SIG 
sales manager) is telling me that the SmartPlant has a productivity gain, is more friendly, and so… on the 
other side, not everything that comes from PDS ... will be just to press a button and will become SmartPlant… 
so we will be gaining productivity on the one side, and we will have an additional work to adequate the rest… 
The second… I need to know how much does it cost to embark in the PDS solution, in terms of software cost, 
and how much is it for the SmartPlant solution… we have to close the number… this package…the best 
number of PDS is this… so we can be competitive and win, and the best number of SmartPlant is this one… 
Then comes the third question, which is the interface with the client. It´s a decision that you can help us but it 
is a decision CNC/WP with Eletronuclear (…) Let´s suppose that… I expect… that the solution SmartPlant is 
very attractive commercially and significative in terms of the competition… so I have to decide I will be at heads 
with the solution SmartPlant …(…) or not, I will go with the solution PDS, and after winning I can try this… 
So these are the three steps that I think we have to do to close the deal…(…) 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: F.L.P and H.C.L…look… I am living inside the bidding instructions for more than 20 days, 
writing the work procedures and I can say the following…my contribution to this debate is the following… 
First, the bidding instructions are PDS. The procedures are being written in PDS. It´s mandatory…there is no 
discussion. I am writing the work procedure considering PDS. Period. While they don´t open the envelope, we 
can do nothing… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: But in the bidding instructions it doesn´t say… 
 
(CNC) F.F.M..: The piping part of L.M.A. is very specific on PDS. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: (...) there is so many details in the bidding instructions… items requested that specific from 
PDS. So I can do a work procedure to SmartPlant I will have to change everything… bidding instruction items 
inclusive… I think it is unviable to do this…because there are things that are typical from PDS…(…) one of 
the items required in the “work methodology” document is to describe the software…to explain in its own 
words what the software is …(…) So, in terms of proposal it does not help to change anything like this…(…) 
after winning the contract, there will be a period of one to two months, before signing the contract we get 
together with them and try to change that…(…) 
 
(CNC) T.D.: What is he saying is that the technical proposal…OK?!…it has scores…and I´m sure who will 
evaluate that technical proposal specially on the part of piping is M.R.L., and if he has it´s mind totally…he has 
already written thinking… he gave me the impression.. I have never met him… met just before the competition 
starts, in a visit… and he gave me the impression… to be very methodic…OK?!… and also to know very well 
what he really want to do. He has everything in his mind… “How I will going to do... this…and that way…like 
this, and that …and so forth… I already thought about this years and I know it quite well”…So that is what 
you are saying. I read there and there is no other different way to do what the guys is saying. …So…But this 
don´t invalidate we sit here and say “I need the best price, of the best solution in PDS and I need also the best 
price, of the best solution in SmartPlant... we need to have that… Why? …Because this is a commercial 
decision … I can say something like this… I will believe that I will be able to turn heads, but I cannot guarantee 
I will get into the competition in PDS and then I might assume in competition some not so good commercial 
conditions I tried to go for a better solution with SmartPlant afterwards… So, I need these two possibilities  
(Recorded meeting, 7h July 2010 – Exact Transcription) 
 
A point that became clear through this meeting was the huge cost of the licenses as 
we were estimating the service. The expected number of licenses of PDS plus 
additional software would cost approximately US$ 1.5 million, far above the 
expectations and commercially damaging to the project profitability. The use of 
SmartPlant would represent a cost 30% lower compared to PDS.  
 
7.4.2- Project Organization 
 
On the 8th July 2010, G.J., a late-30s project manager from the WP-Reading office, 
arrived at CNC/WP to closely follow the bidding process, re-ignited the discussion 
over the PDS versus SmartPlant subject. However, On the 9th July 2010, T.D. went on 
vacations and let R.M.Z. in charge of the proposal until the 29th July 2010. The arrival 
of G.J and B.M., consolidated the project organizational structure as follows: 
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Fig. 69: UNA3 Project Organization  (only key participants). 
 
On the 12th July 2010, in a private conversation with R.M.Z., G.J. and F.M.M., 
additional points of the issue were debated: 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: Is that the meeting? 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: G.J., did you know F.M.C.?  
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: No, I don´t know... G.J. please to meet you… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: F.M.C. is the other guy who´s helping us to write the methodology …(…) F.M.C. is preparing 
the beginning of the part of the work scope… the first part… and we are talking about PDS and Smart Plant 
and L.M.A. will explain to you why do we need to say on the bid that we are going to use clearly PDS. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: This week that we have been working with this, we found some noise about this question about 
and PDS and SmartPlant 3D, and something that was supposed to be just a small discussion, ideas for an 
initial kick-off for the work, just came out to be a issue for long debate. Last week on Friday, we met with people 
from Intergraph Brazil and… just came to me in the middle of the meeting… that we cannot make a bid 
different from PDS. There is some reasons for this. The first reason is that PDS is a subject in many other items 
that are required for the bid. So, they speak about PDS in many items that´s in the very surface level… if you go 
a little bit deeper you will find that many of the third-party softwares they are asking us to use, because they 
have their reference databases… at some point… just work with PDS. For example, PDS/RHALT… the 
software they use for piping support… the BQCAD, that is another software they are using… they are all 
softwares that only work with PDS. They do not work with SmartPlant 3D… Why? Because they are softwares 
that have been developed to work with Microstation16. PDS works together with Microstation. But SmartPlant 
3D does not have a CAD interface… he has a proprietary CAD… and they hardly would be able to develop a 
software that works with a proprietary graphical interface… 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: I maybe wrong… but a think we are using SmartPlant with Microstation… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z..: They told us it is not necessary Microstation, just SmartPlant… 
                                                
16
 Microstation is a proprietary software from Bentley Systems Inc. and serve as CAD interface for the operation of PDS. 
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(CNC) L.M.A.: They do the following, they work in the SmartPlant 3D with models then they export the 
drawings in Microstation and at some point they make changes in drawings with Microstation. They do not do 
that changes in the 3D model…So it’s a final step onto the drawing. (…) Smart Plant 3D has anything to do 
with Microstation.  
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: I think that I am understanding what you are saying… you can export to Microstation, 
but you can´t manipulate the core drawing… that I believe it’s true… I believe that. I guess… what you are 
saying is that in PDS, Microstation can be used to manipulate the core file… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Yeah… for example, that some elements that if you don´t want to use equipment module, you 
can work in Microstation and attach this model inside PDS. The same thing you cannot do in SmartPlant 3D 
because he does not read a Microstation file in the core graphic interface that he uses.  
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: So my question would be… that these additional files that are called for… I understand 
that the modules that have been designed to work with PDS …I wonder if …SmartPlant also… because 
essentially SmartPlant was created to do what lot of companies were doing with PDS and ….PDS was not 
capable of doing a lot of functions, people built special modules to attach to PDS, we did that also at WP, and 
Intergraph discovered that there were a great need for this suite of services like pipe stress analysis, and cable 
routing and all kinds of other things… and so they essentially took probably what was the best available 
modules on the market, bought them and then attached to integrate everything into SmartPlant suite. So, I am 
wondering if it is available in SmartPlant now, but it is not exactly the same software but perhaps with a 
similar capability… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Sure we can do the same job with PDS and working on SmartPlant and another bundle of 
softwares, but the problem is… the bid asks for those softwares.  
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: It does … (…) there is one place where they mention… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Yes… I know this… it´s this one… “other programs and modules of PDS of proved efficiency 
…” 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: All we have to do is… I mean we don´t have that …I´ve already kind of talk to my around 
this issue, about a dozen times and right now I am comfortable doing the PDS only, and just offering in there 
“we are comfortable with SmartPlant if you want us go to….if you want that too…then we will negotiate the 
price difference…” That´s kind of I want to say in the proposal. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: I agree with but I would go a little bit further… As I was talking to R.M.Z. before you came, 
we can do this, that´s fine… there are two ways they can accept that… the first thing they can say “OK, you 
are not going to use all that softwares I did, all the reference databases I did… and you are going to give me that 
on SmartPlant 3D … but the initial idea that they will have is that we want charge more for this… that´s not 
true… we have to be confident that … this will be saving money with this…but they don´t need to know that… 
right?! …We are going to say “you are asking for PDS, we are going to make exactly what you want but we 
will charge X hours… but if you want we can do the same job… exactly the same job… with Smart Plant 3D… 
and we charge the same hours… you decide. 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: That´s going to be a tough one…We didn´t think about that…  We´ll have to import all 
their databases…make sure all things function  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Very hard work…to reconstruct these databases in SmartPlant 3D… 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: Very hard work… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: We have to make… be really sure… we can make some gain by using SmartPlant 3D… 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: I think all we have to do is bid it … the more I think about it … is bid it PDS, offer to use 
SmartPlant, and then negotiate after the award what the additional time and materials cost would be for 
transferring the existing modeling to SmartPlant 3D, and getting the existing tools as good as they are with 
Eletrobras now, into the SmartPlant suite, to make sure that they have equivalent function and then…you 
know… whatever that costs… we may estimate a cost of doing that an extra Y hours, or something like that, 
and we will make that offer for time and materials, above and beyond the original work was… but then we will 
make a very aggressive bid, and we want them to know that it is in their best interest for a lots of reasons to go 
with SmartPlant, and they have an experienced user in us to help their transition through the process… So I 
want to make they fell good about us… and I am willing we to do this, but you are right I think the price is…  
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(CNC) L.M.A.: Price is a very sensitive issue for them… (laughs) ..I believe they are insisting in PDS because 
they have an extensive work, building reference databases and they probably spent a lot of money doing this 
partial model they want to give us… 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: He have the same investment in PDS… we have a tremendous investment in PDS and 
our engineers and designers are very comfortable with PDS and our modules that go on with it… but 
SmartPlant is a superior product, it´s a better product…(…) I think when we are writing this section 
“methodology and work plan” you have the right concept in writing about PDS … only… and at the end…I 
think we then begin with our argument … and say “however, if we use SmartPlant… it is an Intergraph 
product, it has lots of advantages, and these are the advantages we are saying… and then we can talk a little bit 
about descriptions of the measures for lower costs, higher productivity, and then I think we should talk about 
obsolescence, of the PDS program… I know in Brazil it is not imminent… but in U.S. it is… that this program 
will be obsolete, and will not be supported by Intergraph, going forward…  and this is a five year, six year long 
project. So by the time this plant gets turned over, and comes on-line they are going to work definitively with a 
piece of software that is very outdated… it has to go to SmartPlant eventually… 
 
(…)  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Did you read, the paper work that we have been working? 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: No.. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: We are describing how to do this PDS. We describe commands, we describe what to do (…) 
including the items of quality control we are describing, because our feeling is that the guy that is going to 
check it, he must read it and must know that we know what we are talking about, and that we are able to do the 
job, just like in the bidding guidelines. 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: So you got this part covered...some… after that is covered that´s when we need to talk 
about SmartPlant 3D. And I think the things we need to cover here are what we are just talking about… first, 
that we have experience with SmartPlant 3D… it has benefits… it avoids the risks… particularly of 
obsolescence… it has efficiencies… and productivity gains…we know they know because they talked to 
Intergraph about using it… they are interested…so we tell them we know… (…) and that they are concerned 
about their existing model …can be… can … be… imported…(…) they are worried about their existing model 
… right?! …    
 
(Recorded meeting, 12th July 2010 – Exact Transcription) 
 
 
7.4.3- Current Knowledge Weakening 
 
Days later, G.J. vented that in case SmartPlant 3D would be adopted, it would be 
completely set up by WP-London (UK) or WP-Perth (Australia) professionals, who 
would remotely hold control of the system, with few capability building on the 
CNC/WP side (similar to what happened with PDMS Global during PDY project, 
whose control was in charge of WP-Houston). Therefore, the potential adoption of 
SmartPlant 3D may as well be approached as an attempt of WP-Reading and WP-
Sofia to bring key processes into their control and this way supply key technological 
services as a black-box to CNC/WP, with the help of the centers who had developed 
this expertise (WP-London and WP-Perth). 
  
All that debate, however, fell apart after the visit to Eletrobras Eletronuclear on the 
25th July, where we could see its extreme software expertise in developing tools 
specific for nuclear projects where PDS, was merely used a integration tool prior to 
model review generation. Not only it became clear that the use of SmartPlant 3D 
would be incompatible with all those tools developed to speed up design work based 
on prior documents from UNA2 but also the expected number of PDS licenses was 
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cut by 2/3 as it became clear it was merely a integration tool, soothing the financial 
hurdles of its requirement. 
 
While this PDS versus SmartPlant 3D debated unfolded, several other important 
issues like idiom and division work were overlooked as can be seen in the field diary 
notes below: 
 
Along this meeting were also discussed the idiom of the documents and the division of work. Due to 
the short time available and the need for WP to evaluate and complement the documents, it was set 
that the documents would go straight into English. However, G.J. also asked to have the documents 
in Portuguese so that a sworn translation could be done. Awkward as it seemed everybody agreed at 
that time. The division of work in relation to the write-up´s was even more confusing. Hardly each 
partner could tell for sure what was he about to do and nowhere there was a registry of that. I asked 
if there were people from planning and document control working on their sections however, R.M.Z. 
could not confirm. R.M.Z. passed on the work to WP-Reading and, G.J. to WP-Sofia. Where definition 
was required they fired up with a conference call to define it. F.M.C., however, remained as the final 
assembler of the documents and responsible for proofreading them prior to WP examination. (Field 
Diary, 12th July  2010). 
 
Also on 12th July 2010, arrangements for the Eletrobras Eletronuclear office and site 
visit began. From WP-Sofia would go, S.T.V (electrical engineer), G.G (piping 
engineer) and B.M. (business analyst), from WP-Reading, G.J. (project manager), and 
from CNC/WP would go T.D., R.M.Z., F.F.M. and I.  
 
In the 13th July 2010, the first difficulties began to appear. Technical staff experience 
that since beginning was WP-Reading responsibility, proved hard to comply with 
Eletrobras Eletronuclear requirements (regular employer, long company tenure, 15 to 
10 years experience, nuclear project preferable). As WP-Reading begin to falter on 
this subject, they tried to work out some alternatives.   
 
(CNC) F.C. 
  
L.M.A. meets the requirements for the PDS administrator on the project, and it would be good for him to be the 
representative for this proposal.  However, he took the courses when with SIG/Intergraph, and they did not 
issue him a certificate, which he needs to be able to show. 
  
Would it be possible for CNC/WP to request for this certificate to be issued retroactively to L.M.A using his 
completion of the courses required as a basis?  We think the request would be better coming from an executive 
rather than from the worker directly to SIG.  Please share your thoughts on this. 
  
Sincerely, 
  
(WP-Reading) G.J.: 
 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: 
  
We will be working with SIG, however it is important to take into consideration that although CNC/WP can 
get such certificate, the bidder is WP and you also have to present someone as the representative, not only for 
this function but also for other functions requested 
  
(CNC) F.C. 
 
(E-mail sent on, 13h July 2010 – Exact transcription) 
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Despite it was WP-Reading responsibility, F.C. (CNC/WP sales director) asked 
S.M.C. (CNC/WP IT manager) to require SIG to issue a certificate, confirming that I 
was qualified as PDS System Administrator, what was made available by 19th July 
2010. Few days later, G.J. also required WP-Houston to grant me a WP e-mail 
address (which I so forth did not have) in order to have access to the WP global 
document exchange system, just like R.M.Z. and T.D. For some reason the e-mail and 
the access was not granted. 
 
Still facing a great uncertainty concerning the definitions and assignments of the 
write-up´s, a conference call was set in the early hours of 15th July 2010.  The content 
of this meeting can be gauged from the field notes below: 
 
The quality of the communication in this conference call was quite good and, as such, we could get 
along with the issues. WP-Sofia began by pushing us to speed up the write-up´s so we could send it to 
them for completion, however, we said that it would take longer because we were in the middle of 
the process and if we sent it now it could be a little confusing for them. Then, G.J. start to discuss 
about difficulties in finding personnel qualified enough to match Eletrobras Eletronuclear 
requirements and even concealed the idea of hiring people for that. (…) 
 
Most of the meeting, however, was dedicated to assign responsibilities to the specific items of the 
write-up´s, which were very poorly defined until now.  After an item-by-item discussion, the 
Brazilian team part of the write-up´s was enlarged as more items end up being assigned because local 
tools such as ProjectWise software would be used instead of WP standard ones. An agreement was 
also reached that the Brazilian team would create master write-up´s composed of the parts supplied 
by each team and would distribute them on a regular basis. (…) 
 
There was also a debate concerning financial issues on the contract division. G.J. said that agreement 
was that the contract would be 5% WP international and 95% CNC/WP, and they had to make sure 
that these 5% would cover for WP people to stay in Brazil for six months to one year. Finally, we 
discussed again about writing and delivering technical documents to Eletrobras Eletronuclear in 
Portuguese, what would save considerably time, however the need to go through WP-Sofia for 
completion and primary examination and WP-Reading final examination turn down the idea (…) 
(Field Diary, 15th July  2010) 
 
With the meeting almost finishing a debate concerning the relationship of CNC/WP 
and WP emerged as can been seen in discussion below: 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: Why?… Don´t you have the PDS guy?… 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: We have them…we have lots of them…but it´s a pain in the ass to have them to come 
here…he (L.M.A.) is better…and you have him here on-site…and we can put him in your contract…he is also a 
lot cheaper…because we don´t have to pay all that taxes…anybody you don´t bring from the U.S. and you don´t 
have to bring those taxes it … this is a hell a lot less expensive… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: But you can´t use L.M.A. as your guy… because you are the bidder (official) and the bidder is 
WP… 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: You are me…you and me are the same…We work for the same company…(…) 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: We know this but for the guys at Eletronuclear we are two different companies… 
 
(WP-Reading) G.J.: We are not two different companies…(…) when you say things like he can´t be on the 
proposal because his not from WP … I mean that… you are a little confused… because of this dual thing that 
we have been living… you know what I mean… You got to get in your mind that we are the same company… 
F.C. is the same way…He thinks of us as two different companies…he thinks you can´t be in our proposal as a 
private individual because you are not WP employee. In fact you have been here for four years… when I put 
your certificate forward you have four years experience with WP… because you are WP affiliate and you got the 
fidelity of one of subsidiaries, fully acquired… (…)  
 
(Recorded meeting sent on, 15th July 2010 – Exact Transcription) 
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Later in the afternoon, an internal meeting was prepared to anticipate the discussions 
of the official risk analysis meeting that would happen the next day over a 
conference call with WP-Reading, WP-Houston and WP-Sofia offices. Were invited 
for this meeting all key CNC/WP personnel from both industry and infrastructures 
divisions were asked to attend to this meeting, however, were absent due to a 
managerial meeting in a hotel nearby São Paulo, invoked by CNC/WP president. The 
main concerns shown by the Brazilian team in this meeting were: 
 
Despite the importance of the proposal attended to this meeting only the risk manager (C.L.D.), the 
risk analyst (B.D.), R.M.Z., two discipline managers, F.F.M. and I. It began quite late as everybody 
was returning for lunch. After R.M.Z. show his concern over the low attendance to the meeting, the 
risk analyst advised us that this would be the first time that CNC/WP would take part on a risk 
analysis with WP. As they did not know how that would proceed, they suggested to make an internal 
risk analysis (which in their opinion would be as good if not better than the one used by WP) and 
simulate what be the relevant items and in the official meeting they would follow trough them. Great 
concern has been shown towards communication difficulties due to the lack of fluency in most of the 
Brazilian team, the complexity of the issues and to the particular characteristics of the English as 
spoken by the partners. (…) 
 
A noteworthy point discussed during this meeting concerned the different business environments to 
which WP and CNC/WP were submitted and thus developed different risk analysis approaches, she 
said: “(…) we could make this analysis in contingency terms… because… what happens… they (WP) don´t 
add contingency. Because they are not normally used to work with global price. Global price is something new 
for them. And we (CNC/WP) are used to work with global price. For this we have thought …(…) we were 
thinking about running the “Monte Carlo simulation” that they knew a little bit and they feel quite safe in this 
area. Then, to show something Brazil is doing as a new thing, to present this material to them with this 
simulation (…)” 
 
Another important point discussed during the meeting was the hardships in using formal employee 
wage estimations to build the proposal price, as WP required. Because hardly any senior engineer 
would accept to work as a formal employee and have to pay 30% in taxes. Despite strong opposition 
to the use of informal employment in the proposal prices by G.J., R.M.Z. said that F.C. was already 
convincing WP that a combination of formal and informal employment should unavoidable 
otherwise the bid would surpass the price limits. The risk manager said that as it would bring an 
increase to the risk of labor liabilities this should be taking into consideration in the risk analysis. (…) 
(Field Diary, 15th July  2010). 
 
This meeting has been far too long, as it lasted from the beginning of the afternoon 
until late at the night. Apparently, it has been too broad in terms of issues 
approached and considered in the analysis. One problematic factor was the atypical 
format of the project which, together with the transitional state of the company and 
the uncertainty concerning appropriate interpretations from WP, generated many 
doubts and long discussions among the participants. Moreover, aside of R.M.Z., 
F.F.M. and me none of the participants were really aware of the project details and 
had little power to lay down a decision or an interpretation, undermining the quality 
of the discussions, which frequently slipped into a personal knowledge showdown. 
  
By the end of the day, B.M. sent some sections of the documents that were under 
WP-Sofia responsibility. To CNC/WP surprise, great part of the content of the 
documents concerned the application of SmartPlant and other softwares that were 
standard at WP but were not compliant with UNA3 requirements. Furthermore, 
except for the company organizational details, most of their content applied only to 
traditional projects and not to specific tasks and requirements expressed in the 
UNA3 bidding instructions. As this material showed up useless to complete the 
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document as we agreed, it fell upon CNC/WP to also write the parts that belonged to 
WP-Sofia. Also worrisome, key staff assignment to comply with technical staff 
experience item in the organizational structure was almost all blank with only two 
names (out of 11) confirmed.  
 
On the 19th July, B.M., a young Bulgarian business analyst from WP-Sofia, arrived at 
CNC/WP to support G.J. in the organization of the proposal and of the formal steps 
towards proposal approval. Our first contact was a tepid one, maybe reflecting a sort 
of an office rivalry. When told that he “needed to exchange some e-mails” in order to 
receive some updates, she answered harshly “no, we need to finish the procedures”. 
This harshness, however, did not last a day and she quickly turned into a very 
receptive and helping person. As I made available upon the CNC/WP network the 
master copies of the write-up´s, she quickly thanked for the updates and sent more 
sections commented by WP-Sofia we had priorly released. The comments again did 
not help much there was only minor English mistakes and itemization of the items 
already clear in the bidding instructions.  
 
The official risk analysis meeting took place the next day, on the 19th July 2010, and 
was marked by difficult communications, a tortuous translation process and a 
complete lack of knowledge of the competition rules. As a result, not only calculated 
contingencies account for a considerable rise in the proposal price but also 
considered some legal requirements of the contract as unacceptable for WP. The 
repercussion of the WP risk analysis on the CNC/WP office were as described above: 
 
(…) in front of the two discipline managers (S.P.H. and M.J.O.), the risk manager and those who were 
participating in the meeting, R.M.Z. again complained that people at CNC/WP was not taking the 
proposal as seriously as had invited several key executives and none of them showed up….and 
except for F.C. and those directly working in the proposal people (…) He explained that within WP, 
proposal should be approved by two commissions the “red-team”, to the proposal was selected, and 
the “green-team” before going ahead. The first one would comprise of a technical team in charge of 
checking if the technical terms of the proposal were carefully appreciated and if people knew what 
they were doing, or check why a determined technical assumption or amount of hours was taken into 
consideration on the proposal. The second one, the “green-team”, comprised of a financial team, 
which will argue about the economic and financial aspects of the proposal. Therefore, it would be 
important to key executives and discipline leaders to participate in that in order to get used to this 
kind of procedure.  (…) 
 
Moreover, he told that as a result of the prior risk analysis, WP went deeper into the contract and 
highlighted some points considered of high potential risk, nevertheless they were common place in 
Brazilian business. As they were providing contingencies for all those items the final price of the 
proposal could be lifted to uncompetitive levels. The conclusion of all participants is that everything 
requirement that did not make part of standard WP contract was faced a source risk. He added that in 
the case of the technical warranty, because Eletrobras Eletronuclear want more months covered that 
the usual for WP, they suggested to change the contract… what would be impossible as governmental 
competitions were laid down on non-negotiable rules. As they were explained several times of that, 
they argued that if it could not be changed then it would have to be covered by a contingency value.  
And despite all the effort of F.C., it was hard to go ahead with the proposal because the Brazilian 
lawyers said it was an interpretation problem of the U.S. lawyers that on their turn blocked the 
proposal.  Even the key lawyer that responded directly to the CEO said that it was an unacceptable 
risk. Even though after he explained her that all this contractual risks were already embedded in to 
the price, she did not completely agreed. As such, R.M.Z. called attention to the kind of problem that 
they were facing and that could extend to other proposals from CNC/WP as WP was only used to 
work with over hourly contracts and not global price ones. (Field Diary, 19th July  2010). 
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This meeting has been interrupted by F.C. who was worried about the technical score 
impact on the financial strategies of the project, as can be seen in the following 
dialogue: 
 
(CNC) F.C.: Let me tell you something…. Right now, I was talking to C.H.E, G.J., everybody… we need to take 
a time … I have this… I have that analysis spreadsheet, I need to talk to you and… based on this … because we 
are trying… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: The score… 
 
(CNC) F.C.: Yes. … If a get everything where do I arrive (in terms of score)? Because I have that spreadsheet if 
a get that far in the technical, I can get that far in the commercial one... I have many analyses…We have to it 
today because G.J. and C.H.E. (WP-Reading Managing Director) were discussing the remittance problem.  (…)  
And depending on the score I have, it´s one strategy different from the other… So, we must take a time and say 
“If these guys cover me on here, here and here… I am going to get here”. If they do not cover where it will go? 
(…) To make a series of analysis so we can take a decision… because it does not help to say to remit or not the 
money because I don´t know where I will be in the technical (evaluation)… the technical is that will decide! … 
For god sake!  
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: We must do that right now… 
 
(CNC) F.C.: We have to do that right now. I am sending a message to T.M. (Global Power Managing Director), 
to H.S. (US-Latin America Senior Vice President)… I am throwing the problem up to the space… so that they 
can solve it…  
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: They are asking quite much, that they require your presence in the risk analysis review that will 
take place Wednesday. They want your presence in the “green team” meeting… 
 
(CNC) F.C.: In this one I will be… in the other I will not go… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: Because he says the following… 
 
(CNC) F.C.: Its technical? … ( discussion about the date ) … Green team is commercial… This one I will 
participate… I told you… Wednesday is technical I will not go…  
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: Wednesday afternoon they want set up a meeting 1:00PM about risk analysis… (…) Today we 
had a meeting with C.H.E… 
 
(CNC) F.C.: We were now on the phone….  him, G.J., R.M., S.C. (U.S.-Latin American Vice President) with 
me… everybody online with me… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: We made a meeting today and analyzed several points in the contract… we have even asked 
C.A.A. (CNC/WP lawyer) … 
 
(CNC) F.C.: I have several questions to make to you… to whoever read in the dept the contract… Where is the 
place where I have to declare the percentage I have to remit overseas???…(…) These are the things that are 
important… How do I have to do to win?… What must be filled or not is their (WP-Reading) problem and give 
to us… (…) these things… What do I place here to take out of there… To make number guys … Important is to 
be smart… How do we going to get out of this situation?… I charge him what must be done…So, I need you 
soon up there (4th floor), let´s re-analyze this, I need somebody from risk analysis to tell me “its in the item X, 
that you have to tell the percentage”… because it (bidding instructions) does not say… He says that… If I do 
not tell it will assume 20%.  
(CNC) S.P.H.: Do we have condition to any better than this 20%?  
 
(CNC) F.C.: Less! I want 0%… I will say its zero… My business is not to be penalized … 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: You want to justify to go from 20% to 0%??  
 
(CNC) F.C.: I want to know where it should be indicated…. How will I justify?… I am going to say the 
shareholders the following… will not remit any money…I am going to say its zero…  (…) 
 
(CNC) F.C.: To win… Guys… it´s not about paper… It´s about thinking… Engineers just know how to 
calculate… throw the engineers in the trash can and let´s think like businessmen…How do I do to transfer and 
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knock the others (competitors) down? (…) We have to do a spreadsheet and make some conjectures what 
happens in the commercial (proposal) if I change this here…  Can I go up?… go down?… Can I bee more 
expensive than any other… understood… this I have to do right now! .. If we don´t do this, any paperwork you 
do it´s mathematic calculation stuff, to send to someone to do… it does not matter… this is a competition….(…) 
I need to know where am I going to fall in the technical proposal, so that I will pass it over to the commercial 
proposal…OK?!… that is it!… I told to them (WP executives), it does not help to worry about the commercial 
proposal … I have just talked to C.H.E., to G.J., to everybody! …I told S.C. (U.S. - Latin America Vice 
President)… you are the president of this here…. it does not help… I have to take maximum score in the 
technical… commercial goes together… because this represents 75% (technical)… if you don´t get those 75% 
any number that you chose it´s already expensive… because of the difference in the score…it´s one to three…  
 
(Recorded meeting, 19th July 2010 –  Author Translation) 
 
In the end of the day, we met B.M. to discuss the situation of the write-up´s and some 
strategies to speed up their writing/checking process. We showed her a spreadsheet 
we created to track the progress and responsibility of elaboration of th technical 
documents and discussed strategies on how to speed up and share the work in order 
to have all items covered and assigned. After that conversation, both I and F.F.M. 
had an impression that B.M. was more opened, pragmatic and hands-on than G.J. 
 
 
Fig. 70: Spreadsheet to control the completion of the sections in UNA3 proposal technical documents (write-up´s). 
 
That impression hold up through the next days as the presence of B.M. in the 
CNC/WP office speed up response from other offices and the completion of write-
up´s, which were supposed to be ready prior to de EPR (executive proposal review) 
meeting on 23rd July 2010. As such, greater pressure on other people around the 
company was made to supply necessary non-technical information to complement 
the technical documents. The dynamism gained with her arrival can be gauged from 
the following thread: 
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Time is OK with me……IT guys still have time for Projectwise no worries. Document Management system 
description can be added whenever ready by the end of the week. We do not need the description for the EPR, but 
the methodology and Scope understanding is more vital. 
  
Regards, 
(WP-Sofia) B.M.  
  
 
(WP-Sofia) B.M. 
  
Comments received. I´ll read and merge comments ASAP. 
 Talked to F.F.M. and we can meet at 18:00 to check the completion of this section. 
 We are waiting for IT personnel to release a Projectwise procedure in English. If they do not will keep it as 
SPF/Encompass to save time. 
  
Att,  
  
(CNC) L.M.A.  
 
Guys, 
  
As promised attached is a revision of the methodology section that you sent last week with track changes kept and 
whole sections inserted. 
  
Please have a look and let’s meet later today (whenever you can) to discuss what else we have left from this 
section. Georgi and Sasa worked mainly on this section and put some suggestions/ comments. Feel free to keep/ 
remove whatever you like or do not like.  
  
With regard to the ProjectWise’ question below my understanding was that this is what you will use and the 
reason to have Encompass and SPF described is that this write-up was developed 10 days ago when this was not 
clarified. So you need to substitute the Encompass and SPF information with what you have available for 
ProjectWise. 
  
Kind regards, 
(WP-Sofia) B.M. 
 
(E-mail thread copied to F.F.M., R.M.Z. and G.J. sent on, 19h July 2010 – Exact transcription) 
 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
 
(CNC) L.M.A. 
  
Attached is the spreadsheet with the Organizational Structure and Technology Transfer Sections breakdowns 
included. When G.J. comes later today we will sit and may introduce some other changes to these sections since 
we are responsible for their completion however for the purpose of tracking at the moment these should be OK. 
(Note that I have kept the original name of the file you sent).  
  
Kind regards, 
(WP-Sofia) B.M. 
 
(WP-Sofia) B.M. 
  
HSE write-ups merged into master Methodology and Work Plan. 
  
I am sending you the control spreadsheet so you can include other documents and their status. 
  
Att, 
  
(CNC) L.M.A. 
 
Guys, 
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Please, find attached the general HSE section. We need to check with G.J., R.M.Z. and the other guy that you 
said suggested to have this section or we need to have something more specific about this particular project with 
regard to HSE.  
  
I agree with your idea that will be useful to have the Organization and Transfer of Knowledge sections in this 
format as well. Let me know if you want me to place them your spreadsheet or you prefer to do it yourself. 
  
Kind regards, 
(WP-Sofia) B.M. 
 
Guys, 
  
Attached follows spreadsheet describing item X resposibility X status of the 1.6 - Methodology & Work Plan 
and 1.5 - Knoledge of the Object documents. 
  
As a suggestion we should consider in this control list the other documents of the technical proposal (1.7 – 
Organizational Structure & 1.8 Knowledge Transference Working Plan) in order to keep on tracking their 
completion. 
  
Att, 
  
(CNC) L.M.A. 
 
(E-mail thread copied to (CNC) F.F.M., (CNC) R.M.Z. and (WP-Reading) G.J. sent on, 20h July 2010 – Exact 
transcription) 
 
 
Nevertheless, several problems showed up on the eligibility documents of WP as 
well on the technical staff experience documents. On then 20th July 2010, F.C. was 
very worried with the score of the technical proposal, as he needed to adjust the cash 
flow to WP in order to arrive at a final price for the proposal. As such, he asked for 
an urgent meeting to simulate the score level attainable that far and the problems we 
had to be awarded more technical points. R.M.Z. explained to F.C. that several key 
technicians that should integrate the proposal were still not assigned as WP-Reading 
were experiencing difficulties in finding them. Additionally, WP-Reading were not 
being able to prove his participation in other nuclear projects as most of the projects 
have been done by Gilbert/Commonwealth prior to WP purchase and these 
certificates were attached to the WP-New York, an office that only existed in the 
paper to reap fiscal benefits. This way, my role in the proposal PDS administrator 
grew in strength. To make sure that in case they did not find a qualified PDS 
administrator in Reading, CNC/WP provided a quick admission as a formal 
employee for me.   
 
Parallel, R.M.Z. tried to organize a preparation meeting for the “red-team”, however 
due to mounting problems in the risk assessment of the proposal this meeting had to 
be postponed. When it happened there were not enough people and R.M.Z. 
cancelled the preparation meeting. With problems and doubts mounting, all official 
meeting scheduled were postponed until the site and office visit. These problems 
became even more evident in the early night conversation involving B.M. G.J., F.F.M 
and me, described in the field notes as follows: 
 
(…) A debate began concerning the logo to be used in the proposal. According to G.J. it was 
important to have the CNC/WP logo stamped into sheets of the official proposal to make Eletrobras 
Eletronuclear aware of the relationship involving the two companies. B.M., however strongly 
disagreed as she argued that the bidder officially would be WP, therefore that should be the only logo 
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carried on the proposal. She conceded that at some point of the proposal it could be disclosed that WP 
and CNC/WP already have a workshare agreement and, in fact, they would be the same company. 
Nevertheless, the proposal should bear the WP logo all the way through. G.J. again insisted that the 
dual logo should not be seen as a aberration, because CNC/WP and WP would be, in his opinion the 
same company, with CNC/WP a simple local office of WP. It did not help to explained G.J. that in 
Brazilian business each company would be individualized by its CNPJ (Cadastro Nacional de Pessoa 
Juridica) number and CNC/WP had one and WP none, and that there must be one company (one 
CNPJ or foreign company) to hold the technical certificates to won the contract so that CNC/WP 
(another CNPJ) could be subcontracted for the work. After a lengthy debate, he said that C.A.J., 
CNC/WP president were to decide about that. (…) 
 
Another discussion initiated as G.J. said to be surprised by the fact that I was not a regular CNC/WP 
employee, but a contract worker. He said that the fact that most of CNC/WP personnel were not 
regular employees would represent a risk for the proposal and for the company. Because it the client 
discovered it they could be sued over having people illegally enrolled in the company.  We tried to 
explain to him that it was a common in Brazil to have high salaries personnel as contract works 
because high employment taxes in Brazil represent a severe hurdle for engineering companies, and 
that was the way engineering business was ran in Brazil. (…)  
 
He also expressed worry about the amount of money already spent in the proposal (around US$ 
300.000) and that they could not afford losing it. There were still too many things to be done and 
arranged and he was worried about the schedule. He realized that to have the write-up´s written here 
in English, sent to Sofia for a primary check, then complement and sent for U.S. to be verified, to be 
consularized and only then to be translated back to Portuguese by a sworn translator would take too 
much time and make them miss the schedule. After discussing what consularization meant in Brazil, 
we expressed doubts on how to do it. I suggested that he should ask for WP-Houston because they 
have been through all the proposal and contracting process with Petrobras in PDY project and 
probably knew how that was supposed to work. He agreed and said the next day he would look for 
someone in Houston to give him advice. Nevertheless he argued that we were still far behind the 
curve and that want to get things done on time we should have a plan B. B.M argued that we should 
think about doing the write-ups in Portuguese what would save a considerable time in writing and 
translating.  He said they would not be able to do that because he was being pushed by WP-Reading 
to hand in the write-ups. Then B.M. suggested to hand in directly to WP-Reading without going 
through WP-Sofia, saying that the documents would look like crap if not checked and corrected and 
they would be ridicularized, what made me fell embarrassed. After that, I left the conversation to get 
back to work and saw that  G.J. and B.M. discussed harshly until he left the office . When I went to say 
B.M. goodbye she told me that G.J. had been out for a walk because he was too nervous (…)(Field 
Diary, 21th July  2010). 
 
On the 22th July 2010, B.M. sent additional doubts concerning the proposal raised by 
WP-Sofia engineers. Their doubts however showed certain confusion, particularly in 
relation to the terms used and the modus operandi required by Eletrobras 
Eletronuclear. At some questions they even questioned the very essence of the task 
required in the bidding instructions, a lack of abstraction power that did not help 
much in describing a method or evaluating man-hours. As we were close to the site 
visit that would begin in the 25th July, we sent the following response 
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Fig. 71: List of Questions sent by WP-Sofia engineers on the 22nd July 2010. 
 
Things were not better for the support we received from the other local colleagues. 
On the 22nd of 2010, required to help in the description and functionalities of the 
software that would be responsible for the document management system, CNC/WP 
manager IT, who few weeks ago were the responsible for its implementation replied 
us sending the software manual.  On the same day we (R.M.Z., F.F.M. and I) had a 
conversation with P.D.J., a coordinator we knew from the PDY project, and also were 
developing proposals with WP. In this conversation it was possible to see how 
difficult it was to make even internal people to understand the unconventional 
character of the UNA3 proposal. It was also perceptible how standardized 
methodologies were ingrained within WP.  
 
(CNC) P.D.J.: By what I am “smelling”… by three phrases that I saw… it smells like the PEP… Project 
Execution Plan… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: More or less… 
 
(CNC) P.D.J.: What he is asking here is a PEP.  
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: They are asking for a technical proposal. Describe what we know about our work method… 
 
(CNC) P.D.J.: WP… don´t know if it helps… if it would be good or bad…it must be discussed… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: Don´t talk about the EMS, what they have there…forget… We are talking about our project… 
(…) that EMS that has all the norms and procedures … 
 
(CNC) P.D.J.: Let´s say… you never had done a PEP until today and you don´t know what is inside…I think 
what is there inside is a directive of it…and is WP… it is in the house… I can show you that I did for the FPSO 
(proposal)… you take a look at it… get its structure and try… I read three phrases, It might be that I am talking 
bullshit…if we are not going to do something close to this… you can get the PEP WP… it was a 
structure…and there you go fitting these blocks in a manner that explains how you are going to do the project. 
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PEP is this… (…) apparently what the guy here wants is a project plan (PEP) … where I am going to get 
workforce, what do I do, which are the keys to develop the project ..is it? 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: The problem is that this document has 10 pages. … 
 
(CNC) P.D.J.: WP´s has 120 pages…  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: That´s because I think it is not this… (…) Let´s go I think 1.5.3. (section in the “Knowledge of 
the Object” document) is not the PEP. It falls upon this… “General appreciation of the modern concepts of 
project management…” something very conceptual… 
 
(CNC) P.D.J.: Inside the PEP… it will say to you how you going to do each activity… (…) and then there is 
something ours… it is from the house…I read it here, I read it at Houston… the guy know what I am talking 
about… (…)  
 
(CNC) P.D.J:  PEP is in the network (WP network, not CNC/WP network)…I did one for the FPSO … and I 
did it in three days…you go filling the blanks… it says what you have to write there… there is a manual to 
build the PEP…(…) Maybe it is not what you want but I would recommend to do things in the way the 
company works (WP). 
 
(… he go a get the PEP elaborated for PDY…) 
 
(CNC) P.D.J.: This one S.B.D. did for PDY. And if you want I handle mine for the FPSO that is filled up and 
digital…   
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: The problem now is to develop this item here (1.5.3.) ….  
 
(CNC) P.D.J.: This here will be integrated inside your PEP. (…) They spent years thinking about how to 
structure that… Am I going to think all that again to make a report?…(…) It going to give all that…This is 
because this guy here (Eletrobras Eletronuclear) does not know the PEP… ours… This guy here (point to the 
bidding instructions)… obviously does not know…What you are going to do is handle it (to Eletrobras 
Eletronuclear) and say “We work this way!”  
 
(…) 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: If they have asked for a PEP or the document format opened was free, it would be perfect… the 
problem is that they asked for it in pieces and for each item he will assign a score…and this score account for 
technical evaluation… 
 
(Recorded meeting, 22th July 2010 – Author Translation)  
 
After a long conversation, P.D.J. accepted to write some paragraphs on the subject 
we requested instead of using the standard WP proposal tool. The resulting 
contribution, however, was almost useless. Whereas the item requested more 
practical concepts involving the operational work, he wrote about project top-
management organization and concerns, as shown below: 
 
 
 
(…)The project will be executed by an Integrator Program Management Team (IPMT) responsible for the 
development and implementation of a Project Execution Plan (PEP), the details of which will be developed after 
the Contract signature. The PEP will be developed following careful and detailed consideration of the 
complexities of the project and will be based upon implementing a series of strategies to minimize risk and 
maximize the certainty of a successful project.(…) IPMT Responsibilities:  
(…) 
- Issuance of the List of Documents (deliverables) for the scope of work 
- Issuance of the preliminary List of Documents for the Integration effort 
- Issuance of the List of Actions (LOA) 
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- Implementation of Report of Occurrences (RDO) 
- Issuance of the Project Execution Plan (PEP) 
 
(…) In order to manage the overall engineering during the detailed design phase, the IPMT will utilize a Project 
Management Team (PMT) as the project organization responsible for the day to day execution of the work. The 
IPMT will accomplish this through a Project Management Team (PMT) composed of personnel from WP 
organization. The PMT Coordinator will have management oversight responsibility for the execution of the 
detailed engineering design by assisting the IPMT with: 
- Ensure compliance with Project’ Specifications and Procedures. 
- Participate in meetings and screenings with Eletronuclear to coordinate key project milestones affecting the 
scope of work. 
- Coordinate with the IPMT any proposed changes by the Eletronuclear affecting the scope of work 
- Implement early application of Constructability reviews during detailed design. (…) 
 
(E-mail sent on, 23th July August 2010 – Exact Transcription) 
 
The days right before the visit, work was quite intense as we needed to get the write-
up´s as close as possible to the end, so that we could quickly complement them with 
the information gathered during the three days of client visit, and sent them as soon 
as possible for WP-Sofia and WP-Reading review. I change that also occurred in this 
task was that after a conversation between R.M.Z., G.J., B.M., F.F.M. and I, where, 
supported by a official Eletrobras Eletronuclear note, we decided that the write-ups 
would be written and handled to Eletrobras Eletronuclear in Portuguese and only 
after being finished would be “goggle translated” and sent to WP for review. Initially 
that generated a considerable workload as more than 50 pages had been already 
written in English. However, as many sections were still waiting for the technical 
visit at Eletrobras Eletronuclear, the damage would be compensated. 
 
7.4.4- Sequential Knowledge Change 
 
The three days visiting the Eletrobras Eletronuclear office in Rio de Janeiro, the 
UNA2 nuclear plant in Angra dos Reis, and attending the technical seminar were a 
key moment in the project. We were able to see that everything that have puzzled us 
during almost two months really made sense, and Eletrobras had everything ready 
for resuming UNA3 project. All documentation from UNA 2 project that would be 
used to build UNA3 was clearly organized, many softwares have been internally 
developed to speed up the project process and the competence of the Eletrobras 
Eletronuclear technical staff impressed everybody, especially those who were 
skeptics about the adequacy of technical requirements and the directions given by 
the bidding instructions. In their visit report, WP-Sofia engineers say: 
 
On the Eletrobras Eletronuclear office visit: 
(…) 
Conclusion: 
The documentation that had been preseneted was very detailed and completed and should be enough to perform 
the job. 
 
Senior Piping Engineer:  G.G. (WP-Sofia) 
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On the Eletrobras Eletronuclear site visit: 
 
(…) 
Conclusion: 
The site visit was very usefull and interesting. I assume that Electronuclear is very precise in their work, has a 
well trained and experienced stuff, and gives are great care to this project. 
 
Senior Piping Engineer:  G.G. (WP-Sofia) 
 
Also important, the time out enabled team members to know each other better. We 
could talk much more with G.J. and B.M., who he have been working with us for 
several weeks, and understand their motivations and personal stories.  It was the 
first time G.J. traveled outside the U.S. and he was excited and impressed to all that 
he was seen in Brazil. He told about the resistance of his colleagues to come to Brazil 
but said that he would love move with his family for some time and his kids were 
excited to live by the beach in Rio. B.M. was a globetrotter. She had traveled too 
many countries, especially in the Eastern Europe. But she loved Bulgaria and the 
quite life she lived there. Curious and vibrant she never refused an invitation for 
going out, visiting places and talk for hours.  
 
On arrival, we met G.G., an early-30s Bulgarian piping engineer who had just arrived 
from the WP Sofia office to follow us on the visit. Two days later, we met S.T.V., a 
late-40 electrical engineer. Very reserved and somehow wary in the beginning, 
slowly through the days they relaxed and showed up to be very friendly.  
For four days we traveled, went out for dining and drinking and for some 
sightseeing. Despite the apparent cultural difference, a sentiment that we Brazilians 
shared was that we got along much better with the Bulgarians than with the 
Americans though were much more used to them.  
 
S.P.H. behavior during the visit attracted my attention as can be seen in the field 
notes below: 
 
(…) Overall during the trip, he talked very few to me and whenever he did was in  lecturing tone as a 
should have done or paid attention to something only him noticed. During the technical 
documentation examination in the office visit, in front Eletrobras Eletronuclear technical staff he 
constantly tried to be friendly and pretend that he was aware of everything. Every time I asked 
something to Eletrobras Eletronuclear he get into the subject and mimicked the answer usually to 
make my question look like trivial.  
 
(…) While we get into the van to go back to Rio, he insistently repeated to everybody, even in English, 
that it was a trivial project and we could halve the man-hours estimates, what gave me a chill in the 
spine (…) On return he realized that he had not checked-out at the hotel before living and how his 
things were at the reception as the room was already reserved for another guest. He had not also 
booked his ticket back to São Paulo, and as all flights were full he would have to get another hotel in 
Rio what was also hard to find. As he must get back to São Paulo early in the morning to get I flight o 
Manaus, he had to booked I flight at 5 o’clock in the morning, in international airport (35Km away 
from Rio) and stay the night in the flat of a former CNC/WP colleague that were living in Rio. All that 
made me wonder which organizational skills qualified this man for manager, if he wasn’t able to even 
set with the secretary a business trip to Rio …(…)(Field Diary, 28th July  2010). 
 
On the 30th July 2010, we took the day to work on the Rio de Janeiro office of another 
WP affiliated, ITCS, which worked with deep-sea drilling. This day, working on a 
round table we tried to line up information, organize the work left and decide where 
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to concentrate the efforts. The content of this day long joint work can gauged 
through the field diary notes next: 
 
 
(…) T.D. was worried about the impact of the technical certifications in the overall technical score and 
the room left for cutting prices. As he simulated many different score scenarios he realized that the 
competition depended even more on the technical point that previously imagined, with price 
discounts not compensating for lost technical points. Taking some limitations into consideration, his 
calculations shown that a single technical point ahead of competitors would cover for a price increase 
of 5% in the overall project cost over competitors. On the other hand, large discounts would not 
compensate for low technical score because limiting factors in the competition calculation formula 
would block their effect. (…) as we could calculate, objective score, corresponding to technical 
certificates from the company and the key technical staff accounted for 70% of all technical score, 
while subjective score, corresponding to the write-up´s accounted for 30% of technical score (…) As 
this look counter-intuitive we read again altogether and checked if all these calculations were correct. 
(…) after all this process T.D. said “Discount does not matter! What matters is technical score!” (…) 
 
(…)While I, B.M. and F.F.M spent time updating document status and responsibilities in the write-up 
control, T.D., R.M.Z. and G.J. discussed about the technical certificates supposed to be supplied by 
WP-Reading.(…) (Field Diary, 30th July  2010). 
 
With T.D. return and the awareness of the importance of the technical certifications, 
which heavily depended on WP-Reading, pressure upon G.J., build up. As he was 
also losing ground for the active and pragmatic B.M. actuation, he felt the hit and 
end up isolating himself from the group. After this week, G.J. returned to the U.S. to 
speed up certificates expedition and B.M., G.G. and S.T.V. returned to Bulgaria. 
Communications and cooperation also improved, as can be seen below: 
 
Hi All, 
  
Please see the attached files with my comments and addition to write-ups from 30/07/2010. I have used track 
changes so it should be easier to recognize them. I have checked also and Section B 18 - Knowledge 
Transfer_23Jul2010 - on page 8: “…of Technical Consultant to Kozloduy NPP in a Euro 492 bln. project for 
Units 5 – 6 modernization…” should be “…mln (milion)…”. Anything else looks fine for me. 
  
(CNC) L.M.A. 
  
The part 1.6.1.1.2.2 - STRESS ANALYSIS and SUPPORT CALCULATION REPORT I have modified in 
Angra3_B16_MethodWorkPlan. I have added some paragraphs that I think are important but still you check 
them. Especially the usage of ASME and KTA standards. 
  
If there are any else I can do, don’t hesitate to contact me. 
  
Best regards, 
  
(WP-Sofia) G.G.  
Piping Engineer 
 
Hi L.M.A. (CNC) 
  
Good to know that you guys are back to Sao Paulo and everything is ok. I missed my fly to Sofia because the 
flight from Rio had late. So I had to stay one night in a hotel at Paris airport. It’s not nice but sometimes 
happens. 
  
About the write-up I’ll take a look and see what I can do. As soon I’m done I’ll write you back. 
  
Regards, 
  
(WP-Sofia) G.G. 
Piping Engineer  
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Hi (WP-Sofia) G.G. 
  
What about the trip back to Sofia? Everything just fine? 
  
Here we are back to São Paulo and fully dedicated to write these write-ups.  
  
Maybe you can help us on the STRESS ANALYSIS and SUPPORT CALCULATION REPORT as we 
discussed in Rio. 
  
Attached follows what I have written prior to the visit. Feel free to change this as you wish. 
  
Regards, 
   
(CNC) L.M.A. 
 
(E-mail thread copied to (CNC) F.F.M., (WP-Sofia) B.M., (WP-Sofia) L.S.V. and (WP-Reading) G.J. 
from, 02h August 2010 to 05th August 2010 – Exact transcription) 
 
On the 2nd August 2010, back to CNC/WP office in São Paulo, we realized that much 
of the technical documents had to be updated to reflect the information gathered 
during the visit. Nevertheless, S.P.H. eagerly wanted to cut down the man-hours 
estimation, the intense debate involving this issue can be gauged by the field diary 
notes below: 
 
(…) However, early in the day S.P.H. stop at my desk and eagerly said that we would have to work 
on an intensive cut in the man-hours previously estimated. I said ok, but before I need to tell him 
about the technical seminar and explain how the project automations tools developed by them 
worked. He said ok, but it was less important, and that based on what he had seen in the project 
documentation and UNA2 site visit we could cut 50% in the man-hours estimated. Then, I told him 
about the conversation we had with T.D. where it would not help much to cut the man-hours 
because we were already working close to the client estimation and that the competitions rules did 
not benefit low prices but higher technical scores, and maybe it did not worth the time to revise 
man-hours in face of so much to do in the technical documents. Loudly, he said that what I was 
saying did not make sense and that we must cut the hours to win the bid. As, I tried to further 
explain he got angry said that my desk was not place to discuss this. I said we should then look for 
T.D. and he would explain everything. Then he went away complaining about me so that people 
around could see. I went to talk to R.M.Z. to complain what have happened while we were talking, 
S.P.H. came to us and asked us to follow him and look for T.D.(…) (Field Diary, 2nd  August  2010). 
 
We asked T.D. a small meeting to clarify the issue. In this meeting several 
problematic issues concerning the proposal have been discussed as follows: 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: The discussion is this the following… after the technical visit… all that we saw… S.P.H. saw 
that it is possible to reduce the number of man-hours in a relevant way. (…) This morning we were talking, and 
L.M.A. said “Oh, is it worth to change the man-hours now because T.D. did an calculation (…) and maybe it is 
not worth to invest time in changing the man-hours because it will change price and that´s not what matters”. 
In my opinion, we indeed have to change the man-hours because … it´s something somehow 
philosophic…operation has to deliver an amount of man-hours enough to do that project. (…) So, what´s the 
idea… I think we have to improve the man-hours…. Because he (L.M.A.) also said something important he have 
to spent a time that I could be working in the technical documents. I said “That´s true… this that you are 
saying is important”…but what I also think, is that we are going to get that table and work on the man-hours 
because, although the technical documents are as much or even more important than that, we have to run the 
PV (proposal price), we have to run several things… he have to run the risk analysis that depend on the amount 
of man-hours…so, I think we must have a reliable amount of what we need in terms of man-hours. 
 
(CNC) T.D.: Yeah… let me take advantage of the moment to explain something. There is people that has as a 
work style… ok… to hide from the rest of the team … ok… something…”Look, I only tell this to you because for 
me you only has to know this and so I will only tell this”… This is a way … don´t want to make any further 
evaluation if it right or wrong… I don´t work like this… I think the team… of course there is certain things, 
certain questions, that are not appropriate for the team but I think the more information the team knows, the 
better we are aligned to get the project done…ok?! So, when I did that in Rio a simulation and show to you that 
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the price sensitivity is not as big as the technical score problem…that´s because you are involved in doing… it 
happened that what was expect WP to do… ok… We end up increasingly absorbing things… texts to do about 
the methodology, about the knowledge transfer, of this and that…  
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: This was a WP task? 
 
(CNC) T.D.: For me it was WP task. Has always been… because they are the proponents, they know nuclear 
projects, they should do… Then, they came up with the following argument… “But you (CNC/WP) went deep 
down in the technical specification, you know well the scope. So create a draft to me… I said “Ok, as a draft I 
accept…but it keep being yours (WP)”…Then, while I was on vacation, it changed… the text can go straight 
into Portuguese…don´t need to translate… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: We did the draft in English… and sent to them…  
 
(CNC) T.D.: They did not talk about it… did not added to this….(…) What I wanted to show to you is 
highlight the importance of getting the maximum technical score… so these texts, these things… we have to do 
and if it is necessary we have to beat these WP guys because it has to become the best technical proposal as 
possible.  
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: Are we on this way? 
 
(CNC) T.D.: I think they are working well, but we have to … don´t be shy to finger point this guys (WP) … 
you have to do this…for example, the came here when I arrived, to talk … “Look, we are writing about project 
management…”. Hey, project management… despite all of your effort… they are not specialists…WP comes 
here with a lot of “gringos” bothering us that they have more than a thousand procedures … WP has to say: “ 
My way to manage a project with more than 70.000 documents is like this”… it is already in the procedures… 
So, why us “tupiniquins” have to be writing if the guys have a procedure? But look… it does not kelp to say I 
will grant access to T.D. and then he goes there in a place where there is 1500 procedures, and go look for what 
talk about what. So, my importance is this one… to highlight that the technical score… yes, is very important. 
But now let´s go back to the man-hours to the money…what happens…we must have the leanest proposal as 
possible… achievable, that you are…it is not comfortable…today we cannot be comfortable…(…) that´s what 
we need to know. Why? Because there are a bunch of thinks … for example there is a bunch of risks the guy 
(WP) are identifying, and this risk is about to revert in money… contingency… There is a great discussion 
today…. Between us here… CNC/WP and WP… because WP says that everybody has to be CLT (formal 
employees)… if we assume everybody as CLT either we will pay few and won´t have employees or will pay too 
much and we are out… (…) all this will reflect on price… then this debate we will have with F.C., C.A.J…(…) 
Summing up, let´s optimize the man-hours, taking into account what we understood of the scope… ok…we 
need to revise…(…)   
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: (…) What worries me is that if we are awarded the contract… (pretend applauses) …if we are 
not awarded let´s do a analysis… Why we lost the bid? … look  Promon estimate X hour and we 2X 
hours…(…) Then, I be very transparent “ But T.D. said it was not that important and we did not care much 
about this”…”Errr, but you get that wrong”. 
 
(CNC) T.D.: OK! It is important! … so let clarify… I want from the production the leanest proposal. It is not 
me, T.D. …CNC/WP wants…  
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: We are going to revise this… it will come down, we don’t know how much , but we are going to 
revise it…Another thing… technical documents are the most important…this inclusive was WP task… we are 
doing it here, the technical procedures internally… Will WP check this giving its approval?… Will confirm 
that? 
 
(CNC) T.D.: Yes, they will have to… You (R.M.Z.) are saying no, but I am to get G.J. now and say “My fellow, 
this is your duty! Let´s get into F.C. room and I am going to tell “it is you obligation!” … “If we receive a bad 
score in the methodology it is your fault not mine, all right?!” 
 
(… a noisy discussion …) 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.:  That is what happens… We began doing it in Portuguese, because we need to send them a 
draft so that they could read and comment. What we perceived… correct if I am wrong… is that not only they 
did not do that, but they don´t have enough knowledge on the proposal and what they did was to go their in 
1500 procedures in the EMS and send some to us… so that at least two times the sent me documentation that I 
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forwarded to him (L.M.A.) and he looked made many comments and said “No, this is what is there (EMS), we 
need what is in the project!” Then we set that it does not help to be waiting them, let´s to it here… (…)  
 
(T.D. leave the room to talk to M.A.C., engineering director) 
 
(CNC)  F.F.M.: So there must be someone that go there and charge G.J. … Everytime we talk to him he never 
comment it…  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: It is not the worst… the worst is that a document were in their hands (WP-Reading), is now on 
our hands… the technology transfer plan…  
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.:  The problem is that the document that were in their hands for 10 days, 15 days… (…) and if 
we were to do that … 10 days ago we could think about something… but he (G.J.) took 10 days to read a 
document from B.M. that he did not take a look, and sent it to us… that means… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: What were those guys doing here (G.J. and B.M.)? 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z. (…) They understood what we need in terms of technical certificates… I mean, they think they 
understood… and requested this to the U.S. They think they understood the people that has to work in the 
project… on the rest…(…) “no, because we are sending them a draft”… we did it…and nothing… we made 
F.M.C translate to English… and no return…  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: When the technical documents were at 1/3… “oh, no it was to come in English”…we spent 
time translating… then we did another 1/3.. he had  2/3… again… “oh, no it has to be done in Portuguese”… 
and then we went to the technical visit… when you read the bidding instructions you understand one thing, 
and you go there talk to the guys (Eletronuclear) and see what it is… it´s another job… 
 
(CNC) F.F.M: There is so much work to be done. 
 
(…) 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: So, what we are doing goes back and forth … AND… new things keep coming… When you get 
rid of an item you get two more to be done.  
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: It is important to understand why he did that….When we read the proposal… They discovered 
that there were items that depended on the visit to complement the technical part of the proposal. (…)  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: There were items that it does not worth to work on them because without knowing exactly what 
that meant it would be impossible to say something… 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: (...) Then the guys (WP) arrived and said: “ Send it to us that the way it is we will translate it 
and…” But there are missing things… This depend on the visit, that depends on the visit…Then they get 
desperate… Then came a note (from Eletrobras Eletronuclear) telling that if the technical documents were 
written in Portuguese they did not need to be sworn translated. Then they said  “So send it in Portuguese” 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: And do they know Portuguese? 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: No! 
 
(CNC) F.F.M.: They will not evaluate…  
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: They will not evaluate, but this is their responsibility. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: In my opinion what happened is that they get these guys as the best in the nuclear field … that 
they would solve everything … First, that they solved nothing… Second that the project there is nothing to do 
with nuclear … there will be 10% of project … 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: It´s a copy… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: And half is electrical stuff, half is piping stuff... there is 5% nuclear piping project work… the 
rest is data processing work…So, they put too much responsibility in the hand of these guys and they didn´t 
hold it up… and then it keep coming back things for us…  
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(CNC) R.M.Z.: They did not read the Technical Specification, as they should… they did not understand what 
was supposed to be done…  
 
(…) 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: Without losing focus… we cannot get paranoid... you (L.M.A.) go ahead with the technical 
documents because you are focused… if you stop now to revise man-hours you are going to say “Good damn!” 
It is! So if it is not necessary we will not to that…  you finish what you are doing… because the man-hour 
revision will take few hours… one day we will address this… (…)  
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.: No, because of the following … when you run the PV (sale price) you have to do the risk 
analysis… (…) I need the man-hours before, so that I need to close the PV …WP has already separated a 
contingency of US$10 million because of the technical warranty of 5 years. Do you understand… if we keep 
separating contingencies this way  …there is no way to compete… so we have to arrive at a price as soon as 
possible.  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: So, let´s do it… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: Let´s take a time tomorrow and do it…  
 
(Recorded Meeting, 2nd August 2010, Author translation). 
 
On the 3rd August. T.D. talked to F.C. and together they put more pressure on G.J. so 
that WP-Reading personnel verify and comment the documents sent. This pressure 
however has been transmitted to WP-Sofia as two days later they sent comments on 
the partial documents previously sent. This time also comment represented more 
substance instead of being disconnected excerpts of previous works and standard 
procedures. 
 
The next day, WP-Reading succeeded in certifying their PDS administrator, so my 
name would not be used in the proposal anymore. Not only the certificate supplied 
by Intergraph displayed a very recent date, what could make Eletrobras 
Eletronuclear suspicious, but also it did not prove he had the necessary experience 
required in the bidding instructions. I advised R.M.Z. which wrote to T.D. advising 
to ask for another certificate with older date. Surprisingly he called me to discuss the 
situation. As he thought it was not important but show some hesitation, I again 
advised him to discuss about it with somebody because any false information would 
mean declassification and ruin all effort done. In the end he decided that it was not 
important and left it untouched. Even though, for safety I decided to tell R.M.Z., 
which wrote a e-mail to T.D., copied L.S.V. describing the problem: 
 
(CNC) T.D., 
 
According item 1.2.7. from the BID we need to prove the experience of the PDS administrator informing all 
contracts that this guy worked as PDS administrator. 
 
And in compliance with page 131/132, proof of staff experience, the PDS administrator shall be at least 5 years 
experience in the area. 
 
Is our guy in compliance with this 2 item? The certificate was issued in 2010, remember this, please! 
 
(CNC) R.M.Z.  
 
(E-mail sent on 04th August 2010 – Author Translation) 
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On the 5th August, T.D. invited me to discussion about the organizational structure of 
the UNA3 project where relevant issues about CNC/WP organizational history and 
culture emerged, as can be seen in the field diary notes below: 
 
(…) While I was working in the write-ups, T.D. and R.M.Z. passed by my desk and asked me to come 
with them. We took a round table available near R.M.Z.´s desk and start to discuss about the 
organizational structure of the project. T.D. had some doubts about the project structure to be 
presented because he were used to the traditional project structure of the CNC/WP infrastructure 
division, and the UNA 3 project would better follow a project structure more close to those of the 
industry division. As such they intended to use the organizational structure of the PDY project as a 
model, because this project involved workshare between U.S. and Brazil. Then I and R.M.Z. began 
discussing who did what in the project and highlighted that although it was a nice idea to go in that 
direction, the PDY structure presented some problems that required correction. The role of the 
coordinators in the project (R.M.Z. had been electrical coordinator), for example, in our opinion 
required some changes. Then T.D. reminded the figure of the P.E., or project engineer, who was 
traditionally assigned with the technical responsibility of the project. Then T.D. also invited P.D.J. 
whose desk was close to join the conversation about the P.E. role. (…)  
 
We then engaged a debate concerning the use of two coordinators, one technical the other for 
production control. T.D. intervene to say that they would have to think it well because expatriates 
should be assigned to high positions and these should not be inflated. Otherwise, he said, either they 
might not accept to come to Brazil or the client impression about the expatriate importance would be 
affected. We then argues that WP usually raked people one grade above the usual in Brazil, with 
Project Manager turning into Project Director, and so on… T.D. said that it depended on client’s top-
management, which might refuse to talk to someone with a lower rank, with directors only speaking 
to directors, managers to manager and so forth. Then he said it resembled what happened in CCC. 
(…) 
 
T.D. then began to tell us about what happened prior to CNC sale. He told that in CCC the 
environment was highly politicized and rivalries build a great secrecy in the company. Working in 
private offices with their secretaries and direct collaborators, CCC managers and director begin to 
make deals on the edge of legality all for competition. According with T.D. the chief of one of the 
competing groups manage to be in the succession line, just waiting for the CEO to retire. In his 
account some CNC executives (which he does not tell) were just waiting this to happen to move to 
key CCC positions. Little before, however, the Federal Police broke into CCC office with a mandate 
looking for corruption proofs. After that, the family that controls the group decided to hire an 
external executive to assume in the place of the retiring CEO. In T.D. words, “when somebody comes 
from out of the structure, he has a mission”. The new CEO dismantled all parallel power among 
political groups, making everybody work close to one another, changing positions and breaking 
command lines. Also during this process CNC sale was sealed. Curiously, this discussion start to 
attract more and more people when we saw there were at least 7 people watching and participating 
on the discussions (…). 
 
This story made me wonder about the fact that F.C. still used CCC e-mail and that CNC/WP 
president, C.A.J., was almost a ghost president with little involvement with the company. Also make 
me wonder a picture in the 4th floor, where all CNC/WP top executives had private offices, with the 
CCC directorship still hanging on the wall. (…)(Field Diary, 5th  August  2010). 
 
With the proposal deadline of 24th August 2010 looming and pressure upon the 
write-ups mounting up, F.M.C., who was introduced as a key person in the company 
to help the proposal, and till then had only done few trivial work, decided jump out 
when he was most needed, for the reasons described below:  
 
(CNC) F.M.C., 
  
Below follows the text for translation and verification: 1.6.2.1 – Project Manual Draft: BY WP SOFIA  
  
Design Manual will incorporate our proven (…) 
 
Att, 
(CNC) L.M.A. 
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Dear (CNC) R.M.Z. and (CNC) L.M.A., 
  
Today I will finish the translation of this text here – 1.6.2.1 and I’ll sent it to you. 
 
About the 2 others, I think I won’t be able to help on time, because there is another urgent proposal of the TAV 
(high Speed Train) Rio – SP – Campinas, to which I was required! 
  
Can you sent the 2 other texts to other people? 
  
Sincerily,  
 
(CNC) F.M.C.  
 
 
(CNC) F.M.C., good afternoon,  
  
Let go, we can handle that. 
  
Thanks 
  
(CNC) R.M.Z.   
 
(E-mail thread on 05h August 2010 – Author Translation) 
 
To cover for the work left, R.M.Z. required two junior engineers from his origin 
discipline (electrical). These two junior engineers received several sections of the 
technical documentation to translate and write and did a fairly good job even when 
they did not know much about subject under their responsibility as they searched 
other colleagues for help. Parallel, both R.M.Z. and T.D. also took sections to write 
and revise.  As a result of all these efforts the write-up job advanced steady through 
the 11th of August, and as soon as each document was completed in Portuguese, 
F.F.M. and the other two junior engineers “google translated” them to English so that 
they could be sent to WP-Reading for final review and help in the EPR (Executive 
proposal review) preparation.  
 
On the 11th August, A.G.R. sent the man-hours estimates for the final review. As 
nothing changed in this mean time, they have just been just confirmed. Parallel, final 
versions of the write-ups prepared by the Brazilian team began to be sent to WP-
Sofia for review and comments. The “organizational structure” was the first one to 
be sent for analysis. On the 13th August, the first comments arrived on this document, 
as can be see below: 
 
(CNC) T.D., (CNC) R.M.Z., (WP-Reading) G.J, 
  
Attached is Sofia revision of the Organizational structure you sent on Wednesday with track changes. As 
discussed yesterday on the conference call with D.T. (Nuclear Division Managing Director – WP-London 
formerly WP-Sofia Managing Director) for projects of this size it is standard practice in WP worldwide to 
introduce such Steering Committee. Generally we do not have two committees but in the preliminary 
conversations we had with F.C. he suggested that usually you have another committee at Technical level. That is 
why we decide to introduce two – Executive Steering Committee: with really high level executives 
(suggestions are D.T. and C.A.J.) that will meet every 3-4 months with same high level Client’s representatives 
and another Technical Steering Committee to resolve technical issues (suggestions are S.S. (Regional 
Director WP-Sofia), J.C.K.(Nuclear Division General Manager),F.C.) and similar level representatives from 
Eletrobras. This committee will meet more often ~ monthly. 
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Please note that these are just suggestions and general practices in WP but might be something 
totally untypical and not very acceptable by the Client. Your advice on this will be very important 
since you know the Client and you know what they are used to see in Brazil. Also any changes that 
you want to make to the suggested people for each committee are also welcome.  
  
At the OrgChart we tried to put the two Committees the way we see them and the connection lines with the 
other boxes but feel free to remove and adapt these consequently. 
  
After the OrgChart we have represented two sections including the main functions of the key individuals with 
specific attention given to the technical guys in the last section stressing on their educational and professional 
background as per the RFP. 
  
Hope you will have chance to discuss among the management and get back to us with your comments. 
 
We are working on the revision of the other sections as well and will send them shortly.  
  
Kind regards, 
(WP-Sofia) B.M. 
 
(E-mail sent on 13h August 2010 – Exact Transcription – sender highlight) 
 
Together with this message B.M. sent pictures of the WP organizational chart in 
corporative, divisional and project terms to be added to the “Organizational 
Structure” document to be delivered to Eletrobras Eletronuclear. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 72: WP global management structure as per 13th August 2010 (WP Presentation). 
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Fig. 73: WP nuclear business management structure as per 13th August 2010 (WP Presentation). 
 
 
 
Fig. 74: WP organizational chart for UNA3. Red-box for WP-Reading, blue-box CNC/WP ones (WP Presentation). 
 
On the 13th of August, arrived the news that the deadline of the proposal had 
changed again to the 9th of September 2010, from the 24th August 2010.  Also, key 
technical documents were sent to WP-Sofia for review and came out with trivial 
comments, as can be seen next: 
 
Hi All, 
  
I have passed through B15 - KNOWLEDGE OF THE OBJECT and I find it OK.  
  
Just one thing is that on page 13:  “…as recognized in the market and can be proven in the curricula presented 
in Annex YYY.”,-  there is no annex number. 
  
Best regards, 
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(WP-Sofia) G.G. 
Piping Engineer 
 
(E-mail sent on 16h August 2010 – Exact Transcription) 
 
              +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
Hi Gyus, 
Here are my comments 
 
1.5.1.1.1 – Mobilization Phase 
 It is worthy to add few more sentences of how the “Projectwise” will be used as well as what document control 
philosophy will be implemented  
1.5.1.1.2 - Phase Modeling 
Remove the last paragraph of the section, it is repeated twice. 
1.5.3- GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSESSMENT OF CONCEPTS TO BE EMPLOYED 
Please describe what PMI is 
1.5.3.1- Management and Project Supervision 
It is worthy to emphases the importance of the design review meeting and what is their importance for design 
development. On the other hand I think that fortnightly design review meeting is too much. Bear in mind that 
the meeting has to be prepared, conducted, feedback to be collected and implemented. Please bear in mind that 
the WP procedure requires three stages design review during whole design process at 25/30% at 60/70 % and 
90/100%.  
1.5.4.1 - Availability of manpower place 
Last paragraph. Please do not forget to define the “X%” and “Y years”. 
1.5.4.2- Recruitment 
Last two sentences. “… listed in the table below …” and “… is shown in the chart below.”  The table and the 
chart are missing. 
  
Regards 
(WP-Sofia)  G.I. 
Senior Process Engineer 
 
(E-mail sent on 16h August 2010 – Exact Transcription) 
 
In the same day, B.M. requested technical information to prepare a short description 
of the work for the participants of the EPR meeting on the 24th August 2010.  
 
(CNC) L.M.A., 
  
I am now working on the EPR (Executive Proposal Review) document and would like to include a short 
description of the work. I remember that you sad that in the Methodology you want to include a flow diagram of 
the processes. If you had a chance to develop it can you send me an editable English version so I can include in 
the document. 
  
Thanks! 
 
Regards, 
 
(WP-Sofia)  B.M. 
 
 
Hi (WP-Sofia)  B.M., 
  
That´s the workflow I did for the executive sequence. Check it out and if its OK I can translate the legend and 
send you. 
  
Att. 
  
(CNC) L.M.A. 
Project Engineer 
 
(E-mail thread on 16h August 2010 – Exact Transcription) 
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Fig. 75: CNC/WP workflow developed according to UNA 3 bidding instructions. 
  
With man-hours consolidated, it was possible to go ahead with the final risk analysis 
review. As I came to know, there was intense argument between proposal 
management and risk analysis personnel. The stressful outcomes of this meeting can 
be gauged from the field notes below: 
 
When I met F.F.M. later in the afternoon he asked if I knew what have happened in the risk meeting. I 
said I did not, as I was not required to attend it. So, he told that things “got hot” in there as T.D. 
fiercely fought over the criteria used for risk assessment, which were imposing an pointless financial 
burden into the commercial proposal. According to F.F.M. the argument between T.D. and D.B. was 
so intense that the meeting had to be interrupted several times and end up breaking without a 
compromise. (…)  
 
After lunch I accidentally met C.L.D. in the elevator and without quoting the source asked what have 
happened in UNA 3 risk meeting. He showed discontent I said: “In this company there is people (T.D. 
and R.M.Z., I suppose) that think they are stars in the constellation…So, you know about risk??…. Then do it 
yourself!” Curiously, seconds later T.D. got into the elevator  and said hello to us and the conversation 
broke down. (…) (Field Diary, 19h  August  2010). (Field Diary, 19h  August  2010). 
 
As I came to know later, T.D. extended the discussion to F.C., M.T.L. (Infrastructure 
Division Superintendent) and even C.A.J. As I came to know he threatened to quit 
the proposal if risk assessment criteria that he considered excessive were not revised. 
His efforts were successful. When I had the opportunity to ask him about what 
happened he just told me that “Risk people” were crazy. The way they acted we 
would never be awarded a contract.   Few days later there was another risk meeting 
and this time a compromise was reached towards a more acceptable level of 
contingencies. 
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7.5- KNOWLEDGE CHANGE OUTCOMES 
 
On the 20th of August 2010, R.M.Z. forwarded to me and F.F.M., the first visible 
contribution of WP-Reading to the proposal. A person named B.M.M., sent to a 
document called “Executive Summary”, alien to the bidding instructions, which 
were to be added to the proposal as marketing piece to talk about the advantages of 
hiring WP and introducing the seven engineers to be assigned to the project. The e-
mail was sent to C.A.J (CNC/WP President), F.C. (Sales Director), M.T.C. 
(Infrastructure division superintendent), T.D., R.M.Z., D.T. (President Global Nuclear 
Division – WP London, formerly from WP-Sofia), H.S. (WP-Houston Regional 
Director), T.M. (Global Power Managing Director), B.M., L.S.V., S.S. (WP-Sofia 
Regional Director), and G.J. in that order. The document displayed the logo of both 
CNC/WP and WP on the header and foothold.  
 
 
Fig. 76: List of Questions sent by WP-Sofia engineers on the 22th July 2010.  
 
Later, WP-Sofia commented the two last documents, also with trivial concerns: 
 
Attached are some small comments on Knowledge transfer section. We have just one concern that we are 
allowed to use up to 15 pages and we used only 7 (or maybe in Portuguese version they are 1 or 2 more pages). 
Do you think that this will be well accepted by the Client? Should we think of expanding this section? Even 
with some pictures – diagrams. We can think about this after the EPR rush is over.  
  
Regards, 
(WP-Sofia)  B.M. 
 
(Subject: UNA3_B16_Work Methodology_20.08.10_Sofia comments...) 
 
Hi All, 
  
Please see the attached file with our comments highlighted by track changing. 
  
Due to google translation it’s hard to read and follow them but in general we agree with the text, still more that 
we had read them before. So the comments shouldn’t lead to some significant modifications. 
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Best regards, 
  
(WP-Sofia) G.G. 
Piping Engineer 
 
(E-mail sent on  20h August 2010 – Exact Transcription) 
 
On the 23rd August 2010, B.M. returned to CNC/WP office in São Paulo, to organize 
the EPR meeting and to follow the last developments of the proposal. In a private 
conversation she told me more about the EPR meeting: 
 
(…)I saw B.M. quite busy on the phone then it took time to go there and say hello. Then she explained 
to me that she should make all arrangements prior to the EPR. She had to make sure that all technical 
and financial information had correctly arrived to each executive members and set up a adequate 
schedule so that all of them could attend to the meeting. She confessed that it was very hard to 
arrange a time to get together at once people in such distant offices like Sydney, Houston, São Paulo, 
Singapore, and Sofia. I took the opportunity to ask her what was EPR meeting for. She explained to 
me that EPR was a high level committee that would say “yes” or “no” to the proposal. In this meeting 
C.A.J., CNC/WP president, would officially present the proposal and the other members would check 
his knowledge about it. However, generally EPR members knew little about the proposal and usually 
just  look at the numbers and taking care about the money and the cash-flow. Therefore, during the 
presentation, there must not be the signal of minus (-) in any place. She also conceded that schedule 
planning frequently had to be manipulated to get rid of any (-) which could eventually show up. Even 
though, she also told me that sometimes the EPR meeting “gets hot”, what I assumed to happen in the 
form of a political battleground. After all that, the final word would be said by R.E.W, US – Latin 
America Regional Director.(…) (Field Diary, 23rd  August  2010). 
 
On the 24th August EPR meeting took place, and I was allowed to follow in the initial 
technical discussions, as described in the field notes below: 
 
(…) The EPR meeting was made through conference call. My great expectations to see the proposal 
debates were broken by the terrible communication resources available, the sound of airplanes on the 
other side was sensible. Overall the meeting was almost ritualistic in that questions were trivial, like, 
“Are you confident that all points have been examined”, and the answers limited to “yes” and “no”. 
When financial discussions began we were asked to go and the meeting continued with R.M.Z., T.D., 
C.D.L, and A.G.R.(…) (Field Diary, 24th August  2010). 
 
While technical write-ups headed to conclusion, documental work involving 
certificates and eligibility documents, which were in charge of WP-Reading, 
(specially G.J.), sparked increasing concerns. B.M. was very worried for the time left 
for sworn translations of these documents. In a brief conversation, however, we 
talked about WP and the role of CNC/WP and WP-Sofia: 
 
(…) We suddenly began to talk about differences within WP. According to B.M. the cultures and 
forms of CNC/WP and WP-Sofia were very different, with CNC/WP very inward-looking and WP-
Sofia more forward-looking. B.M. said she was surprising to see that many CNC/WP managers could 
barely keep a conversation in English, while in WP-Sofia people internally spoke English to one 
another as a form to train the idiom. As such, she said ti was hard to take something out of meetings, 
and it was better to require and discuss things through e-mail or personal conversations. (…) 
 
(…) When talking about CNC/WP purchase, she said that despite the fact that everybody it was 
because of its hydropower engineering capability, in fact it was due to nuclear and oil contracts that 
were on sight of WP. (…)(Field Diary, 26th August  2010). 
 
By the 25th of August 2010, when documents start to arrive by standard mail, and for 
the first time were seen. Immediately, B.M. and CNC/WP personnel detected several 
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problems with those few who had arrived. Nuclear project certificates still belonged 
to Gilbert/Commonwealth, formally linked to WP-NewYork, a branch without 
employees and revenues (who had been transferred to WP-Reading), which were not 
entirely absorbed by WP-Reading to reap fiscal benefits in the U.S.  
 
Another key unobserved element was that the official bidder would be WP-
International, which also did not possessed any revenues or official employees, 
whereas, technical certificates and financial statements all belonged to WP-Group  
(WP-Reading controller) which linked to WP-Incorporated (the parent company) and 
not to WP- International (a ghost entity). Without asking anyone in Brazil or Sofia, 
WP-Reading only sent an unsigned letter explaining that all these companies 
belonged to WP-International assuming that it would be just fine. The problem was 
that WP corporate structure, with several ramifications, cross-controlled companies 
and ghost entities resembled fraudulent arrangements in Brazilian business, against 
which competition rules provided several protections, and with certainly would not 
be met by such letter.  
 
On top of everything, as WP-Group was not a listed company (only the parent 
company WP-Incorporated was) so it wasn’t required by U.S. law to keep audited 
balance records, required by the eligibility package. As such Ernst & Young a 
acknowledge auditing company was required to write a virtual balance sheet in the 
name of WP-International so that it could be presented in the proposal. However, 
when the audit balance sheet of WP arrived to be attached to the proposal it were 
detected to be hand signed by “Mr. Ernst & Young”, the name of the auditing 
company, not of its due representatives, a serious and naïve flaw. Even worst, the 
notary had confirmed and stamped the signature as valid one, what would cast 
doubts all over the documentation.  
 
Any of these problems would mean immediately disqualification of the proposal, on 
the 27th of August 2010, as such, F.C. urged for a meeting to discuss the proposal 
situation, described in the field notes below: 
 
(…) Late in the day, I was urged to follow F.F.M. to a meeting required by T.D. In the room we met 
C.A.A (CNC lawyer)., discussing with F.C. and T.D. As the discussion concerning translation 
problems of the eligibility documents ended, F.C. told that the technical documents sent to an “insider 
expert” from Eletrobras Eletronuclear for evaluation returned with a good impression. While there 
were some comments about the “Knowledge of the Object” and the “Organizational Structure”, the 
“Methodology and Work Plan” impressed to the point that he asked if there were any other person 
from the Eletrobras Eletronuclear helping us. He congratulated us for the work and asked to speed up 
the few adjustments.  
 
After that T.D. explained the problem concerning the balance sheets and the ownership of the 
technical certificates, what angered F.C. He immediately called H.S. (US-Latin America Senior Vice 
President) and asked for correct documentation. The short time available to correct all these problems 
brought a great anxiety to the CNC/WP team. There were only 10 days for the bid deadline and only 
the balance sheet took more than 15 days to be obtained, notary stamped, and sworn translated. Amid 
the turmoil, several suggestions for correction and speed up measures have been made, however it 
was Friday and not much could be done. T.D. was very nervous and said that we would call G.J. had 
urged that he spent the weekend to get everything correctly set.  
 
After the meeting B.M. expressed her worries about how things were handled by WP people in the 
U.S. (Reading and Houston supposedly). She complained that they simply didn´t asked anybody 
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before doing something, a thing F.F.M had just said before entering the meeting. Moreover, she said 
she should had already learnt that whenever working with them, she should check things all times, 
and never forget doing a close follow up. (Field Diary, 27th August  2010). 
 
In the aftermath of this meeting, T.D. traveled to Houston during the weekend to 
personally oversee the reformulation of the problematic documents and check the 
other that was still on the go.  
 
With the last corrections made according to “insider expert” comments, on the 30th 
August I sent the final version of the technical documents to R.M.Z. and my 
participation on the proposal reached an end, as I travel on the 01st September 2010 
an academic meeting in Barcelona. 
 
On the 10th of September 2010, T.D. sent the following message: 
 
Dear Colleagues, 
 
Yesterday we successfully delivered the technical proposal of UNA3. 
  
Our proposal in general was largest and more impressive than of the others. 
  
I would like, in the name of CNC/WP and in my name, thank all those who helped in this endeavor. 
  
After three months of hard work, we delivered a proposal that makes us proud of our quality and 
competitiveness. 
 
Please extend to our gratefulness to all that directly and indirectly  helped in this work. 
   
Abraços, 
  
(CNC) T.D. 
Infrastructure – Project Manager 
 
(E-mail sent on 10h September 2010 – Author Translation) 
 
This message has been copied to R.M.Z., M.A.C. (CNC/WP Engineering Director), 
M.T.C. (Infrastructure Division Superintendent), C.A.A. (CNC/WP lawyer), S.R. (HR 
Manager), E.D. (Administrative Superintendent) and S.S.H. (Industry Division 
Superintendent), and copied to F.F.M., A.G.R., D.B., C.D.L., L.M.A., S.P.H., and 
approximately 20 other people who in one or other way had participated in the 
proposal, both in what apparently looks like an relevance order. 
 
On the 14th September, back to São Paulo, T.D. told me about the very last days of the 
proposal.  
 
(…) He T.D. saw me he came to tell about the last days in the proposal. That him, B.M. and F.F.M. 
spent the last nights and weekends checking each point, correcting, organizing and printing the 
proposal. He explained that they worked so much that almost lost the last flight to Rio to deliver in 
the final hours the proposal to Eletrobras Eletronuclear. He said in the end only three competitors 
presented their bids and that CNC/WP proposal was the largest and most impressive one. He also, 
told me about the problems that he and B.M. had to make G.J. to get what they asked for. According 
to his account B.M. had to call to D.T. (President Global Nuclear Division – WP London, formerly 
from WP-Sofia), which had been his boss in Sofia to intervene and the WP U.S. personnel do what 
was necessary to finish the proposal. (…) (Field Diary, 14th September  2010). 
 
 285 
 
Few weeks later, on the 29th of September, T.D. has been invited to visit at WP-
Reading, probably as recognition of his role in the UNA3 proposal. When he came 
back he told about the great structure they had with the most modern project tools 
and skilled personnel. 
 
Several times I asked R.M.Z. and T.D. about the results of the proposal without any 
direct answer. I was just told that the proposal had problems in the eligibility 
package with WP documentation and that they were requiring revision. On the 19th 
November, however, when I passed by T.D. desk, and described the situation as 
such: 
 
(…) He said me that there were bad news as WP has been disqualified from the competition due to 
problems in the company documentation. However, for good the other two competitors had been also 
disqualified by the same reason. Therefore, competition has been canceled and after some time would 
resume once again. I asked what had happened and he explained that Eletrobras Eletronuclear 
argued that there were problems in four points of the proposal, particularly in the WP financial 
statements. Among the other competitors, the Finish company AF Consulting, had three problems, 
and the Canadian SNC Lavalin, the one that WP feared most, presented only one minor Portuguese 
mistake but Eletrobras decided disqualify all . Packages containing these two parts of the proposal 
were returned sealed to the bidders. (…) 
 
(…) Reflecting about the proposal process T.D. conceded that there were difficulties for the WP 
corporate structure to adapt to the Brazilian business environment. He argued that arrangements to 
keep technical licenses through companies without employees looked like Brazilian fraudulent 
arrangements. Therefore, when UNA3 competition were resumed, WP would have to make 
corporative adjustments or to work on the background to turn new competition rules in their favor. 
Which strategy would be chosen, he did not know. (…) 
 
(…) In regard to WP U.S., T.D. complained about their careless self-confidence, and “certainty 
assurance”, carrying everything like “Here it is this way, so it will also kie these there.” He also 
complained about the difficulty of obtaining information “as it is”, and that he had always to guess 
and check to know how things work in WP. In his opinion nobody can give a direct indication on 
how to do anything and people were always vague.(…) (Field Diary, 19th November  2010). 
 
On the 8th of December, again I met on the corridors T.D. and he told me that finally 
WP agreed to make the structural arrangement as he suggested for and WP-New 
York would be finally incorporated to the WP-Group which would be in charge of 
the UNA3 bidding as soon as it was resumed. One year later, the bidding process 
resumed and after several delays and a lengthy process of proposal judgment, a 
Finnish engineering company unknown to the Brazilian market but assisted by a 
former CCC director won the bidding process and took over the job. 
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8.1- PROJECT OBJECT 
 
BGB was conceived as an integrated oil terminal and storage facility operated by BG, 
a British oil & gas company, in the future Açu Superport Industrial Complex. The 
complex is being constructed by LLX, an emergent Brazilian logistics operator, in the 
municipality of Campos dos Goytacazes (Rio de Janeiro state, Brazil), and according 
to plans, is expected to handle at least 350 million tons of exports and imports per 
year, making it the largest industrial port enterprise in Latin America and one of the 
three largest ports in the world.  
 
The complex has also plans to host two steel mills, two cement factories, a 
thermoelectric, an automaker, auto parts industries, a metallurgical center, a terminal 
for the storage and processing of oil, and an offshore support services with an IT 
complex.  According to company’s estimates, the whole complex will attract 
investments of more than US$ 40 billion and create approximately 50,000 new jobs. 
 
 
Fig.77: BGB location. (Source: Google Maps) 
 
BGB is a direct consequence of the promulgation of the Oil Law in 1997 (law nº 
9.478/1997), which broke up with Petrobras monopoly and implemented the 
concession system for oil exploration in Brazil. In the concession system, ANP 
(Brazilian Oil Agency) organize auctions where companies can acquire exclusive 
exploration rights within determined areas (blocks) for a time period (usually 8 
years). Companies are given any oil they produce in return for taking exploratory 
and operational risks and for paying royalties and other fees to the government. 
Most of Brazil’s oilfields use this system, including about 30 per cent of the pre-salt 
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region. These were put out in several concessions before the region’s potential was 
understood, mostly to Petrobras, either alone or in partnership with international oil 
companies (IOCs) such as ExxonMobil, Shell and BG. 
 
In June 2000, took place “Brazil Round 2” ANP auction, where companies spent 
around US$292 million to acquire exploration rights on 21 of the 23 offered areas. 
The consortia led by Petrobras acquired the exploration rights of all Santos basin 
blocks, paying a particularly high price (US$ 143 million) for three of these blocks, 
BM-S-9/10/11. Together with other international oil companies, BG composed a 
minority share (25% ∼ 30%) on these three blocks, what was priced US$ 42 million at 
the time. 
 
 
Fig.78: Brazil Round 2 (Source: ANP) 
 
In October 2006, Petrobras, BG and Galp discovered oil in an ultra deep field of the 
BM-S-11 block, which became known as Tupi. After 2 years and US$1 billion more 
on research, Tupi proved to hold a minimum of 8 billion barrels of light crude, the 
world largest oil discovery in more than 20 years. Tupi revolutionized oil exploration 
in Brazil as it disclosed the existence of the so-called “pre-salt fields”, light oil 
reservoirs beneath 2,000 meters of water and 5,000 of salt, sand and rocks. After Tupi, 
several other large oil fields were discovered (Tupi Sul, Iara, Iracema, Jupiter e 
Carioca) in the Petrobras and BG blocks. Preliminary estimates worth the oil held in 
the BM-S-9-10/11 fields in US$ 60billion. 
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After the pre-salt discoveries, Brazilian government ordered ANP to interrupted 
further auctions in the Santos basin for further studies. In December 2010, the 
congress passed a law (12.351/2010) submitting the pre-salt and other strategic areas 
to the shared production system, where government, instead of fees and royalties, 
receives a share of the oil extracted by private companies which are forced to accept 
at least 30% of Petrobras participation. Despite of these changes, the previous 
concessions were maintained untouched. 
 
In May 2009, the consortium extracted the first oil from the Tupi field and in October 
2010, the long lasting tests (TLD) began. With only minor problems affecting Tupi 
TLD, experimental production is planned to reach 75,000 barrels/day by December 
2011, which together with other TLDs on course in the same block, point to an 
expected production 105,000barrels/day for the consortium by the same date.  
 
In the last quarter of 2010, the fast production ramping up operated by Petrobras 
began to worry BG management. Different from Petrobras and Galp, the volume of 
oil soon to be received was incompatible with its logistic structure in Brazil, and 
shortly a great pressure upon the company’s commercialization strategy would build 
up. With an expectation of reaching 1 million barrel/day by 2014, BG needed viable 
long-term oil export solution. So forth, three options underwent study by different 
BG teams: 
 
- Long-haul shipping either direct to market or to a trans-shipment point at an 
existing facility outside Brazil (such as Aruba in the Caribbean). What would 
require a large number of ships whose arrival would hardly meet production 
schedule; 
 
- Shallow water offshore terminal (SWOT) in Brazil. This facility would most 
likely be a converted tanker and two single buoy moorings (SBM). In Brazil, 
however, off-shore terminals require hard to get environmental licenses to be 
constructed, what would also create problems to meet production schedule; 
 
 
Fig.79: SWOT terminal schematics. (Source: Revista Petrobras) 
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- Açu Super Port: Port facility being developed by a large Brazilian 
infrastructure developer, LLX.  For a tariff, they would provide basic 
infrastructure (land, trestle, berths and breakwater).  BG would need to build 
the oil terminal and outfit the trestle and berths, what became known as BGB 
project. 
 
 
 
Fig.80: Açu Superport Industrial Complex as per March 2011. (Source: LLX  website) 
 
So forth, CNC/WP was hired to provide owners engineering services and help in the 
basic definitions and feasibility studies for the BGB option. 
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8.2- PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS 
 
8.2.1- The Client: BG 
 
In the early 1900s, the gas market in the United Kingdom was mainly run by county 
councils and small private firms. The Gas Act of 1948, nationalized the UK gas 
industry and more than one thousand privately owned and municipal gas 
companies were merged into twelve Area Gas boards, each a separate body with its 
own management structure. UK gas industry was again restructured by the Gas Act 
of 1972 which centralized all Area Gas Boards into one single state-owned company, 
creating the British Gas Corporation.  
 
The Conservative Government led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher introduced 
the Gas Act of 1986, which led to the privatization of the company. On the 8th  
December 1986, its shares floated on the London stock market in an initial public 
offering valued at £9 billion (US$ 18 Billion), the highest equity offering ever at the 
time.  
 
Ten years later, in preparation for the end of gas monopoly in 1996, British Gas had 
to go through a major restructuring which separated the company into five divisions: 
Public Gas Supply, Contract Trading, Transportation and Storage (Transco), Service 
and Installation, Retail. In 1997, British Gas demerged into two separately listed 
companies: BG plc in charge of exploration and production and the overseas 
operations and Centrica plc in charge of the UK retail business. Two years later, after 
a second demerger, BG plc get rid of the UK transport and distribution business to 
became fully dedicated international to exploration and production company, BG 
Group. 
 
 
Fig.81: BG Group history. (Source: BG website) 
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BG Group became a shareholder in the newly restructured Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium, which planned to build a new pipeline from Kazakhstan to the Black 
Sea port of Novorossiysk. Under the terms of the agreement, BG Group was entitled 
to 3 million ton/year of capacity to transport condensate from the Karachaganak gas 
field in northwest Kazakhstan to markets in the west. The Karachaganak field is one 
of the largest gas fields in the world, holding according to estimates 9 billion barrels 
of condensate and 48 trillion cubic feet of gas. Later in the year, BG Group signed gas 
sales agreement with the Egyptian General Petroleum Company for sales of gas from 
the Rosetta concession offshore the Nile Delta, to Egypt. 
 
In 1998, BG Group acquired the controlling stake in Metrogas, one of the largest gas 
distribution companies in the southern cone region, extending BG Group's position 
in Argentina, where BG Group had been the technical operator since 1992. In 
November the same year, BG Group announced the discovery of the Margarita field 
in Bolivia what closed the path to construction of the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline. Two 
years later, the Presidents of Brazil and Bolivia opened the US$2 billion pipeline 
connecting the two countries. The project had been developed by a consortium 
including BG Group and was the largest gas infrastructure project ever to have been 
carried out in South America, and supplied gas from Bolivia to consumers in the São 
Paolo and coastal regions. In April the same year, BG Group acquired a controlling 
stake in Comgas, a gas transmission and distribution company which today supplies 
more than 570 000 customers in Brazil. In 2000, BG Group acquired rights to explore 
for oil and gas in the Santos Basin offshore Brazil with the purchase of a share of 
exploration rights in the deepwater blocks BM-S-10, BM-S-11 and BM-S-9. 
 
In early 2001, BG Group and partners announced that the Rosetta field had came 
onstream. The commercialization of the field had been realized in record time, just 45 
months after the initial discovery well was drilled. At the same time, BG Group and 
partners confirmed a successful appraisal well had been drilled on the Sapphire field, 
in the West Delta Deep Marine (WDDM) area, the sixteenth consecutive successful 
well that BG Group and partners had drilled on Rosetta and the WDDM over four 
years. Little later, BG Group and the Government of Egypt signed an LNG Export 
Agreement for Egyptian gas via an Egyptian LNG plant based in Idku, on the 
Mediterranean coast. Construction of the first train of Egyptian LNG began in 
2001.In June the same year, BG Group announced the discovery of a significant new 
oil discovery, the Buzzard field, located some 100 km offshore Aberdeen in the 
Central North Sea. Estimated reserves in the field were estimated to be around 600 
million barrels of oil equivalent, which means that Buzzard is one of the largest 
discoveries in the UK North Sea in ten years. 
 
In 2002, the acquisition of a 30% stake in the Tapti field and the closely related Panna 
and Mukta fields confirmed BG Group as a key player in the Indian gas production 
market. BG Group also took over field operation. Following drilling of three 
appraisal wells from 1997 onwards BG Group confirmed the Hasdrubal discovery 
offshore Tunisia in 2002, when a third appraisal well tested light oil. In the following 
years, BG Group took delivery of it's first wholly-owned LNG (Liquid Natural Gas) 
ship, the Methane Princess and open up purchase process for several more. 
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In July 2005, BG Group was awarded three concessions in the Santos Basin in Brazil's 
seventh annual licensing round, this time for blocks BM-S-47, BM-S-50 and BM-S-52. 
In this later round, BG Group was also awarded one onshore concession BT-SF-2 in 
the São Francisco Basin. In December the same year BG inaugurated the fourth train 
of its Atlantic LGN facility in Trinidad & Tobago, reaching total production capacity 
at Atlantic LNG to approximately 15 million ton/year. 
 
In 2006, BG entered several markets worldwide such as China, Oman, Algeria and 
Nigeria, started to explore gas fields in the Alaska, realized new discoveries in the 
North Sea and received three large scale LNG ships from Hyundai heavy industries 
in Korea, and four more were expected to 2007. In September the same year, BG 
Group and partner Petrobras announced a light oil discovery in the Tupi field, in the 
deep water Santos Basin, offshore Brazil. A further discovery, Parati, was also made 
in Block BM-S-10. 
 
After ten years of growth, by 2008, BG Group confirms leading position in LNG 
trade. BG Group supplied 55% of US LNG and 50% of all LNG sold from the Atlantic 
Basin into Pacific basin markets in 2007. BG Group's supply portfolio enabled it to 
market more than one third of its supply to meet demand in new countries. In total, 
BG Group supplied nine of the seventeen LNG importing nations.  
 
Through 2009 to 2011, the company kept expanding into new markets and fast 
growing ones. In 2009, BG Group signed a LNG sales contract with the China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation, concluding negotiations announced in May 2009, 
for the supply of 3.6 million ton/year of LNG over a 20-year period. In 2011, BG 
Group also signed a similar sales agreement with Japan's Tokyo Gas Co., concluding 
negotiations for the supply of 1.2 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas a year for 20 
years from 2015. Both to be supplied with LNG from the Queensland Curtis LNG 
facility on Curtis Island in Queensland.  
 
In Brazil, BG Group and its partners awarded engineering, procurement and 
construction contracts worth $3.5 billion for eight hulls for floating production, 
storage and offloading vessels to be used in developing blocks in the Santos Basin, 
offshore Brazil. On completion, each vessel will have production capacity of 150 000 
barrels of oil per day and approximately 212 million cubic feet of gas per day. In 
early 2011, Petrobras filed a “Declaration of Commerciality” with ANP over the Tupi 
and Cernambi fields in the Santos Basin. The declaration marked the start of the 
production phase for the fields. 
 
Nowadays, BG Group is a major integrated gas company with a record of delivering 
strong growth by identifying and focusing on selected high value markets and 
securing low cost gas for delivery. The cornerstones of the Group’s competitive 
advantage are a deep understanding of gas markets, the skills and experience to 
invest throughout the chain, and a focus on project delivery. BG has revenues around 
US$16 billion and direct employs more than 6000 people (4000 outside UK) from 65 
nationalities in 27 countries.  
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Fig.82: BG geographic diversification. (Source: BG website) 
 
8.2.2- Local Partner: LLX 
 
To understand LLX, first, it is necessary to introduce its founder Eike Batista and the 
conglomerate that he controls, EBX. Eike Batista is currently the most famous 
Brazilian entrepreneur, and according to Forbes magazine, is the 8th richest man in 
the world (March 2011). He is the son of Eliezer Batista da Silva, longtime ministry of 
Mines and Energy, and head of mining company Vale during the military 
government, when he became famous for signing contracts to supply iron ore to the 
Japanese boom. Eike got his start in gold trading and mining. By 1999, its gold 
mining company TVX still producesaround 20 tons of gold per year and employ 2000 
people.  
 
His political and high banking friendships eased the path to expand his business 
through several enterprises, MMX (iron ore), MPX (Energy) and OGX (Oil & Gas), 
usually in association with large international players. He became famous in the 
world business as a risk taker, for recruiting and paying huge bonuses for his 
executives and for the superstition of always using the letter “X” in the name of its 
companies. Nowadays, through its holding company, EBX, Eike controls businesses 
spanning mining, shipbuilding, energy, logistics, tourism and entertainment.  
 
Due to chronic Brazilian logistic infrastructure deficiencies, he decided to invest in 
the concept of integrated industrial port facilities, away from great urbanization 
centers but close to existing logistic corridors and the oil exploration clusters. Having 
this in mind, LLX has been created in 2007 in association with the international 
mining company Anglo American, a Canadian pension fund and the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES). No surprise that, the initial steps of LLX overlapped 
with the US$3,8 billion investments made by Anglo American involving a new iron 
ore mine in the state of Minas Gerais and a pipeline to transport the ore through the 
first of LLX ports, the Açu Superport. The port is still under construction and is 
expected to be ready for the first iron ore shipment by the second semester of 2012. 
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Fig.83: LLX Açu superport strategic location and overall plan (Source: LLX website) 
 
A second LLX port, planned to be built in the south state of Rio de Janeiro 
(municipality of Itaguai) end up being transfered to MMX responsibility to be 
exclusively operated by EBX subsidiaries, in order to accommodate iron ore exports 
from MMX Serra Azul mine, allow for the construction of ships in the OSX shipyard 
and maintenance of oil rigs for OGX. 
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8.3- CASE CONTEXT 
 
8.3.1- Contractor: CNC/WP 
 
The period between UNA3 and BGB has been marked by the deterioration of 
CNC/WP project portfolio, what has been particularly felt in the industry division.  
The constant lay-offs of technical people stimulated the remaining to flee to 
competition, further weakening company’s technical capability. The transition 
process also struggled into rather discretionary acts that clearly privileged staff 
personnel, reversing a long tradition of technical sponsorship.  
 
Along the first semester 2010, CNC/WP industry division engaged into several 
competitions for Petrobras large-scale refining projects, usually in partnership with 
CCC. However, the duo performed badly in most of them losing projects by a large 
difference, mostly for non-traditional engineering companies, which were awarded 
several multi-million dollar contracts. CNC/WP was almost tied to CCC and because 
of contractual terms could only associate with other construction companies if CCC 
declined association. Before large projects ran out, the partnership informally broke 
and CCC, in returning to its traditional partnership with PROMON, was awarded a 
US$ 1 billion project for detailing engineering and construction of a distillation unit 
within the PDY complex. 
 
A sense of insecurity and lack of confidence in the CNC/WP role within WP took 
over the industry division. In the absence of coherent information, rumors spread 
that as it was redundant with WP-Houston, it would be slowly demobilized. Despite 
any practical evidence this story was collaborated by the growing investments in the 
new mining division in Belo Horizonte and the new oil & gas division in Rio de 
Janeiro, which were hiring people locally to avoid the transfer costs associated with 
São Paulo professionals. CNC/WP began to look for increasingly smaller projects on 
its own and with the help of smaller construction companies. One of this project was 
PDY2, where Petrobras used a simplified bid process to hire CNC/WP in order to 
make updates in a specific area of recently delivered PDY project. PDY2 began 
almost at the same time UNA3 ended, and I was automatically requested by C.C, 
now project manager. By the end of September, however, the specific unit where was 
supposed to work was put in hold by Petrobras.  
 
From a privileged engineering company with a solid technical workforce, CNC 
turned into a financially driven free-rider company. The consequences of this 
strategy however were quite severe and stretched all over second semester 2010. 
Contracts decline in value and in schedule what left exposed the heavy and slow 
structure of the company. In response, however, more staff and management 
personnel were hired and granted nice brand new positions in the company. 
Organizational structure at the top suffered at least two large-scale changes to 
accommodate more and more people always in independent positions to avoid 
conflict. In the mean time, several initiatives were implemented to convey a feel of 
normality and open communication within the company. 
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One of the first of them was the “Bimestrial Strategy Dialogue”, aimed at giving first 
hand information to CNC/WP employees. In these meetings, M.A.C. (Engineering 
Director) explained the situation of the company, its prospects and answered 
questions from randomly selected people who would subsequently meet with their 
desk neighbours and pass information away, in a sort of institutionalised “whistle 
blowing”. To kick start, however, people were select by department and discipline 
managers. With the next participants been indicated by the current participants, 
cliques end up monopolizing the meeting. Nevertheless, after the first meeting 
M.A.C. began to be closely followed by the RH manager, which according to a key 
informant frequently interrupted the conversation to reframe the question in softer 
terms for M.A.C. 
 
Another initiative was the monthly “Coffee with the President”, which aimed to 
bring top management closer to CNC/WP employees. However, people attending to 
these meetings were also selected by discipline and department managers, which 
clearly privileged its supporters. On the two editions that I followed S.P.H. indicated 
S.S.S. and A.R.A to participate. Among the phrases about the meeting published in 
the internal bulletin we find: 
 
“The event gave the feel that I was being heard, by who take the strategic decisions of the company”. 
“The invitation for the event made us feel important”. 
(Bulletin #*, 19, November 2010 – Anonymous authors) 
 
In the 18th November, were presented  the results of the “Cultural Bridge”, a 
program developed by the HR along 6 months to identify “cultural particularities” 
between CNC and WP organizational cultures was presented by the RH manager. 
During this meeting a comparison of the cultural differences between U.S., Brazil and 
Australia offices in terms of a cultural typology divided into “relational”, 
“pragmatic” and “conceptual”. According to HR analysis, CNC would be strongly 
“pragmatic” with a slight “relational” tendency. Compared to the U.S. also highly 
“pragmatic” and Australia, highly “conceptual”. Overall, however, the meeting felt 
like “everything is all right”, “there is nothing to worry about”. Lay-offs were 
credited to a bad business environment caused by the 2010 elections (during which 
Brazil GDP grew 7.8%).  
 
By the end of November 2010, with lay-offs smashing industry division to only 80 
people from 400 one year ago, CNC/WP required WP headquarters help to keep the 
remaining workforce. Instead of sending work to CNC/WP, WP required clients 
within international work agreements to use CNC/WP operation to leverage its 
Brazilian project ambitions. Two of them, Chevron and BG, positively responded to 
WP pledge and hired CNC/WP to help in the development of their new projects. 
Chevron, required conceptual studies towards modernization and future expansion 
for its lubricant mixing unit in Rio de Janeiro, a far less sophisticated job than 
CNC/WP was used to. BG job, on its turn, was closer to CNC/WP level of 
specialization, as it required CNC/WP to provide owners engineering services for an 
oil terminal and storage facilities.  
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8.3.2- “Fast Track Project” Current State of Knowledge. 
 
As CNC/WP had no expertise in port facilities or oil terminals, it was necessary for 
part of the project to require the help of WP-Houston which had extensive experience 
in defining, designing and implementing oil terminal and port facilities. Ran by a 
completely autonomous team within WP-Houston office, the ports division was one 
of the most skilled divisions of WP in the U.S. Its engineering manager, W.A., was 
PhD in port infrastructure and spent more than 30 years designing and overseeing 
ports around the world.  
 
The participation of WP-Houston in the project was initially seen as a learning 
opportunity, aligned to what was much said about being part of a global company 
like WP. Right before the project begins CNC/WP management was buoyant. It was 
common place for to hear that it was key to learn how to define and design ports and 
maritime terminals because they would be badly required for Petrobras in a close 
future, opening great business opportunities to CNC/WP and career venues for those 
who took place in the project. However, with the terminal part of the job showing 
complexity and client pressure building up, WP-Houston became increasingly 
confident in claiming the “lyon´s part” of the contract in order to end a long lasting 
period of divisional slack. Henceforth, WP-Houston participation in the project 
became an additional problem to CNC/WP.  
 
As a result of long time practice and considerable success, BG became very confident 
of its investment appraisal methodology. According to that methodology, the BGB 
project should go through several phases in his life cycle: Create, Assess, Select, 
Define, Execute, Operate; which, in fact, were not very different from WP own 
services methodology. 
 
 
 
Fig.84: WP Service methodology (Source: WP website) 
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By January 2011, BGB project was about to enter the so-called “select stage” of this 
methodology. The primary objective of “select stage” was to evaluate and select a 
single development concept to take forward into the “Define Stage” (FEED). The 
concept selection process was expected to yield information enough to develop 
preliminary cost and schedule estimates (+/- 25% precision).  
 
 
Fig.85: BG investment appraisal methodology – Select Stage (Source: BG presentation) 
 
In this context, CNC/WP was selected to provide “owners engineering”17 services to 
BG. Among CNC/WP roles were: 
 
- Review technical data available; 
- Assess any environmental constraints embedded into LLX permits; 
- Help BG draft a “Statement of Owners Requirements” for the project; 
- Develop a “Basis of Design” for the facilities; 
- Attend meetings with LLX and BG to clarify interfaces; 
- Plan the necessary activities to prepare BG for decision gate in April; 
- Draft of the IFB (invitation for bid) for Define Stage; 
 
What was supposed to be a rather trivial job, quickly build up into a dramatic 
operation. As BG investment appraisal methodology required the accomplishment of 
clear and well delimitated phases, overall schedule compression caused the evenly 
compression of each individual phase, penalizing those operating the shorter ones. 
                                                
17
 Under an "owner engineering” contract arrangement an engineering company is sub-contracted to emulate an internal 
engineering department of the client. 
 301 
 
As a result, CNC/WP was pushed into a fast track18 project approach, under 
particularly complex scenario, involving scarce resources, information uncertainty 
and subsidiary rivalry. 
 
 
Fig.86: BGB overall schedule. 
 
To overcome this challenge, CNC/WP would have to break up with its traditional 
way of managing projects and be able to development a fast track approach what 
would represent an important management innovation process for the company and 
an additional capability for WP. 
 
8.3.3- Entering the Field 
 
The rumors concerning the BGB project began in early 16th December 2010, with the 
visit of the first BG executives interested in CNC/WP structure and expertise. The 
first contact with the project was as described in the field diary notes below: 
 
(…)I perceived a certain movement involving a group of foreigners escorted by S.S.H., P.R.F. (a 
former CNC/WP project coordinator), and C.C, heading to the meeting room in the end of the floor. 
At same point, S.S.H. and one of the foreign visitors left the room and looked for A.R.A. apparently 
to show something about CNC/WP 3D design expertise. The talked for a few minute and then had 
back to the meeting room.  
 
(…) Right before lunch, with the floor already emptied, C.C. passed by my table and asked if I had 
a few minutes, and asked one of the foreign executives. He asked me to show some pictures of the 
PDY tank farm and make a quick explanation about the workshare capability developed for the 
PDY project. As I explained this work, he made several questions about CNC/WP skills in other 
plant design systems and collaborative works. Until then, did not know what was it all about.  
 
After lunch, I incidentally met C.C. and asked where those people were from. He told they were 
from BG and were interested in building an oil storage facility. Then I told him that maybe it would 
be also interesting for them to see the work we were developing in the PDY2 concerning full facility 
development in 3D. A little later he brought the executive and we showed this additional work to 
him. (…) By the end of the day, C.C. told me later that they were impressed by CNC/WP and 
chances of being winning the project were high. (Field Diary, 12th January 2011). 
 
There was quite a great thrill in the company about this project. Maybe because it 
was supposed to be the industry division salvation, maybe because it somehow 
materialized the future role of CNC/WP as an engineering consulting company as 
                                                
18
 According to the PMBOK (3rd ed., 2004), fast track approach refers to a project schedule compression technique aimed at 
taking an entire project schedule into a smaller period of time than would be done according to standard methods. This project 
management approach involves conducting project events quicker and overlapped instead of in sequence. Having several teams 
working on various work packages at the same time can cut schedule times significantly. However, there is a greater chance of 
errors when scheduled activities are started without previous the necessary information that would have been available if 
standard project timeline have been followed. 
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rumors spread. However, in a scenario of imminent massive lay-offs it was probably 
seen as the last resort.  
 
On the 27th January 2011, a team of BG executives returned to CNC/WP to conduct a 
due diligence, which comprised of several interviews with key people appointed to 
project, and to impress the client were selected based on curriculum and English 
fluency. As such, S.P.H. and I were required to jointly attend one of these interviews 
on behalf of the piping discipline. The interview conducted in very clear English by 
M.C., a senior BG executive, was very representative of their view of the project and 
the problems expected: 
 
(BG) M.C.: What I suggest we do… if you don´t mind… I explain to you what the project is, and then, if you 
don´t mind, I would like to speak to each of you separately, OK?!…So you know nothing about this, right?!(…) 
So basically what they have done ...they are building a port…and they got a huge piece of land… they got 
permits to do just about anything on this site. So they have a shipyard in a joint venture, I think with Hyundai, 
they have a supply base, they have a space for an oil tank farm, they plan to export iron ore from this port. So we 
say the anchor… you ain´t say anchor? … (…) …the anchor for this project, the thing that it all comes back to 
is the iron ore export, OK!?…and these are the iron ore berths here… and Anglo American, which is a big 
multinational company… will export iron ore from these two berths, through this channel. So, then 
Petrobras… we think… are going to take these three berths here… and they will transfer oil between the ships, 
ok?! … What we want to do is to extend this so that we have space for three ships… and then we will build a 
tank farm in here…and then we will use their bridge… so, basically they will give us the breakwater, the berths, 
and the bridge, and the land and everything else we have to do for ourselves. So, what they did, which were not 
stupid… they to get their permit they had to produce a preliminary design for a terminal… and what they was 
to assume the biggest terminal they can imagine… with the worst oil they could imagine… so they had oil 
treatment… we won’t need that…So, what we need is a smaller tank farm… and we don´t need the 
treatment…the key… the absolute key to this is understand the interfaces, between us and LLX… and the key 
to this is the piping discipline… because you guys own the lay-out, all right?! So what we want to do between 
now and the end of April, is to go and see (…) they have a contractor JPPA who’s done the work for them so 
far…and they also have… a contractor for the bridge, for the breakwaters and everything else…Ok?!... between 
now and the end of April…. 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: End of April?…  
 
(BG) M.C.: Yeah… we are in a big hurry… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: Big challenge. 
 
(BG) M.C.: Yeah…is to understand as much as we can… and there will be holes, obviously…what is exactly 
what they are giving to us… and where exactly all the interfaces are… (…) it is just a simple project with 
complicated interfaces…(…) So basically Petrobras have FPSO (large exploration ships) in the Santos basin… 
and to take the oil from those FPSO, we have to use special tankers with … Do you understand dynamically 
positioning? … we the thrusters underneath … those ships are special and expensive… so what we want to take 
those ships, bring the oil to somewhere like this and then unload the oil to a tank farm, and then we will bring in 
standard ships… fill them up and sent them to probably to China.  
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: High oil, anh?…Oil from Campos? 
 
(BG) M.C.: Santos… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: Santos! ... Pre-salt! ...Oh yeah!... Ok! Ok!…Low oil, anh?!(…)  
 
(BG) M.C.: So, they key is to understand  what we are getting… let me explain why… LLX are giving us the 
channel, the wall, the bridge and the land, and then what they call services…and for that they charge uas a 
tariff… the charge so much per barrel… and it is a big number… we pay for the rest… so, it is obvious what is 
going to happen next. We are going to say, obviously your building that road and that is part of the tariff… and 
they are goig to say “No, no, no…  actually you building 25km in the highway…”, they are going to say so “we 
are going to provide the eletricity”, and we think it is here, we think there is a substation here… and they are 
thinking we are going totake from the powerstation 50km away… and so on, and so on, and so on… So they key 
is to understandwhat exactly is in this tariff… because if it is not in the tariff we have to pay for it… (…) So 
 303 
 
what we are trying to understand by the end of April is the scope. Does that make sense?(…) You guys are 
engineer, you know the devil is the details… (…) So if we can get the broad principles by April… then after 
that we can … improve the answer overtime… the trick is to understand what the question is… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: OK! 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: We are used to do this with Petrobras. Petrobras send us big …how can I say… bid 
guidelines… we have to break it very very small so we understand all the battery limits, all that services 
provided, and you have to give a full price for them… so, if you forget something… 
 
(BG) M.C.: It is your dollar … It is your dollar …Exactly!… And now…this time… you are Petrobras…  
 
(CNC) S.P.H.:  Oh, so... that´s typical Petrobras… 
 
(BG) M.C: That is why you are a team to us… defining  the relationship with the other company… (…) And 
what happens after April?We will decide that between now and April… and it maybe that we run a design 
competition, … the definition you will give us… we give it to two contractors, and they produce a design and 
give us a price… and your duty then is to check their design and to make sure that what they are showing us is 
correct… (…)for me the most important role on this job is the lay-out guide….. So you guys are busy?  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: We recently have avery similar project from Petrobras …  the “PDY” project…  and we had 
huge tank farms there (…) so we can provide youall  this expertise… it is not that difficult. 
 
(BG) M.C.: Good!… So you are not doing anything at the moment… right?! 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Not this big… 
 
(BG) M.C.: So Monday you are else… When you will be available…  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: He (S.P.H.) is my boss… he is going to tell you. He says when I am available… 
 
(Laughs) 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: We will decide  soon… We will decide  soon… 
 
(BG) M.C.: Ok! Because we are going to start on Monday… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.:  Monday… Next Monday? 
 
(BG) M.C.: Yeah!  
 
(CNC) S.P.H.:  (laughs)…OK! 
 
(BG) M.C.:  Ok! So you are available to go to Porto Alegre on Monday…did I hear you say yes? 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: I think so…(long breath)… Monday… 
 
(BG) M.C.:  (Laughs)…you can breathe….mMaybe nothing Monday but very very quickly… next week. 
 
(CNC) S.P.H. Ok!…one weak… ok…we have to plan…(not understandable)…to do this job… 
 
(…) 
 
(BG) M.C.:  (…) It is slightly different arrangement from what you probably are used to… by my experience is 
that the guys that do the detail are the best at doing the concept… because thay think about three years down 
the road…   
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: There is something about reverse engineering...you have to think about the ready facility to get 
back to the principles… 
 
(BG) M.C.: Exactly!…. If you never do anyhting other than concept you never really do anything… I´d rather 
have guys that do the detail doing concepts … that is why we are here…  
 
(CNC) S.P.H. I see…ok! 
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(BG) M.C.: Ok… I think the way it would start …is probably in Rio… we´ll get LLX and its project manager 
and JPPA in a room… and our project manager and CNC/WP in a table …and there will be I incredible 
confusing conversation in Portuguese… (laughs) … and the end of it you will know … you will be able to tell 
us, how bad it is…. So what do you think? 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: The problem gets bigger as much as we know it… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H: I think the only problem is the time… schedule… the only problem is the schedule… in two 
months…  
  
(BG) M.C.: The reason why we are in a hurry is because we thought Petrobras would do this for us… ok, we 
thought… Petrobras Would deliver the oil to us in place where we could use …ordinary ships and taking the 
stuff away… Petrobras thought that too…they study it and they came back in october and say…” we haven´t 
got enough for us…” (…) to be honest,  I dropped this in the shit…and ow we are trying to catch up.(…) the oil 
is going to come… if we cannot sell it… it is not very clever… I lot people in BG could lose their job… 
(laughs)…each cargo is worth US$100 million.  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: And just a question…  When is it expected the oil going to come? 
 
(BG) M.C.: That´s a very good question… (start drawing in a paper)… It won´t be accurate… just take an 
idea…this is barrle per day… this is time …  in terms of number of ships that we would need to take the oil to 
the market… if we would use these dynamically positioned ships… we need one extra ship every six 
months…ok?!. .. to go to the golf of Mexico, we would need something like 20 ships…and to go to China, we 
would need forty ships… but if we have a terminal, we need something like that, and the most ships we need is 
4… so essentially the day we need the terminal its when those 4 ships … that is the they we need the terminal… 
and that day is in 2013... but the earliest we think we ca have the terminal is 2014… (…) in BG we say “strecht 
target” the most aggresively shchedule we can think we must achieve… is the middle of 2014…but you can see 
that every six months that we are late is another ship… (…) so maybe the answer is as fast as we ca get it. (…) 
So that is why we are in a hurry… so that is why if can we go start on Monday.  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Now I can understand the size of the trouble… 
 
(BG) M.C.: I am a kind of fireman… in Brazil is “bombeiros”? … I am a kind of “bomberos” for this… (…) 
And its quite a big fire already.(…) The thing is by April to understand… how real this is … and if this is real 
we just keep going…(…) If you out Shell and Chevron they are completely different companies… in terms of 
the way they think, in terms of the way they think in terms of the way they organize… absolutely… In BG… in 
some ways we are almost naïve… we tend to start out with the idea that is a contractor says he can do 
something we will just believe it… we tend to be very few people…so we rely on the people who the work for us 
far more that probably Petrobras does… So, if you give us rubbish it will probably take us time to realize… 
because we are assuming that you will not give us rubbish… In fact, you probably has much more 
responsibility doing work for us than for a company that is much more structured like Petrobras. But on the 
other side I think we are more fun. 
 
(Recorded Meeting, 27th January 2011 – Exact Translation). 
 
With a clear picture of the service scope it became clear at that moment that the BGB 
project would be no salvation to the industry division in the short term. Hopes then 
turned to the RMAN2 project, whose expansion bid would be probably the large 
Petrobras refining contract for a long time. This project that made part of a long term 
S.P.H. strategy for climbing up positions in the company. Since the first contacts with 
the RMAN personnel in September 2009, he did an immense personal effort towards 
signing and carrying on a money-losing contract just to nurture internal contacts and 
gain access to privileged information for this bid. As such, different from the other 
discipline managers who were urged by the production manager to take active part 
in the BGB project, both to impress the new client and to cover for the lack of senior 
professional, after initial meetings, S.P.H. turned to the RMAN2 and other proposals. 
 
 
 305 
 
8.4- THE KNOWLEDGE CHANGE PROCESS 
 
8.4.1- Current Knowledge Resilience 
 
On the 2nd February 2011, C.C. and P.R.F. organized an internal “kick-off” meeting 
with CNC/WP personnel appointed to the BGB task force. Below follow important 
notes of this meeting: 
 
(…) P.R.F. started this meeting in a very standard way by telling main contract characteristics. He 
told that the preliminary service order was signed in 31st January and would be in place until 18th 
February, so that BG could evaluate the CNC/WP overall mobilization and performance. Thereafter, 
a second order would be expedited valid until 30th April. He explained project characteristics and 
main guidelines, highlighting the importance of job that could eventually be extended for a long 
time. He emphasized that BG was a new client and that if CNC/WP showed good-will it would hold 
upon us all along this project and future projects. C.C. Highlighted that BG has interested in hiring 
CNC/WP for other engineering services beyond that one. In this matter even R.F. pronounced that as 
BG was in Rio de Janeiro, it would be under CNC/WP São Paulo jurisdiction, highlighting it was not 
Belo Horizonte. C.C. reinforced that it was important to diversify away from Petrobras. 
 
(…) P.R.F. also talk about the people who would make part of the project and the right time for their 
allocation. R.M.B. expressed his worry about the necessity to have a dedicated professional for the 
project. He complained that he was short of personnel and that one of its remaining engineers where 
just about to leave. C.C. intervene to say that although not all personnel would be enrolled all the 
time, some people were core to the project and thus should be fully mobilized specially, Process, 
Piping and Civil. P.R.F. insisted that should be make a great effort towards this project because it 
would be a unique opportunity to learn something nobody at CNC/WP knew. C.C. then argued that 
schedule was so tight that disciplines should work side to side to respond as quickly as possible. C.C. 
also demonstrate worry about back office personnel as there had just been an organizational 
restructuring and their results were restrictive in the sense that BGB would have to use the same 
personnel which were finalizing PDY2 project. 
 
(…) P.R.F. described the project activities mostly in generic terms of a common project like “scope 
declaration”, “ project analytic structure”, “list of documents”, and “schedule”. Emphasis was placed 
on the key meetings to happen in February, while most of the hands on activities like “”consistency 
analysis”, “basic design complementation”, and ITT (intention to tender) package and associated 
documents (still undefined) would fall to March. (…) C.C. highlighted that a schedule was soon to be 
presented as the milestones were better defined. (…)  (Field Diary notes, 02nd February 2011) 
 
During this meeting, however, several important questions were overlooked. The 
inherent complexities in work division due to the unconventional character of the 
required documents, for example. People left the meeting with deadlines without 
knowing exactly what should be done and how. Work sequence was also unclear 
and sparked some unresolved debates as the dialogue below shows: 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: (...) There will be no drawing production… there will be only reports, project descriptions… 
only if there is any basic engineering modification… There will be paper only if basic engineering 
complementation …  
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: There is preliminary lay-out that must be… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: If happens any basic engineering complementation … 
 
(CNC) C.C.: There will be procurement…if there will be a complementation…. So, we will have to ask them….. 
we will use the LLX  drawing we will change the stamp… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: I had already understood like this…then after that meeting I had understood like that… It (BG) 
has a conceptual design…  where there is a lay-out…we are going to get this lay-out… check against 1674 (a 
Petrobras standard) … if it is all right…otherwise identify if there is something else to do… we will have to do 
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that job… it is a drawing… I reutilise all JPPA (LLX) drawings… there is no problem… but I will have to 
validate…  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: We will make consistency analysis… if there is … there will be analysis, is is clear… but if 
there will be basic engineering modification… then there will be drawings… Consistency check is clear… If 
there will be drawings … 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: It will depend on what BG wants.  
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: In the first contact we had… sorry, I don´t understand like this…for me it was already 
defined… the guy said the following…. He is going to get this lay out and he will want to hear… “It is good if 
you this, this and that” … If necessary I will have to redraw…  
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: If necessary so… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: Of course I will not start from scratch because I already have one… otherwise… He will not 
want a small report… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: But this is basic engineering complementation… You make an analysis, if the analysis shows a 
problem… so there is basic engineering complementation… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: I know what is basic engineering complementation  my dear… what I could get from the guy 
(M.C.)…was this… it is this that he expect from us… that is what he is contracting… that´s because he said “ I 
want someone who can detail doing this…” Basic, already had that was JPPA… “I want a person from detail 
engineering studying my basic…that is what I want”… 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: It is true… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: Otherwise you won´t be doing nothing… 
 
(CNC) C.C.: The basic (engineering) was made before BG… If our consultant … if we was here… He would 
have to ask BG, what is your operational strategy? How are you going to operate this? To know how to 
adequate what is here to BG  strategy…. BG can say… “this does not work for me…” (…)  
 
(CNC) R.M.B.: Adequate… We have to adequate the project… to the BG reality… it is not complementation…  
 
(CNC) C.C.: It is not complement… the project exists… adequate…suppose that BG says that it is OK to go 
with is , then we get back to what you said.. .validate…comply with Brazilian norms… comply this, that…(…)  
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: It might be not necessary to redraw the concept… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: (…) I will take the editable of this (drawing), do the necessary change and stamp CNC/WP. 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: It might be he don´t need to do that… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: And in our drawing  theirs come as reference … 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: But P.R.F., if it is needed to change the drawings… is it up to us? 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: We will not  change their drawings… their drawings are reference for us… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: So we are going to do a new drawing based in theirs… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: It might be everything the same… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: But it is up to us to do that drawing… 
 
(CNC) C.C.: But then we are going to talk about these details in another meeting…let´s go ahead… 
 
(CNC) S.P.H.: (only to me) We never touch in basic or conceptual engineering… we use as reference…even if it is the 
same… 
 
(Recorded Meeting, 02nd February 2011 – Author Translation). 
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Curious, is that after all that discussion about engineering terms sparked by S.P.H. 
and agreed upon many in the room not to apply, the term “basic (conceptual) 
engineering complementation” (below marked in red) appeared on a slide in the 
screen. It is also noteworthy the generic terms used for the documentation to be 
produced which did not corresponded to anything usual. 
 
 
Fig.87: Initial indications of unusual documentation required for BGB (Source: CNC/WP presentation) 
 
The high level of information uncertainty surrounding the project was also 
observable.  Great emphasis has been given to the meeting with client and LLX, 
probably because of this. Another problem raised in the final of the meeting touched 
the infrastructure available for project execution. P.R.F. still did not have an e-mail 
address and there were no IT link available to exchange documents with BG, so the 
range of documents available for examination were restricted to those in paper that 
were at hand. Also noteworthy, the role of C.C. as a part-time project manager 
surprised and make me wonder how it would be possible to half involved in such a 
challenging and important entrepreneurship. 
 
As P.R.F. required each discipline to prepare a “wish list” of information to start the 
project which should be sent to him as soon as possible. I did as required and, later in 
the afternoon, sent the piping wish list to him. The next day, I met him in the 
corridors and we had the following conversation as described in the field notes: 
 
(…) I asked him if he had seen the information and if that was what he expected. He thanked for the 
fast response, and particularly because it was already in English. As I perceived that he was quite 
busy, I asked it there was anything else I could help. He said that other people were busy doing 
proposals or else and complained that I was the only one who had already sent to them the wish list 
and he needed that for today. I said that I could provide some help writing something about process 
and maybe electrical and instrumentation because I knew some basic information that would be 
required for these disciplines. He thanked and said that it would help much. (…) I postponed my 
lunch one hour and went for some help with people I knew around the company that could help. By 
2 o´clock I sent a message to P.R.F., copied to R.M.B. and S.P.H. with the a preliminary “wish list” for 
all disciplines but Civil. (…) Later on the day, R.M.B. made minor comments, mostly rephrasing the 
questions, which I incorporated and re-send the message. S.P.H. did not answered.(…) (Field Diary 
notes, 03rd February 2011) 
 
On the 4th February, the first change in BG requirements happened. From the initial 
requirements of just taking the JPPA basic design and lay-out as a reference, now it 
was to analyze the extension to what the documents supplied by LLX could be used. 
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Moreover, P.R.F. asked for the disciplines to create a LD (list of documents) draft 
based on the one supplied by LLX what clearly demonstrate that not even P.R.F. was 
aware of the unconventional nature of the project and real client needs. 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
Annex follows the preliminary agenda for our meeting with LLX, 15th February 2011, sent by BG Brazil. 
  
Annex also follows our preliminary “wish list” sent yesterday and revised by BG Brazil (comments in red). 
These topics shall be used in the KOM (kick0oof meeting) of 10th February with BG Brazil.  
  
Yesterday, BG Brazil changed his position in relation to the documentation of LLX, and left it clear that we 
should analyse with them the extension to which we might use LLX Project. This way I remind you again that 
schedule is tight what means that we should immediately start a deeper examination of the needs and how we 
are going to develop this project. 
 
Also ask that all disciplines create a “draft” of how should be the LD (list of documents) of this Project. It might 
be used, only as reference, the LLX/JPPA LD distributed on the 02nd February meeting.  
  
Att, 
 
(CNC) P.R.F. 
 
(Message sent on the, 4th  February 2011 – Author translation and Sender highlights). 
 
8.4.2- Project Organization 
 
CNC/WP project organization was upfront defined and made explicit on the kick-off 
meeting on the 02nd February. Additional personnel from BG and WP-Houston 
became known along the following days through the messages and conversations. 
As such, resulting project organizations was as described in the chart below: 
 
 
Fig 88: BGB project organization. 
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The task force involved in the project was supposed to occupy an especially prepared 
space in the 2nd floor (the same used for the COMOS training) together with BG 
personnel to be resident. The space, however, until 4th February was almost 
untouched and only minor preparations had been done. Only after a formal 
complain of P.R.F. to CNC/WP administrative manager A.M.R., works were 
accelerated, however, by the 9th of February the situation was as described below: 
 
(…) when I met P.R.F. he urged to me to immediately move downstairs as C.K. was about to arrive 
the next day and could not get at the project site and realized that no one have yet been mobilized. I 
said I did not know the place was ready. He said it already was and asked me to rush in. I quickly 
understood the situation and personally got my stuff (computer, cables, documents) and moved 
downstairs to the project site. I was the first to arrive downstairs, and the only thing prepared I saw 
was the drywall separations for the tables of BG personnel (C.K. and S.G.D.) and P.R.F. and the low-
separation desks for the task force personnel. The rest was I trip to the past. Almost rotten chairs and 
old computers with CRT screens instead of the LCD traditionally used all over the company. Phone 
and network lines were misplaced and still did not work. (…) 
 
(…) In the afternoon, R.T.P. arrived and saw astonished the awful infrastructure provided to the 
project. She complained about the computer and argued that with that “crap” she would not be able 
to do not only the BG job but also the other ones she had upstairs. (…) As she was working also in 
other project and could not move her computer downstairs, IT personnel installed a program that 
enable she remotely use her computer, however network speed made it unbearable. (…)  
 
(…) By the end of the day, two more people arrived their J.M.O and G.P.L. (Field Diary notes, 09th 
February 2011) 
 
8.4.3- Current Knowledge Weakening 
 
On the 7th of February 2011 and prior to his arrival in São Paulo, C.K. sent a message 
to C.C. and P.R.F. to establish the guidelines of the BG-CNC/WP kick-off meeting on 
the 10th February, as shown below: 
 
(CNC) C.C. and (CNC) P.R.F., 
 
Herewith the agenda/presentation I have drafted for our kick off meeting on Thursday. 
 
It is not particularly detailed but I hope it starts to facilitate alignment with the team. 
 
I have outlined the main topics to cover, but the format of the meeting shold be opened dialogue and discussion. 
I do not have all answers but it should be the start of how we are to move forward and to achieve in a short 
timescale! 
 
We have started some activities already, but please spend some time before Thursday to identify anything else 
that you or your team want to discuss, particularly if it is not on my agenda. 
 
Could you also start drafting a schedule of CNC/WP activities (to level 1 detail) on Primavera (planning 
software) of how we are to get to a concept select point. I need to establish soon how long realistically it s going 
to take. Our target is April, but I have already said internally that this is going to be difficult to achieve. I hope 
my presentation outlines what we need to achieve by then. (…) 
Regards,  
 
(BG) C.K. 
 
(Message sent on the, 7th  February 2011 – Exact Transcription). 
 
Right from the start the absence of a consolidated LD elaborated by project 
management caused a great confusion on what should be done, how and when. 
Asked to create “drafts” of a LD, discipline heads turn out with standard LD that 
 310 
 
were used for the more detailed project to which they were more used. Some of them 
included documents that were not even possible to be generated with schedule and 
level of information available, such as drawings and material lists.  
 
On the 10th February, took place the official kick-off meeting with BG and the other 
project stakeholder, involving BG project manager, C.K., a BG project engineer, 
S.G.D, all CNC/WP personnel (including S.S.H., industry division superintendent), 
W.A., WP-Houston ports division engineer manager, and L.B.G., a former CCC 
manager, now CNC/WP ports consultant appointed by S.S.H. The meeting gave a 
overall picture of the general guidelines for the project and expectations of BG 
towards it. Key passages were as described in the field diary notes below: 
 
(…) C.K. opened the meeting with a small discourse telling that despite there was a contract and a 
client, he saw CNC/WP as an integrated part of BG, as the engineering resource of the company. 
Therefore we wished CNC/WP to work together with BG as one team only and be pro-active., and 
different from what CNC/WP would be used with Petrobras this time CNC/WP should not wait for 
directions. Something that were welcomed by C.C. (…) 
 
(…) In this meeting C.K. and P.R.F. left it clear that despite the delivery date of the documents 
required by BG was end of April it would be necessary that a technical concept and a +/-25% 
precision investment estimate for the LLX solution should be available to a go-no-go meeting for this 
alternative in BG headquarters by the end of March. After that, J.C.M. display his worries concerning 
the need to revise or apply for new environmental licenses would cause a great impact on the tight 
schedule proposed. C.K. argued that such issues would be discussed in separate in another meeting 
however, he agreed that permits would be one of the issues that could make schedule overrun. (…) 
 
(…) When talking about future contracting strategy C.K. told that he got lots of important 
information from a meeting with F.C., S.S.H., and C.C.. He admitted that BG did not had much 
knowledge about the construction market in Brazil and the conversation helped to initiated the 
construction of a contracting strategy as he presented. (…) He also told that preliminary they would 
conduct a design competition to integrate a ITT (invitation to tender) package and submit it to 
Brazilian contractors, which according to information he collected with F.C. (CNC/WP sales director), 
were 3 construction companies capable of running all project phases at most. Contracting strategy 
was a subject that draw much of CNC/WP management attention, as they wished to extend BG 
contract, an hourly-fee contract, as much as possible. In this sense L.B.G., argued that the pre-
qualification of contractors would last at least 60 days because there were many financial and 
technical issues to check, and proposed that contractors pre-qualification could run in parallel with 
the technical evaluation. C.K. replied saying that BG in Rio de Janeiro office already have a contract 
manager taking care of the pre-qualification issue which would run completely under BG control. 
Later in the meeting again S.S.H. insisted on the subject by saying that it was important to evaluate 
the contractor and their process in face of the construction technology used to speed up construction. 
L.B.G. then begin discussing about the problem of resources competition provided by the 
construction of Anglo American pier and vented the possibility of taking advantage from the 
facilities provided after they end their work.  
 
(…) P.R.F. and C.C. explained that despite the project was a task force, not all people involved would 
be required all time. More probably a core team would be mobilized full time at the second floor 
together with WP-Houston and BG personnel and auxiliary personnel would be mobilized “as 
required”. What was welcomed by C.K. (…) 
 
(…) Quite interesting along this meeting was the ability of both W.A and particular C.K. of being able 
to follow the content of discussions running among Brazilians without even speaking a single word 
of Portuguese. (…)  
 
 
During this meeting, BG made clear which deliverables it expected to receive and 
show some examples of their content. Instead of drawings, material lists, and project 
criteria, BG required a set of conceptual documents whose works were almost 
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unknown to CNC/WP personnel, more used to engineering executive 
documentation.  
 
     
 
Fig.89: Unusual documentation required for BGB (Source: BG presentation) 
 
The contracting strategy was clearly the subject that attracted most of CNC/WP 
management attention. During the presentation some initial options for this ongoing 
evaluation of contract strategy were presented as shown below: 
 
 
Fig 90: Contracting strategy alternatives (Source: BG presentation) 
 
The meeting continued with less people to discuss cost estimate (CAPEX).  
 
(…) C.L.D. explained C.K. the methodology CNC/WP used for CAPEX estimates, which basically 
followed AACE (Association for the Advancement of Cost Estimation), a standard bureau on the 
subject. C.K. asked it could inform on costs per discipline, as piping for example. C.L.D. however, 
anticipated that for the standards applicable the technique would require number of equipments and 
everything else would be weighted out of it. This sound strange to me, because it was a very specific 
project with unusual equipments and wit a very atypical cost distribution than that for a process 
plant. As such to follow the standard and make an estimate as required, several documents would be 
need to be created, as for example: Block Diagrams, PFDs, P&IDs (basic process documents)…C.K. 
reacted and said that he was not sure if they have something like P&IDs  …W.A. laughed and said 
that without I P&ID nothing could be done… then C.L.D. continued… equipment list, electrical one-
line diagram,… Concerning piping, C.L.D. argued that the precision of Piping estimate would be 
enhanced by the P&ID which would be able to supply the number of valves and other in-line 
elements. (…) 
 
(…) C.K. questioned if he (P.R.F.) thought it was achievable to get all this informational and 
documents by the end of April. (…) He explained that the key for the estimate on the level of 
precision BG wanted would be the civil, the tanks and the piping. S.G.D. questioned about how 
would be evaluated the costs of the elements to be placed at the berth (…) C.K. interrupted and said 
that what would be needed at berths would be result of filling the gaps that would appear in the 
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meeting with LLX (…) S.G.D. then asked if elements to be were defined if WP-Houston would have 
price list for the estimation of complementary equipment (…)Then W.A. start to talk about the role of 
WP-Houston ports divisions as a highly specialized division a center of excellence in Marine for the 
whole world. Then started to raise concerns about the work done for LLX basic project and the 
simulations they have ran, lay-out, operability…(…) (Field Diary notes, 10th February 2011) 
 
The next day, however, as C.L.D. receive the information that he was supposed only 
to handle risk analysis and let the Capex work for another professional about to join 
the company (J.A.M.) he demonstrated irritation and anticipated his withdrawal 
from the project as can be seen in the meeting notes below: 
 
(…) After the meeting C.L.D. showed up quite disgusted with the news. While talking to P.R.F. he 
said that people (in directorship) wanted to hire J.A.M. for so long, that this guy was from “their 
clique” in CCC, and they finally found an opportunity to do that but we would not accept this. He 
said that if it were to J.A.M. to do the Capex analysis he should also do the risk analysis by himself 
that he would be involved in helping him in the task nor provided his methodology. (…) P.R.F. 
showed up uneasiness and asked C.L.D. to reconsider. (…) Later I asked P.R.F. if this guy to join the 
project was that good to bother C.L.D. P.R.F. did not comment much, just said that there was an 
internal problem and that this guy was working at CCC and had been hired to provided further help 
to the economic analysis side of WP (…) Apparently, C.L.D. felt as if his turf have been invaded by 
someone better connected with the top management. Moreover, C.L.D. team had just been reduced 
because as she B.D. returned from a period at WP-Houston, the two other junior analysts who C.L.D. 
have trained while B.D. was out were laid-off when she returned. (…) (Field Diary notes, 11th 
February 2011) 
 
Also on the 11th February, P.R.F. forwarded a message sent by C.K. with an example 
of how the documents BG required were to look like.  
 
Gentlemen, 
 
Please find enclosed my first go at drafting a detailed contents list as to what might appear in our Statement of 
Owners Requirement. I also enclose a template for this document – to be populated.  
 
I am not fixed on the title of main headings or sub-headings or the order in which they appear, but would 
welcome your comments.  
 
This is an urgent document to get to together and agree for use by the whole team to provide the initial basis to 
develop the concept. 
 
Regards, 
 
(BG) C.K. 
 
(Message sent on the, 11th  February 2011 – Exact Transcription, P.R.F. highlight). 
 
In response P.R.F., forwarded the above message establishing a closer date for the 
completion of the documents annexed by C.K. 
 
Ladies and Gentleman, 
  
Annex follows the document Statement of Owner's Requirements so we can complete. 
 
This document shall be complete by 15th February. See C.K. text, in red, in the message below. 
  
Atenc 
  
(CNC) P.R.F. 
 (Message sent on the, 11th February 2011 – Author translation and highlights). 
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Fig 91: Statement of Owner Requirement front-page and index. 
Despite the meeting information and document examples, discipline heads were still 
uncertain about the works to be done. As C.C. was almost absent from the project 
taking care of other proposals and P.R.F. spent most of this time, attending to 
meetings with top management, probably discussing strategies to capitalize on the 
project, no one was left to establish a clear breakdown and definitions to work. Also 
troublesome was the lack of physical structure involving phone lines and inadequate 
hardware which made work sluggish and subject to constant interruptions. Not to 
mention the parallel activities discipline manager allocated in the task force were 
constantly submitted to, such as attending to proposal and managerial meetings. So 
far, work followed in a tentatively and unconnected manner which did not yield any 
concrete progress. 
 
Parallel, C.K. struggled with the infrastructure provided by CNC/WP. Wireless 
internet was not working properly and there was no printer available for him to use. 
As he complained to P.R.F., who has asked several time for IT personnel to arrange 
that, he personally went to A.M.R., administrative manager, to ask for a quick 
response in this matter which was supposed to be operational days before. By the 
end of the day internet connection has been set and a printer has been supplied 
however no one appeared to set it in C.K. computer.   
 
On the 13th February, C.K. began to demonstrate his uneasiness concerning the speed 
and direction of CNC/WP work, as can be seen in the message below: 
 
Gentlemen, 
 
Tomorrow is the start of our third week working together for BG Brazil as an integrated project team and 
clearly work has to start ramping up if we are to maintain what is an aggressive schedule for this 
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Select Stage. With this foremost in my mind this weekend, I have tried to give a starter on a number of fronts 
to facilitate the ramping up of work with requesting information from BG (that BG can only provide), 
providing BG’s initial thoughts on the functional operating philosophy for the terminal, commencing the 
contents list for a Statement of Owners Requirements, the Kick Off Meeting, LLX interface meeting (clearly 
crucial) and the environmental download later this week. 
 
To add to this list I now provide a starter for the Process Basis of Design as the process engineering 
discipline is key to start the concept development activities and your process engineers clearly need to help 
develop this document. This document needs further work. 
 
Although this is a BG Brazil provided document to start concept development, we are also an integrated 
BG/CNC team to act on behalf of BG Brazil working as one team as I mentioned in the Kick Off meeting. 
Therefore I would like to hand this over (in BG document template format) to CNC to take control of it and 
its development for BG Brazil and so that its management of change falls within the CNC processes. 
 
The same approach will apply to other BG supplied documents such as (for example) the Statement of Owners 
Requirements and the full Basis of Design across all the engineering disciplines.  
 
Regards, 
 
(BG) C.K. 
 
(Message sent to (CNC) P.R.F., copied to (CNC) C.C. and P.R.F. (CNC) and (BG) S.G.D., (BG) M.S. 
and (WP-Houston) W.A. on the 13th February 2011 – Exact Transcription – Author Highlights). 
 
 
Fig 92: Process Basis of Design front-page and index. 
 
In response P.R.F., forwarded the above message required further attention to the 
project and fast completion of the documents annexed by C.K to be discussed on a 
later meeting. 
 
Gentlemen, 
  
Annex follows the documents “ Process Basis of Design” and “BG shopping list of Common Oil Terminal 
Option” to be completed by BG and CNC/WP. 
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Client awaits fast complementation of the same and I ask you to attend a meeting today at 14:00 to discuss how 
we will implement or comment them. 
  
I remember again that this Project is different from everything ever done by CNC/WP, because it is a 
Fast Track  with a “Crash” schedule19. 
  
In the message below it is clear that our answer has to be immediate. 
 
(CNC) P.R.F. 
 
(Message sent on the, 13th February 2011 – Author translation and highlights). 
 
The meeting took place only the next day, as almost there was no one available and 
even him, P.R.F., was asked to meet S.S.H. to discuss contract issues and WP-
Houston participation.  Also the 13th February, C.K. sent to C.C., R.F.P. and W.A. a 
document listing data necessary for the elaboration of the Process Basis of Design 
which would be completed by BG and a third-party contractor.  
 
Gentlemen, 
 
I have today requested a “shopping list” of data to be provided from BG Brazil to help populate the Basis of 
Design for this select  stage (as attached). Some of it may not be immediately available and will come from a 
study undertaken by HR Wallingford for BG Brazil. This is not yet completed, so if outstanding, I have asked 
for a target date for completion. 
 
Please advise if you have any other points as soon as possible. 
Regards, 
 
(BG) C.K. 
 
(Message sent to C.C., P.R.F. and W.A. and copied to S.G.D. and M.S. on the, 13th  February 2011 – 
Exact Transcription). 
 
 
Fig.93: “Shopping list” of documents example. 
                                                
19
 According to the PMBOK (3rd ed., 2004), crashing approach refers to another particular variety of project schedule 
compression which is performed for the purposes of decreasing total project schedule duration. This involves weighing the 
additional costs associated with doing a rush job with the benefits of meeting the newly proposed deadline. The diminishing of 
the project duration typically take place after a careful and thorough analysis of all possible project duration minimization 
alternatives in which any and all methods to attain the maximum schedule duration for the least additional cost, and essentially, it 
boils down to an attempt to get the most productivity out of the least time and expense. 
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In response, W.A. wrote two times (13th and 14th February 2011) directly to C.K. 
suggesting that additional information was also important. Noteworthy, however, 
was that most of this information required extrapolates the WP-Houston scope, 
which would be of equipping berths for operation, not berth design and construction 
(LLX responsibility). 
 
(BG) C.K.,  
 
I suggest the following, in addition to the list I sent earlier for discussion with LLX: 
Environmental & Geothecnical 
Ambient temperatures 
Rainfall data 
(…) 
Facilities: 
Design life (years) 
Design flow rates - maximum, minumum, expected averagRegards; 
(WP-Houston) W.A. 
 
(Message sent on the, 13th February 2011 – Exact Transcription). 
 
 
(BG) C.K., 
 
Please add: 
 
1. Molded depth 
2. Number and arrangement of mooring lines (for mooring load calculations)  
3. Maximum storm surge height (to determine underside height of the jetty head and trestle. 
 
In addition to winds, waves, and currents for operating and maximum conditions (directionality extremely important). 
 
Regards, 
(WP-Houston) W.A. 
 
(Message sent on the, 14th February 2011 – Exact Transcription). 
 
As the amount of information handed over by BG increased so lag time within 
CNC/WP also increased. While the “Statement of Owners Design” was distributed 
the same day it arrived, the “Process Design Basis” and Shopping List of Common 
Data” took one day to be distributed and the “Functional Operation Philosophy” two 
days. The information flow between BG and CNC/WP also became highly dynamic. 
On the 12th of February 2011 C.K. sent the first draft on the “Functional Operation 
Philosophy” of the terminal.  
 
  
 
Fig.94: BGB basic design alternatives (Source: BG presentation) 
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This document was only distributed by P.R.F. two days later on the 14th February 
2011, almost at the same time that C.K. sent additional comments upon:  
 
Gentlemen, 
 
On Monday 14 Feb I presented BG initial thoughts on the operating functionality to CNEC for this terminal 
(as attached).  As discussed then, I can now provide our additional remaining requirements on the functionality 
for the concept Select Stage with some refinement to the previous information. By tomorrow morning I will also 
provide the crude quality data as also discussed. There will be five (5) crude qualities to consider to represent 
cargo quality in shuttle tankers from the five offshore fields (namely Iara, Iracema, Tupi, Guara and Carioca). 
These will be the assumptions on crude quality valid for this Select Stage of the concept. 
 
All together this will provide all BG required information for BG/CNC to finalise the process basis of design 
and begin the concept development for the process engineering function in earnest. Please proceed with 
finalising this document for this Select Stage. It also provides part of the input to the Statement of Owners 
Requirements.  
 
The additional functionality requirements are as follows: 
 
Marine Side at Berths: 
·       Berth 1 nearest trestle and on seaward side to accommodate DP2 shuttle tanker, Aframax and Suezmax 
(as before); 
·       Berth 2 nearest trestle and on coastal side to accommodate DP2 shuttle tanker, Aframax and Suezmax. 
Also in case of mishap at Berth 3 to accommodate VLCC it shall be assumed that seabed shall be dredged to 
accommodate VLCC as well at Berth 2. Therefore piping layout and unloading/ loading arms location shall 
match this possible circumstance, however arm sizes and piping sizes will only be for DP2 shuttles tankers, 
Aframax and Suezmax. VLCC will have to load at a reduced rate at Berth 2 (if needed); 
·       Berth 3 furthest from trestle to accommodate Aframax, Suezmax and VLCC (as before); 
·       We still require 3 berths not 4 berths in total (even though LLX plans/design can accommodate 4 berths); 
·       Provision only for a third fiscal meter (sized for VLCC loading duty) shall be assumed, but not installed 
initially at the jetty head. So not to be included in the Capex estimate other than any pre-investment needed to 
install in the future (e.g. tie-ins, space allocation in layout, etc) 
·       Two simultaneous loading/ unloading operation at the berths is still valid. We do not require 3 
simultaneous operations. 
 
BG will provide shipping data for mooring layouts, etc shortly. 
 
Trestle/ Bridge/ Pier Bi-directional loading/ unloading lines: 
·       We require two bi-directional loading/ unloading lines to storage to be installed, one sized for DP2 
unloading, Aframax and Suezmax loading and one sized to accommodate VLCC loading (as before) 
·       Provision only for a third bi-directional unloading/ loading line sized for VLCC loading, but not installed 
initially along the pier to storage. So not to be included in the Capex estimate other than any pre-investment 
needed to install in the future (e.g. spacing requirement and pipe supports design so that we can retrofit for a 
future operational date). 
·       All pipes and equipment to be designed for fluid of specific gravity =  1.0 
Tanks and Tank Storage Area: 
·       Previously we advised that Base Case total useable volume was 4 million bbls. We need to match useable 
volume delivered by DP2 shuttle tankers of 1.1 million bbls in each and every delivered cargo. So requirement is 
now for eight (8) tanks of 550,000 bbls useable capacity  - ground conditions prevailing (equating to 4.4 million 
bbls total useable volume); 
·       Provision for future expansion case of another eight (8 tanks) similarly remains (e.g. total 8.8 million 
bbls). Any pre-investment requirements for future expansion should be included in Capex estimate. 
·       Provision of a second set of pumps to accommodate the future expansion storage should also be made, but 
not installed. Any pre-investment requirements for future pumps should be included in Capex estimate. 
·       Transfer capability of crude from tank to tank shall be required, but not blending capability. It is envisaged 
that the loading pumps could accommodate this with some flow control, but CNEC to confirm or otherwise 
advise through conceptual design. 
·       BG will require segregated storage for certain crude products, but this should be possible through the 
conceptual design of the facilities anyway. CNEC to confirm or otherwise advise through conceptual design 
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·       It is assumed that all crude types (5 off) will be capable of being stored. 
I hope this is clear. I am willing to go over this again with you and the process engineers in a meeting if there 
any queries. Please advise. 
 
Regards, 
 
(BG) C.K., 
 
(Message sent on the, 16th February 2011 – Exact Transcription – F.P.R. highlights in red). 
 
This comments were distributed only on the 16th February 2011 but were further 
complemented on the 17th February 2011: 
 
Gentlemen, 
 
Apologies, but a small refinement to the requirements stated below on functionality of this oil terminal  as 
follows: 
 
Where I had stated (highlight below) that no blending facilities were required in storage, this is not true; 
 
BG will require stirrers in the bottom of each tank as this will enable a homogenous solution in a tank should 
we mix cargo quality types in any given tank; 
BG require a facility to ‘spike’ crude quality from storage to that of incoming crude quality to the terminal from 
the FPSO´s/shuttle tankers to create blend. 
 
BG should be able to monitor flow rate delivered from any tank. This may have an impact on the layout of the 
suction pipework from each tank to the pumping area. CNC/WP to optimize piping configuration layout. 
 
Regards 
 
(BG) C.K., 
 
(Message sent on the, 17th February 2011 – Exact Transcription). 
 
Noteworthy, along this process is the fact that WP-Houston was cut-off from direct 
communications with BG as can be see below in the information regarding “Marine 
Side / Shipping Assumptions for Concept Select Stage” which directly interested to 
WP-Houston however first passed through CNC/WP hands, demonstrating an 
attempt to control the information flow: 
 
Gentlemen, 
 
I now provide further BG supplied data/ assumptions for Marine side and shipping details for use by CNC in 
this Select Stage for concept definition activities. As you have advised me you may need to share some of this 
data with your WP colleagues in Houston. 
1)      Data/ assumptions related to the Crude Quality parameters (ref. Section 1 of the attached document) was 
sent to CNEC by separate email today - completed. 
2)      Data/ assumptions related to BG operating functionality requirements for the Terminal (ref. Section 3 of 
the attached document) was sent to CNEC on Monday and Wednesday this week and today – completed. 
3)      Data/ assumption related to Marine side and shipping details is provided in Section 2 of the attached 
document and is the subject of this email 
In addition: 
(…) 
 
Regards, 
 
(BG) C.K., 
 
(Message sent on the, 14th February 2011 – Exact Transcription). 
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The highly dynamic character of the information and the increasing lag time took the 
CNC/WP into some confusing situations, as for example, when two different 
“Functional Operation Philosophy” documents (the one sent on the 14th Feb. and the 
other one sent on the 16th Feb.) circulated simultaneously among technical personnel. 
Also, most of the interdisciplinary work depended on definitions developed by the 
Process discipline, which until then were busy with other jobs in the company. To 
the point that these problems added to the already existing ones, CNC/WP progress 
almost stalled. To revert this situation, on the 14th February, P.R.F. requested a 
meeting with all discipline heads, to discuss technical issues, particularly process 
ones, with the help of W.A and C.K. The overall content of this meeting was as 
described below:  
 
(…) C.K. began the meeting by reviewing the project concepts. He spent quite some time presenting 
the “Functional Operation Philosophy”(…) it was observable that still there was great uncertainty 
regarding, oil properties, flows and necessary facilities, as C.K. told there were more information to 
arrive by the end of the week.  
 
(…) R.M.B. remembered that a “flush line” would probably necessary to avoid contamination of 
different products during loading and unloading. (…) C.K. however interrupted the discussion to 
say that all this debate depended on the types of cargo that BG might want segregate, what still was 
under definition, what might even develop into using different berths for different types of oil (…) 
In the same line W.A. reminded about heating requirements which would be necessary depending 
also on the type of oil. C.K. said that there were ongoing tests on the oil quality and that it would 
take time for a final word on the issue. Because of this we would have to work with an assumption 
for the select phase.  
 
(…) There was agreement that few could be done without oil compositions, flows and segregation 
strategy. However, in the end it fall upon R.M.B. to specify which exact oil properties were needed so 
that the Process discipline could go ahead into its definitions, which was set to be sent tomorrow. (…) 
 
(…) P.R.F. told that he had already received the BG standards to be used in the work and that they 
would soon be uploaded in the PW (document management system) so that everybody could access. 
(Field Diary notes, 14th February 2011) 
 
As C.K. left the room, C.C. and P.R.F. required the others to stay for an internal 
meeting. In face of the client expectations and the tight schedule, W.A. pushed for a 
wider participation of WP-Houston, as can be seen in the dialogue below: 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: What is concerning me in this project is the speed of this project. We normally don´t see this 
kind of speed in Brazil, first… second, I only know of Shell and Exxon doing project in a situation of crash 
schedule as you said… and what C.K… BG is expecting when they make “ping” we do the “pong”…(…)… in 
half an hour more. And sometimes it is not possible… we are still getting data… without this data we are not 
going to get… 
 
(WP-Houston) W.A.: The problem is that… we… as a team… are not telling the client BG the fact. It is too 
fast we cannot met… or we can met… they still are under the impression that it can be done. We are not 
telling… C.K…The other thing is that we are still missing some basic data … don´t have!… I mean unless you 
do just sketches, just like what he did… those scenarios (…)… it´s kind of very schematic…it is not difficult to 
do something like that. (…) We don´t have complex process… very simple (…) In Houston mechanical 
engineering do all that… (…) The other thing we have to talk is how can we support you?… and let the client 
agree too. We can really speed up… specially now if a change my flight for returning tomorrow… so I will be 
Wednesday morning in Houston… I can do, and help and support you if we have the green light… we can 
work on these blocks, in scenarios, we can do things… I try to get more people you know and put under 
crashing…and come up with some sketches and some diagrams… but we need the green light…  because it is 
important that we try to meet their expectations… we are one team… 
 
(CNC) C.C.: Let me ask now the Process team here… but first in Portuguese then P.R.F. will translate to be 
easy to understand… (Turn to R.M.B. and E.L.N. in Portuguese) You are getting into now and this is the first 
time you are seeing this, but…what would be the “battery-limit” (work division) between us and WP 
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effective?… for example, he has just offered to do the block diagram, and this and that… Can we do this with 
them? Is it possible for us?… Because it looks like to me… 
 
(CNC) R.M.B.: We don´t have resources to do this… with this Friday dead-line for example… it made it quite 
hard… Wednesday and Thursday I will be in Rio… Chevron…  E.L.N. is busy in RNEST, a bush of VDF fall 
upon her…   
 
(CNC) E.L.N.: A bunch… and the other person that is with me is going away (leaving CNC/WP)…  
 
(CNC) R.M.B.: We are losing an engineer…  
 
(CNC) E.L.N.: We are losing an engineer and we have a pile of things, people is upon me… 
 
(CNC) R.M.B.: If Houston could go ahead with this initial diagrams and so forth… (…) 
  
(CNC) C.C.:  This block diagram, as you said… these scenarios… it is not included in the proposal you sent me 
tomorrow? …  
 
(WP-Houston) W.A.: Yeah… but considering that it has to be done by the end of the week I don´t have the 
paperwork… the authorization… I did get in touch with Houston to prepare a process engineer and ask go 
ahead and get a visa… and keep him ready… but visa takes a week… so we have issues. 
 
(CNC) C.C.: Because we have a problem with resources… this scenarios could be studied here… because after 
his presentation, what we are going to need from WP is very clear to me is the port area… (…) What do you 
think (to CNC/WP personnel)? …(…) let´s discuss this a little bit more…(…) he has the project for two 
ships…so somebody has already studied how does this ship arrive through the channel …(…), then BG is 
requiring a third berth…(…) so for this third ship, in case LLX agrees, all portuary infrastructure must be 
confirmed… so we will discover tomorrow who will do this job… 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: (…) It will completely change the third pier… BG… all the berths will change… (…) It will be 
necessary to duplicate the Petrobras berth… 
 
(…) 
 
(WP-Houston) W.A.: We can see tomorrow if LLX is flexible, if we can rearrange the berth… we have 
flexibility to do the image of what Petrobras has… (…) We will see tomorrow what we can do or cannot do…  
 
(…) 
 
(CNC) C.C.: But whatever is the status that is where we are going to need your support.   
 
(WP-Houston) W.A.: We ca do complete layout, do all the studies, we can do all the design … even the “top-
side”, the mechanical, the process, everything… the electrical, the instrumentation, the loading arms, all the 
equipment that goes with it, resting, mooring, the whole work, that is no problem…  
 
(CNC) C.C.: And returning to the first question, about the process itself… the scenarios…the conceptual 
analysis, since we do not the resources over here, then I think it could be done there from Houston… 
 
(WP-Houston) W.A.: That what I was to say, we can really support you with this crash thing… if getting 
people here, as you know is a problem, the cost and also the rates are too high… it is a lot cheaper to do that in 
Houston… but we don´t want to tell the client that we are doing too much… ok… but somehow we can find 
some arrangement … 
 
(CNC) C.C.: As you said, only this conceptual split of work…  
 
(WP-Houston) W.A.: I have to get the green light before I leave… because tomorrow evening I am leaving…  
 
(CNC) C.C.: We have another problem… it´s a commercial one… they have an trade agreement with WP-
Europe… not with WP-U.S….  
 
(WP-Houston) W.A.: I raised the question already with Houston… If we can we work under that 
agreement… (…) they know… 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: F.C ask you (C.C.) to get in contact with G.F. to use this table and it´s over…   
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(CNC) C.C.: It is not possible… it is in Euros…  
 
(WP-Houston) W.A.: But that is what C.K. told me … initially what he told me, before lunch, is that they are 
going to do that in Europe...Initially, then they were told that they have to do it in Brazil… (…) this need to be 
resolved as soon as possible… and tomorrow… we don´t have time because the meeting is going to …  
C.C.: Then you return to Houston…and we going to address… 
 
(WP-Houston) W.A.: Nothing can be done in Houston until we get the green light …  
 
(CNC) C.C.: I know… Even been here… (laughs)  
 
(Recorded Meeting, 14th February 2011 – Exact Transcription). 
 
 
8.4.4- Innovation Attempt 
 
Over the next day, 15th February 2011, the alignment meeting between 
LLX/BG/CNC/WP took place. Attended to meeting LLX commercial and project 
managers, JPPA personnel who had developed the preliminary port and oil storage 
concept, C.K., S.G.D, all CNC/WP task force personnel, and W.A, which were 
required to stay for the whole week in order to also participated in that meeting. It 
was a very cordial meeting and most of the discussions were dedicated at confirming 
information provided by LLX, clarifying the interface limits to be provided by the 
port facilities and go through an information check list elaborated by BG and 
CNC/WP elaborated from the “wish list” and “shopping list of data” previously 
developed.  
 
 
 
Fig.95: Interface and data gathering question list. 
 
Overall, LLX showed great interest in doing business with BG and very flexible in 
changing its project, provided that BG paid the due costs. The meeting enabled an 
interface clarification document, which established LLX duties and delivery dates as 
well as some BG comments on how it views some of the project constrains on LLX 
schedule. 
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Fig.96: Interface and data gathering responses. 
 
Later in the day, two situations attracted my attention and were captured through 
the field notes below: 
 
(…) before leaving, W.A. and P.R.F. engaged a meaningful conversation. W.A. thanked very much 
P.R.F. and his wife for receiving him so well and being so friendly and said that anytime P.R.F. 
traveled to Houston to tell him so that he could return the kindness. (…) Then W.A. told that he 
recognized that there was a fear in CNC/WP of work being transferred between U.S. and Brazil. He 
said we would never think in “packing things and take out”. He said we should not fear them and 
that he wanted just to help.(…) certainly WP-Houston was eager to raise its share on the project, 
however apparently it face resistance from BG in face of raising cost concerning. (…) 
 
(…) later I the day and for the first time I saw, S.S.H. (CNC industry division superintendent) showed 
up to see how was set the infrastructure available for the BGB task force. The floor was empty and he 
called me by my name to ask for P.R.F. I thought that was kind of strange because in more than 4 
years working there I had never had the opportunity to talk to him and did not even know he knew 
my name. He inspected the structure, now more acceptable, and showed surprised that I was still 
working. (…)(Field Diary notes, 15th February 2011) 
 
With more information consolidated and released for CNC/WP work, BG pressure 
intensified. Perceiving a certain hesitation of CNC/WP in creating a schedule and 
showing progress, C.K. required documents to be released in preliminary versions at 
a shorter date. In this context, on the 17th of February, C.C. required a meeting to 
discuss strategies to unravel the work. Key points discussed follow below: 
 
(CNC) C.C.: (…) The inputs we have are here. (…) What do we have to do, in this project… let´s 
recapitulate… We have to produce deliverables… with a certain coverage… that allow for a cost estimate with 
this precision here… (…) we have to do this “guy “ here… he first campaign of all…  we have to populate this 
document … “Statement of Owners Requirement”… we have to do the “Process Design Basis”… the “Full 
Design Basis” which in fact is a general “Project Criteria”… in a sole document he embraces electrical, piping, 
mechanical… and then we have to do the “Interface Matrix”… between the LLX and BG … (…) this thing 
here, if I am not mistaken, is up to the next week… 25th  of February. 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: These documents are more descriptive than any other thing… they do not have a calculation or 
any deep technique… 
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(CNC) C.C.: How are we structuring it, to try to attend … the entire conceptual process project … based on 
the operational philosophy that he (C.K.) gave us… with operational data… will be done by WP (Houston)… 
people is negotiating with them… to close deal as fast as possible… the guy there are going to get all this 
conditions (…) will estimate dimensions for the tanks, in function of the types of oils, of the blending that will 
be necessary… will create a preliminary lay-out both for the on-shore and the port…so he (WP-Houston) will 
have to give this picture to us … that is what guy are going to get… and from this point and on we will have to 
complete our part. (…) independent of it, one cannot say “ there is no work for me now”…yes there is a lot of 
work … This guy here, “JPPA” did a complete basic project (...) he designed for the worst case assumption… 
(…) I want to say the following… there… inside the documents they sent to us… there is a kind of general 
descriptive project that in fact is this document here… this “Full Design Basis” where all is written somehow 
for that project…nothing prevent us to go there and take things out to populate ours… (…) Tomorrow the guy 
will make a Capex… my friend… if there is no time to do a “one-line diagram” … you will not tell the guy that 
is doing it here… he is not here now, he will begin on Monday… my friend call to ABB and ask how much does 
it cost a substation like (…) to use the LLX documentation as reference… it is not for you to tell our inspector 
(C.K.) (…) So, with all this information we can have an idea (…) and beyond this there is the project as we 
know it… (…)this initiates with WP-Houston and finalize here in CNC/WP… but this here… has begin, 
middle and end here… beyond the JPPA documentation, yesterday in the meeting they gave a lot of 
information… about the site, gave many important documents… (…) these documents here have to be 
populated… is the extract of all that has to be done… (…) So, I suggest we should print … To make the text of 
this guy here… we may talk later about the structure we are thinking… there will be a person that will be the 
owner of this… he will compile all this information… we will write… a scribe… a tough guy… but each one of 
you will have … when it is up to talk about “automation system”… G.P.L. has to go there and tell the 
philosophy, what to consider… Guys, independent what they are producing there (Houston) because no one 
will do this for us… (…) Another thing, we are talking about a terminal… pump, tank and piping… only 
that… (…) it is a simple thing. (…) The shock here is the schedule … this phase here… that has to be 
overcame… so, this guy here, and this guy here… he already filled in some parts… so this information that 
arrived today… he (C.K.) does not want the document all completed, typed, to be issued… nothing like this… 
he wants the document completed by us, where there is missing data… with premises… (…) but he wants this 
thing for the next week! Because he needs this… “how they are going to do the project if they don´t have that” 
…this is the project criteria... everybody also does… here we have a model… multidisciplinary… we can use it. 
 
(…) 
 
(CNC) J.M.O.: Who will be the father of this deliverable?  
 
(CNC) C.C.: This guy here will be a person from the infra (infrastructure division), his name is F.M.C. (the 
same who left UNA3 project when his workload surged)…and his mission… how it will operate… there will be 
P.R.F…. and F.M.C…and there will be one more guy… J.A.M.…(…) this guy here (F.M.C.) will have this 
Statement (Statement of Owners Design) here…  his mission will be … come back with this ready… 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: (…) You will have to do your part and he will compile…and improve…  
 
(CNC) C.C.: This guy here (J.A.M.), will take care of Capex… Now, in the first days… he will begin on 
Monday… he will have nothing to ask to you… but little later, he will begin to walk on the alley… (…) he will 
go for… no, price no!… maybe you know the guy from Siemens… only if there is a in-house database… if there 
is not, has to get with an acquaintance… “please, give me a price…”   
 
(CNC) J.M.O.: We are going to do this or there will be someone responsible… 
 
(CNC) R.T.P.: This person… J.A.M.…. 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: J.A.M. will not quote prices! … he will just compile…  
 
(Technical people demonstrate concern about the additional activity) 
 
(CNC) C.C.: Calm… (…)we have to get at this level (+/-25%)…it is not 10% nor 5%… so far we go…  the 
rest is index… (…) I was looking at the documentation, of the methodology… to get to this level … we don´t 
need to make layout plans… it´s by an index… (…) This guy here (J.A.M.) will give the methodology…to get 
here what do we have to feedback… the rest is index… (…) To succeed it has to get ready by 30th March…face 
it like it was a traditional proposal… for those who had the opportunity to do all that fast… you have to imagine 
something… here we have to imagine more because theoretically there we have better information …(…) 
 
(CNC) P.I.: Capex on the 25th (February), no?… 
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(CNC) P.R.F.: No…far ahead… 30th March. 
 
(CNC) R.T.P.: Is it not April? 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: No…April is the end of the project…  
 
(CNC) P.I.: They (technical personnel) are questioning because they thing it is 30th April… 
 
(CNC) C.C.: He (C.K.) he began with 30th April and ended with 30th March… He knows it is extremely 
difficult… we have to do our obligation… (…) our mission… CNC/WP is used to do FEED and detailing … it 
is not used to do that… so this is a great challenge…our mission, despite all daily hardships, is to “die 
shooting”.(…) 
 
(CNC) E.L.N.: By what I talked with R.M.B…. we are waiting that Houston go ahead with a process concept, 
(…) this conceptual will come?  
 
(CNC) C.C.: It will… 
 
(CNC) E.L.N.: And when it is expected? Does it have already been traced with Houston…When is it expected? 
 
(CNC) C.C.: It has been promised before the 9th March…(…) they are there… negotiating… 
 
(CNC) E.L.N.: (…) And we would have to deliver all these basic data before the 30th March…and we would do 
a PFD, a line list, a P&ID, the basic documents (…) But we this conceptual to know what to do (…) 
 
(CNC) C.C.: What you can do in parallel…find out a datasheet… “tropicalize” all in their… or check against 
standards… (…) it is something simple… it is not an executive project …(…) just to enable someone to 
quote…(…) 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: Take a look at what LLX did as a reference…  
 
(…) 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: But C.C., what worries me is that, ok this is a simple project, but on the other side the only 
thing we asked in that meeting that arrived until now is the oil composition but it did not come the flow nor the 
operational philosophy… the operational philosophy he sent is loading and unloading… will he made it 
automatic, or manual…  
 
(CNC) P.F.R.: We… We have to study that…  
 
(CNC) C.C.: We are the engineering… “owners-engineering”… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Ok, but what about the flow? 
 
(CNC) C.C.: The flow he has to tell…if it is missing… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Without the flow I will choose a pipe of 50” or 10”?…The tank will be… 
 
(CNC) E.L.N.: But I think the conceptual will come soon…(…) Because you have to unload the ship… How 
long to unload the ship?… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: OK, if a define that the tank is 80,000… I am defining!…  
 
(CNC) E.L.N.: If we have the size of each ship and the time it takes to unload the ship we can have the 
flow…(…) and the size of the ship Houston will have to supply… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: The ships we have the sizes, the problem is not the size of the ships is the flow…flow at the 
terminal… (…) 
 
(CNC) E.L.N.: The flow it is probably Houston… its conceptual… its basic… (…) 
 
(CNC) C.C.: If it missing… ask the guy (C.K.)…  
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: If you are going direct at the guy… read the documents (…)  
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(CNC) C.C.: We are going to do as much meetings as necessary to align this understanding. … if we are going 
to talk to the guy he will say “you are my engineering”. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: All right C.C., but there is information that is not ours…I can define whatever I want 
but…(…) 
 
(CNC) E.L.N.: To define storage volume and define equipment someone has to know the flow.  
 
(CNC) C.C.: No doubt … if it did not come, we have to ask… Houston is not in yet… W.A. opened his luggage 
yesterday… we have to read it here … 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: But who will make this question… me?… E.L.N.?... because it interest both… 
 
(CNC) J.M.O.: Centralize in P.R.F… 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: I centralize… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: This P.R.F. does not have to centralize…it´s her question…  
 
(CNC) C.C.: In fact… this question is Process…let the Process begin… because the project begins at Process. 
In this case… If she is not available, and you evaluate the documents… you can ask… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: C.C. if the information has to come from her and she did not do it so I will have to do my 
calculations and go ahead…  
 
(CNC) E.L.N.: No… it is not like this… it is not like this… (…) the flow is an important information that 
must go to Houston so they can delineate all storage, flow, how many pumps… 
 
(CNC) C.C.: These guys (WP-Houston) … they still did not make a deal… 
 
(After people left the meeting I asked to talk to C.C. and P.R.F.) 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: (...) I see various common mistakes that we did in UNA3, and that … First… F.M.C. will not 
do this job…Who did it for UNA3 was me and F.F.M…we worked through several night to do this job… He 
will not do…  
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: It has been defined by the Directors… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: When the eleventh hour arrives, and you realize that he had not done that…you will need 
someone to work through the night to do it…he will not do that… 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: But it is hard to believe…(…) 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Let C.C. come back then we make a resume…and another thing that still is not clear… not 
clear to me and I don’t believe that it is clear it the others, is a link between what everyone has to do, to what has 
to be delivered …  
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: We have to do that table…  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: It is not clear… there is 4 generic documents but where is my exact duty … where I am going 
to place my information… 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: It is inside the index of the documents … It is just to open the document and read, man! It is 
just to complete a description…there is no calculation in these documents… 
 
(C.C. approaches the conversation with P.R.F.) 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: But when you begin to assemble that it is going to be tough… (…) UNA3 was a technical 
proposal, where we had to deliver something like this … We would win the bid not based on price but based on 
what we would do…this was the proposal, they put F.M.C. to compile… he did not do that…(…) he 
accumulate the job and when it was close to the deadline he jump out… Then I and F.F.M. we worked through 
the night for weeks to compile and get document together… to make a product… the product was a book…(…)  
Second, while we did not atomised item by item … man!… it did not go ahead … because two people did the 
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same job… another one nobody did… (…) my worry is this… I am downstairs helping P.R.F... we are as much 
as we can… but if we do not separate… “this is your box, fill it!” .. it won´t go… and if we left in F.M.C´s  
hands… nothing against him…it a huge stuff for him and he don´t  hold …don´t hold… 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: It´s important to know… 
 
(CNC) C.C.: OK! We have to get this index…we sit together and take the index… identify who are people…   
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: I begin to do something yesterday, more or less like this…(…) each of these items are the 
finished products… each of them unfold in several items…(…) there is things that we can take out of LLX 
documents…There is things that became clear during the meeting with LLX… (…) Getting data from JPPA 
and LLX we can fill in some of these spaces… (…) so each space either has to be done or has to have an owner, 
to deliver this on a due date…otherwise it is not possible to assemble a complete documents…(…) Some things 
are mine, some others are E.M.S and others are G.P.L…. but we must pay attention that is mine but before 
passes through E.L.N.…(…) so each item has to have a owner… somebody that comes and write 
something…(…) if we don’t do that we won´t end in a document, we end with a patchwork full of holes… As 
such, something I think is important to be done before set people for working is to give this orientation…(…) 
 
(CNC) C.C.: Wait a minute…. (…) We are going to do the following… until 25th… F.M.C….because it is a 
fight to get the guy… he is into three proposals…. until 25th…am I going to ask you to coordinate this for me…  
 
(Recorded Meeting, 17th February 2011 – Author translation). 
 
On the 18th of February, P.R.F. finally sent the meeting notes of BG/LLX/CNC 
meeting settling down the important point discussed. He also highlighted to all in 
the team the pressure exerted by BG manager, C.K. 
 
Gentlemen, 
  
Annex follows the meeting notes with LLX, in 17/02/2011, and the new version of LLX/BG Interface 
Assumptions Engineering Data Gathering. 
  
The data of this meeting, which you all participated, and the respective meeting notes contain directives 
necessary to complete the documents required for this project:  
 
- Statement of Owner’s Requirement 
- Process Design Basis 
- Full Design Basis 
  
BG  requires that these documents shall be completed until 21st February the latest, even if a preliminary status. 
 
This way I insist, again, that all make efforts to read the documentation priorly received. 
 
Client is not satisfied with our response time and I foresee strong problems beginning on Monday, 21st  
February, if we are not fast enough in the execution and complementation of the documents above. 
  
IMPORTANT: From 21st  February and on, we will have weekly Project Review meeting in the 
presence of the client. The first meeting will be 22th February at 14:00, Block A, 3rd floor. All of you 
are required to go. 
  
Att, 
  
(CNC) P.R.F. 
 
(Message sent on the, 18th February 2011 – Author translation and sender highlights). 
 
By then, several annoying situation start to affect the perception of BG manager C.K., 
towards CNC/WP, what can see in the field notes below: 
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(…) Again C.K. struggled to use the printer recently set. As he tried to print a document and it did 
not worked, he showed nervous and after several trials, and P.R.F. was not at his table, he decided to 
go upstairs probably to complain to C.C. or S.S.H. because no one at the IT desk in front of our desks  
spoke English (…) 
 
(…) Later in the day, P.R.F. commented with me that C.K. complained about the time people arrive at 
the office at CNC/WP and their dedication to the project as several times he saw the desks empty. As 
we discussed about the issue, P.R.F. said that we had already told that people followed company 
schedule, and although they arrived later (9:00AM) they also left later (at 7:00PM), different from 
C.K. who arrived around 7:00AM and left 5:00PM at most.  (…)  (Field Diary notes, 18th February 
2011) 
 
In order to intensify the pressure towards result, C.K. sent the following message, 
where he established several intermediate targets to CNC/WP pursue although work 
was still under organizations. 
 
(CNC) C.C. and (CNC) P.R.F., 
 
Next week is week 4 of CNC / BG working together out of a potential total of only 10 weeks for this Select Stage 
activities for concept development. 
 
Therefore I expect to have received or have completed the following as a minimum by the time I leave for UK on 
24 Feb: 
·       I should be receiving time sheets today for review of actual hours worked by CNC on this project as agreed 
last week;  
·       The WP proposal for additional resources as required by CNC; together with CV’s and CTR’s to underpin 
the proposal; 
·       The revised Level 3 Schedule of CNC/ BG activities as discussed yesterday to end of this Select Stage; 
·       The CTR catalogue for CNC resources to underpin the schedule to end of Select Stage (i.e. the estimate of 
man-hours); 
·       The final version of the Process Basis of Design document as per the draft and BG template I sent you 
last weekend; 
·       An essentially complete draft of the full Basis of Design document (for all disciplines); 
·       An essentially complete draft of the Statement of Owners Requirements document (lets discuss today if 
there are still queries as to what this is); 
·       The translation of the Cost estimating sheet as discussed at the Kick Off meeting. 
  
No pressure eh! 
 
Best Regards, 
 
(BG) C.K. 
 
(Message sent on the, 18th February 2011 – Exact Transcription - sender highlights). 
 
As expected, on the 21st February, J.A.M. arrived at CNC/WP to provide support to 
the Capex estimation. Along the days I gathered several impressions over him which 
can be gauged from the field diary notes. 
 
(…) J.A.M. arrived while everybody was in a rush to read the documentation and begin to generate 
some output. As he engaged into several conversations trying to gather more information about the 
project, I noticed that all the time he kept flattering itself. Sometimes about the great projects he had 
participated before, the role of manager he had in some company, or his links with CCC (…) In the 
end of the day as I did not joined the conversations he start asking questions about my role in the 
project, my rank and tell I was too young to such important position. I said that despite I was young I 
had participated in several projects and had learnt a lot (…) As instead of looking for something to 
help he kept on bolstering his curriculum I realized why C.L.D. did not liked him. (…) (Field Diary 
notes, 21h February 2011) 
 
 328 
 
After lunch, I and P.R.F. looked for C.K. to show how we were thinking in 
organizing this work in order to consolidate concepts and get more information to 
help team to elaborate the unusual documents required. The dialogue was as 
follows: 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: This is a sort of split of work we did based on the documents you sent us and essentially, in 
orange we have the main documents (…)  
 
(P.R.F. interrupt to talk about internet connection problems experienced by C.K and promised he would go 
“upstairs” to require immediate solution) 
 
(BG) C.K.: Let me just say what I just said (…) … so the “Basis of Design” is what BG says what we can rely 
on… for the concept select… thee “Statement of Requirements” is what we do with the “Basis of Design” to 
develop the concept… but it is not the concept… the “Conceptual Design Report”, at the end … early April… 
is the key deliverable which has a lot of things that support such as equipment lists, PFDs, etcetera, etcetera… 
Around the preferred concept… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Is this the hard core document so?…  
 
(BG) C.K.: That is the main … and then we have an estimate that comes with it… 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: Here he has what it is, how long and how much it is going to cost…it is really the main 
document… (Portuguese) 
 
(BG) C.K.: Ok, just to say to be clear the standard… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Ok… For example, for the “State of Owners Requirement” we have just to describe what we 
are about to do, in the “Concept Design Report”…  
 
(BG) C.K.: Yeah…using the Basis of Design …on reliable information… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: It is all about telling how we are going to work with this to get to here…  
 
(BG) C.K.: Yeah…correct…so it says, and a key example is we will produce an estimate to +/-25% equity… 
that´s all we need to say against the estimate… and also the methodology about by which we get to that…  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: But the consideration that we will be using for this estimate… we placed them in the  
“Statement of Owners Requirement” or we wait to show them in the “Conceptual Design Report”? … For 
example we are assuming there will be an heliport… 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: That should be in the “Statement of Owners Requirement”  
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: So every consideration I do for the “Concept Design Report” for the Capex estimation, should 
be in the “Statement of Owners Requirement”?  
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: Because on the “statement” we should write what is going to … 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Because am I handling those documents right now and what I feel is that something that is not 
completely…decided, (…) so in this text (“Statement of Owners Requirement”), I must tell I am considering, I 
am not considering…  
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: In this document you just tell what you are considering… (…) 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: The description will be in “Concept Design Report” but the assumptions will be in the 
“Statement of Owners Requirement”…(…) 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: Right… 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: That is something very important to us…  
 
(BG) C.K.: The “Statement of Owners Requirement” says we don´t need to provide accommodation for operate, 
but we should consider it to constructions… 
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(CNC) P.R.F.: Period…just clear…. 
 
(BG) C.K.: He does not say the nature of the campus… that is the work, that´s done. 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.: Ahead of concept selection report…(…) What we should require from every discipline leader is 
to provide assumptions that will be used at this point… 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: Just described it…You don´t have to calculate anything…  
 
(BG) C.K.: Shouldn´t take a long time to produce it…  
 
(…) 
 
(BG) C.K…. (laughs nervously)…I want to see I first draft…because we are working together…I don´t mind 
in editing it… but it gives me opportunity to share it back in my office in the UK… and particularly my 
venture manager… to double check … if we are going the right way… that is why it is important to do it… 
well I said this week…as soon as possible … before I very go to marching on there…  
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: We will not issue anything before you have a look at that… 
 
(BG) C.K.: Like with the schedule… if we get a long time to get the first draft… because I think C.C. is trying 
to perfect it… and then I have comments, and then it takes even longer… so I don´t mind what status it is in… 
as long as you think you’ve done a first reasonable draft…then give it me… it does not have to be perfection… 
(…) we all are working in one team …that would normally be BG document to give to a contractor… but  
because, you know, we have late started now part of the plan is to have CNC/WP to be part of the BG team to 
help to develop this and then do the work… (…)  
 
(Recorded Meeting, 21th February 2011 – Exact transcription). 
 
On the same day, C.K. finally provided the flow information, and now it was 
possible to calculate how many oil pipelines would be necessary and thus start to 
work with the tank farm and pipeway arrangements.  
 
(CNC) P.R.F. 
 
I enclosed our assumptions related to the type of tankers that we shall be accommodating at the oil terminal, 
their offloading and loading assumptions (as applicable) and slop/ produced water to be returned to shore 
assumptions. 
 
Please use these assumptions in the conceptual design of the facilities for this Select Stage. 
 
Regards, 
 
(BG) C.K. 
 
(Message sent on the, 21th February 2011 – Exact Transcription). 
 
Later in the day, P.R.F. managed to organize a clear input/output and a draft of the 
responsibility matrix concerning the outputs, as can be seen below: 
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Fig.97: BGB preliminary inputs and outputs. 
 
In the sequence, Process discipline manager, R.M.B., replayed the message rebuffing 
the schedule and turning over the scope for WP-Houston. 
 
(CNC) P.R.F., 
 
In relation to the schedule to the “Process Design basis”,  it was compromised as WP-Houston scope, Am I 
right? Otherwise, the date 21th February is not viable. 
 
Sds 
 
(Message sent on the, 21st  February 2011 – Author translation). 
 
Later, I finished and sent the work breakdown with items that could be individually 
assigned to professionals and have their accomplishment monitored.  
 
Gentleman, 
  
Annex follows the spreadsheet to be considered as responsibility matrix. In their it is described the relation item 
versus responsible for each document to be delivered.  
 
Texts in English corresponding to each item shall be sent to me for final document assembly. There will not be 
any verification on my part. 
  
This matrix is still under construction and therefore might be modified at any time. Use always the last version 
received. 
  
Few minutes ago, in a meeting with P.R.F. and C.K., it has been clarified that to the Statement of Owners 
Requirement we shall supply only the ASSUMPTIONS and EXCLUSION to the items ranked. Therefore, this 
document is equivalent to our “declaration of scope”. 
 
Any doubt please get in contact.  
  
(CNC) L.M.A. 
 
(Message sent on the, 21st  February 2011 – Author translation). 
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Fig.98: Project team responsibility matrix. 
 
On the 22nd February, based on the information regarding flow sent by C.K., L.M.A., 
R.M.B. and E.L.N. agreed to be considering in our studies three pipelines (two 42 
inch and one 48 inch) from terminal to storage, what would be considered by the 
piping discipline to develop the overall layout of the project and to feed the Capex 
estimate. 
  
The visit to the Açu Superport site happened on the 23rd of February. Some 
impressions of the trip can be taken from the field diary notes below: 
 
(…) As we waited for R.T.P. in the hotel lobby, I, P.R.F. and C.C. engaged with a series of 
conversations talking about oil projects and characteristics of Petrobras. When R.T.P. arrived, we 
headed to a nice restaurant in Rio, however, C.K. seemed a little uncomfortable. Along the diner he 
also talked little and as such we all end up speaking more Portuguese among us. A rather unkind 
situation however, happened when C.C. asked for the bill and in checking it, C.K. saw and showed 
surprise with the price, R$ 600 (US$ 400). When C.C. said that it would be upon CNC/WP, C.K. said it 
did not matter because in the end it was up for him to pay.(…) 
 
(…) While waiting in the tiny waiting room for the private jet that would take us to Açu, S.G.D. and I 
engaged into a conversation about the good and the bad things about Rio. The conversation extended 
and he told about his life, how he learned to speak Portuguese in Angola and this skill helped him to 
get this job in Rio. Told that he had married a Brazilian and had two children. (…) as C.K. sat down 
and start to talk with S.G.D. about the hotel accommodation in São Paulo, I was looking at a 
magazine when I saw an Aston Martin on a publicity page. I showed the photo to C.K., and trying to 
engage into an informal conversation said that I really liked British cars. Almost informally, he 
replied that this one was quite hard to see even there… and added he had a BMW. I showed my 
amusement for a British having a BMW. He told it was just fine. (…)  I asked where he worked in 
England and he explained that he lived in a nearby city and commuted every day to London for 
almost an hour. (…) Although not enthusiastically, it was the first time we talked informally during 
all his time in Brazil. The conversation, however, ended when we were required to go to the airplane. 
(…) 
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(…) Along the visit, I only talk to S.G.D. once. He asked about my impressions on the visit and about 
my formation and specialization. The conversation this time felt a little more like an inquiring, as if 
he wanted to check my credentials. (…) Along the visit, C.K. made many questions and talked a lot 
with P.R.F. about many things from the cities around the port to the operational details of the 
construction (…) During the lunch, however, despite we sat all together and enjoyed a incredible 
meal, both S.G.D. and C.K. barely spoke. Just like in our return to Rio. (…) (Field Diary notes, 14th 
February 2011) 
 
Technical impressions on the visit can be taken from the message sent on the 24th 
February 2011 to keep S.P.H. informed: 
 
(CNC) S.P.H., 
  
Yesterday (23rd February 2011) we visited the Açu portuary complex, which is under construction. Through the 
visit we realized that the LLX entrepreneurship is still more incipient than we thought.The land is still covered 
with vegetation and without due preparation. Land is still subject to hydraulic landfill and soil preparation. 
There is no electricity or water supply. Roads are not paved and there is no rainwater drainage. In construction 
phase only the píer and the berths for Anglo America and part of iron ore slurry settling, however, nothing 
complete or operational.  In the maritime part there is still 500m of berths to be constructed. Breakwater still 
awaits construction. 
 
He identified at least one key problem that affects the piping discipline on the off-shore part. Apparently there is 
no space in the bridge to the passage of the pipeway. There is only two lanes on the bridge one for the conveyor 
belt of Anglo American and other for vehicles. Initially we thought about locating the pipeway right to the belts 
(…) however, the presence of heavy trucks around and the constant belt maintenance would represent a 
constant risk to that. On the left side, there is also problems particularly with the rainwater channel which is 2 
m wide and 2,5m deep, and stretches all over the bridge.  
  
He will need to get a cross section drawing of the bridge in order to analyse which is the current space 
availability and think about alternatives, however, a final solution shall be agreed upon LLX and environment 
personnel because it will certainly require changes in the bridge project and probably in the environmental 
permits  The on-shore part apparently presents no problem, because the land is completely straight and there is 
no relevant crossings. Along this branch, piping shall be supported by sleepers.  
 
Att, 
  
(CNC) L.M.A. 
 
(Message sent to S.P.H. and copied to P.R.F., on the, 24th  February 2011 – Author translation). 
 
Back to the office, I could see that the work breakdown suggested found a good 
reception and start to yield results. I received several e-mail with the individual parts 
from each task-force member and after some suggestions gradually this parts were 
dynamically added to the documents BG required. In the end of the day I sent the a 
preliminary version of the “Full Design Basis”, “Interface Matrix” and of the 
“Statement of Owners Requirement” so that P.R.F. could check the progress and also 
made some comments.  
 
GOOD WORK!!!  
 
I will start today the verification and also on the weekend and on Monday, 28th Febreuary we talk by the 
morning. 
 
THANK YOU ALL THE EFFORT AND DEDICATION! 
 
LET´SHOW THE CLIENT THAT WE DESERVE ALSO THE BASIC AND EXECUTIVE PROJECT IN 
THE SEQUENCE! 
 
(CNC) P.R.F. 
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Gentlemen, 
  
Added to the documents all material sent me to the date. Annex follows the responsibility matrix and the 
documents as they are at the moment (except for the Process Design Basis) 
  
Any comment Just look for me so that we can make the adjustments. 
  
Please, pay attention to the changes in the responsibility matrix, and to what has been left. 
  
Att, 
  
(CNC) L.M.A. 
 
(Message sent to P.R.F. and team members and copied to C.C., on the, 24th  February 2011 – Author 
translation). 
 
Despite the work ramping up and further extension for draft delivery, P.R.F. looked 
increasingly tenser. After the port visit his relationship with C.K. had visible 
deteriorated. Apparently, C.K. questioned expenses and hours charged on the 
project, leaving P.R.F. in the troublesome position to give explanations to the 
CNC/WP management. In at least one occasion it was visible P.R.F. irritation with 
C.K. constant demands. By this time, P.R.F. looked quite stressed and meetings with 
the CNC/WP top management became constant. He almost did not had time to 
coordinate the efforts of the task force, and in the absence of any other leadership the 
team was running almost on its own. 
 
Also on the 25th February 2011, a preliminary schedule was released, evidencing the 
fast-track characteristic of many sequential activities running almost simultaneously.  
 
 
Fig.99: BGB fast-track project/crash schedule. 
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8.4.5- Innovation Break-up 
 
Later in the day S.G.D., which would be replacing C.K. for a week (2nd to 4th of 
March), sent a message requiring P.R.F. to speak in private with each discipline head 
in order to get more information on project progress. P.R.F. considered that a vote of 
distrust, however, did not react against. P.R.F. was worried because as C.K. was not 
satisfied with CNC/WP mobilization and results he was delaying to sign the 
definitive service order until 30th April. On his account the order was waiting to be 
signed in for days at C.K.´s desk. 
 
On the 28th February 2011, finally CNC/WP and WP-Houston reached a cooperation 
agreement, as can see in the message below: 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
  
 Split of work between CNC/WP and WP Houston as follows: 
 
  
 
Atenc 
 
(CNC) P.R.F. 
 
(Message sent on the, 28st  February 2011 – Exact Transcription). 
 
Despite of the agreement, almost no information produced at WP-Houston arrived 
and CNC/WP in time for the elaboration of the draft documents required by C.K. and 
therefore it was expected to impact only the final documents to be delivered in the 
end of April.  
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A curious situation happened when in the rush to completed the documents, P.R.F. 
asked J.A.M. to take care of some parts and he almost immediately passed them over 
to me, as can be seen in the message below: 
 
(CNC) L.M.A.  
  
Follows the descriptive for  item 1 (annex). 
  
For item 2 (keep). 
  
For item 3 ask you to add (UNDER DEVELOPMENT) 
  
Item 4 – You are elaborating, Am I right? 
  
Item 5 – Document List of the Excel file (annex) 
  
Any doubt, just get in contact. 
  
Sds 
  
(CNC) J.A.M. 
  
 
  
(CNC) J.A.M. 
  
Annex LLX LD (List of Documents) to complete the item “ Documents associated”, which we spoke today. 
 
Ask for you help to develop the following topics: 
  
1- Purpose of basis design 
2- Distribuition and intended audience 
3- Definitions 
4- Acronysm and abreviations 
5- Referenced and associated documents 
  
Atenc 
  
(CNC) P.R.F. 
 
(Thread sent on the, 28th February 2011 – Author Translation). 
 
In the afternoon, P.R.F. gathered discipline heads for a fast meeting, in order to 
prepare them for S.G.D inquire the next day. The content of the meeting was the 
following: 
 
(CNC) C.C.: S.G.D. that some of you knew, that is the manager responsible in BG Brazil for this 
project too… C.K. is by BG UK… and S.G.D. is for BG Brazil. (…) He will want to talk to each one of 
you … 10, 15 minutes… whatever… and then he will want to check that talk with me. So I requested 
this conversation here, so that we could align… as far as possible… I know there is a lot of people 
with a question mark this size, in some areas of the project, but this is to align what we are going to 
tell…. First, that date on the 30th, we have to let it clear to S.G.D. that we cannot met. I received now a 
call from C.K. that his director …a way to say… punched the table… I want everything on the 
30th…of March…He called me and I said “ It does not work you to ask for the 30th March because this 
is unreal…I will give you what I can on the 30th of March, and the rest goes to the 15th April in 
accordance with our schedule” … The guy already got nervous on the phone… It does not work if I 
do cuddles… So, until 30th March let´s produce what is possible (…) but this date 15th April I need 
you to real hold to it… (…) because in the beginning it was on the 30th March, but we all arrived at 
the conclusion that it was not possible. I debated with him, asked for three weeks and he gave me 
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two. But looks like that when he get in London he was forced to retreat. So we have to show our 
position (…) So this is the first alignment I want to do… I think S.G.D. will go for the schedule… 
 
(…)  
 
(CNC) R.M.B.: And Houston? 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: Houston is beginning to check the documents today. Why/ because it has only been 
signed by BG, on Friday in the end of the afternoon… and by us to… so Houston did nothing till 
now… (…) S.G.D. will probably ask about Houston… please… answer, “ You BG, inclusive, signed 
the proposal on Friday 25th in the afternoon… so today 28th I have no information… and probably 
throughout the week…(…) 
 
(CNC) R.M.B.: What is up to Houston? 
 
(CNC) P.R.F.: It is up to Houston, only the maritime terminal! And there is more… Beyond process 
that would be the basis, I had asked support for tank dimensioning, something like this… C.K. cut 
this all …and told “ If you ask for this I will cut more than the half of your CNC/WP hours” … 
because you are transferring CNC/WP responsibility to WP-Houston…so it is kind a complicated… 
don´t count on Tank dimensioning, piping dimensioning… (…)(Field Diary notes, 28th February 2011) 
 
 
In the beginning of the night, counting almost 4 days of delay, we sent the drafts to 
P.R.F. in editable format with his comments incorporated. He worked through the 
night to check the documents, included additional information and forwarded the 
documents to C.K. so that he could show the progress of the work in an important 
meeting to happen in BG office in London. After that point, I suspended my 
collaboration with the project organization and required P.R.F. to ask J.A.M. to keep 
on organizing the conceptual documents because it was time to dedicate to the 
piping technical documents. 
 
8.5- OLD KNOWLEDGE COLLAPSES 
 
On the 2nd of March 2011, C.K. sent a harsh comment on the “Design Basis” 
document drafts sent by CNC/WP team.  
 
(CNC) P.R.F., 
 
I have enclosed my initial marked up comments of your first draft of this General Basis of Design document. 
I have struggled with this document draft! 
The purpose of this document is to provide rely on information for our project team to go away and do a 
conceptual design for the onshore oil terminal for the Select Stage. 
My general observations are: 
·       Some sections are still to be completed 
·       The BG Standards to which we agreed three weeks ago are not listed or referenced 
·       A lot of the sections detail design basis that would be more appropriate to FEED or even detailed design 
engineering and I question whether they are needed for conceptual design (e.g. why do I need to know that all 
rotating equipment shall have guards for conceptual design?) 
·       There are no sections on Environmental conditions (e.g wave data, temperature data, marine growth, wind 
data, topography, geotech, soil conditions, bathymetry, seismic, etc) – other than perhaps by reference to LLX 
supplied data 
·       There is no Reliability, Availability and Maintainability criteria 
·       There is no project location data or coordinates for the Project and Port Site areas – other than perhaps by 
reference to LLX supplied data 
·       There should be a general Units of Measure section (rather than just covered in the Instrumentation 
Section) 
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·       There is nothing on HSSE – at the very least project activities should be in accordance with BG HSSE 
Policy and Standards – not mentionedI look forward to receiving a revised version as soon as possible. 
 
Regards, 
 
(BG) C.K. 
 
(Message sent on the, 2nd March 2011 – Exact Transcription - sender highlights). 
 
Later in the day, C.K. sent an even harsher comments about the Statement of Owners 
Requirement, as can be seen below: 
 
(CNC) P.R.F. and (CNC)  C.C., 
 
I enclose my initial marked up comments on CNC very early draft of the Statement of Owners Requirements. 
 
Again I have struggled with this document! I am now very concerned: 
·       The performance of CNC is not good enough to meet the schedule that we agreed and that you recently 
realistically said you could achieve; 
·       This schedule shows completion of most of the activities for Select at the end of March; 
·       Next week is not going to be that productive due to the 2.5 public/ bridging  holidays in Sao Paulo, which 
only leaves 3 full weeks to end of March thereafter; 
·       CNC team members demonstrate a lack of understanding of what is required for conceptual design in this 
Select Stage; 
·       This document should not take days to complete – it is relatively simple and states what we are going to do 
with the ‘rely upon’ information that is in the Basis of Design documentation. It is not intended to be the 
summary of the conceptual design output – that is the Conceptual Design Report; 
·       CNC team members have a tendency in this document and in the General Basis of Design document to 
focus on more FEED and/ or detailed design criteria/ assumptions rather than conceptual design. They seem to 
have problem in developing from a blank sheet of paper to develop the concept. I was at pains to stress the 
differences at the KO meeting, but the message does not seem to have got through. 
 
We have a conference call tomorrow and I ask you to think beforehand how we improve performance. 
 
Regards, 
 
(BG) C.K. 
 
(Message sent on the, 2nd March 2011 – Exact Transcription - sender highlights). 
 
During the afternoon, after a tense conference call with C.K., P.R.F. sent an urgent 
message to all in the team: 
 
Ladies and Gentleman, 
  
After the project meeting, day 28th February, I require each discipline to develop a urgent strategic plan, so that 
we know which “deliverable” it is possible to issue until 30th March, and what is necessary for this to happen. 
I suggest that you do this study. “forward back”, because the date is already defined and as kept on the 30th 
March, that is, what are the information, documents and actions needed to be taken to accomplish this schedule. 
I remind you that the creation of a LD is extremely urgent. 
C.K. informed that the closing meeting - Integrated Function Review (IFR) – will be on the 4th April, here in 
CNC/WP with all disciplines and coordination.  
We will have until 10th April to finalize and issue all documents after the IFR meeting. 
 C.J.B. is responsible for collecting the most data from each discipline to build the Capex and compile the 
documentation for the BG ITT. 
  
Atenc 
  
P.R.F. (Message sent on the, 2nd March 2011 – Author Translation - sender highlights). 
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On the rush to go ahead with the technical documents, I asked for the help of R.T.P 
and Z.V. to provided the calculation over building, dikes and tank sizes so that we 
could model these elements it in the 3D environment and start working with the 
layout.  
 
On the 3rd March, to speed up the process I ask some colleagues which have worked 
with me in the PDY project to help in the layout work. A.R.A. helped copy some 
common elements from the PDY project and through the day we began working in 
the layout. In the end of the day we were able to tell J.A.M. the amount of pipe so 
that he could work on the Capex.  
 
On the 4th March, I created a document list for the piping discipline to serve as a 
reference to what CNC/WP would deliver at the date required and sent it to P.R.F.  
 
 
Fig.100: Piping document list – Return to old knowledge. 
 
It was a turbulent day for P.R.F. and the following dramatic situation happened: 
 
(…) Early in the morning P.R.F. asked me if I had something like a document or a layout so that he 
could show at a crucial teleconference that would happen after lunch time. I said we were working 
very hard to finish the layout in the 3D and I would tell A.R.A and C.L.S, who were helping me, to 
speed up so that it was ready by 14:00. He thanked and left in a rush to a meeting with directors. 
Then I went upstairs and explained the situation to A.R.A. and C.L.S. who immediately decided  to 
work until we finish the layout. (…) As the meeting hour approached I began to press C.L.S. to avoid 
being too detailing and speed up work. We were both tired and hungry but we keep on working to 
finish the layout to hand it to P.R.F.(…)  
 
(…) By 15:00, C.L.S. finished the last details and we could generate several images and I rushed to 
sent them to P.R.F. before the meeting began. We also printed some large versions and handed them 
to him as he headed to the meeting. (…)(Field Diary notes, 04th March 2011) 
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Fig.101: BGB preliminary lay-out plan view. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.102: BGB preliminary lay-out isometric view. 
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On the 14th March 2011, after the Carnival break (7th to 10th of March), the BGB project 
has been abruptly interrupted as BG was greatly disappointed with CNC/WP and 
decided to give up the LLX option and join Petrobras in the expansion of its oil 
storage facilities.  
 
Appalled with the results of the BGB project, P.R.F. quit WP and returned to its 
independent engineering consulting business. With the almost simultaneously 
failure of the RMAN2 bid, personnel recently hired and allocated in the BGB project 
such as G.P.L., Z.V., and J.A.M. were immediately laid-off. The end of the third study 
case also marked the finish of the data collection for this investigation. As such, I left 
WP and resumed my engineering consulting works elsewhere. 
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9.1- DATA INTERPRETATION 
 
9.1.1- PDY Case  
 
In the beginning of PDY, power asymmetry between WP and CNC was considerable. 
Not only WP was the contract owner but it was also overly confident in its methods 
and capabilities even in face of a new and unknown client like Petrobras. As a result, 
WP socialized CNC on how workshare was to be conducted, what CNC personnel 
accepted based on the assumption that WP international experience provided 
superior project management knowledge compared to CNC. The limited scope of 
interaction further reinforced the sensation that the knowledge provided by WP 
worked fine and that should be institutionalized. 
 
As conflicts intensified due to the inability of WP in managing the strict contract 
requirements and in meeting Petrobras demands, WP has seen itself in the need to 
ask for CNC advice on how to handle as increasing number of project issues.  
Although this process led to a decrease in the power asymmetry, CNC socialization 
was already extensive and the belief that WP was right in its workshare approach 
undermined any possibility of questioning the institutional knowledge transmitted. As 
a result, even experiencing a favorable situation in terms of gaining an increasingly 
important role on the project, CNC personnel remained passive knowledge 
replicators for quite a long time, what helped to WP knowledge to gain density and 
further institutionalize. 
 
 
 
Fig. 103: PDY international workshare knowledge change stage 01. 
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As the project advanced and interaction intensified, workshare coordination became 
increasingly difficult bringing a sense of uneasiness to the partnership. Even though 
initial dimensional inputs for calculation and detailed design should come from WP, 
CNC was constantly accused of lagging behind the partnership for not being capable 
of designing directly into the 3D environment (PDMS). Though this diagnostic 
reflected a rather superficial analysis of the workshare problem, it has been 
acknowledged and internalized by CNC project management to the point of 
becoming a sort of a self-recognized handicap.  
 
Parallel, CNC was already addressing project issues directly to Petrobras without 
WP mediation, what alleviated client pressure over WP but resulted in additional 
reduction of the power asymmetry. Under these circumstances, tension has been 
introduced in the relationship. If on the one hand WP kept on blaming CNC for 
project delays, on the other hand it kept on benefiting from its participation on the 
work process. As a result, pressure for change started to accumulate on WP side. 
 
Apart from most people at CNC which self-blamed their lack of experience in 
conducing the workshare appropriately, a few people (i.e.: K.G., D.C.C, A.R.A) start 
to wonder what could possibly be wrong with CNC that prevented an experienced 
company (to the point of being appointed by Petrobras) from living up to its 
expectations. This self-evaluation moment represented a shift in the mainstream 
project mentality as it marked the point where the search for alternatives began. As a 
consequence the workshare knowledge provided by WP began to lose density and 
head towards initial questionings. 
 
 
Fig. 104: PDY international workshare knowledge change stage 02. 
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With this self-evaluation moment, came up for the very first time the possibility that 
instead of having internal (CNC) causes, workshare problems could result from 
external (non-CNC) ones, WP knowledge inclusive. Argued about its confidence on 
the approached, WP rebuffed the possibility of being wrong and once again accused 
CNC Civil team of being incompetent in handling the joint work in the 3D 
environment. Pressure reached its maximum when WP threatened to send personnel 
to CNC to handle the problem, what has been taking as a direct threat to CNC 
project manager’s (K.G.) autonomy and as a challenge to the company. 
  
With WP being emphatic on the effectiveness of the knowledge supplied and with 
pressure building up for results, a period of radicalization in the use of the older 
approach took place (i.e.: more database filters, more spreadsheets, more people 
involved). Nevertheless, the more effort and resources were directed to the task of 
making the knowledge supplied to fit into the situation, the more it seemed 
inappropriate. Along informal and frank conversations important typifications that 
latter would help in the knowledge change process emerged (i.e.: “freezing”). 
 
At this point, differently from the initial moment in which self-evaluation ruled out 
the possibility of an internal (CNC) cause for the workshare problems, the 
radicalization in the use of the traditional approach made evident that the ultimate 
cause for the workshare problems was the knowledge provided by WP. Henceforth, 
certainty about the knowledge in use was suspended and its density fell below 
institutional level. As a result, internal questionings to the way WP handover work 
to CNC were voiced for the first time along team meetings. 
  
 
Fig. 105: PDY international workshare knowledge change stage 03. 
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After certainty suspension, underlying concepts regarding the workshare in the 3D 
environment underwent a detailed review by the personnel in charge of solving the 
problem. Knowledge elements previously taken-for-granted were thoroughly 
examined providing a more robust case against the way WP designed the workshare 
process. At the same time that faulty elements in the knowledge were ranked, 
additional typifications (i.e.: “marking”, “coping”) regarding what should change to 
make the workshare more effective kept on emerging as a result of informal 
conversations and debates involving key project personnel.  
 
A collateral effect of this open examination process was that the density of the 
knowledge regarding how to manage the workshare fell down quickly. With 
problematic elements in the WP workshare knowledge being exposed along informal 
conversations and in meetings, key project members started to openly question it. 
Nevertheless, more important than finger pointing at WP was to spot the necessary 
changes to be made. As agreement within CNC was thin at the time, a first moment 
of political action involved “selling” the necessary changes first at upper level to K.G. 
what as been facilitated by the crisis moment the project experienced. 
 
As debates advanced and a clear proposition on what would be required from WP 
crystallized, a strategy to approach WP and ask for changes in the handover process 
has been designed and involved the support of K.G., as strong resistance was 
expected. In a direct e-mail sent to WP project manager (G.F.), K.G. exposed WP 
missteps, required work responsibilities to be clearly marked and asked for a 
meeting to discuss the issue. This mounted to be a second moment of political action. 
 
 
Fig. 106: PDY international workshare knowledge change stage 04. 
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A third moment of political action happened during a teleconference involving CNC 
and WP teams, having at the forefront of WP team S.B.D. (WP engineering manager). 
In the beginning of the meeting, WP personnel insisted that there were already in 
place many forms of identifying CNC scope, however, with S.B.D. adopting the 
certainty suspension position transmitted by K.G., they were far less emphatic. As 
discussion progressed and S.B.D. position remained one of suspended certainty, WP 
team also start to put on hold their certainties and asked for examples of handover 
problems. Quickly, debates moved to WP personnel having one side sensitive to the 
problem (i.e.: S.B.D.), and other more resistant to change (i.e.: H.L.). Faced with a 
robust questioning, current knowledge defenders brought up additional elements to 
keep it afloat (i.e.: “That´s on the P&ID”, H.L.). At this point, however, it became 
clear that the changes were necessary, and resistance to change quickly faded away. 
 
With WP agreement, a new definition of the workshare problem emerged making up 
for a turning point for the workshare knowledge in use, and thus made up for the 
very moment of innovation. In the same day, e-mail was sent to K.G. settling down 
the new marking system to be implemented by WP. As new knowledge start taking 
place of the older one, workshare knowledge density stabilized, though, at a very 
low level. More elements needed to be added (i.e.: “coping”, “naming”, “deleting”, 
“SIC”.) to make up for a whole new workshare knowledge to be tested and 
transmitted. Now enjoying a higher status as accredited “knowers”20, CNC was in 
charge to develop it. Few days after, the initial draft of a new procedure guiding how 
workshare was to be done has been sent to WP for comments.  
 
 
Fig. 107: PDY international workshare knowledge change stage 05. 
                                                
20
 Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p.71 
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As the implementation began more people where told informally on how workshare 
was to be held and the impact of the changes in their work. As many details 
concerning the new knowledge were still under development and test this has been a 
gradual but straightforward process. With the early basic elements of the changed 
knowledge already accepted, the sequential ones found little opposition. As the new 
knowledge kept on being developed and been increasingly accepted it entered a 
zone of quasi-institutional equilibrium, where knowledge is dense enough to be 
transmitted but still remains subject to retrenchment or further change.  
 
The creation of the SIC control is a landmark in the knowledge process as it 
represents a moment where the changed knowledge materialized beyond its 
typifications (i.e.: “filtering”, “coping”, “naming”, “registering’, “deleting”,  
“freezing”, “associating”, “tracking”). Once objectivated, the new workshare 
knowledge could be more easily explained and submitted to a wider audience. The 
stage for a successful legitimation and socialization was already set.  
 
With the formal presentation of the detailed procedure first to K.G. and then to 
S.B.D. the workshare knowledge, now embodied in the “SIC control”, has been 
legitimized, and thus, gained density enough to be socialized at large. Alongside, the 
arrival of WP personnel to closely follow/support CNC work marked a rare moment 
of face-to-face interaction between international team members. Despite initial 
lecturing on WP part, the relationship quickly evolved into one of trust and even 
friendship, resulting in further confidence in CNC work and recognition of CNC 
personnel as “knowers” just like them. 
  
 
Fig. 108: PDY international workshare knowledge change stage 06. 
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Being legitimized by both project managers, the new knowledge found little if any 
opposition. For WP, socialization proceeded quite smoothly, as few reinforcements 
and back-checks were necessary with most of them happening through a fast 
sequence of exchanged e-mails. For CNC, however, the larger impact and number of 
people involved turned new knowledge socialization lengthy and more problematic. 
CNC supervisors had their work backlog exposed and partially lost their scrutiny 
over work planning. As a result, they resisted using the SIC control as a work release 
tool and kept asking WP to release element by other means, though unsuccessfully. 
 
“Area 8000” development represented a turning point in the power relation between 
WP and CNC. For the first time CNC lead the project and had WP under a 
dependent position. The new workshare knowledge and tools (SIC control) played a 
key role in the successful accomplishment of this task and set the landmark for an 
“almost equals” relationship between WP and CNC. As a result, the socialization has 
been fully accomplished at WP where it became institutionalized at project level. 
 
Alongside, the new workshare knowledge went through further refinements to 
become more consistent and to provide further managerial information regarding 
CNC work progress. Despite the underlying aim of reinforcing to WP that CNC had 
everything under control, D.C.C. blocked to disclose the progress graphic to WP 
arguing that it would attract too much attention what could backfire. As a result, 
new knowledge institutionalization at WP has been restricted to the project interface. 
Combined with the partial institutionalization at CNC, the overall new knowledge 
institutionalization end up losing thrust and remained quite tenuous.   
 
 
Fig. 109: PDY international workshare knowledge change stage 07. 
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After WP acquisition a period of political turmoil took place at CNC where project 
and technical managers rushed to show up their best works to WP in order to 
improve (or keep) their positions. Ahead in this race K.G., who already enjoyed 
considerable reputation at WP, found in the new workshare knowledge a showcase. 
During the first international visit of a key WP project manager (A.J.S.), K.G. tried to 
lift the new workshare knowledge to a “CNC capability” status. As PDY headed 
towards a close end, K.G. aim was to join A.J.S. project (a multibillion dollar mining 
entrepreneurship for VALE) in similar conditions it had now with PDY. Day long 
presentations and meetings brought company wide attention and A.J.S. keen interest. 
 
Nevertheless, this attempt of increasing knowledge density (and acquire prestige) by 
promoting its reproduction also attracted the opposition of the Industry Division 
Superintendent (S.S.H.) and its Engineering Manager (R.F). Exerting their 
prerogative of assigning personnel to firm tasks, S.S.H. and R.F. took over control of 
direct contact with A.J.S. With this boundary spanning monopoly in place, no contact 
regarding the potential partnership could go ahead without consent of S.S.H. and 
R.F. CNC feedback to WP-Edmonton inquires became protracted to the point that 
A.J.S. interest in the partnership quickly faded away.  
 
As such, the second attempt of increasing knowledge density by promoting non-
identical reproduction beyond PDY and CNC boundaries failed as a result of 
strategic action of S.S.H. and R.F. who feared K.G. strengthening.  Further, attempts 
to sell CNC expertise abroad failed as Brazilian professionals were not WP wide 
recognized as “knowers”, mainly due to a lack of contact among peers. 
 
 
Fig. 110: PDY international workshare knowledge change stage 08. 
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In a third attempt, K.G. asked S.P.H. to implement a similar 3D model control similar 
to that of PDY at the RMAN project. S.P.H., however, did not made great efforts to 
extend the use of the new knowledge, as it would expose his schedule overrun and 
compromise his autonomy. Even though, two people have been indicated by K.G. to 
reproduce the SIC Control methodology in RMAN, however, without S.P.H. support 
both of them left the project without making any progress in this direction. 
 
Alongside, the tenuous institutionalization of the new workshare knowledge within 
CNC made its socialization to go unfinished as the “look-at-the-model” approach 
persisted in supervisors’ minds. Counting with K.G. support, D.C.C. urged a meeting 
with coordinators in order to clarify and reinforce the use of the SIC control as a tool 
to release work to supervisors. It was up to the coordinators now to enforce the full 
application of the new knowledge what helped to further extend its internal density. 
 
Also under D.C.C. initiative and K.G. support, a “3D project management seminar”, 
has been promoted in order to “sell” internally at CNC parts of the new workshare 
knowledge (i.e.: SIC control and 3D progress measurement). Again the move has 
been blocked by R.F. who rescheduled several times the seminar and in the end 
emptied the room by making himself absent. S.P.H., who had long held the 
monopoly over 3D works, attended to one of the seminars and actively downplayed 
the usefulness and novelty of the new workshare knowledge. He also pushed 
debates to such a complex point that the subject became almost hermetic to the rest 
of the audience. As a result, another attempt of non-identical reproduction failed and 
new knowledge institutionalization though effective remained tenuous.  
 
 
Fig. 111: PDY international workshare knowledge change stage 09. 
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Though workshare knowledge has actually changed both at CNC and WP and the 
net result of the change process has been positive (workshare process improved), 
overall impact on companies´ knowledge has been limited as the new knowledge (or 
parts of it) did not stretched much further than PDY limits. On the WP side, 
knowledge change impact has been higher in intensity (more institutionalized) but 
shorter in range  (less people affected). At CNC impact has been less intensive (less 
institutionalized) however implications have been almost companywide (more 
people affected).  
 
New knowledge expansion has been limited on the WP side both by CNC lack of 
self-confidence and by the internal power struggle which hampered its reproductive 
strength. Even though, the good performance in PDY (enabled by the new workshare 
knowledge) reflected in an improved corporative image of CNC. Within CNC, 
knowledge expansion has been clearly limited by the internal power struggle among 
managers. Nevertheless, spun off effects of the new knowledge could be felt over 
several other areas such as planning (i.e.: model progress), engineering (i.e.: work 
organization), and project management (i.e.: 3D coordinator as key project position) 
as well as through different projects (i.e. UNA3, BGB). 
 
As soon as PDY ended and the new knowledge lost its direct utility, it retrenched 
back to a personal knowledge possessed by the strict circle of professionals who 
directly worked on it. Once again it entered a debatable state were CNC personnel 
held disparate opinions about the pros and cons of its definitions and on how 
workshare should be held and 3D work progress should be measured. 
 
 
Fig. 112: PDY international workshare knowledge change stage 10. 
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9.1.2- UNA3 Case 
 
UNA3 bid represents the first international project of CNC as a formal WP 
subsidiary (thus CNC/WP). It is also representative of the initial strategy WP 
designed to tap into Brazil sizzling economy. Despite the official discourse in which 
WP would empower CNC/WP to become a fully capable subsidiary, initial 
movements went in the direction of using CNC/WP as a local post to have access to 
stated-owned companies' mega-projects to be further redirected to other well 
established subsidiaries abroad. Within that logic, UNA3 bid participation came up 
as a WP-Reading (U.S.) initiative channeled through the good relations CNC/WP had 
with Eletrobras, a long time hydropower client.  
 
In the beginning, power asymmetry was high, with WP-Reading holding a “knower” 
status and CNC/WP holding a support status. The points of interest checked by 
G.L.G (WP nuclear division vice-president) during his visit at CNC/WP demonstrate 
that expectations were low about CNC/WP with questions mostly directed to 
CNC/WP 3D design capability and how to transfer part of the job overseas (mainly to 
WP-China). The unconventional activities disclosed in men-hour (MH) spreadsheet 
puzzled WP-Reading making it less certain on how bid was to be held. The request 
to CNC/WP to fill in the MH estimate represents the weakening of WP knowledge on 
how to bid under such circumstances. This uncertainty intensified with the release of 
the bid instructions which brought current estimation methods under deeper 
scrutiny. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 113: UNA3 global price contracting knowledge change stage 01. 
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The uncertainty regarding the scope of activities (to which WP-reading was not 
familiar) together with the requirement that at least 80% of the job should be held 
locally and there should be technology transfer with local entities turned upside-
down the initial power distribution. Faced with a marginal role in the future project 
and the prospect of creating a local competitor, WP-Reading reduced its participation 
in the bidding to a minimum. Even though empowered, CNC/WP still depended on 
the nuclear certificates that only WP-Reading could provide, ultimately leveling the 
power asymmetry between WP-Reading and CNC/WP.  
 
Despite its lack of nuclear expertise, CNC/WP applied knowledge from other bids for 
stated-owned companies and went ahead with the estimation. CNC/WP also cross-
checked information within bid instructions to ensure its estimations, however, 
uncertainty on the tasks to be held clearly unsettled WP and CNC/WP executives. 
Even though, CNC/WP still trusted that WP know what it was doing and thus 
should follow its lead. To enforce his control over the process, WP headquarters 
urged WP-Sofia (Bulgaria) to join the bidding team.  
 
Initially, WP-Sofia role was to provide a checking stance for CNC/WP estimation and 
technical doubts, however, almost without examining the bid instructions, WP-Sofia 
straightforwardly applied the standard estimation methods originally developed by 
WP-Reading (its parent office). As a result, WP-Sofia questioned estimations 
weakening again CNC/WP position in the bidding. The enrollment of WP-Sofia also 
represented a less careful socialization of the current knowledge and thus the return 
of its density and taken-for-granted status.  
 
 
Fig. 114: UNA3 global price contracting knowledge change stage 02. 
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Alongside WP-Sofia questionings, WP-Reading interest in the bid returned with a 
strategy to gain further influence and secure a privileged place in a future project. 
Drawing on the strict personnel qualification requirements, WP-Reading claimed key 
positions in the future project further weakening CNC/WP stance. To make sure that 
it had updated information and its interests preserved, WP-Reading sent G.J. to 
CNC/WP to closely follow proposal developments. G.J. focus on contract pricing and 
job posts as well as its disregard for the technical documents and certificates, which 
were decisive bid parameters, evidence the stance adopted by WP-Reading.  
 
The lack of understanding of the bid instructions by its partners has been noted by 
CNC/WP which fiercely debate with WP-Sofia to defend its estimations. To rebuff 
critics of a poor examination of the bid instructions WP-Sofia sent standard 
estimation forms and statistic tables as a way to legitimize its approach. These 
documents, however, made little sense in the context of the UNA3 bidding which 
was very strict and clear about activities to be carried, which had no correspondence 
to what was considered in these documents. Nevertheless, as they represented the 
materialization of WP current knowledge on how to bid such projects, they were 
forcefully socialized at CNC/WP as the ones to be universally followed. 
 
As a complement in its strategy to occupy future key posts, WP-Reading also 
required the final word on the technical documents to be attached to the proposal. 
Event though, responsibility over initial drafts fell upon CNC/WP which was at great 
time pressure to hand them to WP-Reading to be “verified” and “enhanced”. This 
work division put CNC/WP under a disproportionate pressure of time.  
 
 
Fig. 115: UNA3 global price contracting knowledge change stage 03. 
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Two events marked a turning point where CNC/WP realized that WP knowledge no 
longer could be held credible: the debates about the use of another engineering 
design system (SmartPlant 3D instead of PDS), and the standard technical 
procedures sent by WP-Sofia. In the first case, the idea has been aired by G.J. despite 
clear bid instructions about using PDS. He believed that Eletrobras could be 
dissuaded out of this requirement what beyond impractical as it would mean full 
revision of a public bid instructions in favor of a proponent, was also largely illegal. 
In the second one, WP-Sofia sent work procedures describing how to roll a brand 
new project while bid instructions clearly emphasized that UNA3 was to be an exact 
clone of UNA2, what required a completely different approach.  
 
As a result of the enrollment of WP-Sofia (and WP-Reading come back), power 
asymmetry grew up again, leaving little space for CNC/WP to voice its questionings 
over the highly institutionalized approach. Current knowledge density increased 
steeply and mounted to an almost oversocialization of the current knowledge on 
how to bid large-scale projects. All this in behalf of more power for WP-Reading in 
the future project, and more prestige for WP-Sofia as a “procedure champion”. 
 
The uneven distribution of power and responsibilities brought the proposal work to 
a sudden halt. At the same time WP-Reading and WP-Sofia successfully enforced 
their highly institutionalized knowledge, more responsibility was being transferred 
to CNC/WP. Once WP knowledge demonstrated being non-functional to the 
proposal work but no other party listened to it, no other option was left to CNC/WP 
than to let WP knowledge fell for itself.  
 
 
Fig. 116: UNA3 global price contracting knowledge change stage 04. 
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Quickly, however, current knowledge proved highly inadequate guidance the UNA3 
bidding process. The arrival of technical procedures which completely missed the 
point or ignored bid requirements, set off a dismal reaction on the part of CNC/WP. 
As a result of the dissonance between the WP knowledge and proposal needs, a 
parallel line of work has been established with approval of R.M.Z. in which CNC/WP 
took over responsibility over most of the write-up´s required, inclusive those 
planned to be held by WP-reading and WP-Sofia. This was seen as a safeguard 
against their inability in providing reliable knowledge regarding the accomplishment 
of the write-up´s which suddenly became the focus of CNC/WP. 
 
In opposition, however, G.J. focus was still to make changes on the bid process and 
proposal on WP-Reading behalf.  G.J. insistence in using SmartPlant 3D instead of 
PDS (required in the bid) ignored the many arguments provided by CNC/WP for 
moving on the debates to more important and practical proposal subjects, such as the 
certificates and technical write-up´s, which were far more decisive in the bid. 
 
As a consequence of this process, vast time has been wasted discussing how to 
change clearly defined bid requirements (i.e. engineering systems and work 
methodology), showing a lack of self-evaluation on the part of both WP-Reading and 
WP-Sofia. With the time running out fast pressure mounted for clear and precise 
directions not only regarding what to do but also who would hold responsibility. In 
the lack of practical guidance on how to deal with real proposal tasks current 
knowledge begin to show signs of losing any functionality.   
 
 
 
Fig. 117: UNA3 global price contracting knowledge change stage 05. 
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Despite the parallel work line established by CNC/WP in relation to the write-up´s, 
uncertainty spread over other areas of the proposal work. The persistent discussion 
regarding the engineering systems and future project positions promoted by G.J. 
distracted other team leaders from smaller but fundamental decisions, regarding, for 
example, the idiom in which proposal documents were to be written and who were 
to be in charge of each document. 
 
Another reversal happened when WP-Reading realized that not even its senior 
specialists fit into the qualification requirements asked by Eletronuclear. As WP-
Reading began to falter in this subject they were urged to present alternatives which 
further exposed their lack of knowledge for this specific sort of proposal. An 
unfolding problem then became the limits between WP-Reading and CNC/WP 
identities. As G.J. insisted that both were the same company and thus could assign 
personnel to the key positions, CNC/WP personnel argued that WP-Reading and 
CNC/WP were legally different companies and thus CNC/WP could not have their 
personnel listed in a proposal officially led by WP-Reading. The confusion regarding 
company identity quickly spread into the certificates and eligibility documents 
further jeopardizing the process and dragging down knowledge density. 
 
Although at this point WP current knowledge went under certainty suspension at 
CNC/WP opening room for deeper questioning, this far it has been restricted to the 
CNC/WP corridors. Nevertheless, power asymmetry was still too high for this 
questionings to spark any change. As such, knowledge density kept falling as a result 
of the work increasingly become uncertain and misguided. 
 
 
Fig. 118: UNA3 global price contracting knowledge change stage 06. 
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Even though technical proposal work was running adrift, WP-Reading turned its 
focus to the financial questions and used its “knower” prerogative to claim the final 
word on the commercial proposal terms. Even in a scenario were its leadership and 
knowledge proved highly dysfunctional, the legitimation position WP–Reading held 
within the corporation provided the means to kept power asymmetry untouched. 
 
As it would be the first corporate risk analysis CNC/WP would participate risk 
personnel decided to run a preliminary analysis, using its own methodology, to set a 
good impression at the official meeting. Several key CNC/WP executives have been 
invited to contribute to this preliminary analysis however, the exercise has been 
emptied by an internal event promoted by CNC/WP president despite the 
importance of the proposal for the company as whole. During official risk analysis, 
however, divergences on how contingencies should apply demonstrated that WP 
contracting knowledge was strongly biased towards “reimbursable costs contracts”, 
and thus, was highly inadequate for “global pricing contracts” such as UNA3. 
Overall, the use of the current contracting knowledge in the Brazilian market would 
result either in non-competitive prices or bid withdrawal due to unacceptable risk. 
 
The arrival of B.M. (WP-Sofia) to assist G.J. in the proposal organization 
unintentionally marked the beginning of a change in direction in the whole proposal 
process. B.M. not only improved communications with WP-Sofia, but also 
established an independent assessment of the current knowledge on the WP side. As 
such, her stance contrasted with G.J., which saw CNC/WP remarks as linked to its 
under-socialization on WP contracting knowledge. 
 
 
Fig. 119: UNA3 global price contracting knowledge change stage 07. 
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Initially, B.M. work focused on establishing a bridge between CNC/WP and assist 
G.J. in disentangling UNA3 eligibility requirements and access WP resources to get 
them. Regarding the first task, B.M. participation has been decisive. Despite initial 
rivalry, the extenuating work journeys and face-to-face interaction created a 
trustworthiness bond between her and the CNC/WP personnel, which was passed on 
to WP-Sofia office and facilitated exchanges between the two offices. On the other 
hand, divergences between B.M. and G.J. increased on daily basis, as her focus was 
to fit the WP approach to CNC/WP and UNA3 needs while his was to fit CNC/WP 
and UNA3 needs into WP approach.  
 
Even though feedback time improved, remarks over CNC/WP papers still 
demonstrated a lack of proposal understanding on the part of WP-Sofia. This 
problem also affected new CNC/WP additions to the proposal team. Particularly 
remarkable was the fact that the absence of a thorough analysis of the bid 
instructions did not prevented people from joining discussions and make 
disconcerting suggestions, some of them questioning explicit client requirements and 
scope definitions. Overall, this can be taken as an indicator of loss of meaning 
regarding the current contracting knowledge as it became so rarefied that stopped to 
provide a common ground for team members' interaction, opening space for 
meaningless ideas. 
 
At this point, a state of almost paralysis took over team activities. Key meetings to 
approve the technical and commercial proposal had to be postponed due to a lack of 
common ground in which debates could proceed and decisions could be made.  
 
 
Fig. 120: UNA3 global price contracting knowledge change stage 08. 
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The site visit and the technical seminars represented a key moment in the proposal 
work. The materialization of all elements mentioned in the bid instructions in front 
of team members left no space for doubts or second thoughts. At this point current 
contracting knowledge looked completely out of place, and both G.J. and WP-Sofia 
engineers had to completely review their approaches. For CNC/WP, which have 
been questioning WP approach for several weeks without results, the information 
gathered came to confirm several points it had brought to WP-Reading and WP-Sofia 
attention. 
 
As a result of the visit, new common typifications replaced the almost individual 
ones that existed just before the visit establishing a new common ground on which 
communication and understanding could be once again rebuilt. Moreover, face-to-
face interaction between CNC/WP and WP-Sofia engineers (i.e.: G.G. and S.T.V.) 
solidified the incipient trustworthiness bonds and resulted in CNC/WP personnel 
being granted a “knower” status. Out of these two processes, new typifications 
involving roles and responsibilities emerged bringing order and direction to the joint 
work of CNC/WP and WP-Sofia regarding the write-up´s.  
 
Overall, the visit redefined the problem to all team members and created the 
conditions by which old knowledge could not block new understandings and 
courses of action. As a result, a completely new knowledge progressively gained 
density and re-entered a quasi-institutional zone. Now team members could interact 
to improve these definitions towards more effective joint work, and back to their 
home offices, further spread these typifications to overseas professionals enrolled. 
 
 
Fig. 121: UNA3 global price contracting knowledge change stage 09. 
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Back from the visit, CNC/WP personnel quickly updated the MH estimation and 
began to revise the documents for the technical proposal. With the helped of two  
junior engineers, which substituted F.M.C. and P.D.J. (two proposal experts which 
brought no contribution to UNA3 at all), the write-up work gained great speed.  T.D. 
and R.M.Z. also helped revising and writing entire sections. As a result of this effort 
and of having most of its concerns confirmed by the client site visit, CNC/WP has 
seen itself in position to make demands against WP-Sofia and WP-Reading regarding 
their responsibilities in the joint project. WP-Reading has been urged to deliver the 
eligibility documents while WP-Sofia to quickly review the revise write-up´s.  
 
With WP-Sofia sending now “just suggestions”, the review work has been quite fast 
and CNC/WP technical write-up´s were quickly legitimized almost without remarks. 
With WP-Sofia on his side, CNC/WP buildup pressure upon G.J. and WP-Reading 
regarding the certificates for the eligibility package. In a situation that can be 
understood as a first moment of political action, T.D. urged F.C. to ask top WP US 
management to put further pressure on WP-Reading. B.M. also added to this 
pressure enrolling the participation of D.T. her former boss and now WP Nuclear 
Division Managing Director. 
 
As a result of having WP-Sofia and top WP management at his side, the power 
asymmetry between WP-Reading and CNC/WP reduced significantly. This reduction 
in power asymmetry also opened room for further questionings from CNC/WP, 
which now were carefully listened by WP Nuclear division executives at large. As 
such, the new contracting knowledge upon development gained further density. 
 
 
Fig. 122: UNA3 global price contracting knowledge change stage 10. 
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With the MH estimation approach legitimized, the next challenge for the proposal 
was the risk methodologies both CNC/WP and WP-Reading used. On the CNC/WP 
side, the amount added for contingency was so high that final price would 
extrapolate client top estimations (presented in the bid instructions) meaning 
immediate disqualification. On the WP side, due to the amount of money involved 
and to its global price features, UNA3 proposal ranked at an unacceptable level and 
thus would need approval of WP CEO before going ahead.  
 
To overcome these two barriers, T.D. engaged into intense debates with CNC/WP 
risk personnel and actively questioned in the risk meetings contingency values and 
criteria. Under the threat of T.D. quitting the proposal if risk criteria were not 
reviewed to bring proposal price close to bid instruction values, C.A.J. (CNC/WP 
President) had no other option than to legitimize T.D. risk view. Afterwards, T.D. 
engaged into intense political action for WP to accept CNC/WP analysis which 
brought risk levels back to acceptable ones. Operated in his favor CNC/WP efforts, 
mobilization of WP top executives (T.D.; S.C., S.H.) and the project attractiveness, 
which would open up a unique market for WP. Despite its tradition, faced with such 
pressure, WP-Reading end up having its power leveled with CNC/WP one. 
 
After that, the focus also turned to the EPR meeting which would give the proposal 
final approval.  B.M. personally dedicated to the task of preparing CNC/WP to make 
a successful presentation. Though almost ritualistic, in the sense that no debates and 
questionings were made during the meeting, EPR approval gave further density to 
the new contracting knowledge as more and more people agreed with its definitions.  
 
 
Fig. 123: UNA3 global price contracting knowledge change stage 11. 
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Despite the massive work done by CNC/WP and WP-Sofia towards proposal 
paperwork, in attempt to standout, WP-Reading launched its first material 
contribution to the proposal, a 5 page marketing piece called “executive summary” 
(not required by the bid instructions) with great publicity to all WP top managers 
involved in the proposal before submitting it to the other partners. However, when 
long waited eligibility documents from WP-Reading started to arrive at CNC/WP. In 
a preliminary check, B.M., T.D. and F.F.M. realized that have been issued following 
U.S. legal standards, and not Brazilian ones (far more strict) and therefore were not 
acceptable according to bid instructions. Moreover, only at this point details 
regarding WP corporative arrangement that would be unacceptable according to 
client terms only then were brought to partners' attention. The fact that WP-Reading 
had hold these problems for so long is elusive of the pervasive influence of and 
longstanding power asymmetry, particularly reflected as excessive self-assurance. 
 
In a third moment of intense political action, F.C. directly called U.S. top 
management and urged immediate action to correct and re-issue the documents. 
B.M. also used its links with D.T. to urge a critical intervention in the WP-Reading 
work. Also, T.D. immediately departed to the U.S. to follow up corrections and make 
sure no other document would be sent with problems alike. UNA3 proposal was 
finished at the very last minute and has been delivered on due time thanks to the 
efforts of CNC/WP personnel and WP-Sofia. Months later when proposal resumed 
after a short cancellation, WP agreed to make changes to its corporate structure in 
order to avoid problems in future proposals for Brazilian state-controlled companies.  
 
 
 
Fig. 124: UNA3 global price contracting knowledge change stage 12. 
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9.1.3 – BGB Case 
 
Despite the lack of expertise in designing oil terminals and being completely 
inexperienced in rolling out fast-track projects, BGB contract and project leadership 
has been assigned to CNC/WP. The reasoning behind client’s decision was that 
experience regarding the local business environment would be more important than 
technical expertise, and WP could be able to offer them both.  As such, CNC/WP 
would be responsible by project management and tank facilities while WP-Houston 
would provide support for it on the ports and terminals. This way, project started 
with power asymmetry favoring CNC/WP, differently from recent past experiences.  
  
Right from the internal kick-off meeting, however, the approach adopted by 
CNC/WP was that of a standard project. Even recognizing the challenging outlook, 
project management almost unconsciously relied on the same path used for 
traditional projects. Even in face of a quite unconventional project scope, initial 
directions for team members were to develop traditional documents, which 
represented the materialization of the current institutional knowledge on how to 
develop projects. The taken-for-granted belief in the current approach made project 
management and key leaders to downplay the few questionings raised and disregard 
the composing effects a fast-track schedule would bring upon initial project 
uncertainties. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 125: BGB fast-track project knowledge change stage 01. 
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Following the traditional project organization, F.R.P asked for a “list of documents” 
(LD). Due to the unconventional character of the project, however, this requirement 
generated great uncertainty as project scope fit awkwardly on a traditional LD. With 
unconventional client requirements such as “information wish-lists” and constant 
direction changes on how to consider costumer-supplied data, traditional project 
organization knowledge steeply lost its functionality. Working under increasingly 
uncertain conditions and with a pressing schedule, some supervisors added to their 
lists documents that mismatched project stage and available level of information. As 
uncertainty surged knowledge density plummeted. 
 
In the official kick-off meeting, C.K. provided current knowledge a further 
downward push as he presented a far from conventional set of documents expected 
to be developed by CNC/WP. In face of these explicit requirements, team members 
suspended their certainty on how to handle project activities, making current 
knowledge lose its take-for-granted status and enter a debatable zone.  Even with 
knowledge plummeting and schedule tightening, contracting strategy was the only 
matter that attracted full project management attention.  
 
To make things worse, company support for the project, neither reflected the 
importance of the project for CNC/WP nor its detached position in the partnership. 
With project infrastructure on the verge of improvisation, and discipline leaders 
delaying project assignments, CNC/WP responsiveness to client requirements has 
been severely hampered. CNC/WP lack of direction in the initial weeks undermined 
client’s confidence, weakening its power stance against WP-Houston influence. 
 
 
Fig. 126: BGB fast-track project knowledge change stage 02. 
 366 
 
The unconventional set of documents required by the client extended uncertainty 
from “how to organize” into “how to do”. Even though documentation examples 
(materialization of client fast-track project knowledge) were provided, in the absence 
a legitimation instance to “explain” them through socialization or guide disparate 
interpretations towards a new consensus, they were of little use. Moreover, enrolled 
in parallel tasks and submitted to a tight schedule, team members also did not gather 
the conditions to come up with new typifications and objectivations required for a 
knowledge change. As a result, current knowledge density kept on plunging and 
started to provided less and less guidance even to face-to-face interaction among 
local team members. 
 
Parallel, WP-Houston increasingly demanded higher project participation. CNC/WP 
strategy devised by H.S.S., however, was to get the most of WP-Houston technical 
expertise in exchange for the least possible stake in the project. Unexpectedly, 
however, WP-Houston by-passed CNC/WP and opened its way direct to the client. 
This act of rebellion further weakened CNC/WP leadership in front of the client and 
thus its power stance in the project.  
 
Suddenly the client flooded CNC/WP with information and scope changes. As the 
amount of information increased so did the lag time between its arrival and 
distribution within CNC/WP. As a result, uncertainty further extended towards 
“what to do”. Disciplines began to work on different client requirements dragging 
down communications and the rest of common understanding. The hope to bring the 
team back on track was the interface and data-gathering meeting with LLX.  
 
 
Fig. 127: BGB fast-track project knowledge change stage 03. 
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Indeed, the interface meeting with LLX helped the team to arrive at some new 
typifications as well as it highlighted that key client information was missing. After 
this meeting, W.A., in a first moment of public political action, made project 
management realize that it would be impossible to cope with client requirements 
without increasing WP-Houston share. As such, power asymmetry has been leveled 
between partners opening room for more knowledge exchange. Notwithstanding, 
BG quickly turned-over the information required and intensified the pressure upon 
CNC/WP demanding for document drafts.  
 
In order to respond to this pressure an internal meeting was set to discuss ways to 
unravel the work. Despite arriving at key typifications and close addressing real 
work issues, project management came up with the proposal that team personnel 
should focus on the technical work while document organization work would be 
assigned outside the team, a very similar approach to the one that failed at UNA3.  
 
In a second moment of intense political action an alternative compromise has been 
reached with project management in that both tasks would remain within the team 
organized by a clear “work breakdown” with responsibilities assigned according to a 
“responsibility matrix”. This agreement represented a shift in the way projects were 
organized within CNC/WP, and thus, a truly innovation moment. As C.K. 
legitimized the “work breakdown” and P.R.F. the “responsibility matrix”, this new 
knowledge gained density enough to be transmitted within the team though it still 
remained debatable and subject to further change.  
 
 
 
Fig. 128: BGB fast-track project knowledge change stage 04. 
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The new approach caught on quickly among team members and considerably 
improved work organization, however, it apparently arrived too late. With tasks 
defined and responsibilities clearly assigned work ramped up and the initial drafts 
start being assembled. A preliminary scheduled has also been developed evidencing 
an extreme “fast-track” characteristic with almost all activities running in parallel.  
 
Nevertheless credibility with the client was already damaged and P.R.F. and C.K. 
relationship worsened on a daily basis. During the one-day site visit client discontent 
with overall CNC/WP performance was visible. Even though, CNC/WP top 
management increasingly required P.R.F. presence to discuss contract management 
approaches and problems such as C.K. reluctance in signing the additional work 
orders. On its turn, P.R.F. constant project absence left team members again 
struggling for definitions and feedback and made the relationship with C.K. to 
further deteriorate, what reached a maximum with S.G.D. (C.K. assistant) requesting 
to talk in private with team members. Contracting management priorities also 
prevented P.R.F. from following draft progress through the new organization tools 
what made the new knowledge slowly losing its initial impetus.  
 
After a long negotiation the split of work between CNC/WP and WP-Houston has 
been defined and the IEWO (internal exchange work order) prepared to be issued. 
When their schedule arrived, however, it became clear that WP-Houston support 
would not come on time to help in the draft preparation as expected. With four days 
of delay the drafts and the preliminary schedule were released to client comments.  
 
 
 
Fig. 129: BGB fast-track project knowledge change stage 05. 
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The arrival of early C.K. comments over the drafts caused great consternation within 
team, as they were unusually harsh and expressed a long time frustration with 
CNC/WP work.  His observations and remarks were interpreted as vague and 
contradictory and instead of setting CNC/WP work into a desired path resulted in 
great uncertainty on what the client wanted at all. 
 
With the organization work in the hands of J.A.M. the new knowledge stopped been 
harnessed and to the point that it did not followed further project developments has 
seen its practicality severely reduced. As a result of this continued under-
socialization, new knowledge lost density and quickly stopped providing guidance 
to the teamwork. In a conference call with P.R.F. to discuss an action plan C.K. 
request a LD and a preliminary capital expenditure (CAPEX) estimation as 
traditionally developed for standard projects what puzzled team members and 
represented a return to former project approach. In this process, a sense of loss of 
meaning took over team members as they no longer knew what should be done to 
match client expectations. 
 
In a last attempt to save the project, P.R.F. urged for any documents that could show 
project progress. Even though a great effort involving many people has been done to 
generate evidences that the project though was not set as the client expected it was 
indeed progressing. The attempt failed as the client did not accept the evidences 
presented and decided to cancel the project. At this point knowledge on how to carry 
on a “fast-track” project headed towards anomie where team members no longer 
could tell even what has happened at all. 
 
 
Fig. 130: BGB fast-track project knowledge change stage 06. 
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9.2- CASE INSIGHTS 
 
9.2.1- PDY Case Insights 
 
A first insight arising from PDY data is that power asymmetries have a persistent 
effect on knowledge density. In PDY, even with a decrease in power asymmetry, 
current knowledge kept its momentum towards increasing institutionalization. A 
possible explanation relies on the fact that long-standing power asymmetries allow 
socialization processes to be far-reaching and gain a momentum on their own 
detached from increasing returns or efficiency concerns. In this framework, inertial 
institutionalization persists until conditions change to make current knowledge lose 
density faster than it gains on being socialized (what happened in PDY). 
 
Long-standing power asymmetries also undermine self-assurance and capacity of 
questioning, thus reducing the prospects of endogenous knowledge change. On the 
weaker side, subjects tend to associate problems not to the knowledge itself but to its 
understanding or application. On the stronger one, knowledge creators tend to stand 
for a dysfunctional knowledge in order to keep their status and power position. As a 
result, socialization is further strengthened, leading to a radicalization in the 
knowledge application and the accruing of related problems. Along such evaluative 
blind spots, internal pressure can build up for quite a long time without yielding any 
endogenous change movement. In PDY, despite the crisis situation, result of 14 
months of poor results, exogenous third-party pressures were responsible for initial 
change movements. 
 
A key insight arising from the PDY case is that self-criticism represents a 
fundamental moment in the whole process of knowledge change. Self-criticism takes 
place when the question “why is it not working?” comes to the mind of personnel 
deeply involved in knowledge application. This was an essential moment where 
some subjects tried to figure out their responsibility in making current knowledge 
effective or not. Only after ruling out their own failure in understanding and 
applying it is that they can turn attention to knowledge functionality itself. In PDY, 
this self-evaluation process represented a point in which a few team members (i.e.: 
D.C.C. and A.R.A.) detached from mainstream project mentality (i.e.: CNC Civil does 
not know to work on 3D) and begin to search for alternative explanations.  
 
Once problems with current knowledge were exposed, what was taken for granted 
became openly criticized and certainty about it suspended. After this point, 
knowledge density fell sharply and great uncertainty started to surround the work. 
Under great time pressure, some team members engaged into open and direct 
debates (under ideal speech conditions) to identify faulty elements in the current 
knowledge and gradually develop new typifications towards a more functional one. 
Internal political action, thus, was a key mechanism to redirect knowledge from a 
downward trajectory. Internal political action was also fundamental to “sell the 
idea” and enlist the support of key project members for the initial set of typifications 
and propositions.  
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Though innovation is commonly approached as a moment of ingenuity of few 
enlightened ones (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2010), in PDY it came up as a calculated 
strategic path composed of a compelling argument, a consistent proposition and a 
political backing path. A weak argument, a loose proposition, or a poorly chosen 
political backing path would certainly have undermined the chances of innovation to 
come about. Moreover, innovation came out not as a finished idea to be 
straightforwardly implemented but rather as a new problem definition built around 
several newly developed typifications. Nevertheless, it marked a turning point in the 
knowledge change process as it opened the path for a new more functional 
knowledge to emerge and keep on being improved. 
 
Another key insight brought about by PDY points to the key role played by project 
managers in the knowledge change process. In PDY, although project managers did 
not take part in the ideational part of the knowledge change process, they actively 
participated in the structuring one, as they contributed for new typifications to be 
voiced, debated and objectivated. In this frame, at least three essential roles were 
played by project managers: knowledge state transmittal, communication/framing, 
and arbitration.  
 
In the first place, project managers usually assume that if an issue has been brought 
to discussion by a pear then it is worth attention. On the background of this sort of 
class courtesy is the perception that one manager can induce its lower level 
knowledge state into others.  In PDY, for example, the certainty suspension state of 
K.G. has been transmitted to S.B.D. who, even standing where current knowledge 
was held highly institutionalized, agreed to bring the subject into discussion by also 
temporarily suspending his certainty.  The same did not happen at lower ranks 
which categorically rebuffed the complaints in prior meetings. In this sense, 
knowledge state transmittal is a key role played by managers that enables issues to 
be bridged along groups enjoying different knowledge states. 
 
Next, in the whereabouts of decisive meetings, communication and framing 
difficulties were overcome through project managers’ effort in continuously back 
checking and aligning meanings along with discussion participants. As a result, 
communication did not get jammed by language differences as well as problems and 
propositions were not framed differently on each side of the discussion due to 
cultural differences. In PDY, S.B.D. participation in the meeting of 20th October 2009 
is a perfect example of the communication/framing role project managers possess in 
international project teams, and how it is important not only to knowledge change 
processes but also to international joint work at large. 
 
Finally, project managers also arbitrate team member’s discussions in order to check 
for argumentation consistency and strength. This task requires great sensibility on 
the part of project managers who must go beyond entrenched positions and vested 
interests to determine the rationale underlying each argumentation. In PDY, S.B.D. 
sensibility in arbitrating discussions was key to break into the defensive position of 
WP-Houston and bringing them also into certainty suspension. In this sense, 
arbitration is a key role that project managers have in knowledge change processes 
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which enables them to explore and balance arguments in order to determine which 
one shall win and receive further support.  
 
As a result of new typifications being declared winners of the debate, its creators 
were granted “knower” status within the team, meaning that they were henceforth 
“holders of qualified opinions” and thus “worth to be listened”. In PDY, the 
“knower” status was essential for further knowledge development as it shifted the 
efforts of change advocates from winning support towards perfecting the new 
knowledge. In this sense, the “knower” status allowed complementary typifications 
to be developed more quickly and under less scrutiny than the initial ones 
supporting the subsequent objectivation process.  
 
Along PDY, the objectivation process proved to be a very iterative one. The very 
first attempts of objectivation prompted for the need of additional typifications to 
complement and perfect the initial ones. As additional typifications were developed 
and complementarity among them grew, objectivation advanced. With the 
perfecting process underway, new knowledge gained density and its first objective 
elements started to materialize (i.e.: “WORKRESP” attribute, “Extraction” 
spreadsheet, “transfer/deleting” procedure). In PDY, however, the “SIC spreadsheet” 
represented the core materialization of the new knowledge and the ultimate result of 
the objectivation process. Once objectivated, new knowledge could be more easily 
explained and submitted to a wider audience thus making it gain further density.  
 
The objectivation process enabled the new knowledge to be once again submitted to 
managerial attention, this time in search for legitimation. The advancements made 
from initial typifications towards objectified products yielded a more clear 
appreciation of and also more mature knowledge. As a result, the “vote of 
confidence” given by project managers to initial typifications has been transformed 
into a “certainty of course” in face of the resulting objectivations. With the new 
knowledge legitimized by both project managers what was thus far a “proposition of 
few” became a “managerial decision” with due coercive implications.  
 
In PDY, legitimation has proved to be a fundamental process in the knowledge 
change process as it embedded the new knowledge with a power component beyond 
the political one it held so far. The power component added to the new knowledge 
gave it an important initial socialization impetus which speeded up and facilitated 
the transmission process. The recent recollection of old knowledge collapse also 
contributed to new knowledge socialization by exempting it from any conceptual 
competition. 
 
Once legitimized, the new knowledge could then be socialized with other project 
members at large. In PDY, however, the socialization process followed quite distinct 
paths along the different partners. In WP-Houston, socialization has been fast and 
strong but short in range, which has been quite limited to those directly involved 
with the workshare problem. In CNC, socialization was been quite sluggish and 
tenuous, however, it has been far reaching, affecting not only the entire Brazilian 
project members but also stretching to other parts of the local organization and even 
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into the corporate level. Such difference can be explained in several ways and unveils 
important insights, particularly those regarding the role of power and politics in 
knowledge latency and penetration. 
 
A first explanation is a structural one. At WP there was less people directly involved 
in the knowledge change process (about 5) compared to CNC (at least 18). On the 
one hand, the smaller number of people involved allowed new knowledge to gain 
density much faster at WP than at CNC. On the other one, the reduced number of 
people affected by change in WP provided fewer links by which socialization could 
propagate. Further contributed to narrow the socialization channels the fact that 
roles were much more well-defined at WP (specialist/short-term worker profile) than 
at CNC (generalist/long-term worker profile). Under tighter roles, new knowledge 
usefulness remained limited to WP personnel directly involved with the workshare 
problem, thus imposing an additional limitation for its socialization impetus. 
 
A second explanation is a contextual one. The impact of knowledge change has been 
much more extensive at CNC than at WP. As a result, new knowledge socialization 
at CNC required a more careful process of explanation and justification to proceed. It 
that sense it can be argued that although debates slowed new knowledge 
socialization and made its institutionalization more tenuous they also made its main 
typifications and objectivations more widespreadly known and debated. 
Alternatively, however, new knowledge impact (and thus socialization) at WP has 
also been limited by CNC action, which decided not to disclose the new knowledge 
in full. If more elements of the new knowledge had been disclosed (i.e.: progress 
graphics) it could have brought a deeper impact on the way WP carried their work 
and thus to the extent it had been socialized and institutionalized. 
 
The higher internal power asymmetry within WP and the lengthy process of 
deconstruction of the old knowledge also left few room for questioning once new 
knowledge has been legitimize by top management, what certainly translated into a 
more straightforward socialization at WP. If on the WP side it was necessary only a 
first legitimation thrust provided by project management for the new knowledge to 
settle down, at CNC, a more diffuse power allocation allowed room for a more 
discretionary action (especially on the part of supervisors) thus making necessary 
several management interventions to reinforce socialization whenever explanation 
and justification proven not effective.  
 
This last explanation can be complemented by a cultural component. As suggest by 
DaMatta (1979), rules in Brazilian society are taken as guidelines for action rather 
than coercive elements of social order. Therefore, Brazilians (CNC team members 
included) tend to reinterpret or selectively apply rules and hierarchical decisions 
taking in consideration broader contextual factors. According to the author, the same 
does not apply to the U.S. culture (predominant at WP-Houston) to which a rule is 
an element to be applied equally to all individuals beyond contextual considerations.  
 
Overall it can be said that socialization in WP has been more “power-led” while in 
CNC it has been more “politically-led”. An evidence supporting this argument is the 
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fact that once PDY project has finished, and its power relations ended, the new 
knowledge quickly lost density and completely vanished from WP, while in CNC it 
kept on being debated and had parts of it applied on other projects. Another 
evidence supporting this claim is that in CNC the new knowledge remained tenuous 
for quite a long time only breaking this tendency after “power-led” attempts of non-
identical reproduction. Overall, it can be argued that “politically-led” socialization 
takes longer however its impact on the overall stock of knowledge is more extensive 
both in time and space. Where socialization is more “power-led”, knowledge 
changes faster but its influence remains restricted to its direct application point.  
  
Another important insight from PDY is that face-to-face interaction in multicultural 
work environments (i.e.: international project teams) through short-term assignments 
can be more conducive to mutual understanding than to misunderstanding. 
Although in a first moment cultural differences indeed set a stage for rivalry and 
misunderstanding, given appropriate conditions, these shortcomings tend to be 
gradually replaced by better communication and collaboration. Several mechanisms 
linked to the use of international project teams contribute to this process of cultural 
distention.  
 
First, face-to-face interaction through short-term assignments helps team members to 
acquire first-hand contextual information regarding the conditions under which 
common work takes place in its different locations. Not only the lived experience 
helps to demystify prejudices and overcome second–hand impressions but also offer 
opportunity for engagement on other locations realities allowing for qualified 
contributions that ultimately improve project team relations. With more information 
regarding each other contexts available through face-to-face interaction the ground 
for better mutual judgment and conduct adjustment is already set. 
 
Second, short-term assignments help team member’s communications beyond the 
acquisition/improvement of language skills. Actions, reactions, behaviors, 
demeanors, and other non-verbal forms of interaction gradually became 
unspoken/unwritten elements of language which help improving communication or 
at least the expectations framework. Face-to-face interaction also provides direct 
feedback on minor cultural differences further improving communications. To the 
extent that new information channels are added and meanings are adjusted, it can be 
argued that communications are “reframed”, that is, adjusted to multicultural face-
to-face interaction conditions.  
 
Finally, once contextualization took place and communications were reframed 
information flew more easily and precisely between team members allowing for the 
mutual recognition under “knowers” status. Back to their offices, the “knower” 
status was passed on to other team members further improving the overall project 
communication. Cultural distension, however, can be influenced by a myriad of 
factors ranging from social to individual. Although it is not the focus of this analysis 
to point all these factors, some noteworthy features of PDY context have been 
identified as contributed to a notable cultural distension. Among them were 
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noteworthy the clear goal setting for the team, the receptive stance on the Brazilian 
team part, and the clear and straightforward pragmatism of the American team.    
 
Another key insight arising from PDY case is that the personal power of a project 
manager is closed linked to the knowledge resources he has at his disposal both 
formally and informally. Usually, non-institutionalized knowledge resources are 
embedded with key people who may develop allegiance links with project managers 
and favor them in exchange for better project posts or employment stability. Less 
usual, however, is a project manager to prop up the knowledge resources of his team 
members in order to enhance his power stance. In PDY, K.G. consistently tried to 
leverage the knowledge resource he had at hand in order to gain wider visibility in 
the corporate structure and reinforce his company position compared to his peers. If 
he had succeeded he would have struck a deal to join another major international 
project (i.e.: VALE project) almost effortlessly.  
 
In the same way knowledge resources can leverage personal power, power struggle 
can be transmitted to knowledge processes. As K.G. tried to leverage his position 
company and corporate wide by propping up the new workshare knowledge, his 
move has been strategically counteracted by his peers who used their privileged 
positions to block direct access to other potential users. Manipulating the 
socialization channels, corporate managers prevented the new knowledge to 
institutionalize beyond project limits, what would reinforce its density and revert 
into additional influence for K.G. and his project members. So far, it can be argued 
that in PDY, the power struggle involving K.G., S.S.H., R.F., S.P.H., D.C.C. and other 
team members end up limiting the extent by which the knowledge change influenced 
the company despite its pragmatic implications. 
 
This struggle is representative of how project-led firms are kept under a constant 
tension. On the one hand, project managers depend on resources provided by 
corporate managers to accomplish their tasks. However, once engaged into the 
project with financial resources under his control they can leverage their position 
almost unconstrained. By controlling determined clients or knowledge resources, 
project managers can extract power enough to challenge company’s hierarchical 
structure and influence company’s ways. Corporate managers, however, are always 
in a delicate position to provide enough resources for projects to be successful but 
not enough to be challenged ahead. Overall, power struggle can make knowledge 
change more unpredictable as it becomes subject to non-pragmatic concerns.    
 
A final insight provided by the PDY case is that even if a new knowledge do not 
propagate and institutionalize to the point of becoming a widespread practice, it still 
can influence several areas of the company beyond project boundaries. When a 
certain knowledge stop being understood as an institutionally coherent piece due to 
the end of its direct pragmatic application, or because it fail to break resistance of 
company sectors, it end up retrenching back to a quasi-institutional state (held by 
few individuals). This way it can be kept alive in a less structured format and 
propagate through “project stories”. Eventually it can also be spun off into its 
objectivations to be selectively applied somewhere else in the company.  
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9.2.2- UNA3 Case Insights 
 
A first important insight brought about by UNA3 case regards socialization 
intensity. Along this case it was possible to see that socialization intensity increases 
with subsequent socializations. Those who are socialized under certain knowledge 
tend to further socialize it with much more intensity. Overtime, however, 
socialization may intensify to the point of becoming an over-socialization. It was 
noteworthy in UNA3 how the traditional knowledge was much more emphatically 
enforced by WP-Sofia (who was socialized on it) than by WP-Reading itself (who 
created it). As a consequence, no method is better at pushing certain knowledge 
ahead than let somebody who received it already institutionalized to propagate it.  
 
Another important insight from UNA3 is that power asymmetries also make debates 
to shift focus and thus become inefficient knowledge change mechanisms. Along 
UNA3 it was possible to see several situations where the power prerogative has been 
used to direct attention away from problematic items or reinterpret them as non-
problematic ones. Several knowledge maintaining mechanisms operates in that 
direction. First, once knowledge is institutionalized (and thus taken-for-granted) 
analytic focus automatically shifts from core elements towards peripheral ones. 
Away from the core, relatedness is subject to discretionary criteria which not rarely is 
guided by non-pragmatic concerns. Second, institutional knowledge filters actor’s 
perceptions in a way that they cannot perceive non-covered items as potentially 
problematic ones. As such, problems that do not fit into the institutional knowledge 
definitions are deemed irrelevant.  Finally, to acknowledge that institutional 
knowledge might be faulty or wrong is by definition unacceptable. A power position 
simply allows actors to disregard evidences that contradict their convictions 
(institutional ones).  
 
Thin problem analysis is another knowledge maintaining mechanism that can put 
knowledge change at bay for a long time. Thin analysis is frequently used to direct 
discussions towards elements of the traditional knowledge that still hold for the 
situation under examination, letting other non-compliant elements hidden and 
unobserved. In other words, it is an attempt to legitimize a certain knowledge by 
hiding its faulty parts while highlighting it's still functional ones. Is a deliberate 
attempt to influence interpretations and manipulating meaning towards a favorable 
stance regarding the current knowledge. Thin analysis, though do not directly 
deviate focus from problematic knowledge elements, act to make change arguments 
look less compelling. 
 
Together, oversocialization, shifted focus and thin analysis contributed to a state of 
blindness among team members where even confronted with mounting evidence 
against traditional knowledge made them unable to develop a critical assessment or 
envisage the need for change. Along UNA3 this situation lasted for a considerable 
time mainly due to a power concentration in the hands of WP-Reading who 
discretionarily used its leading position to set priorities and drive debates towards its 
interests. In that sense, it can be argued that in asymmetric partnerships self-interest 
and strategic intent frequently overcome collective interests and practical intent.  
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The extent to which WP-Reading used its privileged position to protect its 
knowledge and interests at UNA3 made loss of meaning a phenomenon quite visible.  
The disconnection between WP-Reading and WP-Sofia situation assessments and 
pragmatic project needs made current knowledge to lose density for a considerable 
amount of time. In that sense, loss of meaning could be clearly identified in the 
moments where ungrounded debates involving disconnected ideas become common 
place. An important insight, then, is that under loss of meaning, debates no longer 
help to redefine problems because common knowledge is so rarefied that it stops 
providing a common discussion ground. Remaining typifications though existed 
where scattered and held almost at individual level. 
 
Under these circumstances, it was necessary an exogenous shock (i.e.: client visit) to 
break with the blindness state in which team members found themselves and to 
realign typifications and make meaningful debates among team members possible 
once again. Along this realigning movement it has also been important the 
participation of B.M. who provided a first critical stance on WP side to alert on the 
mismatch between situation assessment and project reality. B.M. also promoted 
cultural distension by enacting a boundary-spanning role between CNC/WP and 
WP-Sofia, which helped communications to improve, and a trustworthiness bond to 
rise. As a result WP-Sofia changed side and began to support the new contracting 
knowledge pushed forward by CNC/WP. 
 
Another key insight from UNA3 regards the use of personal ties to enfranchise 
external support and overcome internal resistances for knowledge change. Although 
WP-reading mismanagement became evident after client visit, it still kept a 
privileged power position due to the possession of key bid assets (i.e.: certificates, 
key personnel). To hold control over project, WP-Reading exited joint work and held 
tight its legitimation role, thus placing necessary knowledge changes at bay. To bring 
power asymmetry down and move on with necessary changes, both T.D. and B.M. 
had to use their personal ties to circumvent project structure and indirectly press 
WP-Reading to loosen its grip over project control. Through external political action 
they enlisted the support of WP managers from other offices and at key corporate 
positions (i.e.: WP-Houston, WP-London), which could provide alternative 
legitimation means and thus weaken WP-Reading resistance towards necessary 
knowledge changes. 
 
Also, a credible mix of threats and trust helped to enfranchise the support of 
reluctant company executives towards the necessary knowledge changes. By 
threatening to drop proposal, T.D. forced C.A.J. (i.e.: CNC/WP president) to join 
ranks and lift the pressure over WP-Reading. Had not T.D. being a long time and 
respected project manager within the company, and project deadlines looming too 
close, this strategy would have certainly backfired. In that sense, additional power 
can be extracted from momentary opportunities and reputational background at a 
price that must be weighed against its risks. Overall, a thorough situation assessment 
and sense of opportunity were found to be key elements supporting external 
political action. 
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Another strategy adopted by CNC/WP and WP-Sofia to bring power asymmetry 
down was to swiftly comply with its duties in order to expose WP-Reading 
misconduct in theirs. This can be quite visible after client site visit when CNC/WP 
and WP-Sofia joined forces to speed up write-up and man-hour estimation revision, 
which have been accomplished and approved almost the same time. WP-Sofia has 
also provided full support to CNC/WP risk analysis virtually without comments. As 
a result, work activities under WP-Reading visibly became bottlenecking points 
providing arguments for a more emphatic external political action. Overall, the 
combination of these two strategies (external political action and careful 
“housekeeping”) consistently eroded the existing power asymmetry, allowing room 
for the necessary knowledge changes. 
 
A final but relevant insight from UNA3 is the pervasive influence of long-standing 
power asymmetries, particularly reflected on an institutional knowledge over-reliance. 
At some moments of UNA3 reliance on the current knowledge was so intense that it 
prevented team members from even reading the bidding instructions before 
presenting their contributions and opinions. As a result considerable time has been 
wasted convincing people of the appropriateness of direction given by the client 
itself. Over-reliance on institutional knowledge also caused activities to go on for a long 
time without proper feedback. As a result, feedback has been pushed downstream 
making misunderstandings and misalignments going undetected for a long time. 
 
9.2.3- BGB Case Insights 
 
A first insight arising from BGB case refers to the extent that simultaneously 
divergent interest weakens current knowledge and also the prospects of knowledge 
change. As debates dispersed around several issues, ground for common 
understanding diminished, what quickly dragged down the density of current 
knowledge. Dispersed debates also tend to yield feeble and disconnected 
typifications that have little chance to evolve into coherent objectivations and 
contribute to project main goals and to a wider knowledge change. Therefore, just as 
intense power asymmetry can make debates to shift focus, the coexistence of 
simultaneously divergent interests make debates to lose focus and also become 
inefficient inductors of change.  
 
Along BGB, at least three competing poles of interest could be detected. First, 
CNC/WP interest in acquiring ports and terminals knowledge from WP-Houston. 
Second, WP-Houston interest in keeping its large specialized structure afloat in a 
uncertain economic environment.  Third, CNC/WP interest in extending its 
participation and leadership through the whole entrepreneurship. With these three 
parallel issues competing for team members´ attention, debates have been scattered 
thus yielding few and weak typifications regarding how to conduct a “fast-track” 
project that could hardly represent an alternative path to current knowledge. 
Furthermore, such lack of focus kept management attention away from project main 
problems, and unable to detect and support new typifications that could have 
contributed to the necessary knowledge change. 
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In this line, BGB case provides additional insights that complement the arguments 
developed along PDY examination regarding the role that management plays in 
knowledge change process. A first insight points to the important screening role 
played by project managers, which must pay attention to the rising of new 
typifications among team members and select the most promising ones to receive 
support towards further developments. By providing the necessary stimulus by 
which new typifications can emerge and be further developed, managers can both 
keep knowledge alternatives at hand, and signal team members the direction of 
change when necessary. 
 
Along BGB, this role has been only partially played by P.R.F. because only through 
internal political action he was able to recognize the need of change and become 
aware of alternative, more functional ways of managing a “fast-track” project. Even 
though P.R.F. supported initial typifications and opened an opportunity window 
towards knowledge change, this happened in a reactive rather than active fashion 
way. As a result, the impetus provided for knowledge change has been way below 
the necessary one to foster wider debates and eventually yield a more robust 
knowledge alternative. As such, although initial typifications materialized into new 
objectivations (i.e.: responsibility matrix, work breakdown), legitimation has been 
almost rhetoric resulting in a limited stimulus for new knowledge socialization. 
 
This argument also brings to light the role played by internal political action in 
creating the necessary conditions for knowledge change. Along BGB the skillful 
political action of some team members helped to attracted management attention to 
the need of knowledge change. While W.A. has made a compelling argument 
regarding the need for more power sharing between partners and a truly workshare 
arrangement, L.M.A made an emphatic recall of recent company mistakes that 
should be avoided within BGB, such as sharing project responsibilities with people 
outside the team. Overall, these two political interventions made management 
sensible to the need of change and attentive to alternative more functional ways of 
carrying a “fast-track” project. 
 
Unfolding from these observations, another important insight brought by BGB is that 
although knowledge materialization helps to increment knowledge density, by no 
means it supersedes socialization and the time component it involves. In other 
words, knowledge does not acquire an institutional status for the sake of being 
materialized into objective media but rather by being subjectively introduced in the 
consciousness of individuals along time. In BGB, although new knowledge has been 
quickly objectified, the lack of socialization impetus and the assignment of 
socialization task to someone unfamiliar to its development (J.A.M.), turned 
knowledge change a short-lived experience.  Therefore, a second key role managers 
play is knowledge change processes is the sponsorship one. After legitimizing a new 
body of knowledge, managers must provide enough socialization stimuli (politically 
or coercively) so that socialization becomes a self-sustaining process.  
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Overall, BGB case provide compelling evidence that if managers fail to bring into 
balance this dual role (screening and sponsorship) under low power asymmetry, 
knowledge invariably loses density due to a continuous loss of functionality and lack 
of viable alternatives. Along BGB, knowledge deterioration was almost palpable with 
uncertainty gradually expanding from “when to do”, into “how to do” and finally 
arriving at the most basic question: “what to do”. Although, team members may 
always arrive at new knowledge consensus and endogenously generate the 
conditions by which socialization becomes a self-sustaining process, under the 
pressure of time and without leadership more probably they won’t. This happens 
because for knowledge change to gain momentum, typifications must come up and 
develop around a certain gravitating point, what requires a certain level of 
intentionality, certainly an attribute of individuals and well-delimited groups.  
 
A final insight arising from BGB case is that, in case internal team conditions do not 
favor debates involving current knowledge problems and they produce only feeble 
and disconnected typifications, knowledge change can always rely on externally 
developed typifications. These are usually brought from prior work experiences on 
which team members may have participated. Nevertheless, bringing typifications 
from the outset, break up with collective creation character they are supposed to hold 
and link them to the specific individual that brought them about, what may 
eventually generate resistance and weaken its knowledge change potential. 
 
9.3- CROSS CASE ANALYSIS  
 
9.3.1- Cases Similarities 
 
A first noteworthy similarity touches the fact that all three cases began with a 
considerable power asymmetry, which invariably evolved into a certain degree of 
power equilibrium. In a broad sense it can be argued that as projects involve non-
redundant resources, each participant is expected to provide a unique, and thus 
powerful, contribution towards project goals. Though at the beginning of the project 
some tasks are deemed more important than others, overtime their relative 
contributions are rebalanced in the light of project developments or unplanned 
events. This explanation support the common theoretical argument that projects 
teams are by definition zero-sum games composed of interdependent parts whose 
individual powers naturally neutralizes one another. 
 
A closer look at the cases, however, shows that rather than any natural tendency 
towards equilibrium it was the active agency of disadvantaged actors that brought 
down initial power asymmetries. Quite often, power asymmetry translates into 
knowledge socialization from the stronger partner to the weaker ones. However, any 
socialization attempt across different situations brings the prospect of dysfunctional 
outcomes, which are met by weaker partners with opposition and a consequent 
power struggle. Data collected suggests that disadvantage actors actively seek to 
rewrite the power balance in better terms not only as a reaction of self-interest but 
also as a protection against unfair partnership conditions, and they do this by 
questioning the power distribution basis from which knowledge is a key component.  
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Evidences that disadvantaged actors carefully explore project contingencies to put 
forth their power rebalancing strategies abound in the cases examined. Deliberate 
rebalancing acts happened several times along the cases and were particularly 
salient during “area 8000 design” in PDY, in the “write-up fast delivery” in UNA3, 
and through W.A. speech in BGB. In common these rebalancing acts share 
intentionality, sense of opportunity, and a great deal of political action, which is 
essential to expose knowledge (or partnership) dysfunctionalities, align interests and 
mobilize pro-reform groups. The main goal of rebalancing acts is to level down 
existing power asymmetries in order gain further status in the eyes of corporate 
managers or to correct for unfair partnership conditions. 
 
Hardly, however, can rebalancing acts happen without the sanction and support of 
management, and their effectiveness is directly linked with the intensity of such 
participation. In PDY, where management agency has been more incisive (K.G., 
D.C.C), power asymmetry dropped quickly allowing room for a more consistent 
knowledge change process. In UNA3, management agency has been more reluctant 
(T.D., R.M.Z.), and thus power asymmetry remained high for a considerably longer 
time putting at risk the prospects of successful knowledge change. In BGB, it is 
possible to identify two moments with quite different outcomes. A first one, where 
power asymmetry dropped quickly thanks to active agency of W.A., which opened 
room for a initial knowledge change movement, and a second one, with the project 
already running under low power asymmetry, which weakened/scattered change 
propositions fostering the return of traditional knowledge, and subsequent anomie. 
 
If at the forefront of knowledge change is management agency, at the background is 
the role of “change agents” or innovators. In all three cases were detected the 
presence of “change agents”, who are the first ones to devised a gap between 
traditional knowledge and project goals, and actively engaged into political action, 
not only to expose those gaps but also to propose new directions. Along the three 
cases “change agents” can be easily identified as those who first questioned 
institutional knowledge in the light of current situations to unravel dysfunctional 
typifications from functional ones. “Change agents” were also responsible for 
assessing and organizing key variables affecting the problematic situations to frame 
it to a wider audience, thus providing a reference background to further debates.  
 
Can be pointed as “change agents” or innovators along the three cases examined 
A.R.A, L.M.A., B.M., F.F.M., and W.A. In common these “change agents” shared the 
following characteristics: outstanding academic formation, inquisitiveness, critic 
view, investigative mindset, open mindedness, strong orientation towards 
project/corporate goals, group detachment, and framing skills. If their individual 
characteristics were rather predictable, their emergence proved subtler. If under high 
power asymmetries to be a “change agent” is a rather unwanted status, under power 
equilibrium conditions it happens so unconstrained that consensus and a consistent 
direction of change result attainable. In that sense, data collection indicates that 
moderate power asymmetries not only trigger but also organize agency, and thus 
foster the emergence of “change agents” in the number and quality necessary to set 
in motion the change process.  
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Power rebalancing developments set out another commonality among the three 
cases. Despite abounding literature pointing to “cultural clashes” as a common 
outcome of international work settings, data collection points to a much more 
dynamic and complex picture of these multicultural encounters. Differently from the 
ubiquitous cultural rifts found in most international business literature, the three 
cases showed that multicultural relationships evolve overtime, and given certain 
conditions, do this in a way that improve mutual understanding and allow for 
groundbreaking political compromises with substantial knowledge change 
consequences. 
 
On the side of the time, all three cases began surrounded by intense power 
asymmetries what set the stage for mutual distrust and open rivalries. Under such 
tense environment, disagreements and broken expectations tend to be blamed on 
easier to spot dissimilarities, from which cultural differences are a rich and 
unavoidable source. Moreover the extensive use of lower richness media (i.e.: e-mail, 
instant messages, phoneconference) for communication in early project phases as 
well as the absence of social bonds linking project members can be easily associated 
to the bulk of reported “cultural clashes”. Where project members met earlier in the 
project development and made use of richer media to communicate, “cultural 
clashes” have been considerably reduced, as both UNA3 and BGB cases demonstrate.  
 
Whenever power was rebalanced and tensions eased, cultural differences no longer 
represented valid elements of contention but rather different perspectives over the 
same subject. Along the cases it was particularly visible that initial rivalries and 
cultural misunderstandings evolved into quite friendly collaboration once face-to-
face interaction began. As previously discussed, face-to-face interaction enables 
contextualization, improve communications and create social bonds. In that sense, 
the recognition of each other knowledge as different yet equivalent through the 
concession of the “knower status” represented the point where mutual 
understanding was reached and political compromises turn out viable, thus opening 
an essential path by which multicultural environments can yield groundbreaking 
knowledge change. 
 
On the side of the conditions, data collection shows that when team members from 
the weaker partner are assigned to the stronger partner they become mere spectators 
of the process led by them. Overtime, the weaker partner expatriates are either 
socialized into stronger partner views, ways and approaches or fell compelled to 
support them to be accepted in the new environment. To bring about any 
questioning or resist socialization not only is met with incredulity and 
disappointment but may ultimately be labeled as assignment failure. As an example, 
both P.D.J in PDY and T.D. in UNA3 returned from their overseas assignments 
convinced that stronger partners (WP-Houston and WP-Reading, respectively) held 
everything under control to few months later realize the knowledge supplied by 
them provided poor support to project needs.  
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In the opposite direction, when stronger partner team members are assigned to go to 
the weaker partner, they are confronted with situations where their knowledge fits 
awkwardly and thus becomes subject to questioning. Away from the main power 
source, such questionings must be met with new arguments that require a critical 
inspection of what has already been institutionalized. Such critical inspection not 
only softens existing convictions but also open space for political action and 
knowledge revision. Moreover, the need to be accepted in the new environment open 
room for concessions on the part of stronger partner expatriates, what involve at 
least listening to what weaker partners have to say. As an example, G.A. in PDY and 
B.M. in UNA3, arrived at the weaker partner (CNC) convinced that they were 
underperforming its tasks to later realize that several issues (among them the 
institutional knowledge imposed) prevented them from performing properly. 
 
Therefore, data collection points that moving personnel internationally from the 
stronger partner for temporary assignments on the weaker partner proved more 
relevant to overall knowledge change than the opposite move. Such “bridging” 
assignments represent a channel by which power can be rebalanced and institutional 
knowledge resistance be breached. Along “bridging” assignments change is key for 
acceptance and a successful assignment, while in “socialization” assignments (from 
the weaker partner to the stronger one) conformity usually is the awarded outcome. 
In that sense, moving team members from the stronger partner to the weaker ones 
help creating the conditions by knowledge change can be triggered.  
 
Even though assignment direction represents an important enabling factor in 
international project teams, its effects seems to be composed by other elements, what 
would help to explain some noteworthy deviations. For example, though C.K. (BGB) 
and G.J. (UNA3) moved from the stronger to the weaker partner, they negatively 
contributed to the establishment of an enabling multicultural environment. On the 
other hand, W.A. (BGB), though moving from the weaker to the stronger partner, 
contributed to establishment of a constructive multicultural environment and to 
trigger the knowledge change process. In this line, data collection indicates that 
cultural interest and proximity are mediating factors affecting the performance of 
“bridging” assignments.  
 
The three cases offer contrasting examples on how different personal approaches 
towards the host culture affected teamwork integration and knowledge change 
outcomes. G.A. (PDY), B.M. (UNA3), and W.A. (BGB), for example, demonstrated 
great cultural interest21 in interacting and understanding the surrounding cultural 
environment and therefore represented successful integration examples. Not by 
coincidence they became active participants of knowledge change processes. In the 
opposite field, E.R.K. (PDY), G.J. (UNA3) and, C.K. (BGB) provided examples that 
range from disinterest to negative stance towards the host culture. Overall, they 
showed little interest in understanding or participating in the surrounding cultural 
environment and are directly associated to change resistance or negative project 
outcomes.  
                                                
21
 Correlate yet distinct concept from “learning orientation” (Porter & Tansky, 1999) and “willingness to adapt” (Selmer, 2001b).  
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At the root of cultural interest is the individual predisposition to overcome 
language, meaning and background differences and engage into an exchange 
relationship with people from different cultures. Expatriation literature (Mendenhall 
& Odou, 1985; Aycan, 1997; Black, 1988) points that such individual predisposition 
can be fostered by a myriad of factors. Prior international experience (work/travel), 
for example, has been positively associated to positive expatriation outcomes 
(Takeuchi et Al., 2005). In this line, though younger and less technically 
inexperienced, B.M. was already a globetrotter executive while G.J., despite older 
and more technically experienced, was in its first international assignment. Prior 
international assignments B.M. may have provided her with the necessary skills to 
disentangle the uncertainty surrounding international mobility and enable her to 
overcome cultural differences more easily than G.J. 
 
Another predisposition factor ranked by expatriate literature is ethnocentric 
behavior, which lies in the assumption that home country culture is more important 
or superior to that of other countries. Ethnocentric behavior is commonly associated 
to negative expatriation outcomes (Hall & Gudyknust, 1989) and according to Clark 
et al. (1999) is more often found in central economies like U.S and U.K. In this line, 
confronted with a mild but increasingly assertive societal environment like the 
Brazilian one, it would be naturally expected that W.A., which comes from a less 
assertive societal background (Libya), would present a considerably more perceptive 
stance when compared to C.K., which comes from an more assertive and rather 
ethnocentric societal background like the U.K. The same argument may be used to 
compare the intercultural predispositions displayed by B.M (Bulgaria) and G.J. (U.S.) 
in UNA3, and G.A. (Colombia) and E.R.K. (U.S.) in PDY. 
 
Cultural interest can also be harnessed by a welcoming stance from the host culture 
(Florkowski & Fogel, 1999), and therefore be externally induced. In all three cases, 
Brazilian team members displayed a noteworthy welcoming stance towards overseas 
colleagues. International team members were supported in their adaptation needs 
and receive direct information and feedback regarding their adaptation needs (i.e.: 
language, location, local habits, and behaviors). Moreover, they were frequently 
stimulated to join conversations, lunches, and social events. Nevertheless, the effects 
of a welcoming stance seem to be limited to the intensification of already existing 
predispositions in the sense that no conversion from a culturally disinterested to a 
culturally interested one has been identified along the cases. Even though, except for 
G.J. and C.K., at the end of the assignments it was visible the creation of social bonds 
among local and international team members, what could become visible in the 
farewell events, personal compliments and post-assignment contacts.  
 
Along data collection proximity emerged as an important factor of integration for 
international team members. Proximity can be understood as any condition that 
creates close contact and direct exposition of international team members to the host 
context and its actors. Close and direct contact between project members and the host 
environment require differences (i.e.: idiom, technical terminology, discursive 
approach, habits) to be worked out in order to make joint work tenable. Proximity 
also prevents cultural segregation and the formation of cliques and the consequent 
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accruing of culturally-based disagreements. Overall, proximity creates structural 
conditions by which interaction among team members of different cultures becomes 
unavoidable and at the same time clashes undesirable. 
 
Along the three cases, proximity has been achieved by making international team-
members to sit side by side with their local counterparts and to be treated as equals 
and under the same conditions along meetings and team events in relation to its 
counterparts. Such equality among team members set a level playing field where 
differences had to be sorted out among counterparts directly with minimum external 
interference. Moreover, project colleagues become to each other the main point of 
reference to assess the local context and the expectations and feedbacks of the 
international partner. By channeling a great deal of information exchange on a 
limited range of connection points (represented by face to face interaction among 
counterparts) proximity puts a great pressure over actor’s ability to streamline 
communication and arrive at common ground. In that sense, proximity almost 
certainly contributed to sort out differences at a faster pace and in better terms than 
would be achieved in alternative arrangements. 
 
Nevertheless, data collection shows that proximity is not a trouble free integration 
inductor and under certain conditions has show to induce the opposite reaction. In 
BGB, proximity ended up exposing project contradictions (client interests x 
management interests) to C.K. so emphatically that his natural distrust has been 
reinforced to the point of evolving into heavy critics and ultimately causing project 
rupture. In UNA3, proximity ended up taking G.J. into the opposite direction of 
integration. As he remained resolute to its convictions, several times he decided to 
detached from the core team to work at the hotel and ultimately retrench back to his 
office in the U.S.. Such reaction has been identified by Richards (1996) as “exclusion 
paranoia”, where unable to cope with the host environment, the individual is 
overtaken by the impression that the host community is loaded with threats and is 
plotting against him/her. Therefore, the use of proximity as a mechanism to foster 
integration in international project team requires careful attention on the part of 
management, particularly when actors show signs of uneasiness and withdrawal.  
 
9.3.2- Cases Differences 
 
A first dissimilarity involving the three cases regards current knowledge initial 
density. Data collection indicates that initial knowledge density and unfolding power 
dynamics have a direct influence over the prospects of knowledge change. In PDY, 
where knowledge had been more recently institutionalized and power dynamics 
showed quite simple, knowledge change has been a straightforward process. Along 
UNA3, with a moderately institutionalized knowledge and a more intricate power 
dynamics, knowledge change struggled to happen. In BGB, under a highly 
institutionalized knowledge and a complex power dynamics, knowledge change 
showed unattainable. Data indicates that the way knowledge density and power 
dynamics interrelate to allow for knowledge change is mediated by a myriad of 
contextual factors out of which socialization length, actors´ self-confidence, and 
leadership behavior have shown to be important ones. 
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Data collection shows that under a low-density initial current knowledge, power 
asymmetry unleashes socialization forces that set in place for a long period of time 
create self-reinforcing mechanisms that provide a great momentum for knowledge 
institutionalization. In PDY this process has been aggravated by the fact that current 
knowledge has been functional for quite some time, what further reinforced its 
socialization thrust. As a result of such a lengthy socialization, current knowledge 
density strengthened overtime even tough power asymmetry weakened. When 
dysfunctionalities emerged current knowledge had already attained institutional 
level, nonetheless power asymmetry was already low enough to encourage political 
action to start up knowledge change.  
 
In the other two cases, projects began with current knowledge considerably more 
institutionalized. However, even though socialization impetus was stronger, current 
knowledge dysfunctionalities emerged soon enough to prevent them from acquiring 
a self-reinforcing dynamic. In such downward knowledge density scenario two 
situations took place. In a first moment, under a declining power asymmetry, BGB 
team members have been able to engage some level of political action towards initial 
knowledge change movements. In UNA3, however, power asymmetry resisted for a 
long time even faced with a declining knowledge density. In the absence of political 
debates that could yield new typifications and reset problem definitions, current 
knowledge density plummeted bringing the risk of anomie.  
 
Under a knowledge density upward scenario, with new knowledge already 
underway, the role of power asymmetry in knowledge change seems to reverse. 
From knowledge change deterrent, power asymmetry became a knowledge change 
inductor. As an example, in PDY, a moderate level of power asymmetry helped 
knowledge to gain density enough to cross the institutionalization threshold and 
becomes self-reinforcing through socialization. In a second moment of BGB, the lack 
of power asymmetry deprived new knowledge from the necessary support for its 
further development and initial socialization, and as a result new knowledge density 
scaled back. At that point, the absence of some power asymmetry to qualify and 
direct debates, also let team members with no other option than retrench back to old 
knowledge shortly before falling into anomie. 
 
Overall, data indicates that to spark political action and allow room for knowledge 
change, declining current knowledge density must be met by a moderate or 
declining power asymmetry. Great power asymmetries discourage political action 
and thus hinder the reaction capacity of team members to a decline in current 
knowledge density. On the other hand, some level of power asymmetry is necessary 
to make new knowledge gain density prior to socialization gain momentum and 
becomes self-reinforcing. In the absence of some power asymmetry, new knowledge 
may take too long to gain density by its own functional merits and fall prey to 
underdeveloped objectivations or the strategic action of disadvantaged actors. Data 
also indicates that a scenario of power equilibrium and low knowledge density (for 
both current and new knowledge) is highly conducive to a state of anomie, and thus 
interaction paralysis, what invariably translates into project failure.  
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In that framework, it can be argued that socialization length affects knowledge 
density upward responses to changes in power dynamics. The longer the 
socialization processes are in place the less dependent upward knowledge density 
becomes from power asymmetry. Decoupling initial knowledge density from power 
asymmetries creates a favorable environment to knowledge change processes. Such 
favorable environment is further encouraged under simpler power dynamics (i.e.: 
horizontally organized actors, single/aligned interests), which are expected to react 
more quickly to changes in knowledge density. The shorter the socialization 
processes, and the more attached initial knowledge density becomes from power 
asymmetries, the harder is to promote knowledge change without power 
rebalancing. Under a complex power landscape (i.e. vertically integrated actors, 
multiple/concurrent interests) power rebalancing can be a lengthy process and make 
knowledge lose too much density before change comes within reach.  
 
The following diagrams represent the proposed socialization length role over 
upward knowledge density movements in relation to power asymmetry 
developments: 
 
    
 
Fig. 131: Socialization length influence on upward knowledge density and power asymmetry developments. 
 
Another contextual factor that has shown to influence knowledge density and power 
dynamics developments was actors´ self-confidence. Self-confidence allow actors to 
question current knowledge dysfunctionalities earlier in time and under less 
favorable conditions than less confident ones. Such influence operates two-fold. First, 
lack of confidence makes current knowledge go unchecked and uncontested for a 
longer period of time allowing for a deeper socialization and a consequent gain in 
knowledge density that becomes harder to revert.  Second, confident actors are able 
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to question knowledge dysfunctionalities at higher levels of power asymmetries than 
less confident ones, thus anticipating power dynamics developments that might 
allow room for knowledge change to happen.  
 
Along data collection CNC and WP followed partially divergent paths regarding 
self-confidence. Thanks to the worsening Brazilian engineering business scenario 
(between 2009-2011) and ownership transition developments, CNC personnel self-
confidence scaled back from a very confident stance at PDY, to an hesitant one at 
UNA3 and finally to a rather unconfident stance during BGB. This partially explains  
why current knowledge has been more emphatically debated and criticized at all 
levels along PDY (though it was embraced in the beginning under the expectation of 
a “superior knowledge”), criticized but with more restricted debates at UNA3, and 
nor debated neither criticized at BGB.  
 
WP personnel self-confidence also underwent considerable transformation along this 
investigation, however, data collection indicates that it has been far more complex 
and multifaceted process. As WP moved from a multi-domestic company made out 
of acquisitions towards a full-fledged transnational company, some offices acquired 
the status of “excellence centers” whose knowledge has been legitimized at some 
extent by top WP management. Such legitimization did not happen formally through 
charter assignment, however, WP “excellence centers” were automatically enrolled 
in projects involving their engineering specialties. In a first moment, “excellence 
center” personnel have been empowered and became quite confident of their 
“superior knowledge”. In a second moment, however, with this “superior 
knowledge” brought to novel situations, submitted to deeper scrutiny, and 
confronted with local alternatives, a sense of uneasiness quickly superseded any 
confidence gains at the “excellence centers”. As such, apart from the intensification in 
the use of international project teams, data collection shows little influence of this 
transformation over WP personnel self-confidence across the three cases examined. 
 
Overall, it can be argued that actor´s self-confidence affects knowledge density 
downward response to changes in power dynamics. The more self-confident actors 
are the less dependent downward knowledge density response becomes from power 
asymmetry (TYPE1). By exposing current knowledge inconsistencies and dragging 
knowledge density down, earlier questionings create a favorable environment for 
knowledge change to happen if power dynamics shown responsive. Also, the more 
self-confident actors are the less institutionalized current knowledge becomes and 
the easier to promote knowledge change in face of favorable power dynamics 
(TYPE2). Again, decoupling initial knowledge density from power asymmetries 
creates a favorable environment to knowledge change processes, which is further 
encouraged under more flexible power dynamics and hindered under more rigid 
ones. The following diagrams represent the proposed role of actor’s self-confidence 
over downward knowledge density movements in relation to power asymmetry 
developments: 
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Fig. 132: Actor’s self-confidence influence on downward knowledge density and power asymmetry developments. 
  
A last relevant contextual factor that has shown to influence knowledge density and 
power dynamics relationship was leadership behavior. Differently from socialization 
length, which influences upward knowledge density, and actor’s self-confidence, 
which is linked to downward knowledge density, leadership behavior has show to 
affect power asymmetry responses to changes in knowledge density in both ways. By 
paying close attention to knowledge density variations, project managers are in 
position to actively influence power dynamics to facilitate knowledge change 
developments. 
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Project managers shall be able to perceive a steep fall on knowledge density and act 
to timely countervail power asymmetries in order to stimulate debates towards new 
typifications, and facilitate the emergence of alternative directions.  This way, project 
managers can prevent knowledge from losing too much density before a viable 
knowledge option emerges, what can drive project teams into ineffectiveness and 
even paralysis. Also, project managers shall be able to look through a myriad of new 
typifications and incipient objectivations and spot a promising collection of them to 
receive support towards further developments, and eventual legitimization and 
socialization. Acting like this, project managers organize knowledge change efforts 
and prevent the search for alternatives from taking too long or losing focus.  Once 
spotted a new viable knowledge option, project managers are in position to lift 
power asymmetry back to help new knowledge to consolidate and gain density. 
 
Along data collection three quite distinct leadership behaviors can be identified. In 
PDY, project leaders (i.e.: K.G., V.S., S.B.D., C.C., D.C.C., L.S.J.) timely recognized the 
steep fall in knowledge density and quickly reacted to turn power dynamics in favor 
of knowledge change. When a viable knowledge option emerged, once again power 
dynamics moved to support new knowledge development and consolidation. As a 
result of such attentive leadership behavior, PDY knowledge change process 
happened in an opportune and confident manner. Even though the window of 
change brought some disturbances into project daily activities, the amplitude of such 
disturbances have been relatively small, and thus, well assimilated without major 
impact in project team effectiveness. 
 
 
 
Fig. 133: PDY knowledge change window. 
 
Along UNA3, project leaders (i.e.: T.D., R.M.Z., G.J., L.S.V., B.M.) either took too long 
to recognize knowledge dysfunctionalities or did not put the necessary effort to 
timely get power dynamics in line with necessary change. Consequently, knowledge 
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density fell sharply and project went on the verge of anomie. Power dynamics only 
began to move favorably towards knowledge change thanks to an indirect client 
intervention, which made knowledge dysfunctionalities blatant. Such late political 
action required several vigorous interventions from T.D. and B.M. to revert power 
asymmetries, thus slowing new knowledge development and consolidation. As a 
result of such hesitant leadership behavior, UNA3 knowledge change process 
struggled to happen and got too close to failure. Its window of change stretched too 
long causing great disturbances, taking a toll on project team effectiveness.  
 
 
 
Fig. 134: UNA3 knowledge change window. 
 
In BGB, project leaders (P.R.F., C.C., S.S.H., W.A.) were so abstracted with present 
and future contract management that they became completely unaware of upfront 
knowledge dysfunctionalities and the consequent knowledge density freefall. 
Parallel, power asymmetry has been leveled not as a result of a deliberate strategy to 
allow for organized knowledge change but rather as a disorganized response to 
unfolding events. When a viable knowledge option came by, project leadership had 
already lost control over power dynamics, and thus, has been unable to provide a 
favorable environment for its development and consolidation. As a result of such 
inattentive leadership, BGB knowledge change process failed, throwing the whole 
undertaking into irreversible anomie. The available time for a window of change has 
been severely restricted by the time-compressed nature of the project what put great 
pressure over leadership ability to drive power dynamics favorable to knowledge 
change.  
 
 
 392 
 
 
 
Fig. 135: BGB knowledge change window. 
 
Overall, leadership behavior has shown to affect power dynamics responsiveness to 
changes in knowledge density. An attentive leadership is better positioned to gauge 
exploitation and exploration gains and thus anticipate the necessary interventions in 
power domain. In this line, data collection indicates that project leadership sets the 
pace of knowledge change by opening and closing the opportunity window by 
which team members can contribute towards more functional outcomes. Therefore, 
even though project leaders may not take direct part in the elaboration of new 
typifications or objectivations they actively participate in the change process by 
providing a favorable environment in which knowledge change can take place.  
 
Another dissimilarity involving the three cases refers to the nature of the knowledge 
under examination. PDY case involved a strictly technical subject, whereas UNA3 a 
commercial one and BGB a management issue. Data collection indicates that beyond 
knowledge density, which is a function of the number of people attached to the same 
definitions, another less variable knowledge property that affects the prospects of 
change is knowledge nature. Technical knowledge whose debates can be brought 
closer to objective/rational terms proved easier to change. On the opposite corner is 
management knowledge whose debates mostly happen in a highly 
subjective/emotional ground and proved very resilient. In a middle position, 
commercial knowledge displayed a dual character, ranging from a strict rational 
logic when dealing with financial subjects, to a completely subjective one when 
dealing with strategic issues. 
 
Along data collection, technical knowledge (PDY/UNA3) has been widely debated by 
all ranks of team members who from several different perspectives contributed in 
many different ways to stimulate and enrich debates. Team members directly 
involved in debates frequently had to use objective evidences (i.e.: images, graphs, 
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numbers, tables) to prove their point and were frequently submitted to refutation 
tests that further extend changes of reinforced prior conclusions. Additionally, team 
members involved in technical debates displayed the clear goal of arriving at better 
project outcomes based on the objective premise that less cost/better process (as 
project products are mostly specified upfront) should be met. Even though, the 
prospects of carving out a promotion or solely shy away work could be sensed along 
some debates, they still laid behind the less-cost/better process argument.  
 
Management knowledge debates (UNA3/BGB), on the other hand, have been mostly 
conducted in ´petit-comité’ by top management personnel who mostly relied on 
subjective evidences (i.e.: past experiences, third-party stories, impressions, empirical 
observations) or second-hand objective ones provided by middle management to 
prove their points. Great secrecy covered ongoing discussions, leaving even middle 
management at the margins, and thus blocking any chance of external influences to 
penetrate debates. It can be argued that the reduced number of perspectives as well 
as the use of intrinsically weaker evidence, and the hierarchical relations involved in 
such “petit-comités” most certainly induced a sense of collinearity among 
participants curbing drastically the prospects of change. Also, not rarely top 
management displayed to be moved by multiple and conflicting goals. If on the one 
side such lack of direction scattered debates, on the other one, the sensitive character 
of underlying interests restricted debates or made them very subtle, further limiting 
the prospects of change. 
 
Overall, data collection indicates that the subjective level of debated issues, and the 
underlying motivations behind actor’s actions are two important factors affecting the 
prospects of knowledge change. The more subjective the issues under examination 
the less grounded debates becomes and the harder it is to arrive at noticeable 
knowledge change. The more objective the problems under examination the more 
likely debates can yield a substantive knowledge change. Also, the more 
straightforward actor’s interests the easier to arrive at a common ground and thus to 
some level of knowledge change. The more furtive and subtle actor’s interests the 
harder for common ground to be reached, and thus, to yield any knowledge change. 
In that sense, knowledge change is not only function of current knowledge state but 
also function of intrinsic knowledge characteristics that affect team members’ 
ability/predisposition to move in direction of change.  
 
Together, knowledge density dynamics and knowledge nature constrains help to 
explain other dissimilarities observed along the cases. A key dissimilarity explained 
by this combination is the reach of knowledge change outcomes. Although the three 
pieces of knowledge analyzed were corporate wide relevant, the reach of knowledge 
change varies along each case. In PDY, knowledge change has been restricted to the 
project, while in BGB it somehow got lost at firm level, and only at UNA3 it acquired 
wider corporate implications. Data indicates that the reach of knowledge change 
outcomes is linked to the managerial strength placed to make it happen and to the 
extent that knowledge nature is transformed along this process.  
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As previously discussed, data indicates that the more material/objective and the less 
dense current knowledge is, the easier to promote change. Conversely, the more 
ideational/subjective and dense knowledge is, the harder to promote change. The 
combined action of these two knowledge features would explain why in PDY 
knowledge change has been successful, while in BGB it failed, as well as why UNA3 
fits a in between position. Nevertheless, extending analysis beyond the change 
process itself into the reach of its implications, it is possible to go deeper in this 
interplay to argue that knowledge density and knowledge nature have a relationship 
on their own. The examination of the opposing knowledge expansion paths followed 
through PDY and UNA3 can provide closer details of this relationship and the 
elements involved. 
 
In PDY, although the knowledge under examination involved a 
managerial/subjective component, all along the change process it has been handled 
in a technical/objective way. However, as new knowledge began to cross project 
boundaries towards further reach and deeper institutionalization (K.G. initiative) it 
has been immediately counteracted by the strategic action of other firm ranks. Three 
venues of strategic action have been used to weaken new knowledge: containment, 
delegitimation and discredit. By taking control of boundary-spanning positions, 
S.S.H. and R.F. blocked the communication channels by which new knowledge could 
expand beyond firm boundaries (i.e.: WP-Edmonton workshare). Next, 
delegitimation took place in the form of an subtle downplay of new knowledge 
relevance within firm, particularly on the part R.F. (i.e.: seminar delays and absence). 
Finally, new knowledge has been submitted to direct subjective inquire by an 
internal oppositional stance (i.e.: S.P.H, who has always lead 3D design) in order to 
cast doubts over its functionality. Together, these three strategic action mechanisms 
blocked new knowledge expansion, limiting its reach to project boundaries. 
 
Theory shows that differently from political action, which has the aim to transform 
knowledge in objective grounds through open and direct debates, strategic action 
has the aim to transform knowledge in subjective grounds through subtle and furtive 
moves. In that sense, strategic action works in the opposite direction of socialization. 
While socialization tries to build up knowledge density by progressively establishing 
a subjective complementarity between objective practical implications, strategic 
action deliberately works to deconstruct knowledge by exposing structural flaws in 
this subjective complementarity and extending them to the objective results of its 
practical implications. Although, disadvantaged actors can also make use of strategic 
action to resist socialization, it is by excellence a tool of the powerful. While low 
ranks lack resources to trade and a central network position to manipulate 
communications, top ranks have all what they need to make use of strategic action 
as tool to block change.  
 
The undercover character of strategic action is a necessary one both to exchange 
refutation for validation and to avoid direct confrontation. Discretion helps throwing 
the proof of validity to those promoting knowledge, exempting opposing actors from 
elaborating and submitting a refutation test, what beyond time-consuming may end 
up promoting or perfecting what was supposed to be weakened. In addition, to bring 
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objective evidence to a subjective discussion is always a problematic situation 
because, given a sufficiently biased or uninformed audience, even objective proofs 
may be dragged into doubt. As such, strategic action intrinsically depends on furtive 
methods to avoid confrontations that could ignite open debates and settle 
discussions into more objective grounds.  
 
The use of strategic action to curb new knowledge expansion along PDY indicates 
that in its expansion path new knowledge objectivity has been progressively 
confronted in more subjective terms. As previously discussed, although new 
knowledge can gradually gain density and expand through socialization this process 
can be further accelerated by the use of power. Data indicates, however, that if on 
more objective grounds power can act as an inductor of knowledge change, in more 
subjective ones it may become a deterrent. First, in more subjective grounds the 
additional strength provided to new knowledge can be seen as a threat to firm´s 
internal power balance and thus trigger oppositional stances. Second, because a 
"power-led" socialization induces a premature transformation of new knowledge 
objective nature into a subjective one, thus making it easier for disadvantaged actors 
to oppose it. Consequently, as new knowledge expands through the use of power it 
is confronted with an increasingly less friendly environment what happened to limit 
the spread of PDY new knowledge to the neighborhoods of its practical application. 
 
In a certain sense, UNA3 represents a diametrically opposing situation both in terms 
of context and results. In UNA3, although the knowledge under examination 
involved a objective/technical component, right from the start it has been handled in 
a highly managerial/subjective way, with a particular emphasis on strategic interests. 
In a framework of intense power asymmetry and project management reluctance in 
confronting it, change come up as a result of indirect client intervention. Taking 
advantage of a complete re-shift in problem definitions that disorganized WP-
Reading hegemony, T.D., on the part of CNC/WP, and B.M., on the part of WP-Sofia, 
joined efforts towards the necessary knowledge changes. Due to a number of 
corporate concessions necessary to make the proposal viable, knowledge change 
expansion was fundamental for the accomplishment of project goals. Instead of using 
power to prop up the new knowledge T.D. and B.M. successively push the threshold 
of political action upwards. Every time, T.D. and B.M. faced strategic action on the 
part of WP-Reading they responded pushing objectivity upwards attracting the 
support of high ranks around corporation linked to project goals. As a result new 
knowledge expanded by progressively pushing the objective character of its 
implications into subjective grounds. 
 
Overall, it can be argued that the use of power to prop up new knowledge density 
has intrinsic limitations. Assuming that political action gain strength on 
material/objective grounds and strategic action gain strength on 
ideational/subjective grounds, the more power is used to boost new knowledge 
initial density the more opposition it is expected to attract as it moves from objective 
to subjective grounds. Data collection suggests that power alters the perception of 
knowledge density and knowledge nature, making denser knowledge also look more 
subjective and thus subject to strategic action. Therefore, the only way to extend the 
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reach of knowledge change beyond the neighborhood of its practical implications is 
to enfranchise the support of higher ranks through open and direct debates, thus 
extending upwards the threshold of political action.  
 
Conversely, although some level of knowledge change has been achieved in all three 
cases, it can be argued that only at PDY it acquired a perennial status. Although, 
strategic action prevented PDY new workshare knowledge to expand corporate-
wide, some of its key elements (i.e.. SIC spreadsheet, fig. 42) manage to spread 
within CNC/WP limits inclusive to UNA3 (i.e..: proposal completion control, fig. 70) 
and BGB (i.e.: responsibility matrix, fig. 99). If on the one hand it can be argued that 
as PDY has been the first case to be approached then it stands in a privileged analytic 
position, on the other hand, data collection suggests that several other factors may 
have also contributed to differentiate the depth of knowledge penetration of this case 
in relation to the other ones. 
 
First, PDY new knowledge higher penetration can be explained by the "politically-
led" character of its socialization within CNC/WP. As previously discussed, due to 
local cultural features new knowledge socialization had to be perfected and carried 
on for a longer period of time what made it to acquire a comparatively stronger self-
reinforcing character within firm limits. A second explanation touches the fact that 
faced with opposition, socialization becomes imperfect and thus knowledge 
reproduction more subject to variation. While weaker objectivations and typifications 
may fall apart, core ones are likely to remain compelling and become more easily 
transmitted to niche audiences. In this sense, it can be argued that although strategic 
action can limit the reach of knowledge, non-identical reproduction can further 
strength its penetration. Finally, moving people across projects is also an objective 
way to spread quasi-institutional knowledge across the company. Although 
individuals are unable to embody institutional knowledge and carry on socialization on 
their own, they are still capable of carrying a considerable amount of 
typifications/objectivations elsewhere, thus promoting new knowledge penetration. 
 
Another noteworthy dissimilarity among the three cases touches the innovation 
timing. Data collection shows that whereas for PDY and BGB innovation represented 
a key step in a wider knowledge change process, for UNA3 it looked more like the 
ultimate product of the knowledge change process itself. Deeper analysis involving 
the broader context, however, reveals that this process/product paradox can be 
explained if one takes in consideration the dimension of the knowledge change 
process in relation to a single observer´s perspective. In PDY and BGB, for example, 
the scope of knowledge change has been relatively contained to project/firm 
boundaries. So far, knowledge change depended on a singular problem redefinition 
involving a limited number of people and a relatively simple set of typifications and 
objectivations, elements that were gathered around a visible boundary and 
developed along a clearly delimited timeframe.  
 
For UNA3, however, the scope of knowledge change has been considerable wider as 
it involved a key business knowledge and several corporate entities. Thus, 
knowledge change required the redefinition of a multifaceted problem involving an 
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undefined number of people and a complex set of typifications and objectivations. 
While in PDY and BGB the knowledge change process could be apprehended by a 
individual observer as whole (first image, fig. 136), in UNA3 it became too large to be 
captured in detail without allowing for temporal distortions (second image, fig. 136).  
 
Distortions in the perception of time have been long described by authors in the field 
psychology like Ornstein (1975), Hicks et al., 1976), Fraisse (1984), Taylor (2005), 
Grondin (2010), and Le Poidevin (2011). In common these authors argue that the 
perception of time is influenced by the amount of information absorbed by the 
observer. The more information is absorbed, faster is the perception of time, and 
thus, greater the difference between actual and perceived timeframe. In that sense, as 
complex processes overwhelm individual observers with data, they tend to believe 
that they have ended while they are still unfolding. Along knowledge change 
process, a truncated time perception makes innovation look closer to the end, and 
thus a product rather than a process. 
 
 
Fig. 136: Process/product paradox applied to the knowledge change process. 
 
Further complement the prior argument the notion of analytic myopia found in 
works as diverse as Levitt´s (1960) on marketing, Porter´s (1992) on strategy, and 
Stein´s (1998),  Larwood & Whittaker´s (1977), Miller´s (2002) on managerial decision. 
In common these authors identify actor´s tendency to focus on a rather restricted 
frame of analysis at the expense of a more encompassing one. In practical terms, 
 398 
 
analytic myopia translates into the inability to see problems and processes in their 
due perspective, therefore distorting cause-effect relationships. Drawing on this 
concept, it can be argued that if from a more restricted perspective and a compressed 
timeframe innovation looks like a product, seen from a wider perspective and 
through an expand timeframe, it once again looks like a process (see fig. 137).  This 
observation further contributes to the argument that innovation is a fundamental 
step within a larger process of knowledge change rather than a product in itself. 
 
 
 
Fig. 137: Process/product paradox applied to PDY/BGB in comparison to  UNA3. 
 
Beyond intrinsic knowledge features and situational factors, broad contextual 
differences have also contributed to the observed outcomes. Client participation, for 
example, clearly distinguishes the three cases, with BGB enjoying direct 
participation, UNA3 indirect participation, and PDY in a midterm position with 
client operating at arm´s length. Along PDY and BGB, power asymmetry quickly 
responded to the loss of knowledge density whereas at UNA3, it resisted quite long 
time, particularly due to the absence of a countervailing force to disrupt existing 
power asymmetries. In that sense, data indicates that the closer is client participation, 
the faster tends to be internal power rebalance in face of a dysfunctional knowledge. 
Nevertheless, in PDY client pressure had been positively channeled towards 
knowledge change while at BGB it has been so intense that became disruptive to the 
knowledge change process, suggesting that there is a limit on how much client 
participation can contribute to knowledge change. Overall, clients represent a key 
source of both power and legitimation and to the extent they influence intra-
company power balances they can decisively influence the outcomes of knowledge 
change processes. 
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Also, the level of international interaction have been quite different across cases, 
with PDY involving a more limited interface interaction, while UNA3 and BGB 
involved a broader and more direct one. The level of international interaction is a 
measure of the number of different cultural backgrounds team members were 
exposed to while interacting within international project teams. In PDY, only two 
different cultural backgrounds were in play and at a moderate distance, what despite 
allowing for a certain rivalry contributed to a simpler compromise and more 
straightforward change process. In UNA3 and BGB, however, the number of 
different cultural backgrounds was considerable higher and their interaction much 
closer. If on the one hand such background dispersion made polarization more 
difficult, on the other hand it also made a compromise less likely. In UNA3, a great 
deal of political skill has been necessary to set a level playing field for debates 
stripped out of cultural biases, a situation rendered almost impossible in BGB due to 
the conflictive character client-management relationship acquire d along project. 
Overall, data indicates that the higher the level of international interaction the easier 
to move towards change however harder is to reach at common ground, thus 
requiring great political skills on the part of change incumbents.  
 
9.4- KEY STUDY FINDINGS 
 
9.4.1- Analytic Backdrop 
 
In the first place, data examination indicates a considerable correlation between the 
theoretical framework used to approach knowledge change and the investigated 
phenomena. Data shows clear signals of theoretically expected processes, such as 
typification, objectivation, and institutionalization. 
 
Overall, typification could be identified as the process by which individual concepts 
regarding reality emerge out of individuals´ direct interaction. In that sense, 
typifications are incipient and unstructured attempts to approach reality at the level 
of individual interaction. Typifications are very subtle cognitive and discursive 
entities that can be detected in speeches at near subliminal level, and which 
progressively grow from recurrent thematic, to metaphors, and then to ad-hoc 
concepts. The intersubjective negotiations that create typifications runs almost 
unnoticed along interactions and follows a path of interactively testing "tags" and 
"meanings". At a certain point a "tag/meaning" pair (i.e.: "freezing"/"make things stop 
changing for a while") is formed and increasingly used to recall a determined aspect 
of reality in further interactions.  
 
Along data collection, typification was particularly salient in PDY. A great effort to 
grasp the overall situation and provide a backdrop for debates, what can be detected 
along recorded meetings, especially those from 5th Oct. 2009 to 14th Oct. 2009. For 
UNA3 and BGB, however, typification have been far less salient thanks to 
diametrically opposing reasons. In UNA3, persistent power asymmetry left almost 
no space for typification to take place. Rather than interactively generated, 
typifications emerged almost ready to use out of client visit. In BGB, the lack of 
direction dispersed debates what resulted in fewer and weaker typifications. As a 
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result, key typifications had to be "imported" from the outset rather than 
interactively generated.  
 
Objectivation, on its turn, could be identified as the process by which typifications 
were refined and interconnected along multiple interactions. Objectivations provide 
a more structured and encompassing interaction frame which enhance mutual 
understanding and enable further advances in reality definition. Objectivations rise 
up as new understandings/reality propositions, as well as proposed courses of 
action, to be submitted to a wider audience. As such, they can be detected in the form 
of incipient discourses or even materialized into objects such as studies and 
prototypes. Even though objectivations already present a certain level of structuring, 
the typifications that compose them and their links remain relatively feeble and are 
still subject to negotiation. In that sense, typifications may be added, changed, and 
subtracted in order to enhance new knowledge functionality and endorsement. 
Along successive rounds of interaction reality definitions gain a well-defined shape 
so that concerted social action turns viable in determined directions.   
 
Data collection shows that objectivation manifested both in discursive and material 
terms across all cases. Along PDY, new knowledge has been objectified by the urge 
"to control model handover and execution" discourse, which materialized in the form of 
"WORKRESP" attribute, extraction, SIC spreadsheet, and weekly progress curves. In 
UNA3, new knowledge has been objectified by the "that´s how business is done in 
Brazil" and materialized in the "proposal completion spreadsheet" and in the 
proposal "write-ups" and "man-hour estimations". Finally, in BGB, new knowledge 
has been objectified by the "this is a unusual job and needs unusual tools" discourse and 
materialized in the form of a "work breakdown plan" and a "responsibility matrix". 
As transmittable and testable propositions, objectivations are far more observable 
than the typifications that compose them, however, objectivation still is a highly 
interactive process that requires a great deal of attention from change incumbents.  
 
Finally, institutionalization came up as the process where objectivations 
consolidated into an encompassing system of roles and representations, which 
enabled actors to cope with a determined reality definition. Institutional knowledge, 
therefore, embodies a concrete reality definition and a concerted guide for action to 
be transmitted and abided by. As a complex system that intersubjectively link actors 
at several levels and across different timeframes, institutional knowledge is not readily 
observable as an ensemble. At moderate levels of institutionalization, part of its 
constituents become salient along socialization processes. When highly 
institutionalized, however, institutional knowledge becomes partially visible through 
widespread assumptions that end up constraining actor´s perceptions of a changing 
or different reality, and taken for granted courses of action, that pay little attention to 
environmental circumstances or unexpected outcomes.  
 
Along the three cases, only at PDY new "workshare" knowledge attained 
institutional level within project boundaries. In UNA3, new "global-pricing 
contracting" knowledge objectivation has been fully accomplished and it managed to 
cross the institutionalization threshold, however, there is not enough data available 
 401 
 
to confirm if it has indeed attained institutional level at corporate level. In BGB, new 
"fast-track project management" knowledge change retrenched back before crossing 
the institutional threshold. Nevertheless, in the beginning of each project, the 
strength of current institutional knowledge could be felt at rather different levels. In 
PDY, institutional knowledge presented itself through the "look at the model" 
approach, in UNA3 through the "reimbursable-costs contracting" mindset, and in 
BGB as the traditional "detailed engineering" project management approach. 
 
Fig. 138: Simplified framework of the knowledge creation process from a social-constructionist perspective. 
 
 
9.4.2- Knowledge Change Framework 
 
Next, in line with extant theory, data collection shows that apart from extreme 
situations (i.e.: reification), knowledge is not a stable product and its integrity is 
subject to the action of simultaneously countervailing forces. The balance among 
these forces not only continuously affect institutional knowledge "density", that is, its 
ability to engender concerted action, but also controls the prospects of knowledge 
change. To single out these forces it is necessary to take a closer look to the parallel 
processes that set knowledge in motion along its three basic states and how these 
forces may compose to produce the observable outcomes.  
 
While in an ordinary situation powerful actors tend to impose their reality 
definitions over others, within a situation of weakened definitions (e.g.: crisis, 
current knowledge demise) hardly there is something that can be imposed, and as a 
result, power stop making sense from a coercive point of view. Insofar, a scenario of 
low knowledge density almost invariably contributes to lower power asymmetries, 
what makes all reality grasping attempts to be deemed equal and typification process 
to flourish. Overtime, some propositions will look more appealing than others, and 
as interactions proceed, some of them will invariably acquire a typification status.  
  
 402 
 
Along data collection, such sense of uncertainty can be clearly captured in PDY 
recorded meetings from 05th October 2009 to 14th October 2009, particularly through 
D.C.C, P.R.W. and K.G. speeches. In UNA3, uncertainty began on the 5th July 2010, 
with the first WP-Sofia misplaced contribution, and reached a maximum in 23rd July 
2010, when proposal approval meetings were canceled due to a complete lack of 
common definitions. In BGB, uncertainty took time to manifest but emerged strongly 
when the client asked for completely unknown documents on the 02th February 2011 
and peaked on the 17th February 2011 under the pressure for document draft 
delivery. Though at different moments, in all three cases uncertainties lowered 
power asymmetries narrowing hierarchical distances among team members, and 
encouraging particular views to be externalized and debated.  
 
In PDY, uncertainty and power distension set off strong typification processes, with 
initial typifications emerging out of informal meetings like those involving D.C.C., 
P.R.W., and A.R.A. Some appeared first like "tracking", "extracting", "filtering", 
"naming", "registering" and "freezing", while other only later on like "marking", 
"coping", and "deleting". In BGB, strong institutional knowledge delayed uncertainty 
perception and so power distension, what resulted in late and messy typification 
processes yielding few hardly connecting typifications like "unusual", "drafts", and 
"speed". In UNA3, power asymmetry was held for so long that uncertainty has been 
completely overlooked and typification process did not happen for most of current 
knowledge decay. Basic definitions had to be provided by the client during site visit 
once typifications were unable to be created interactively within project team.  
 
A dispersed collection of typifications, however, does not automatically translates 
into mutual understanding nor provide enough definitions to be imposed. Although 
typifications may be associated by chance and allow for some level of mutual 
understanding, more likely it will happen in a lengthy and highly unpredictable 
way. Data collection suggests that the primary force that set actors towards timely 
and objective mutual understanding is political action. Political action has been 
identified as the process by which actors deliberately try to build mutually shared 
understanding out of the myriad of existing typifications. In this framework, 
politically-driven actors try to identify, settle and interrelate existing typifications in 
order to organize and broaden the scope of intersubjective interaction. 
 
In its essence, political action creates "density" by tying together closely-occurring or 
clearly-related typifications (i.e.: clustering, fig. 138), by weaving complementarities 
among apparently disconnected typifications (i.e.: binding, fig. 138), or by fostering 
new typifications that create complementarity between existing ones (i.e.: bridging, 
fig. 138). Such associative work, however, is built on the free agreement of other 
actors what depends on "open and direct" debates to happen. By "open" it  shall be 
understood that participation must be granted to all actors that actively manipulate 
the reality aspect under examination, and thus, can contribute to the reality 
definition task. By "direct" it means that particular and collective interests must be 
clearly stated in order to allow political action to efficiently work towards an 
encompassing compromise. Therefore, moving individual concepts to mutually 
shared ones is a process that involves intensive intersubjective negotiation.  
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Fig. 139: Different forms of political action. 
 
Several moments of political action were captured along data collection. In PDY, 
political action majorly happened from 14th October 2009 to 20th October 2009 and 
involved increasingly larger interaction circles. First, D.C.C., A.R.A., and L.M.A, then 
K.G., P.R.W., and C.L.E., and finally S.B.D., H.L., and K.D.H. Along these debates, 
clustering involved typifications like "tracking"-"extracting"-"filtering", while binding 
ones like "naming"-"registering", and "registering"-"issuing". Bridging happened with 
the creation of new typifications like "coping" (e.g.: "filtering"-"coping"-"naming") 
and "deleting" (e.g.: "registering"-"deleting"-"freezing"). Also, along political 
processes some typifications were rejected (e.g.: "tracking" X "marking"), while others 
were reframed (e.g.: "naming" for "tracking" -> "naming" for "registering"). Overall, 
PDY relatively intense political process provided the basis for a radical change in the 
way reality was approached and a solid landmark towards a new reality definition. 
 
In BGB, political action involved a rather limited number of people (markedly F.R.P., 
C.C., W.A., and L.M.A.) and took place in the form of one-off events. To unleash 
political processes and bring complementarity to a poor set of typifications it was 
necessary to bring additional ones from the outset (i.e.: client, past projects) like 
"sharing" (by W.A.), "assigning" (by J.M.O.), and "internalizing" (by L.M.A.). In that 
case, bridging has been the main form of political action used to create 
complementarities like "unusual"-"sharing"-"speed", and "draft"-"assigning"-
"internalizing"-"speed". The limited scope of political action in BGB resulted in a 
minor change in the way reality was approached, basically pointing to an adaptation 
of definitions from similar situations to the current one.  
 
In UNA3, specific circumstances made political action acquire a quite distinct 
dynamic. The closed set of complementary typifications provided by the client 
sparked a late round of typification dedicated at project organization which lasted 
from 30th July 2010 to 2nd August 2010, and directly involved T.D., R.M.Z., B.M., 
L.M.A. and F.F.M. In this process new typifications such as "breaking", "assigning", 
"evaluating", and "consolidating" emerged enabling political action to take place in a 
sequential way and involve a large set of actors, mostly in its binding form. In UNA3, 
a late and prolonged political process, resulted in a relatively moderate change in the 
way reality was approached, one that fit well enough for the current situation, 
however, did not established a rupture with the previous one. 
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Increasingly complementary typifications provide a preliminary interaction 
background to all those involved in the reality definition task. However, while some 
reality spots become more or less defined, great uncertainty still covers most of 
interaction landscape. Nevertheless, such preliminary background provides a 
departure point from which further typifications and associations can be built upon, 
and overtime, continued political action engender increasingly broader reality 
propositions. At a certain point, such political activity arrives at propositions that 
markedly imply in a groundbreaking approach to reality, one that may establish a 
complete rupture with previous ones, and that´s when innovation takes place.  
 
In this line, data collection suggests that innovation can be understood as a sudden 
change in the way reality is approached sparked by a cumulative process of 
interaction background reorganization. Far from the traditional image of a 
"luminous" well-defined idea, innovation would represent a turning point in the 
knowledge change process, a collective reflection moment which breaks up with past 
references to embrace new ones. Data shows innovation as a moment where 
uncertainty gave room to a subtle sense of direction, as if a new path towards a more 
encompassing reality definition had been suddenly unveiled. In PDY, this innovation 
moment took place during the 20th October 2009 meeting, while for BGB it happened 
during the 17th February 2011 meeting. In UNA3, due to the extent of the knowledge 
change involved, innovation came up in corporate terms as proposal delivery. 
Overall, considering that such change process is sparked by balanced arguments, 
shared propositions and an initial set of supporters, it can be argued that political 
action always set the stage for innovation.  
 
Though innovation foretells a new reality definition by no means this is a warranted 
or a straightforward path. While this upcoming reality proposition remains 
supported only by a tentative association of typifications, it represents a rather 
delicate framework that can be rapidly dismantled by a single strategic move. To 
gain density and better support the reality definition work, such complementary 
typifications must be submitted to a larger set of actors for appraisal, improvement 
and support. These actors, however, either are experiencing great uncertainty and 
must be introduced to such new reality developments, or are still rooted in the older 
definitions, and thus, must be convinced to leave it. The challenge, therefore, is to 
move ahead with the reality definition task not only in an organized fashion way, but 
also in a way that do not jeopardize the political compromises so far harnessed.  
 
The solution for this conundrum is to embed typifications and their associations into 
a manageable support so that they can be scrutinized towards advancement but not 
obliterated. As previously seen, objectivation is the process by which complementary 
typifications acquire materiality and thus can be more easily explained and securely 
debated. The objectivation focus is to enroll a larger set of actors to look for a 
increasingly broader picture based on the proposed interaction background, rather 
than to rediscuss the typifications and associations develop so far. Even though 
changes in the proposed interaction background can be expected as a result of wider 
exposure, this is not supposed to happen directly but rather within a larger and more 
subtle process.  
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Data indicates that materialization triggers a reflexivity process by which 
typifications and their associations are progressively enhanced towards the 
objectivation status (see Fig. 139). In a first reflexive moment, initial actors put 
themselves in the position of the intended audience and, based on their assessment 
of audience focus, critically gauge if a determined material representation is 
compelling enough to promote mutual understanding and grab support for the 
associations made so far. If not, such material representation goes into change until 
this critical assessment is satisfied and it is considered ready to be disclosed. In a 
second reflexive moment, initial actors evaluate audience feedback, and if necessary 
make improvements or a complete redesign. As objectivations are submitted to 
diverse audiences they are perfected and increasingly serve as a base for mutual 
understanding across actors approaching reality from different perspectives. As the 
interaction base expands supported by these objectivations, the new reality definition 
is enhanced and gains strength.  
 
 
 
Fig. 140: Objectivation as a reflexive process. 
 
Objectivations, therefore, are designed to attract the attention and grab support of a 
specific audience, what according to data collection obey some basic principles: they 
must be simple and actionable. Simple in the sense that they must be easily captured 
by an audience troubled by uncertainty. Actionable in the sense that they must 
establish a clear way to handle reality as proposed. The more complex and the less 
actionable an objectivation is the less likely it will provide a basis for mutual 
understanding and receive enough support from the intended audience.  
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The transformation of the "marking" typification into the "WORKRESP" attribute, 
and the materialization of the "freezing" typification into the "transfer/deleting" 
procedure represent two key examples of how objectivation happened at PDY in a 
very basic level. Also in PDY, the "SOW" and the "summary spreadsheets" (Figs. 35 & 
36) represent examples of failed objectivation attempts due to their complexity and 
poor actionable character. Lately, the whole new workshare knowledge materialized 
in the form of the "new-SIC spreadsheet". In BGB, document "work breakdown" and 
"responsibility matrix" also represent objectivations derived from typifications such 
as "unconventional" and "document father". For UNA3, client typifications 
materialized in the form of "man-hour-estimate", through the "write-ups" and in the 
"risk analysis" report, while project organization typifications developed 
interactively materialized in the "document completion spreadsheet". Also lately, the 
whole new global-pricing contract knowledge materialized in the form of the 
"delivered proposal". Insofar, objectivations usually develop from discourses, to 
tools, then to procedures, and eventually into prototypes. 
 
Overall, objectivation creates "density" by embedding complementary typifications 
into a web of signs, thus creating a protection layer that exposes their actionable 
character but hide their conceptual ones. In other words, the audience is submitted to 
what objectivations are up to in terms of organizing the proposed reality (e.g.: 
classify, relate, assign, control, inform) rather than to inspect what is conceptually 
behind them. At this stage, it is essential to protect typifications and their 
associations from wider scrutiny, otherwise political processes would run 
indefinitely, as increasing the number of actors, political processes would turn 
exponentially complex and far-reaching compromises virtually impossible to reach. 
Objectivations, thus, represent a cognitive artifice to convey complex and subtle 
ideas in a simple and direct manner so that dissent and uncertain actors are attracted 
towards the new reality proposition, and more, engage into its development.  
 
Therefore, objectivation marks a change in the reality definition task from a 
ideational phase into a structuring one. While in the ideational phase typification 
links are spontaneously created through interaction and compromise, in the 
structuring phase, objectivation layers are deliberately "designed". Though such 
design task still involves interaction and compromise, objectivations are also subject 
to choice what allows room for power to manifest. As such, if initial objectivations 
can be deemed political, as they become more complex and capable of directing 
action they are increasingly accompanied by some level of "sanctioning". As data 
collection shows, "sanctioning" has the aim to control the unfolding consequences of 
the knowledge change process in ways that benefit, or at least do not jeopardize, 
particular interests. In PDY, progress graphic (Figs. 47 & 48) concealing by D.C.C. 
represents an event where an objectivation has been discretionarily blocked from 
being disclosed under the argument that it could backfire planning, a audience 
reaction that could affect his personal power. "Sanctioning", therefore, is the primary 
channel by which a power component is gradually introduced in the knowledge 
change equation. 
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Fig. 141: Shifting forces along objectivation. 
 
What determines the end of the objectivation process is legitimation. By definition, 
legitimation is the ultimate introduction of power in the reality definition task done 
by a sanctioned authority, one that settles what is to be considered "the" reality and 
shall be transmitted as such. Once legitimized, room for negotiation narrows 
drastically and the incipient knowledge is ready to be socialized. As data collection 
shows, legitimation usually takes place when the new reality proposition is 
supported by objectivations that are robust enough to hold some level of concerted 
action and to elicit the support of key constituency. In PDY, new knowledge has been 
legitimized first by K.G. (CNC project manager) in the 12th November 2009 and then 
by S.B.D. (WP project manager) during the 18th November 2009 meeting. In BGB, 
new knowledge has been legitimized by P.R.F. (BGB project manager) on the 21st 
February 2011. In UNA3, due to the considerably larger scope of the knowledge 
change process, legitimation body rested on a corporate stance, which has only 
opened the way for proposal delivery on the 10th September 2010.  
 
Even though legitimation powerfully constrains the reality definition task, the 
collection of actionable objectivations that supports it still has a long way to go before 
being able to promote concerted action. The mechanism by which this incipient 
knowledge is transmitted and thus consolidates is socialization. Data collection 
confirms that socialization creates "density" by reproducing knowledge, that is, by 
expanding its base of supporters and transmitters. Socialization usually materializes 
through a series of mechanisms such as lecturing, training, and supervising, and is 
enforced either through monitoring or symbolic rewards. Socialization also plays a 
key role in determining group faultlines, what constitutes a further venue of 
enforcement. Given certain conditions, this base of supporters and transmitters can 
increase to point of making socialization self-reinforcing. Before acquiring a self-
reinforcing character, however, socialization depends on a driver to be sustainable. 
Data collection shows, that socialization can be powered by two distinct drivers, 
resulting in two completely different outcomes in terms of knowledge development.  
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Under a "power-led" socialization knowledge is rapidly socialized, usually along a 
structured impersonal program or direct coercive supervision, and as such, it 
remains only at a superficial level of consciousness, almost mounting to a form of 
social performance. "Power-led" socialization creates a knowledge that is extrinsically 
strong, or in other words, a knowledge that is pervasive while external stimuli (e.g.: 
coercion, reward) is in place. Provided the end of these external stimuli, socialization 
loses strength and the new knowledge density tumbles quite rapidly. Provided 
enough power, however, this external stimuli can perfect socialization to the point of 
inducing identical reproduction, what not only promotes a fast gain of density but 
also provides enough energy to create strong self-reinforcement dynamics along new 
knowledge socialization. This way, "power-led" socialization allows room for abrupt 
changes in the knowledge dynamics. 
 
On the other hand, under "politically-led" socialization knowledge is gradually 
socialized on a peer-to-peer basis, and as such, goes deep into consciousness to the 
point of being internalized as a belief. As such, actors are convinced to embrace new 
knowledge based on a critical assessment of efficiency and fairness. Furthermore, in 
the same way that "politically-led" socialization may allow for some level of 
resistance it also invite actors to take part in new knowledge consolidation, therefore 
opening room for additional enhancements, more encompassing compromises, and 
further acceptance. Insofar, "politically-led" socialization creates a knowledge that is 
intrinsically strong, that is, a knowledge whose pervasiveness is independent of 
external stimuli, as long as its strength is internally generated through a gradual 
process of persuasion. This way, "politically-led" socialization allows room for non-
identical reproduction as a way to accommodate some change and alleviate tension 
generated along new knowledge socialization.  
 
These two socialization drivers could are visible along data collection through PDY 
case, with WP-Houston running under "power-led" socialization, and CNC running 
under "politically-led" socialization. In the first case, the reduced number of actors to 
be socialized as well as the coercive possibilities of being fired or sent into a dreadful 
assignment (e.g.: Middle-East) in retaliation for opposing a management decision 
made its part in enlisting new knowledge compliance in WP-Houston in a quite fast 
manner. In CNC, the lack of coercive instruments (i.e.: hot engineering market) as 
well as the local tradition of selectively applying rules and directions made 
socialization more dependent on a gradual and negotiated approach. In BGB, a tepid 
legitimation unleashed a feeble socialization process were the power driver was 
almost absent and the political one has been overwhelmed by a tight scheduled. In 
UNA3, data collection does not allow many inferences about socialization process 
that might have happened as a result of proposal delivery. 
 
After successive rounds of socialization, new knowledge density increases to the 
point of becoming self-sustainable, and as a new reality definition finally settles in 
the collectivity, concerted action around clear roles and expectations turns viable. At 
this point it can be said that knowledge reached institutional level, that is, acquired 
firmness in actors consciousness that goes beyond direct forms of manipulation. The 
so-called institutional knowledge not only provides clear courses of action but also 
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shapes actors perception of reality. Confronted with a different situation, actors tend 
to see it in the same terms as the original one upon which institutional knowledge has 
been developed. Overtime, institutional knowledge creates complex self-maintenance 
apparatus which can take the form of procedures, norms or even artifacts (e.g.: 
machines, softwares). Not rarely, however, institutional knowledge can materialize as 
whole bodies of compliance and enforcement which are governed by specialized 
personnel called institutions (e.g.: universities, companies, societies).  
 
 
Fig. 142: Institutionalization as a distributive process. 
 
Along all three cases, only at PDY data collection provides solid evidence that new 
knowledge has attained institutional level within project boundaries. In PDY, the 
new workshare knowledge became fully institutionalized at WP-Houston by 11th 
January 2010 when it played a key role in the accomplishment of a key milestone, the 
"area 8000" joint design task.  At CNC, the "politically-led" character of socialization 
kept it developing until 12th February 2010, when L.Y.L., the last supervisor to fully 
embrace the new workshare knowledge, finally complied with its procedures. In 
BGB, as a result of a lack of socialization drivers, new knowledge failed to reach 
institutional level, and a return to old knowledge paved the way towards anomie. In 
UNA3, although data collection provides little evidence that new knowledge 
attained institutionalization, there is an indication that as a result of UNA3 proposal, 
changes happened in the corporate structure so that records would be concentrated 
in key offices in order to enhance corporate ability to handle similarly strict bidding 
rules. 
 
Even after institutionalizing at project level new knowledge behavior still reflects 
choices made along its development path. "Power-led" socialization consolidates a 
sort of knowledge that carries internal tensions, and thus can be kept stable only 
under constant monitoring and enforcement. "Politically-led" socialization 
consolidates a sort of knowledge that is relatively tension-free and thus capable of 
self-sustaining, and eventually expanding beyond project boundaries. New 
knowledge expansion is an important outcome as long as it provides a venue to 
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tackle correlate situations in other settings, what may eventually revert into more 
influence and power to its proponents. However, let socialization alone, this 
expansion rate is too slow to boost new knowledge into higher institutional levels 
before project ends and its density declines. In that sense, data collection shows that 
to promote new knowledge beyond project boundaries, at a faster rate, it is necessary 
to use additional amounts of power. In that framework, new knowledge expansion 
turns into an investment of power, that is, power is used to generate more power.  
 
This strategy, however, is not a risk-free one as long as compliance problem arises 
when new knowledge is socialized beyond project boundaries. First, as a determined 
reality definition expands it starts to confront other reality definitions which have 
supporters on their own. Second, this strategy may threaten long standing power 
balances, and thus, spark oppositional stances. Finally, this additional power can 
build up internal oppositional stances, particularly when "power-led" socialization 
has been used to consolidate new knowledge. Therefore, the more power is used to 
prop up knowledge density, the more strategic action is expected to take place, as a 
result latent opposition or challenged interests. In its essence, strategic action is no 
different in nature and in mechanisms from political action, yet it is still distinct due 
to the undercover character and non-aggregative goals, in contrast with political 
action which displays a public character and an aggregative impetus.  
 
As strategic action success depends on its ability to develop furtively for a long time, 
it poses a challenge to the investigation to capture it full detail. Nevertheless, along 
data collection several strategic action moves could be identified. In PDY, where 
"politically-led" socialization took place, strategic action was predominantly external 
to project and involved company high-ranks which saw in new knowledge 
expansion a threat to current power balance. First, S.S.H. and R.F. used their 
organizational prerogatives to seize the communication channels by which new 
knowledge could expand towards the VALE project, leveraging K.G. influence 
within the company. Second, R.F. downplayed new knowledge relevance within 
firm, by delaying and emptying the seminar which intended to expand the new 
knowledge internally. Finally, new knowledge has been strategically exposed to 
direct subjective inquire by S.P.H, who has always lead 3D design within company, 
and casted doubts over its functionality, further weakening company´s interest on it. 
 
Along UNA3 and BGB, where new knowledge socialization was more "power-led", 
some signals of internal opposition could be identified, and serve as an example on 
how strategic action can operate from within projects. In the final UNA3 run, WP-
Reading launched the “executive summary”, a document not required in the bid 
instructions, with great publicity to all WP top managers in an attempt to standout as 
a key participant in the project and blur CNC/WP and WP-Sofia outstanding work.  
In BGB, the fact that J.A.M. has not taken part on new knowledge development and 
legitimation, may have probably influenced him in not putting much effort in further 
socializing or developing it properly. Overall, strategic action can be associated to 
several blocking or disruptive practices that lead to new knowledge containment, 
delegitimation, and discredit, elements that have been traditionally reported in 
business literature as features of "politicized organizations" (Mintzberg, 1985).  
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At this stage of new knowledge development, strategic action becomes a 
countervailing force against further institutionalization, one that can only be 
efficiently offset by reinforcing socialization or by moving upwards the threshold of 
political action what invariably depends on the use of more power. Let alone, 
political action hardly can offset the effects of strategic action, basically because the 
undercover character of strategic action make it difficult for new knowledge 
proponents to detect and counteract it in a timely manner. Furthermore, 
counteracting strategic action is an exasperating task as long as boosting up new 
knowledge consumes disproportionate more time and effort than detracting it. 
Finally, strategic action narrows the room for new knowledge to gain further density 
before environmental changes take place and re-unsettle the original situation which 
gives it essential pragmatic support. As such, the more time strategic action is 
capable of holding back new knowledge expansion the easier it becomes to reverse it. 
Data collection shows that as a result of strategic action and early environmental 
changes, new knowledge invariably retreats back into a quasi-institutional state 
where its density lowers but some of its structuring remains. 
 
Such quasi-institutional knowledge differs from new knowledge at its early stages 
because differently from the later its base of supporters becomes spatially dispersed 
and linked only through common history and long-range bonds. In that sense, 
although it is still held in some actors' consciousness it is hardly actionable in 
practical terms. Most likely is that quasi-institutional knowledge can decisively 
influence current objectivation processes and thus recycle part of its core 
objectivations into newer knowledge under development. One that although 
resembles features from previous ones, is yet quite distinct. Overall, quasi-
institutional knowledge plays a key role in the knowledge change process by 
enriching the medium on which knowledge change occurs and by turning 
knowledge cycling less abrupt and therefore less risky. At this point, it can be argued 
that it is the accumulation of quasi-institutional knowledge what makes social 
ensembles able to pursuit incremental learning strategies.  
 
 
 
Fig. 143: Quasi-institutional knowledge and institutional knowledge decline.  
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In what can be considered a form of "revenge" against strategic action, although 
quasi-institutional knowledge is hardly actionable, two of its features end up 
enhancing the dispersion and penetration power of part of former new knowledge 
components. First, as long as quasi-institutional knowledge remains engraved in 
individual´s consciousness, once projects ends and people disperse across different 
projects (within and outside the company) they end up carrying with them this 
quasi-institutional knowledge in the form of "project stories", which become a sort of 
inspiration repertoire for future problematic situations. By dispersing across multiple 
environments, former knowledge elements gain a reach that they would hardly 
attain in its institutional form. Second, different from institutional knowledge which 
is socialized "as is", in a indivisible manner, quasi-institutional knowledge allow for 
the selective transmission of its components. By enabling selective transmission of its 
components quasi-institutional knowledge has more freedom to spread, and thus to 
penetrate more deeply into particular audiences. Insofar, while in quasi-institutional 
state the once battled knowledge has always the potential to rise up again in 
neighboring situations, improved and strengthened.  
 
The transmission of quasi-institutional knowledge along projects could be observed 
in several occasions along data collection. Key objectivations created along PDY, like 
the "new-SIC spreadsheet", managed to expand in less structured forms towards 
other projects such as RMAN and PDY2. In a similar way, key knowledge elements 
developed for UNA3 such as the "proposal completion control" (fig. 70) also 
propagated in a quasi-institutional form into BGB and influenced one of its new 
knowledge key elements, the "responsibility matrix" (fig. 99). Much of this 
transmission happened thanks to the movement of personnel among projects, 
particularly K.G., which moved to RMAN project, D.C.C., L.M.A. and M.A., which 
moved to PDY2 project, and C.C. and L.M.A. which moved to BGB project. As such, 
in the absence of far-reaching strategic action or relevant environmental changes that 
further weaken its structuring links, former institutional knowledge can survive in 
quasi-institutional state for quite some time, being recycled along different situations.  
 
Data consistently shows that although equally contributing to knowledge density 
power and political action are two mutually exclusive forces that act at different 
timeframes along knowledge change. Politics acts at rarefied knowledge states when 
there is little room for power to exert influence over choice or action. Power, on its 
turn, acts upon more structured knowledge levels where it can exert a coercive 
influence over both choice and action. In that sense, knowledge and power, are 
intrinsically linked, not only power gives knowledge a full existence but it also 
controls its reproduction. Therefore, to question knowledge is a way to question 
power distribution.  
 
In the opposite direction, strategic action and environmental changes are two forces 
that equally contribute to lower knowledge density and also operate at different 
timeframes along knowledge change. Though not mutually exclusive, these two 
forces hardly can be seen operating at the same time. Strategic action operates mainly 
at structured knowledge levels and has the aim to magnify eventual 
dysfunctionalities in order to restore existing power balances. If environmental 
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changes happen in a way that knowledge becomes evidently dysfunctional, strategic 
action ´raison d´être´ ceases to exist. As such, strategic action is directly linked to the 
exercise of power and operates as to countervail its self-reinforcing dynamics.  
 
Insofar, in the same way that political action is enabled by a distension in power 
asymmetry, strategic action is prompted by knowledge dysfunctionalities, 
particularly those caused by early environmental changes. In that sense, political and 
strategic action mount to be micro-level forces which compete against one another 
and act over knowledge in a highly discretionary and subdued way. At the other 
side of the spectrum, the balance between power asymmetry and knowledge 
functionality creates a tension that has far-reaching influence over knowledge 
dynamics. Power can influence the perception of environmental changes almost in 
the same way that environmental changes can gradually erode power coercive 
strength. In that sense power and environmental changes mount to be macro-forces 
that act over knowledge in a very extensive and direct way. 
 
 
 
Fig. 144: Changing forces along knowledge change. 
 
Overall, data indicates that knowledge hinges on a balance of four simultaneously 
countervailing forces: power and environmental changes at macro level, and political 
action and strategic action at micro-level (Fig. 144). These forces not only create 
tensions at their respective levels but also interact with one another in ways that 
apart from extreme situations (i.e.: reification and anomie) set knowledge in state of 
constant search for equilibrium. Such equilibrium, however, is hardly attainable 
because any disturbance in their balance soon or later sets the whole system in 
motion once again. Knowledge change, therefore, is the result of the unfolding 
dynamics along the sequential succession of these forces in a constant search for 
equilibrium (Fig. 145). 
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Fig. 145: Simplified framework of the simultaneously countervailing forces acting over knowledge. 
 
 
Fig. 146: Balance of forces along knowledge change. 
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9.4.3- International Project Teams as Innovation Hubs 
 
The theoretical framework previously described provides a backdrop to explain why 
international project teams are increasingly used to handle complex and innovative 
tasks within MNEs. This framework also provides the necessary theoretical 
background to understand how knowledge diversity and politics interrelate within 
international project teams in order to unleash innovation.  
 
If for firms tasks are mostly well-known and repetitive, and thus, favor knowledge 
institutionalization project teams by definition are special organizational settings 
designed to produce a complex and unique output. As such, firm´s current 
knowledge is to be confronted with a situation it has not been entirely developed for. 
Though some important parts of the task are relatively well-known, other are not. 
More important either, the relationship among these parts, even well-known ones, 
can presented unexpected challenges once brought together. In PDY, for example, 
though refining projects and 3D design were well-known both by WP-Houston and 
CNC, how to design a refinery in the same 3D environment simultaneously from two 
different locations was not. Hardly any manager could have forecasted that such 
overlapping workshare was far more complex than the usual interface workshare 
relationship where partners’ scopes are separated by well-delimited boundaries. 
  
Despite Clegg & Courpasson´s (2004) argument that project teams are strongly 
institutionalized arrangements, data collection shows that most forms of 
institutionalization within project teams are short-lived. Once projects begin, roles, 
objectives and codes of practice quickly go into revision and change, mostly thanks 
to the unique character of the task and the conditions involved in the joint work. 
Along the three cases examined several changes in roles, objectives and practices 
could be vividly observed, and attempts to live up to institutionalized ways 
coincided with observed knowledge dysfunctionalities. A phrase commonly said by 
project professionals along data collection materialize this perception: "Everybody 
knows how a project begins but nobody knows how it ends." (D.C.C.). 
 
Overall, projects represent an attempt to reproduce, under relatively controlled 
conditions, the same crisis scenario brought about by environmental changes. As a 
result, projects do commonly get out of control like BGB, or dangerously get close to 
collapse before turning good like UNA3. However, most often well planned and 
managed projects achieve remarkable goals like PDY. Furthermore, environmental 
changes tend to accumulate for long time before make themselves noticeable. By 
inducing change at a higher rate, projects turn this catch up process more gradual, 
and thus, more manageable. Both BGB and UNA3 projects represent risky attempts  
on the part of CNC to qualify for tasks it did not had prior experience and deemed as 
important in the future, such as ports and nuclear facilities, respectively. Therefore, 
project teams are special organizational structures that submit firm´s institutional 
knowledge to conditions that force it into change and improvement at a higher rate 
than the environment would do, or at least at the same speed, which is the case of 
highly dynamic environments. 
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Within mature MNEs, international project teams go a step further in creating such 
crisis scenario by introducing the pressure of internal competition. Despite the fact 
that in this case international project teams are composed by people belonging to the 
same corporate entity, team members still represent the particular interests of their 
units of origin. As noted by authors like Birkinshaw & Hood (1998) and Galunic & 
Eisenhardt (1996), these particular interests can range from expanding business 
participation to securing a specialized charter in the company, usually at the expense 
of other units. Even though project members are assigned to non-redundant tasks, 
their expectations regarding joint work are rooted in what they know from their 
home units. As such, internal competition gets transferred to the projects either 
through divergent opinions or through the threat of incumbent substitution, which 
adds to uncertainty the pressure of corporate survival and status. 
 
Data collection vividly shows how internal competition (Birkinshaw, 2000, Cerrato, 
2006) show up at early project stages. Along PDY, internal competition became 
evident in the WP-Houston threat to send their personnel to carry on the 3D design 
task at CNC, and in the resistance to concede that the overlapping nature of the 
workshare required changes in the way the design work was traditionally handled. 
Along UNA3, internal competition manifested in the harsh initial contacts between 
CNC/WP and WP-Sofia personnel as well as in the divergences between their man-
hour estimates. In BGB, internal competition also became salient through WP-
Houston attempts to take over CNC/WP project leadership. Overall, internal 
competition is an essential feature of mature MNEs, that by getting transferred to 
international project teams adds more pressure to team members performance. 
 
Data collection also shows that internal competition within international project teams 
can basically unfold in two ways. Sides can recognize each other as being 
equivalently capable to define the problematic situation (therefore, "knowers"), and 
thus, move forwards to the typification and political processes that precede 
innovation and knowledge change, or recognize differences in their capabilities and 
establish a hierarchical relationship (master-apprentice), which implies in 
socialization and few net results in terms of knowledge change, even taking non-
identical reproduction in consideration. Overall, data indicates that internal 
competition can also be seen as a driver for another key MNE strategic element that 
is collaboration, particularly of the type that extends firm´s knowledge capabilities.  
 
Both at PDY and UNA3, initial rivalries evolved into the mutual recognition of the 
"knowers" status, and as a result, both project teams managed to go ahead with 
essential processes for knowledge change, thus arriving at considerable 
achievements. In opposition, along BGB there was a remarkable capability 
asymmetry that could only be resolved by trading power for knowledge. As team 
members struggled to advance their positions without concessions, not even straight 
socialization became feasible and the net result of knowledge change in the project 
was highly disappointing. Therefore, for international project teams to yield 
innovation and knowledge change, as important as setting up challenging project 
goals, is to match highly experienced project partners in ways they can collaborate 
towards knowledge advancements. 
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If the concession of the "knower" status is key for effective communications and 
further agreement in a setting marked by internal competition, international project 
teams provide a key platform for the establishment of such links, specially through 
“bridging assignments". Differently from "socialization assignments", where team 
members move to the stronger partner to be socialized, in "bridging assignments" 
team members move to the weaker partners in order to gauge the environment and 
to establish communication bridges. Such communication bridges not only are 
directly established through personal relations developed along the assignment but 
also indirectly through the establishment of referral networks within project team by 
conveying a contextualized account of other partners capabilities. By looking at a 
closer distance to the problematic situation, and becoming full aware of its context of 
enactment, assigned team members are in position to send a strong feedback to their 
colleagues regarding the trustworthiness of other team members knowledge, thus 
promoting cultural distension and clearing the way towards collaboration.   
 
Represent examples of "socialization assignments", P.D.J. stay in the WP-Houston 
for PDY, and T.D. stay in WP-Reading for UNA3. In contrast, represent examples of 
"bridging assignments" the stay in Brazil of S.L.J., F.R., S.J.L., G.A. and E.R.K. along 
PDY, B.M., G.J., G.G., and S.T.V. along UNA3, and W.A. along B.G.B. According to 
data collection, also contribute to the successful enactment of "bridging 
assignments", intercultural interest on the part of the assigned team member and 
proximity on the part of its local peers. Collaborate to this argument the performance 
of B.M. along UNA3, and G.A. along PDY, team members that detached themselves 
in their depth of engagement and comprehension of the project context. Not by 
coincidence, the two worst performs in their "bridging assignments", corresponded 
to people who least interacted with local team members and which showed 
indifferent to the project context, E.R.K. in PDY, G.J. in UNA3 and C.K. in BGB.  
 
Hardly, however, the "knower" status can be granted under conditions of high power 
asymmetry. If project teams display a natural tendency towards power distension, 
data collection indicates that very often international project teams contradict this 
trajectory. Data suggests that initial power asymmetries tend to resist longer in 
international project teams because their members also represent the interest of their 
home units, and for this try to secure or advance their power positions, particularly 
through knowledge socialization. This socialization push not only prevent team 
members from critically assessing the actual contribution of the their knowledge to 
project goals but also from recognizing its eventual dysfunctionalities, which tend to 
be charged to knowledge incorrect application or understanding, result of lack of 
technical competences or cultural/idiomatic differences. Such socialization push also 
severely undermines team members’ ability to oppose dysfunctional knowledge and 
unfair partnership conditions as it undermines both actor´s self-confidence and self-
criticism. If this socialization push remains in place for a long time it brings the 
additional problem of inertial institutionalization, where dysfunctional knowledge 
keep being socialized in a self-reinforcing way, even after power asymmetry has 
been removed, as happened in PDY. To the point that power asymmetry can resist 
decreasing knowledge density, a crisis scenario may be not enough to spark 
collaboration and thus knowledge change in international project teams. 
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The mismatch between power asymmetry and knowledge density has far-reaching 
implications on international project teams outcomes. The longer this mismatch is in 
place, the harder becomes knowledge change and the more likely project failure. 
Data collection indentifies at least three mechanisms to countervail the initial 
socialization push and rebalance power asymmetries, which are rooted in knowledge 
diversity, rebalancing acts and exogenous shocks. Data also shows that within 
international project teams these mechanisms unfold in a sequential fashion way 
until a resistance point is break. How much of these mechanisms must be applied to 
revert power asymmetry, however, will depend on the strength of the socialization 
push and on particular features of the weaker partners.  
 
Although knowledge diversity is considered a key characteristic of mature MNEs in 
general terms, it is particularly salient across international project teams. In line with 
extant theory, data collection shows that knowledge diversity represent the first line 
of defense against power asymmetries within international project teams. The simple 
presence of alternatives in a crisis scenario add up pressure against current 
knowledge and the power asymmetry that supports it. How this additional pressure 
will influence knowledge change outcomes depends on how strong power 
asymmetry and initial socialization push are. Empirical evidence suggests that under 
low levels of power asymmetry, knowledge diversity alone is enough to countervail 
the initial socialization push, and consequently, bring down existing power 
asymmetries. Under high levels of power asymmetry, however, initial socialization 
push tends to be so strong that knowledge diversity is completely downplayed, thus 
becoming an ineffective inductor of power distension and also of knowledge change. 
 
Even though knowledge diversity may be unable to revert strong power 
asymmetries in a direct way, it still indirectly adds to this process. Data suggests that 
as the mismatch between power asymmetry (or knowledge density) and 
functionality grows, disadvantaged actors fell compelled to critically review current 
knowledge, and do that in the light of the available options provided by knowledge 
diversity. Once doing so, they are in position to first devise the gaps between current 
knowledge and project goals and engage into internal political action, not only to 
expose those gaps but also to propose new directions. Provided enough management 
support (e.g.: knowledge state transmittal, external political action), disadvantaged 
actor can keep exploring project contingencies to the point of openly challenging 
established power asymmetries, a process that could be followed along PDY. Such 
rebalancing acts, therefore, are means by which power asymmetries can be 
endogenously reduced within international project teams.   
 
However, without the engagement of "change agents" or innovators and 
management agency, hardly rebalancing act can go ahead and succeed. In that case, 
only exogenous shocks can offset existing power asymmetries and allow room for 
collaboration. Can be considered exogenous shock any external interference that 
prompts a completely rebalance of team´s power landscape, such as client or 
corporate intervention. Exogenous shock has been the way by which power 
asymmetry has been countervailed within UNA3 project.  Beyond that, only anomie 
and project failure can be expected as a result of persistent power asymmetries. 
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Overall, if the power landscape for international project teams is complicated by the 
introduction of external interests, its inherent knowledge diversity also provides 
tools to overcome it. The persistence of power asymmetries within international 
project teams, however, may render ineffective the use of knowledge diversity to 
trigger the whole knowledge change process. Data collection indicates that the longer 
power asymmetry stands within international project teams the smaller is the scope of 
knowledge change and the larger the disturbances caused by the change process. In 
that sense, although international project teams present a great knowledge change 
potential, this potential can only be fulfilled if the natural tendency of these 
arrangements towards power asymmetry is countervailed by the ability of its 
members to focus on project goals and embrace collaboration. 
 
This need for power rebalance within international project teams highlights another 
important investigation insight: the central role that project managers play in the 
knowledge change processes. Data collection indicates that once in a scenario of 
lower power asymmetry, project managers exchange the control over the direct 
manipulation of knowledge elements, to assume the indirect task of conducting the 
process of change. While in this role, project managers must provide support and set 
the pace of knowledge change processes so that they can unfold in a focused, open  
and timely manner.  
 
In this direction, several are the ways by which project managers help knowledge 
change processes to unfold in a timely and organized manner. First, project 
managers must keep focus on project goals and continually screen the project 
environment paying attention to the rising of new typifications in order to keep 
alternatives at hand. Second, at the first signs of decreasing knowledge density, 
project managers must provide support for rebalancing acts or actively participating 
in power distension through knowledge state-transmittal. As debates begin, project 
managers must provide communicating/framing support for international team 
members, in order to keep communications flowing, as well as arbitrate the 
argumentation process to make debates overcome entrenched positions or vested 
interests. Finally, project managers must prevent knowledge change efforts from 
taking too long or losing focus, and thus must quickly restore power asymmetry 
once a viable option consolidates, what is made through legitimation. 
 
Overall, project managers are responsible for opening and closing the knowledge 
change window, which represent the period of time along which knowledge density 
is deliberately kept low enough for change to take place. Project managers with a 
solid leadership profile can help international project teams to quickly turn over the 
whole knowledge change process with a minimum of disturbances. Just as a steady 
leadership is able to timely influence power dynamics, and thus get the most out of 
international project teams change potential, a loose leadership can easily make these 
arrangements to underperform. Ill-prepared management (either technically or 
managerially) tend to be unable to efficiently mediate and arbitrate debates within 
project teams. In a scenario of great uncertainty and lower power asymmetry, a lack 
of leadership behavior on the part of project management can have ruinous effects 
for the project as BGB case demonstrates.  
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Right after legitimation, project managers still have an additional responsibility 
regarding the knowledge change process, that is to provide a initial socialization 
impetus so that new knowledge can gain momentum enough to become self-
sustaining. Such impetus may vary in strength, and thus, may yield two different 
form of socialization. Under a "power-led" socialization, the initial impetus 
provided by management is immediately applied and has a very strong coercive 
character. As a result, new knowledge is rapidly socialized, however, remains only at 
a superficial level of consciousness, mounting to a form of social performance. Under 
"politically-led" socialization, management impetus is weaker and only 
sporadically applied. As a result, new knowledge is gradually socialized on a peer-
to-peer basis, and as such, goes deep into consciousness to the point of being 
internalized as a belief. Besides, "politically-led" socialization allow room for non-
identical reproduction what overtime tend accommodate some level of change and 
alleviate tension generated along socialization or minor environmental changes. 
 
By fostering knowledge change, project managers are in position to improve the 
efficiency of project resources, and thus, more easily cope with project goals. Besides, 
project managers can use these new knowledge resources to leverage their personal 
power and influence both at unit and corporate level. In this framework, project 
managers may fell tempted to promote new knowledge socialization beyond project 
boundaries using the communication channels they have with other project 
managers within MNE. In doing so, however, they attract the opposition of line 
managers who see the expansion of their influence through knowledge resources as a 
threat to their own power position. In reaction, line managers engage into strategic 
action with the intent to cast doubt over new knowledge functionality beyond 
project boundaries, and thus, block the expansion path. Therefore, to boost new 
knowledge expansion and promote knowledge change at large it is necessary to 
continually raise the threshold of political action and take debates into increasingly 
higher corporate levels, and submit new knowledge to other similar situations across 
the company. If successful, this will grant new knowledge the basis for "standard 
practice", and its sponsors will be considered corporate "innovators". 
 
If strategic action succeeds in blocking new knowledge expansion, early 
environmental changes or project termination almost certainly will make it retreat 
into a quasi-institutional state where its density lowers but some of its structuring 
remains. At this point, although still held in some actors consciousness, it will be 
hardly actionable in practical terms. Most likely is that such quasi-institutional 
knowledge can decisively influence current objectivation processes and thus recycle 
part of its core objectivations into newer knowledge under development. "Project 
stories", therefore, become means by which this quasi-institutional knowledge resist 
time and move along different work environments providing elements of change 
beyond the setting where it has been initially conceived. In this sense, it can be 
argued that within mature MNEs, quasi-institutional knowledge provide an 
additional source of knowledge diversity detached from specific national features 
and which can cross organizational divides embodied in individuals, further 
enriching the media in which knowledge change occurs.  
 
 421 
 
 
 
Fig. 147: Moving the threshold of political action to expand new knowledge at corporate level. 
 
Data collection indicates that situational factors beyond the control of team members 
also influence the functioning and outcomes of international project teams. Initial 
knowledge density, for example has been identified as a relevant situational elements 
along data collection. Contrary to what would be expected, a low initial knowledge 
density do not automatically translate into an easier knowledge change process nor a 
high power asymmetry would make it equally difficult. Data suggests that initial 
knowledge density effects compose with power dynamics developments once project 
begins. In that sense, low initial knowledge density coupled with long-standing 
power asymmetries may unleash socialization process difficult to revert, while high 
knowledge density can be easily overcome if power asymmetries become responsive 
to early dysfunctionalities. Data indicates that to spark political action and allow 
room for knowledge change, declining current knowledge density must be met by a 
moderate or declining power asymmetry. As such, managers within international 
project teams must pay attention to changes in current knowledge density in order to 
drive power asymmetries in a favorable way for knowledge change to happen. 
 
Knowledge nature has also proved to influence the outcomes of international project 
teams in terms of knowledge change. Data indicates that the more subjective the 
issues under examination, the less grounded debates become and the harder it is to 
arrive at noticeable knowledge change. The more objective the problems under 
examination, the more likely debates can yield a substantive knowledge change. 
Knowledge nature has also shown to constrain underlying motivations behind 
actor’s actions which also affects the prospects of knowledge change. As such, the 
more straightforward actor’s interests, the easier to arrive at a common ground, and 
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thus at some level of knowledge change. The more furtive and subtle actor’s 
interests, the harder for common ground to be reached, and thus, to yield any 
knowledge change at all. Overall, the efficiency of international project teams in 
promoting knowledge change is also dependent on knowledge nature as it affects 
team members’ ability/predisposition to move into alternative directions.  
 
Beyond knowledge features and situational factors, broad contextual differences 
have also contributed to the observed outcomes. External stakeholders (e.g.: clients, 
regulatory bodies, community) provide a key source of influence to the knowledge 
change capacity of international project teams. Clients, for example, represent a key 
source of both power and legitimation, and to the extent they influence intra-
company power balances they can decisively influence the outcomes of knowledge 
change processes. Under heavy client supervision power asymmetry tends to quickly 
respond to the loss of knowledge density (as in PDY). Such pressure, however, can 
also become disruptive if not properly gauged (as in BGB), suggesting that there may 
be a limit on how much client participation, and external stakeholders in general, can 
contribute to knowledge change within international project teams.  
 
The level of international interaction, understood as the number of different cultural 
backgrounds within international project teams, has also shown to influence 
knowledge change outcomes. While a low number of backgrounds tend to drive 
international project teams into polarization, the reduced number of backgrounds also 
makes it easier to arrive at a compromise like in PDY. A high number of 
backgrounds make polarization more difficult, but also make framing harder thus 
requiring a great deal of political skill to set a level playing field for debates stripped 
out of cultural biases. Overall, a moderate level of international interaction seems the 
best approach for international project teams towards knowledge change.  
 
 
 
Fig. 148: A model for knowledge change within international project teams.  
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10.1- CONCLUSIONS 
 
Investigation findings are congruent with the empirical evidence that shows 
international project teams being increasingly used to renew and expand the 
knowledge basis of mature MNEs. Along this investigation, beyond project goals, at 
least two new capabilities have been developed within parent company (WP) as a 
result of international project teams: overlapping workshare (PDY) and global-
pricing contracting (UNA3). In that sense, the use of international project teams within 
mature MNEs not only represents a source of profit (through better project 
execution) but also a source of competitive edge by leveraging firm´s knowledge 
resources. 
 
This investigation shows that the knowledge change potential of international project 
teams derive from a series of features that are specific to these arrangements. If 
project´s unique goals simulate the demands of dynamic environments and submit 
firm´s knowledge to unprecedented situations, international project teams add to the 
challenge internal competition, which makes team members to excel themselves in 
search for corporate status and survival. Given conditions that promote "cultural 
distension" and "power rebalance", rivalries can gradually evolve into a singular 
form of collaboration between equals ("knowers"), thus allowing for a setting both 
knowledge diverse and political prone, essential conditions for conspicuous 
knowledge change.  
 
The use of international project teams, however, is far from a straightforward 
endeavor. This investigation shows that these settings must be very carefully crafted 
and managed in order to elicit knowledge advancement instead of power struggle 
and “cultural clashes”. In this regard, data suggests that the knowledge change 
potential of international project teams can only be fulfilled if similarly 
knowledgeable partners are put together. Such matching among partners is essential 
to make sure that collaboration supersedes socialization, thus fostering knowledge 
advancements. Furthermore, team members must also be carefully selected (i.e.: 
multicultural interest) and arranged (i.e.: bridging assignments, proximity) otherwise 
cultural distension will hardly be attained with consequences for power rebalance 
and mutual recognition.  
 
The investigation also cast light upon the central role that project management hold 
in international project teams. While knowledge diversity is almost a given within 
these settings, and partner matching is almost an exercise of chance, the conditions 
that lead to political action, and thus to knowledge change, are heavily dependent on 
project managers. As knowledge diversity inherently brings to the projects divergent 
interest, without management support to quickly revert power asymmetries in face 
of declining knowledge density, ability to frame, arbitrate and provide focus to 
debates, and determination to support initial socialization, it is more likely that 
international project teams will perform very poorly in terms of knowledge 
advancement (as BGB did). In that sense, the use of international project teams as a 
collaborative milieu to perform highly innovative tasks is also subject to having 
highly prepared project management in place.  
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In this framework, what truly distinguishes the knowledge change potential of 
international project teams, compared to similarly diverse forms of collaboration, such 
as international joint ventures, is that their structure of governance enable project 
managers to rein over divergent interests so that power asymmetries can be brought 
down, making possible the coexistence of political action and knowledge diversity. 
In doing so, however, project managers are constrained not only by time and 
resources, but also by their ability to perceive the need for change and communicate 
it at large. Unable to shift initial power asymmetries, either through internal or 
external agency, hardly project managers can set the stage for knowledge change to 
happen within international project teams. In that case, their outcomes will be no better 
than those of international joint ventures or local project teams. 
 
 
 
Fig. 149: Comparative chart among different forms of collaborative joint work. 
 
Additionally, several contextual factors were found to influence international project 
team’s ability to deliver knowledge change. Among them, at least two were identified 
as knowledge-related, such as initial knowledge density and knowledge nature. The 
other ones were identified as actor-related, like external stakeholders and the level of 
international interaction. Together these elements were found not only affect the 
ability of team members to rebalance internal power relations in favorable terms but 
also their ability to arrive at encompassing compromises through political action.  
 
Overall, it can be argued that international project teams are innovative prone settings 
because they bring together critical stances, knowledge diversity, internal rivalry and 
flexible power relations. Nevertheless, they represent a very complex and 
demanding work arrangement that requires great deal of management attention, 
what may not payoff for every task. Insofar, the more dynamic and challenging the 
business environment in which MNEs participates the more the use of international 
project teams is recommended as way to gain competitive edge. 
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10.2- CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIELD 
 
In the first place, data examination indicates a considerable correlation between the 
theoretical framework used to approach knowledge change and the investigated 
phenomena. Data shows clear signals of theoretically expected processes, such as 
typification, objectivation, and institutionalization. More, rich data gathered along 
this investigation enabled to detail the processes and four main forces that set 
knowledge in motion (i.e.: power, political action, strategic action and environmental 
changes) along its three basic states and how these forces countervail each other to 
produce the observable outcomes. In that sense, a key contribution of this 
investigation to the sociological field and to the business strategy field is a better 
understanding on the mechanisms that elicit knowledge change.  
 
The dynamic perspective on knowledge developed along this investigation provides 
important insights to debates involving institutional change (Clemens & Cook, 1999; 
Buchanan & Badham, 1999; Phillips et al., 2004, Morgan, 2005), organizational 
learning and dynamic capabilities (Levitt & March, 1988; Smith et al. 2005, Teece et 
al., 1997; Rindova & Kotha, 2001; Zollo & Winter, 2002; Wang & Ahmed, 2007) and 
MNE structure and competitiveness (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Zander & Sövell, 2000; 
Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Luo, 2002; Morgan & Quack, 2005; Kostova et al., 2008).  
Investigation results also confirm assumptions initiated by Ibarra (2003), Crossant et 
al. (1999), Coopey & Burgoyne (2000), Belanger et al. (2003), Tregaskis (2003) and 
Lawrence et al. (2005) as well as extend debates regarding the role of power and 
politics in organizational learning and knowledge change. 
 
Another key contribution of this investigation is to open up the "black-box" of 
international project teams and explain why these work settings are being increasingly 
used to perform complex and innovative tasks in mature MNEs. The investigation 
shows how power and politics can be fluidly reconfigured by intrinsic features of 
international project teams in ways that favor innovation and knowledge change. This 
study also highlights the key role that project managers have in supporting 
knowledge change within international project teams and how these initiatives 
affects the delicate power balance that exists between project and line managers. The 
investigation also cast light on how power and politics control new knowledge 
expansion beyond project boundaries and how the outcome of this process affects 
firm´s knowledge capabilities. 
 
In this direction, investigation results consistently supports the works of Geppert et 
al. (2003) and Morgan et al. (2003) regarding creation of new understanding through 
international interaction. They also contributes to understand how MNE can use 
their expansion into emerging markets to leverage their capabilities, thus extending 
the works of Edwards (1998) on reverse diffusion and Rugman & Verbeke (2001) on 
subsidiary capability building. The concept of quasi-institutional knowledge also 
provides a basis to explain why clustering yield innovation in the works of Pouder & 
St. Johns (1996), Frost (2001) and Arikan (2009). Results also support Harvey & 
Novicevic (2004) claims on the need of management building political skill/capital 
through international assignments. 
 427 
 
This investigation also provides insights that can help to disentangle international 
human resource management debates regarding the tension between 
homogenization and differentiation of management practices within MNEs (Ferner 
& Quintanilla, 1998; Beret et al., 2003; Edwards & Kuruvilla, 2005) as well as to revive 
the intergration-differentiation debate within the international management field 
(Malnight, 1996, 2001; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Taggart, 1998; Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). New elements of debate were also brought about adding to the expatriation 
role debates conducted by Selmer (2001a; 2001b), Harzing (2001), Takeuchi et al. 
(2005), Tarique et al. (2006), and Collings et al. (2010). 
 
In line with authors like Au (1997), Shenkar (2001), Brannen (2004), and Edwards & 
Kuruvilla (2005) this investigation also downplays the role of cultural diversity in 
determining international project team outcomes. This investigation shows that 
culture is a too broad and uncertain construct to be applied to small populations like 
firms and projects. The investigation highlights that knowledge diversity, 
understood as direct exposure to diverse institutional contexts, is far more important 
for international project teams outcomes than cultural diversity per se, which the 
world of mature MNEs hardly fits itself into the national origin label (From which 
culture belongs an Irish born engineer who has graduate in Australia, worked in Abu 
Dhabi and Kuala Lumpur for 10 years and for the last 3 years is a project manager in 
Brazil? Was he even a prototypical Irishman in the beginning?).  
 
In that sense, it is not to say that within along the cases examined there has been a 
lack of cultural problems, but that cultural misalignments have been limited to minor 
issues with little (if any) influence to project outcomes. Investigation shows that 
given conditions that allow for cultural distension (i.e.: "bridging assignments", 
intercultural interest, proximity) team members were able themselves to resolve 
cultural misunderstandings even in face of communication disruptions due to the 
lack of idiomatic domain or the precarious results of some telecommunication 
technologies used (video and phone conferences). The investigation shows, however, 
that much harder to crack within international project teams are the institutionally 
rooted differences embodied in knowledge diversity. For these, only a lengthy and 
sometimes extenuating process of power rebalancing can allow for mutual 
understanding and coordinate change. 
 
The investigation also add to the debates on the knowledge-based view of the firm 
(Grant, 1996a; Spender, 1996; Eisenhardt & Santos, 2001; Nickerson & Zanger, 2004; 
Martín de Castro et al. 2011) as well as those involving organizational structure in 
dynamic environments, particularly those that point to a link between politics and 
more responsive forms of organization like Lucas (1987), Child (1997), Pichault 
(1998), Child & McGrath, (2001), Clegg & Courpasson (2004). In this direction, the 
present investigation suggests a shift from the traditional focus on ‘power struggle’, 
that so far has tinged the study of politics in the field of business strategy and 
international management, in favor of a process view focused on mechanisms of 
change and compromise. This conceptual shift may yield a novel approach capable 
of enhancing our understanding on the dynamism and complex equilibrium 
involving both multinational activity and business in dynamic environments.  
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10.3- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRATICTIONERS 
 
This investigation suggests that for companies in general, and MNEs in particular, to 
thrive in dynamic environments they have to signal managers to build up their 
power resources not only based on their ability to mingle with top management or to 
deliver financial results but also on their ability to boost firm´s competitive potential 
through knowledge advancements. The investigation provide evidence that 
management spend great part of their time looking up towards the division of 
"prime-work" or harnessing their career prospects rather than looking down to daily 
operations which are frequently left on their own. In that sense, within firms 
personal/group interests frequently supersedes financial ones, not to mention 
knowledge-based competitive ones. As such, whenever firms allow for information 
asymmetry, subjective performance assessment, and non-independent auditing, they 
will be favoring politicking and strategic action instead of collaboration and political 
action with due consequences for its long-term competitiveness. 
 
This investigation also brings a tough warning regarding the potentially damaging 
effect of hesitant or absent project management. Assuming knowledge to be in a 
constant state of change if an action fails to increase new knowledge density, it will 
almost invariably decrease it. In this sense, each innovation failure create conditions 
that reinforce traditional knowledge and also turns futures changes less acceptable. 
Therefore, will is fundamental for knowledge change within international project 
teams. Project managers must pay attention to the right time for promoting new 
knowledge beyond project boundaries, just like change agents have while engaging 
into political action within projects. As such, project managers shall not disperse 
their efforts into other activities while the change window is open. 
 
Another recommendation for MNE practitioners is that cultural differences must be 
viewed through a wider prism than that of monolithic and irreconcilable features of 
groups and of the people that belong to them. The present investigation highlights 
that culture is a too diverse construct to be portrayed (and used) in definite terms, 
and people can perfectly agree or disagree on many of its features. Besides, 
nowadays with all the information, communication and displacement means 
available, culture shall be seen as an extremely broad guide for action and thought 
rather than a encompassing "programming of the mind", like in Hofstede´s terms. 
Provided that interests are aligned, interculturality is harnessed and proximity is 
established, mutual recognition and collaboration almost certainly will develop 
despite the differences in national or business cultures that might exist.  
 
Business practitioners in general must also understand that knowledge diversity can 
be built through several different manners away from international ones, and in that 
sense local companies can greatly benefit from their inner or locational knowledge 
diversity. Provided that they can emulate similar conditions to that of international 
project teams (i.e.: knowledge diversity, political action, pro-change leadership) 
almost certainly they spark great knowledge change potential and thrive in dynamic 
markets. Evidence of small tech companies mimicking such behavior even in the 
absence of international exposure abounds in the academic and specialized literature. 
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The challenge, however, is to balance all these elements on a sustainable basis. As 
long as power builds up power, in the long term past successes may become a hurdle 
for future knowledge change.  
 
10.4- STUDY LIMITATIONS 
 
A first important limitation of this study concerns the relatively restricted point-of-
view from which the researcher obtained his data. Along projects, for example, 
multiple key events unfold simultaneously what poses a challenge of 
“omnipresence” to researcher. Unable to pay attention to all important events at 
once, researchers have to decide which ones are more relevant and must be followed, 
from those that are less relevant, and thus, should be ignored. Research selection, 
however, tends to introduce a bias in data collection towards expected data instead 
of emerging data. This is a known (and inevitable) limitation in qualitative studies 
and in order to minimize its effects several measures have been taken which were 
described in full detailed along the methodology chapter.  
 
Along the investigation, the researcher tried as much as possible to avoid a priori 
categorizations, what has been partially achieved through massive data collection 
and by postponing data compilation to the end of data collection. Even though, it is 
almost inevitable that as investigation advances points of interest progressively 
emerge and somehow end up directing data collection. In reaction to this, collected 
data has been plentifully exposed along data presentation in order to allow readers 
to go beyond researcher focus and explore neighboring subjects as well. Moreover, to 
complement for data transparency, section 5.3.1. (Researcher Standpoint) contains 
researcher biographic information in order to enable readers to evaluate potential 
biases he might have unconsciously introduced within investigation. 
 
Another complicating factor for data collection is that several important situations in 
power and politics studies are “non-events” represented by silences, exit or non-
collaborative behavior. “Non-events” are particularly challenging to capture as they 
require an enormous awareness of the investigation setting and sharp look on part of 
the researcher to perceive unexpected ruptures in the investigation tissue. As such, 
although some important “non-events” have been captured, many other have not 
what can potentially weaken some assumptions made along this investigation. Even 
though the insider status of the researcher helped to sharpen his attention, data 
collection received additional care in order to include a great deal of contextual 
information that later could be used to spot such furtive situations.  
 
A further "perspective-bounded" limitation concerns the relative position the 
researcher occupied within projects. As a common participant in the projects, 
researcher’s (lower) hierarchical position prevented him from attending several key 
events at higher hierarchical level which might have had impact on the conclusions. 
Moreover, several behaviors and opinions that could be deemed improper or image 
damaging happened at close doors or within hermetic circles, most of time away 
from researcher access. In this regard, the same procedure used to report 
simultaneously important events was adopted, that is, to recollect second-hand data 
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from key informants and triangulate them to enhance report precision. Noteworthy, 
however, is that what the researcher was allowed (or not) to see is also highly 
instructive on the dynamics involving the object of investigation. 
 
Even when perspective and access were not a problem, it is still impossible to depict 
in full detail the observed phenomena. Bounded rationality and limited research time 
prevented the researcher from making a completely accurate report of events, and 
once again choice introduces the threat of investigator bias.  In this regard, what has 
been considered important in this investigation was to be exact in the description of 
selected events and to convey the readers a rich account capable of bringing them as 
close as possible from the lived experience.  
 
"Context-bounded" limitations may also to this investigation. A first one, concerns 
the single locational character of the investigation, where all data has been collected 
at the CNC/WP São Paulo office, in Brazil. This can be explained by a clear lack of 
mobility involving Brazilians team members compared to other nationalities (see 
table 3 next). As far as the data collection was able to capture, apart from top 
management business trips, only one CNC/WP professional (B.D., Risk Analyst) was 
sent abroad to engage into a mid-term assignment. Conversely, several meetings, 
seminars and presentations were attended by professionals from other WP offices, 
which came to CNC/WP office on a regular basis.  
 
Case Inflows (to CNC/WP) Outflows (from CNC/WP) 
PDY 12 3 
UNA3 6 1 
BGB 6 0 
Total 23 4 
 
Table 4: Inflows and outflows of expatriates along data collection. 
 
As the willingness of Brazilian professionals to engage into short to mid-term 
assignments abroad is evident across the investigation, this phenomenon can be 
credited to a assumption on the part of WP that Brazil was a market to be "colonized" 
rather than "integrated" Alternatively, as long as mobility opportunities had to be 
financially supported by the office of origin, one could also say that while from the 
outset they were viewed as a necessity, within CNC/WP mobility was seen as a 
symbol of status and thus prerogative of top management personnel only. Either 
way, data collection became impregnated by contextual information obtained in the 
São Paulo office at expense of information that could be obtained at other locations. 
 
Even though, sampling is not considered a major limitation within this investigation 
given that the purpose was to look at the investigated phenomenon at the largest 
number of perspectives as possible. Out of the several projects that took place along 
data collection, investigation concentrated its focus in those considered more 
relevant to understand the object of investigation. Cases spread along key MNE 
concerns (i.e.: technological, commercial, management), western cultural profiles 
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(i.e.: Brazil, U.S., UK, Bulgaria) and different outcomes (i.e.: success, draw, failure), 
substantially enhancing the internal validity of the present investigation. 
 
 
Fig. 150: Investigation time-line 
 
The fact of the researcher being Brazilian-born also introduces a measure of cultural 
bias within this investigation. Actions, behaviors and speeches of foreign team 
members may have been misinterpreted or interpreted in less accurate terms 
compared that to those of Brazilian team members. Additionally, as the main 
location for data collection was Brazil, researcher might have been subject to embrace 
a "Brazilian perspective" of events, rather a more neutral one. Following Easterby-
Smith & Malina (1999), the way to minimize all these limitations was to be the more 
transparent as possible regarding data presentation and exhaustively exercise cross-
checking of evidence and constantly assume a reflexive position to inspect if a 
determined line of argumentation has not been contaminated by cultural or author 
biases. 
 
Time can also be considered a limiting factor for this kind of investigation. Counting 
the necessary time for case selection/field entry (2 years), for collecting data along 
three cases (18 months), for processing collected data (6 months), and for analyzing 
and writing the final report (12 months) it took approximately 5 years to conduct this 
investigation. The cumbersome amount of time required to work with rich data 
imposes a harsh limit upon individual researchers on how deep and how far they 
can go with such investigations. Though it could be argued that a larger set of 
diverse cases, under longer observation, and deeper analysis would expand the 
awareness of the studied phenomena hardly it would be attainable for a single 
researcher within the schedule of a doctoral program. In that sense, case diversity, 
length of collection and depth of analysis are limitations inherent to the 
methodological choice when applied to doctoral dissertations. 
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10.5- SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Future research could expand the external validity of the present investigation by 
involving a larger set of investigators distributed along more diverse cases. Cases 
should vary in location, types of business covered, as well as in and in the array of 
national composition. For the latter, the inclusion of more eastern team members and 
eastern project locations would certainly be welcome and make justice to the 
growing importance of Asian economies in the world economic scenario. The 
inclusion of a larger number of researchers would also allow medium to large-scale 
knowledge change process (like UNA3) be more properly registered as long as they 
can unfold along several years.  
 
It is important to note, however, that this investigation stresses a clear landmark 
between national diversity and knowledge diversity. By no means gathering a large 
number of different nationalities translates into knowledge diversity. Given a certain 
societal background (e.g.: high to upper-middle class), formation pattern (e.g.: U.S. 
inspired business school) and career path (e.g.: large companies) even the most 
dissimilar cultural backgrounds can converge in their hands-on business methods. 
As such, knowledge diversity must be understood as a more encompassing construct 
that goes beyond personal roots and moves into different approaches. In this regard, 
another venue of investigation would be the ability of single-national companies to 
mimic the knowledge diversity found in international project teams and if such form 
of diversity is capable to generate knowledge change just like the international one. 
 
The field would also benefit from studies aimed at measuring constructs like 
environmental changes, knowledge diversity, knowledge density, power 
asymmetries, political and strategic action, and related them with observable 
knowledge outcomes. Such quantitative analysis not only would help to expand the 
external validity of the theoretical body the project work setting but would also help 
to refine it by establishing an order of precedence or relevance regarding which 
measures would cause higher impact in terms of knowledge change when applied 
for both firms and projects. In that sense, qualitative studies are key to expand the 
influence of the theoretical proposition presented through this investigation into 
broader organizational debates.  
 
Data collection indicates that to take advantage of firm´s inherent knowledge 
diversity without being caught in internal competition, mature MNEs may be 
increasingly resorting in the use permanent bodies of internal consultancy. These 
corporate structures are usually composed of international members recruited along 
several units based on their ability to disentangle complex business situations. 
Detached from any national identity and unit interests such internal consultants 
travel around the world giving advice, collecting quasi-institutional knowledge and 
establishing relationships. An example of this is the "Delivery group" recently 
created within WP to support projects worldwide. In this framework, it could argued 
that such internal consultancy not only would represent a way by which knowledge 
diversity would break up with divergent interests easing knowledge change 
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processes along international project teams but maybe more important a way turn 
local project teams into international ones as well. Nevertheless, internal consultancy 
may be used as well to champion corporate sanctioned knowledge upon units, thus 
reinforcing power asymmetries and reducing knowledge diversity. In that sense, the 
creation of these groups and their relationship with local project teams would 
certainly be an interesting focus for future investigations. 
 
Another interesting focus for future research would be to compare how cultural 
differences and power asymmetries affects the prospects of conflict and collaboration 
in international settings. The present investigation suggests that "cultural clashes" 
though are fed by bad communication and lack of contextual background are indeed 
sparked by power asymmetries. The ability to impose rather than negotiate a 
common way is key to turn minor misunderstandings inherent to international 
exposure into paralyzing deadlocks. Along the three cases it could be observed how 
initial "cultural clashes" evolved overtime (even in the absence of a common idiom)  
into mutual understanding and collaboration under power distension, proximity, 
and cultural interest. Insofar, the field would certainly benefit from a closer look at 
the relationship between power and intercultural behavior. 
 
Finally, by considering political action as the process by which common 
understandings and logics of action can emerge out of the multiplicity of actors and 
the diversity of interests, a closer examination of the elements involving power, 
legitimation, and interpretation is likely to unveil key mechanisms governing the 
‘life’ of MNEs. Moreover, taking into account that a political stance is responsible for 
MNE critical balances allow room for the idea that MNEs are in a permanent process 
of redefinition and search for equilibrium, a sort of dynamic order, much more akin 
to what is empirically seen than those quasi-static frames portrayed by traditional 
approaches. In that sense, the upcoming of a political approach would certainly 
represent an advance towards a more encompassing MNE theory. 
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